Opinion
3:CV-00-1405
February 27, 2003
ORDER
BACKGROUND:
Plaintiff John Alexander is suing defendant Provident Life and Accident Insurance Company (Provident) for benefits under a disability insurance policy. Provident has filed a motion in limine in which it seeks to avoid liability for any damages that have accrued after Alexander filed his complaint. Alexander opposes the motion but has filed in the alternative a motion to amend the complaint to add a claim for damages accruing from the time that he filed the complaint up to the time of trial.
Provident bases its argument on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court case ofSummers v. Prudential Ins. Co., 179 A. 78 (1935). In that case, which involved a similar insurance dispute, the court cited the rule that "in an action at law plaintiff can recover only such amounts as are due at the commencement of the action." Id. at 79. Accordingly, it held that it was error to "permit recovery of installments accruing in the interim between [the date of the commencement of the action] and the date of trial." Id. It ruled that with respect to the benefits that accrued after the commencement of the current action, the plaintiff was permitted to "maintain another suit." Id.
Various federal courts have questioned the continuing viability ofSummers. They have recognized that a strict interpretation of Summers may lead to the tedious process of a plaintiff having to refile various lawsuits in order to coordinate his damage claims with the time that the trial begins. Rather than putting the parties and the court through this inconvenience, they simply allowed the plaintiff to amend the complaint to include an updated damages claim. See, e.g., O'Shea v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of New York, 226 F. Supp.2d 660, 662-63 (E.D. Pa. 2002); see also F.P. Woll Co. v. Valiant Ins. Co., 226 F. Supp.2d 688, 693 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
While these courts have called Summers into doubt, no Pennsylvania appellate court has reversed or abrogated Summers accordingly, the case remains binding. In any event, we do not believe that the solution offered by O'Shea and F.P. Woll is appropriate here. As Provident points out, Alexander has never filed with Provident a post-complaint claim for benefits, and discovery in this case has focused on the time up to the filing of the complaint. Simply permitting Alexander to amend his complaint would unduly prejudice Provident, which has not had the opportunity to dispute any post-complaint damages claims. For this reason, and because Summers remains good law, we will grant Provident's motion and hold that the potential damages in this case will be limited to those occurring during the time period up until the filing of the complaint.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED THAT:
1. Defendant's motion (Rec. Doc. No. 59) seeking an order limiting the time period for which plaintiff's claim may be submitted to the jury is granted.
2. Plaintiff's potential damages are limited to those occurring prior to the filing of the complaint.
3. Plaintiff's motion (Rec. Doc. No. 61) to file amendment to pleadings is denied.