Opinion
1:19-cv-10004 (JPO) (SDA)
11-02-2023
Jeriel Alexander, Plaintiff, v. Private Protective Services, Inc., Defendant.
THE HONORABLE J. PAUL OETKEN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:
REPORT & RECOMMENDATION AND OPINION & ORDER
STEWART D. AARON, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Pending before the Court are: (1) a motion by Defendant Private Protective Services, Inc. (“Defendant” or “PPS”) for summary judgment dismissing the sole remaining claim in this case that was brought under the New York City Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”) (Def.'s 5/8/23 Not. of Mot., ECF No. 133); and (2) applications by pro se Plaintiff Jeriel Alexander (“Plaintiff” or “Alexander”) for Magistrate Judge Aaron to recuse himself from this case. (See Pl.'s 7/17/23 Objection, ECF No. 156, ¶ 12; see also Pl.'s 7/31/23 Objection, ECF No. 157, ¶ 21.)
For the reasons set forth below, it is respectfully recommended that Defendant's motion for summary judgment be GRANTED. In addition, it is hereby ORDERED that Plaintiff's applications for recusal are DENIED.
BACKGROUND
The relevant facts are derived from Defendant's Rule 56.1 Statement, which was filed at ECF No. 135, and Plaintiff's response, which he mislabeled as a “Rule 56(A)(2) Statement.” (See Pl.'s 56.1 Response, ECF No. 143, at PDF pp. 14-16.). In accordance with Local Civil Rule 56.1, the Court deems admitted Defendant's statements that Plaintiff does not specifically controvert and/or which Plaintiff controverts without citation to admissible evidence. See S. & E.D.N.Y. L. Civ. R. 56.1(c)-(d); see also Hahn v. Bank of Am. Inc., No. 12-CV-04151 (DF), 2014 WL 1285421, at *1 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2014), aff'd, 607 Fed.Appx. 55 (2d Cir. 2015).
PPS is a Black-owned and operated company that provides private security services for companies and events. (Def.'s Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 3-4.) Alexander, who is a black man, is a former employee of PPS who worked as a security guard for PPS from approximately January 2017 until approximately November 2018. (Id. ¶ 5; Pl.'s 56.1 Response at PDF p. 14; Am. Compl., ECF No. 611, at 5.) Prior to beginning to work for PPS, Alexander signed the PPS Hire Packet and Employee Handbook, which included under “Terms and Conditions” a provision that Alexander would “not seek employment or work for any PPS Inc. customers” for “5 years immediately following the termination of [his] employment with PPS Inc.” (Def.'s Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 7-8; Pl.'s 56.1 Response at PDF p. 14; PPS Hire Packet, ECF No. 137-2, at PDF p. 6.)
In or about July 2019, PPS entered into a contract with Big Fish Entertainment, LLC (“Big Fish”) to provide security services for Big Fish in connection with its Love & Hip Hop television programs. (Def.'s Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 9; Vendor Agmt., ECF No. 137-1, at PDF pp. 2-4) Love & Hip Hop is a show on VH1 that caters primarily to a Black, Indigenous, People of Color (“BIPOC”) audience. (Def.'s Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 10; Pl.'s 56.1 Response at PDF p. 15.)
On October 3, 2019, a film-shoot for the show took place at Pier 132 in the Bronx (the “Film-Shoot”). (Def.'s Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 9, 11.) PPS was paid for its services at the Film-Shoot by Big Fish. (Id. ¶ 14.) The majority of the attendees at the Film-Shoot were Black and other People of Color. (Id. ¶ 18.)
Alexander arrived at Pier 132, seeking admission to the Film-Shoot in order to act as an “extra” in the production. (Def.'s Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 19; Pl.'s 56.1 Response at PDF pp. 15-16.) John Tejada (“Tejada”) - the PPS security guard stationed at the entrance - radioed Christian Nguyen (“Nguyen”) - the PPS supervisor on duty - to address Alexander, and Nguyen denied Alexander entry to the Film-Shoot. (Def.'s Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 17, 21-23Pl.'s 56.1 Response at PDF p. 16.)
