Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO: 00-1007.
April 27, 2001
ORDER
On April 19, 2001, the plaintiff, Rolando Alexander filed a Motion for Protective Order (doc. #27) seeking to prevent the defendants from cuffing his dreadlocks pursuant to his contention that they are the result of his right to exercise his religion. The defendants have not filed an opposition to the pending motion.
It is well established that an inmate retains his First Amendment Right to practice his religion. Powell v. Estelle, 959 F.2d 22 (5th Cir. 1992); Harrison v. McKaskle, 506, U.S. 1025, 113 S.Ct. 668, 121 L.Ed.2d 592 (1992). Nonetheless, prison grooming regulations, including the requirement that a prisoner cut his hair and beard, are permissible if they are rationally related to the achievement of valid penological goals, such as security and inmate identification. See Powell, 959 F.2d at 25 (holding that the prison's prohibition on long hair and beards is rationally related to legitimate state objectives). See also Hicks v. Gardner, 69 F.3d 22 (5th Cir. 1995).
Further, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) establishes the standard for evaluating a request for a protective order. Under Rule 26(c), a court, "upon good cause shown . . . may make any order which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense . . . ." See F. R.Civ. P. 26(c) (2000).
The good cause requirement of Rule 26(c) demonstrates that the burden is upon the movant to show the necessity for the issuance of a protective order. The Rule "contemplates a particular and specific demonstration of fact as distinguished from stereotyped and conclusory statements." Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c)(5) (emphasis added). United States v. Garrett, 571 F.2d 1323, 1326 n. 3 (5th Cir. 1978); see also 8 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure
The Court notes that Rolando Alexander has not presented any evidence by way of affidavit or otherwise establishing that the prison grooming policy is not related to the states legitimate objective of security. In the absence of such proof, the court finds that Alexander has failed to present good cause for the issuance of a protective order.
Therefore, the Motion for Protective Order (doc #27) is DENIED.