Finck v. Brock, 202 Va. 948, 951, 121 S.E.2d 373, 375. The duty of the driver of a motor vehicle when approaching children in or near a street or highway has been stated and restated by us in a long line of cases, beginning with Bail v. Witten, 155 Va. 40, 154 S.E. 547, and repeated in the recent cases of Vought v. Jones, 205 Va. 719, 725, 139 S.E.2d 810, 815; Saulsbury v. Williams, 205 Va. 727, 139 S.E.2d 816; and Alexander v. Moore, 205 Va. 870, 140 S.E.2d 645, 649. In Alexander v. Moore, supra, 205 Va. at p. 875, 140 S.E.2d at p. 648, we quoted from Gabbard v. Knight, 202 Va. 40, 46, 116 S.E.2d 73, 77, as follows:
It is only when reasonable men may draw but one inference from the facts that they become questions of law for the court to decide. Alexander v. Moore, 205 Va. 870, 875, 140 S.E.2d 645, 648-649. And see Hanna v. Fletcher, 97 U.S.App.D.C. 310, 316, 231 F.2d 469, 475, 58 A.L.R.2d 847.
However, when reasonable people cannot differ, the issue becomes a question of law for the court to decide. Jenkins, 251 Va. at 128, 465 S.E.2d at 799 (citing Hadeed v. Medic-24, Ltd., 237 Va. 277, 285, 377 S.E.2d 589, 593 (1989)); Alexander v. Moore, 205 Va. 870, 875, 140 S.E.2d 645, 648-49 (1965). With regard to the issue of proximate cause, the Association argues that, while the personal representatives' expert, Toole, identified several alleged "flaws" in the design of the pathway and its intersection with Sugarland Run Drive, she never explained the causal connection between those particular defects and the accident at issue.
It is only when reasonable men may draw but one inference from the facts that they become questions of law for the court to decide. Finck v. Brock, 202 Va. 948, 951, 121 S.E.2d 373, 375. * * *" Alexander v. Moore, 205 Va. 870, 875, 140 S.E.2d 645. See also Hudgins v. Jones, 205 Va. 495, 499, 138 S.E.2d 16; Beasley v. Bosschermuller, 206 Va. 360, 365, 143 S.E.2d 881; Farmer v. Valley Marine Center, Inc., 206 Va. 737, 741, 146 S.E.2d 265.
It is only when reasonable men may draw but one inference from the facts that they become questions for the court to decide. Alexander v. Moore, 205 Va. 870, 875, 140 S.E.2d 645. On the record before us, we cannot say that Curd was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. We therefore hold that the trial court properly submitted that issue to the jury and that it did not err in refusing to strike plaintiff's evidence.
Furthermore, Calvin McDonald, being four years old, was legally incapable of contributory negligence. A.C.L.R. Co. v. Clements, 184 Va. 656, 36 S.E.2d 553; see Alexander v. Moore, 205 Va. 870, 140 S.E.2d 645; Grant v. Mays, 204 Va. 41, 129 S.E.2d 10. Under the evidence in this case, viewed most favorably to the plaintiff, the defendant should have seen Calvin and Dale McDonald, when the boys were standing in the highway and the defendant's automobile was far from them; and the defendant should have taken into consideration the possibility that Calvin might act thoughtlessly and under childish impulse, as he did when he ran across the eastbound lane of traffic in front of the defendant's automobile.