The next day, i.e., October 4, 2019, Alexander exchanged text messages with Tejada and did not mention any racist comments allegedly made by Nguyen. (See Alexander-Tejada Text Messages, ECF No. 136-5, at PPS00000119-20.) In the October 4, 2019 text exchange, Alexander mentioned prior incidents in which he felt Nguyen had “block[ed]” him from acting jobs at PPS-staffed events, was “playing” him in connection with an opportunity to appear as an extra in another production a year before the VH1 event and “disrespect[ed]” him, accused Nguyen of being a “liar,” indicated that Nguyen had started a “war” with him and expressed his intention to bring this lawsuit to show Nguyen “the power [he] really possess[ed].” (Id. at PPS00000119-21, 124-26.)
II. Relevant Procedural History
On October 25, 2019, Plaintiff commenced this action against PPS by filing a Complaint. (Compl., ECF No. 2.) On November 27, 2019, he filed an Amended Complaint. (Am. Compl., ECF No. 6.) The Amended Complaint asserted a single claim against PPS, pursuant to Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title II”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000a, based upon Plaintiff's allegation that PPS discriminated against him by denying him access to a “shoot” at Pier 132 in the Bronx. (See Am. Compl. at 2, 5-6.)
On May 3, 2021, after PPS's failure to respond to the Amended Complaint, the Clerk of Court entered a certificate of default against PPS. (Cert. of Default, ECF No. 33.) On July 29, 2021, PPS filed a motion to set aside the default. (See Def.'s 7/29/21 Mot., ECF No. 44.) In an Opinion and Order, dated August 30, 2021, the Court granted PPS's motion to set aside the default. See Alexander v. Priv. Protective Servs., Inc., No. 19-CV-10004 (JPO) (SDA), 2021 WL 3862057, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2021).
On September 13, 2021, PPS filed a motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint and for attorneys' fees because Plaintiff refused to withdraw his frivolous claim for damages under Title II. (See Def.'s 9/13/21 Mot., ECF No. 55; Def.'s 9/13/21 Mem., ECF No. 56.) On October 13, 2021, Plaintiff filed a motion to amend. (See Pl.'s 10/13/21 Mot., ECF No. 61.) In his proposed Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that he was excluded from the Film-Shoot based on his race in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the New York State Human Rights Law, the NYCHRL and the New York Civil Rights Law. (See Proposed SAC, ECF No. 61-1.)
In its memorandum of law, PPS cited numerous cases, including one that had been filed by Plaintiff himself, i.e., Alexander v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 19-CV-10811 (OTW), 2021 WL 1061833, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2021), holding that monetary damages are not available under Title II. (See Def.'s 9/13/21 Mem. at 3.)
On November 24, 2021, the undersigned issued a Report and Recommendation (“11/24/21 R&R”) recommending that Defendant's motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint and for attorneys' fees be granted and that Plaintiff's motion to amend be granted in part and denied in part, so as to permit amendment only to assert a NYCHRL claim. See Alexander v. Priv. Protective Servs., Inc., No. 19-CV-10004 (JPO) (SDA), 2021 WL 8445829, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2021). On May 18, 2022, 11/24/21 R&R was adopted by Judge Oetken. See Alexander, 2022 WL 1567447 (S.D.N.Y. May 18, 2022). With respect to the NYCHRL claim, Judge Oetken stated that Plaintiff “ha[d] sufficiently alleged that PPS was an agent of a place of public accommodation” and therefore that Plaintiff's NYCHRL claim “survives at this early stage of litigation.” Id. at *3.
This Court later recommended that PPS be awarded the sum of $16,760.00 for attorneys' fees in connection with its motion to dismiss, which recommendation was adopted by Judge Oetken. See Alexander v. Priv. Protective Servs., Inc., 2022 WL 16555970, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 24, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 16555312 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2022).
Thereafter, by Order dated May 18, 2022, the Court deemed Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint filed at ECF No. 61-1 to be the operative pleading in this action, insofar as it asserted a claim under the NYCHRL. (5/18/22 Order, ECF No. 71, ¶ 2.) On June 1, 2022, PPS filed its Answer. (PPS Answer, ECF No. 74.)
