Opinion
No. 06-02-00084-CR.
Submitted January 6, 2003. Decided January 30, 2003. DO NOT PUBLISH.
Appeal from the 188th Judicial District Court, Gregg County, Texas, Trial Court No. 28,354-A.
Before MORRISS, C.J., ROSS and CARTER, JJ.
OPINION
Rodney Jerome Alexander appeals the revocation of his community supervision. Alexander was convicted by a jury of aggravated robbery. The jury assessed his punishment at ten years' imprisonment and a $10,000.00 fine, but recommended that the imposition of his sentence be suspended and that he be placed on ten years' community supervision. The trial court sentenced him accordingly. Later, the State moved to have Alexander's community supervision revoked, alleging he committed six violations of its terms. Alexander pled true to each of the State's allegations. The trial court found the allegations true, revoked Alexander's community supervision, and sentenced him to ten years' imprisonment. Alexander contends the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his community supervision instead of adding a condition that he undergo substance abuse treatment. He also contends the trial court erred in revoking his community supervision based on his failure to pay community supervision fees, court costs, court-appointed attorney's fees, and restitution in December 2001 and January 2002. Finally, he contends the trial court should not have revoked his community supervision based on his failure to complete required community service hours because there was a fatal variance between the terms of his community supervision and the State's motion to revoke. The decision whether to continue or revoke community supervision is within the trial court's discretion. Wester v. State, 542 S.W.2d 403, 405 (Tex.Crim.App. 1976); Allen v. State, 946 S.W.2d 115, 116 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1997, no pet.). We review the trial court's ruling for abuse of discretion. See Jackson v. State, 645 S.W.2d 303, 305 (Tex.Crim.App. 1983); Lopez v. State, 46 S.W.3d 476, 482 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2001, pet. ref'd). The trial court cannot revoke community supervision without a showing the defendant violated a condition of his or her supervision. DeGay v. State, 741 S.W.2d 445, 449 (Tex.Crim. App. 1987); Allen, 946 S.W.2d at 116. When there is sufficient evidence to support a finding the defendant violated a condition of his or her supervision, the trial court does not abuse its discretion by revoking community supervision. See Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 493-94 (Tex.Crim.App. 1984); Stevens v. State, 900 S.W.2d 348, 351 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1995, pet. ref'd). The defendant's plea of true, standing alone, is sufficient to support a revocation order. Cole v. State, 578 S.W.2d 127, 128 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1979); Jiminez v. State, 552 S.W.2d 469, 472 (Tex.Crim.App. 1977); Guajardo v. State, 24 S.W.3d 423, 427 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2000, pet. granted). Proof of a single violation is sufficient to support revocation of community supervision. O'Neal v. State, 623 S.W.2d 660, 661 (Tex.Crim.App. 1981); Myers v. State, 780 S.W.2d 441, 445 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1989, pet. ref'd). Alexander first contends the trial court should have continued him on community supervision with the added term that he undergo substance abuse treatment. After a hearing on a violation of community supervision, the trial court may continue or modify community supervision and impose a condition that the defendant be placed in a substance abuse felony punishment program. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, § 22(a)(4) (Vernon Supp. 2003). The defendant must not have been convicted of certain felonies (not relevant here), and the trial court must make an affirmative finding that (1) drug or alcohol abuse contributed significantly to the commission of the offense or the violation of community supervision, and (2) the defendant is a suitable candidate for treatment. Id. The record shows that, as part of his community supervision, Alexander served 180 days in the Gregg County jail. Under the terms of his community supervision, he was required to attend and complete a drug education class within 180 days of his release from the Gregg County jail. He was also required to attend and complete a substance abuse evaluation and fully comply with all recommendations of that evaluation. Alexander pled true to the State's allegation that he smoked marihuana, stipulated to the State's evidence, and testified that he smoked marihuana "a couple days" after being released from the Gregg County jail. This violation is, in and of itself, sufficient to support the trial court's decision to revoke community supervision. See Cardona, 665 S.W.2d at 493-94; Stevens, 900 S.W.2d at 351. Further, the State is correct that, by the terms of his community supervision, Alexander had available to him avenues by which any substance abuse problem he has could be evaluated and treated. Rather than availing himself of these opportunities, however, Alexander testified he used marihuana within "a couple days" of his release from the Gregg County jail. Under these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking his community supervision. Alexander also contends the trial court should not have revoked his community supervision based on his failure to pay supervision fees, court costs, court-appointed attorney's fees, and restitution in the two months after he was released from the Gregg County jail. He contends his testimony shows his failure to pay was not intentional, but the result of his inability to pay and his inability to find a job despite his efforts to do so. But the State did not put on any evidence regarding Alexander's intent other than his stipulation. It is, therefore, inaccurate to characterize the record as demonstrating the State's failure to prove its allegation. In addition, Alexander pled true to the State's allegation. As mentioned previously, a plea of true is sufficient to support a revocation order. Cole, 578 S.W.2d at 128; Guajardo, 24 S.W.3d at 427. Moreover, Alexander pled true to two other violations of the terms of his community supervision. As mentioned previously, proof of a single violation is sufficient to support a revocation order. O'Neal, 623 S.W.2d at 661; Myers, 780 S.W.2d at 445. Because of our disposition of these contentions, we find it unnecessary to address Alexander's final contention that the trial court should not have revoked his community supervision based on his failure to complete required community service hours. We affirm the judgment.