Opinion
A148822
10-22-2018
BRIAN ALLEN ALEXANDER, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MEGAN DIANE LEVITT, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Alameda County Super. Ct. No. HG16805747)
Megan Diane Levitt appeals from an order denying her motion for attorney's fees and costs after respondent Brian Allen Alexander voluntarily dismissed his application for a civil harassment restraining order (Code Civ. Proc., § 527.6). Levitt contends the court did not provide a rationale for its denial of her motion, the evidence did not support the ruling, and the court abused its discretion and erred as to the law. We will affirm.
All statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure. --------
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In February 2016, Alexander filed a petition for a civil harassment restraining order against Levitt under section 527.6. The court granted a temporary restraining order and scheduled a hearing to decide whether an injunction prohibiting harassment should be imposed. Levitt filed a response to Alexander's petition, denying the allegations and seeking attorney fees.
At the March 24, 2016, hearing on Alexander's petition, Alexander voluntarily dismissed his petition.
Levitt thereafter filed a motion to recover $3,417.62 for her attorney's fees and costs under section 1032, subdivision (a)(4), contending she was the prevailing party entitled to attorney's fees under section 527.6, subdivision (s). Alexander did not file a written opposition to her motion.
The court issued the following tentative ruling: "The Motion of [Levitt] for Attorney's Fees and Costs is DENIED. . . . Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6(s) provides that '[t]he prevailing party in any action brought under this section may be awarded court costs and attorney's fees, if any.' Thus, an award of such fees and costs is discretionary. After weighing all of the facts before the court, the court, in its discretion, declines to award [Levitt] attorney's fees and costs."
The parties appeared at the hearing on Levitt's motion on May 31, 2016. In response to the court's tentative ruling, Levitt's attorney asked the court to state "the facts upon which it exercised [its] discretion and legal principles thereon," citing Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747 (Sargon). The court replied that it had reached its tentative ruling by looking at the entirety of the record and weighing the factors, and invited Levitt to explain why the tentative ruling was incorrect by presenting "the equitable and legal reasons why [she is] entitled to attorneys fees and costs."
Levitt's attorney asserted, essentially, that there were no facts on which to deny the motion, but acknowledged that the award of fees was discretionary, and he did not submit evidence of bad faith on Alexander's part. Alexander's attorney rejoined that Levitt had "counter-claimed" for her own restraining order in her response to Alexander's petition, and "the last discussion that opposing counsel and I had prior to this voluntary dismissal was him saying to me that respondent would not be pursuing attorney fees." He continued: "Essentially this was a mutual dismissal, your Honor, that opposing counsel and I both agreed to, and we were hoping that respondent and petitioner would go their separate ways." Levitt's attorney then disputed that counsel had indicated there would be no request for fees.
By written order of June 15, 2016, the court denied Levitt's motion. The court set forth the applicable legal principles and explained that, although Levitt was a prevailing party, the award of attorney fees was discretionary rather than mandatory under the statute. The court concluded that, "after weighing all of the facts before the court and the arguments at the hearing, the court, in its discretion, declines to award [Levitt] attorney's fees and costs."
This appeal followed.
II. DISCUSSION
Section 527.6 governs applications for temporary restraining orders and orders after hearing prohibiting harassment. Subdivision (s) of the statute provides: "The prevailing party in an action brought pursuant to this section may be awarded court costs and attorney's fees, if any." (Italics added.) As the trial court stated, the grant or denial of an award of attorney's fees is a matter for the court's discretion. (See Leydon v. Alexander (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 1, 5.)
Levitt contends the court abused its discretion because the court did not explain its ruling. But the court did explain its ruling: in both its tentative ruling and in its order denying Levitt's request for attorney fees, the court stated that attorney fee awards are discretionary under section 527.6 and it decided not to award fees in light of "all of the facts before the court."
Levitt's reliance on Sargon, supra, 55 Cal.4th 747 in this regard is unavailing. There, our Supreme Court stated that a trial court's discretion is limited by the governing legal principles. (Id. at p. 773.) But it did not require that trial courts announce the basis of their decisions in greater detail than the court did here. The court in this case referred to the applicable legal principles set forth in the statute and then exercised its discretion in light of those principles.
Levitt's reference to Stanger v. China Elec. Motor, Inc. (9th Cir. 2016) 812 F.3d 734 is also unavailing. In that case, the trial court had failed to adequately explain its reasons for reducing the lodestar by 30 percent in its attorney fee award, and further failed to explicitly consider the relevant factors under prevailing law, thus depriving the appellate court of meaningful review. (Id. at pp. 739-740.) Stanger is a federal case, is not binding on this court, addressed federal law rather than section 527.6, and is plainly distinguishable on its facts and procedural context.
Levitt further argues that the court should have awarded attorney fees because Alexander sought the restraining order in bad faith. She acknowledges, however, that she did not submit any evidence showing the allegedly false or frivolous nature of Alexander's assertions. The mere fact that Alexander dismissed his application voluntarily at the beginning of the section 527.6 hearing does not compel the conclusion that he had brought the application in bad faith.
Levitt fails to demonstrate that, based on the evidence before the trial court when it decided her motion, the court's denial of her motion was unreasonable, unsupported by the evidence, legal error, or an abuse of discretion.
III. DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
/s/_________
NEEDHAM, J. We concur. /s/_________
JONES, P.J. /s/_________
BRUINIERS, J.