Following discovery, on May 8, 2023, PPS filed the motion for summary judgment that now is before the Court. (See Def.'s 5/8/23 Not. of Mot.; Def.'s 5/8/23 Mem., ECF No. 134.) On June 7, 2023, Plaintiff filed his opposition to the motion for summary judgment. (Pl.'s 6/7/23 Memo of Law, ECF No. 143.)
During the course of discovery, Plaintiff repeatedly failed to comply with his discovery obligations. See Alexander v. Priv. Protective Servs., Inc., 2023 WL 1779544, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2023).
On July 17 and July 31, 2023, Plaintiff filed his applications requesting that Judge Aaron recuse himself. (See Pl.'s 7/17/23 Objection; Pl.'s 7/31/23 Objection.)
SUMMARY JUDGMENT REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. Legal Standards
Summary judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-50 (1986). The moving party has the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a disputed issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 321-23 (1986). “A fact is ‘material' for these purposes when it ‘might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.'” Jeffreys v. City of New York, 426 F.3d 549, 553 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). A dispute concerning material fact is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).
“Although the same standards apply when a pro se litigant is involved, the pro se litigant should be given special latitude in responding to a summary judgment motion.” Caines v. Oudkerk, No. 17-CV-03060 (PGG), 2018 WL 3059653, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 20, 2018) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Tarrant v. City of Mount Vernon et al., No. 20-CV-09004 (PMH), 2022 WL 17070062, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2022) (noting “special solicitude” afforded pro se litigants and that it is through that “lens of leniency” that courts must consider motions for summary judgment against pro se plaintiffs).
Although Alexander is acting pro se in this case, he is very experienced in federal court litigation, having filed and litigated multiple lawsuits. See, e.g., Alexander v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 19-CV-10811 (OTW), 2023 WL 5016603, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2023) (dismissing Alexander's federal claims in amended complaint with prejudice); Alexander v. Town of E. Haven, No. 3:20-CV-01406 (VLB), 2023 WL 22493, at *7 (D. Conn. Jan. 3, 2023) (granting summary judgment motion against Alexander); Alexander v. U.S. Postal Serv., No. 3:19-CV-1295 (VLB), 2020 WL 13591354, at *5 (D. Conn. Nov. 18, 2020) (granting motion to dismiss Alexander's complaint); see also Alexander v. The Stop and Shop Supermarket Company LLC, No. 7:22-cv-09557 (AEK) (S.D.N.Y.) (case pending). Thus, even though the Court in making its recommendation herein is providing a degree of solicitude to Alexander because of his pro se status, such solicitude is relaxed given his extensive litigation experience. See Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 103 (2d Cir. 2010) (“a pro se litigant's experience with and knowledge of both the legal system in general and the particular procedural context at issue are certainly factors that a court should consider when determining the degree of solicitude to afford that litigant”).
II. Analysis
The sole remaining claim in this case is for racial discrimination under the NYCHRL. The NYCHRL makes it unlawful to deny anyone, because of their race, “the full and equal enjoyment . . . of any of the accommodations, advantages, services, facilities or privileges of the place or provider of public accommodation.” N.Y. Admin. Code § 8-107(4)(a)(1)(a). The term “place or provider of public accommodation” is defined to include “providers, whether licensed or unlicensed, of goods, services, facilities, accommodations, advantages or privileges of any kind, and places, whether licensed or unlicensed, where goods, services, facilities, accommodations, advantages or privileges of any kind are extended, offered, sold or otherwise made available.” Id. § 8-102(9).
In the present case, it is undisputed that Defendant's employee, Nguyen, denied Plaintiff access to Pier 132. (Def.'s Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 19, 23; Pl.'s 56.1 Response at PDF pp. 15-16.) Thus, if Defendant and the Film-Shoot were covered by the NYCHRL, Defendant could be liable for the allegedly discriminatory conduct of its employee, Nguyen, in denying Alexander entry into the Film-Shoot. However, to be liable under the NYCHRL, Defendant must have been “the owner, franchisor, franchisee, lessor, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation.” Id. § 8-107(4)(a)(1)(a).
PPS is not alleged to have been the owner, franchisor, franchisee, lessor, lessee, proprietor, manager or superintendent of a place or provider of public accommodation. Rather, Plaintiff alleges that PPS was an agent of Pier 132, which was a place of public accommodation. (See Pl.'s 56.1 Response at PDF p. 15.) Defendant, on the other hand, contends that there is no evidence showing that PPS was an agent of Pier 132. (See Def.'s 5/8/23 Mem. at 19-20.) Based upon the record before the Court, even assuming that Pier 132 was a place of public accommodation at the time of the Film-Shoot, the Court agrees with Defendant.
In its memorandum of law, PPS notes that the Film-Shoot was a private event, even though it was held at a public place, i.e., Pier 132. (Def.'s 5/8/23 Mem. at 23.) Thus, in the context of this case, Pier 132 arguably should not be considered a place of public accommodation since it essentially was acting as a set for a television show. Other members of the public, like Alexander, also presumably would have been denied access, which was the point of PPS providing security for the event.
“[B]ecause the NYCHRL does not define ‘agent,' common law principles apply.” Robinson v. De Niro, No. 19-CV-09156 (LJL), 2023 WL 4862772, at *54 n.35 (S.D.N.Y. May 25, 2023) (quoting White v. Pacifica Found, 973 F.Supp.2d 363, 377 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)). “[U]nder the common law, ‘the party asserting that a relationship of agency exists generally has the burden in litigation of establishing its existence.'” Nippon Yusen Kaisha v. FIL Lines USA Inc., 977 F.Supp.2d 343, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting Restatement (Third) of Agency § 1.02 cmt. d)). “Under New York law, ‘an agency relationship exists . . . when there is agreement between the principal and the agent that the agent will act for the principal and the principal retains a degree of control over the agent. The element of control often is deemed the essential characteristic of the principal-agent relationship.” Robinson, WL 4862772, at *54 n.35 (quoting White, 973 F.Supp.2d at 377). Additionally, an agent must have the authority to bind the principal. Id.
“New York courts have held that ‘when . . . the facts are not disputed, the question of agency should be resolved by the court.'” Paul T. Freund Corp. v. Commonwealth Packing Co., 288 F.Supp.2d 357, 372-73 (W.D.N.Y. 2003) (quoting Plymouth Rock Fuel Corp. v. Leucadia, Inc., 100 A.D.2d 842, 842 (2d Dep't 1984)); see also Cabrera v. Jakabovitz, 24 F.3d 372, 386 n.14 (2d Cir. 1994) (“[A]gency is a question of law for the court where the material facts from which it is to be inferred are not in dispute, the question of agency is not open to doubt, and only one reasonable conclusion can be drawn from the facts in the case.” (quoting 3 C.J.S. Agency § 547 (1973)).
In the present case, the record is clear that PPS had no relationship with Pier 132. PPS entered into a Vendor Agreement with Big Fish, which was the event producer for the Film-Shoot that was held at Pier 132. (See Luster Decl., ECF No. 137, ¶¶ 5, 7; Vendor Agmt.) Plaintiff has not made any showing that PPS had any dealings, with Pier 132, let alone an agency relationship. Rather, PPS has made an evidentiary showing that “PPS had no contractual or other relationship with Pier 132 itself with regard to the [Film-Shoot] or otherwise, and with regard to providing services at the [Film-Shoot] PPS dealt only with Big Fish and its representatives;” that “Big Fish is the entity that arranged the [Film-Shoot], hired PPS and designated what services it wanted PPS to perform;” and that “PPS was paid for its services at the [Film-Shoot] by Big Fish.” (Luster Decl. ¶ 7.)
Plaintiff's assertion that Nguyen represented himself as an “agent or manager” of Pier 132 (Alexander Aff., ECF No. 143, at PDF p. 12), even if assumed to be true, is of no moment. An agency cannot be proved solely through the declarations or admissions of the agent. See Moore v. Leaseway Transp. Corp., 65 A.D.2d 697, 698 (1st Dept.1978), aff'd, 49 N.Y.2d 720 (1980) (“the declarations of an alleged agent may not be shown for the purpose of proving the fact of agency”).
When PPS's motion to dismiss was filed, when the Court was required to accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and to draw all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff's favor, see Alexander, 2021 WL 8445829, at *1, the Court declined to dismiss the NYCHRL claim on the basis that PPS was not an agent of Pier 132. As the Court held at that time, Plaintiff “ha[d] sufficiently alleged that PPS was an agent of a place of public accommodation” and therefore Plaintiff's NYCHRL claim “survive[d] at [that] early stage of litigation.” Alexander, 2022 WL 1567447, at *3. However, now that discovery has concluded and the record has been fully developed, the Court finds that dismissal on that basis is warranted.
Plaintiff had argued in opposition to Defendant's motion to dismiss that Nguyen on behalf of PPS denied Plaintiff entry into Pier 132, a place of public accommodation. (See Pl.'s 10/14/21 Opp. Mem., ECF No. 60, at 4.)
Accordingly, because there is no evidence that Defendant was the agent of a place or provider of public accommodation, the Court recommends that Plaintiff's sole remaining claim under the NYCHRL be dismissed.
Because Defendant cannot be liable for the alleged conduct under the NYCHRL, the Court need not reach Plaintiff's implausible claim that he was denied entry to the Film-Shoot on the basis of his race, in circumstances where the majority of the attendees were Black and other People of Color and Plaintiff had agreed not to seek employment or work for any PPS customers for 5 years following his termination from PPS. The Court also need not reach the issue of whether to preclude the suspect affidavit of Tyrese Andrews and text exchanges between Plaintiff and Carlito Vargas, which were submitted by Plaintiff in opposition to Defendant's summary judgment motion, and relate to whether Plaintiff was discriminated against by PPS. (See Def.'s 6/20/23 Reply, ECF No. 148, at 8-10.)
OPINION AND ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S APPLICATIONS FOR RECUSAL
I. Legal Standards
“Recusal motions are committed to the discretion of the judge who is being asked to recuse himself.” Weston Capital Advisors, Inc. v. PT Bank Mutiara Tbk., No. 13-CV-06945 (PAC), 2019 WL 6002221, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2019) (citing Apple v. Jewish Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 829 F.2d 326, 333 (2d Cir. 1987)). Section 455(a) provides that a judge shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. 28 U.S.C. § 455. In determining whether Section 455(a) requires recusal, the appropriate standard is objective reasonableness-whether “an objective, disinterested observer fully informed of the underlying facts, [would] entertain significant doubt that justice would be done absent recusal, or alternatively, if a reasonable person, knowing all the facts, [would] conclude that the trial judge's impartiality could reasonably be questioned.” Weston Capital Advisors Inc., 2019 WL 6002221, at *2 (cleaned up).
While § 455(a) addresses the appearance of impropriety, § 455(b) “addresses the problem of actual bias by mandating recusal in certain specific circumstances where partiality is presumed.” United States v. Bayless, 201 F.3d 116, 126 (2d Cir. 2000). Section 455(b) requires recusal where a judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1). 28 U.S.C. § 144 provides that a judge should recuse himself when the party has filed a “timely and sufficient affidavit” showing that the judge has a personal bias or prejudice against the party or in favor of an adverse party. 28 U.S.C. § 144. Here, Plaintiff did not file such an affidavit. In any event, the Court's analysis under § 144 is the same as under Section 455(b)(1). See Apple, 829 F.2d at 333.
“Events occurring in the course of judicial proceedings generally do not constitute a basis for recusal unless they indicate that the judge has a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.” United States v. Conte, 99 F.3d 60, 65 (2d Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Moreover, “it is well-settled that a judge's adverse rulings and decisions against a party almost never are a valid basis for a party to seek disqualification based on bias or impartiality.” Pri-har v. United States, 83 F.Supp.2d 393, 397 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (citing Liteky, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994)); see also Chen v. Chen Qualified Settlement Fund, 552 F.3d 218, 227 (2d Cir. 2009).
“The Court has an affirmative duty not to disqualify itself unnecessarily.” Weston Capital Advisors, 2019 WL 6002221, at *3 (citing Rosen v. Sugarman, 357 F.2d 794, 797 (2d Cir. 1966)). “[R]ecusal is not warranted for remote, contingent, or speculative reasons.” United States v. Ahmed, 788 F.Supp. 196, 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), aff'd, 980 F.2d 161 (2d Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). “Any other rule would bestow upon litigants the power to force the disqualification of judges who are not to their liking.” Id. “While litigants are entitled to an impartial judge, they have no right to the judge of their choice.” Id.
II. Application
Plaintiff requests that the undersigned recuse himself for denying extensions (Pl.'s 7/17/23 Objection ¶ 3), ordering Plaintiff to file a motion for default judgment (Pl.'s 7/31/23 Objection ¶ 7), awarding Defendant legal fees (Pl.'s 7/17/23 Objection ¶ 14; Pl.'s 7/31/23 Objection ¶ 23), recommending the Plaintiff consult NYLAG (Pl.'s 7/17/23 Objection ¶ 6; Pl.'s 7/31/23 Objection ¶ 6), failing to enforce page limits as to Defendant's reply brief (Pl.'s 7/17/23 Objection ¶ 1), misrepresenting that a settlement conference occurred (id. ¶ 4), purportedly accepting bribes (id. ¶ 8) and purportedly participating in ex parte communications with Defendant. (Id. ¶ 2.) The Court finds that none of the foregoing provides a valid basis for recusal.
Plaintiff's disagreements with the undersigned's rulings and recommendations in this case, and other events that occurred in the course of this case, are not legitimate grounds for recusal. See Conte, 99 F.3d at 65; Pri-har, 83 F.Supp.2d at 397. The outrageous accusations of misconduct by the Court (i.e., accepting bribes and ex parte communications) are baseless, and certainly provide no basis for recusal. See Bromfield v. Bronx Lebanon Special Care Ctr., Inc., No. 16-CV-10047 (ALC) (SLC), 2021 WL 6055265, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2021) (citing Power Auth. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 743 F.2d 93, 110 (2d Cir. 1984) (movant “has failed to state specific facts indicating that the magistrate judge engaged in ex parte communications warranting recusal”)); Celli v. New York Dep't of Educ., No. 21-CV-10455 (LTS), 2022 WL 292916, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2022) (denying motion for recusal where Plaintiff failed to provide “any basis” for his allegation that court accepted bribes).
The apparently erroneous docket entry stating that a settlement conference occurred in this case on August 31, 2023 (see 8/31/22 Minute Entry) also provides no basis for recusal.
In sum, the Court finds that recusal is not warranted because there is no chance that “a reasonable person, knowing all the facts, would conclude that the [Court's] impartiality could reasonably be questioned.” United States v. Wedd, 993 F.3d 104, 114 (2d Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, Plaintiff's applications for recusal of Judge Aaron are DENIED.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully recommend that Defendant's motion for summary judgment be GRANTED, that this case be closed and that judgment be entered in favor of the Defendant in the sum of $16,760.00 based on the Court's prior decision granting attorney's fees in this amount to Defendant. In addition, it is hereby ORDERED that Plaintiff's applications for recusal are DENIED.
NOTICE OF PROCEDURE FOR FILING OBJECTIONS TO REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
The parties shall have fourteen (14) days (including weekends and holidays) from service of this Report & Recommendation and Opinion & Order to file written objections, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to the recommendation contained herein. See also Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d) (adding three additional days when service is made under Fed.R.Civ.P. 5(b)(2)(C), (D) or (F)). A party may respond to another party's objections within fourteen days after being served with a copy. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Such objections, and any response to objections, shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), 6(d), 72(b). Any requests for an extension of time for filing objections must be addressed to Judge Oetken.
THE FAILURE TO OBJECT WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS WILL RESULT IN A WAIVER OF OBJECTIONS AND WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), 6(d), 72(b); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985).