Opinion
No. 17-35677
08-27-2019
REBECCA ALEXANDER, a single woman, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON, a county municipality; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
D.C. No. 2:17-cv-00653-RSM MEMORANDUM Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington
Ricardo S. Martinez, District Judge, Presiding Before: SCHROEDER, PAEZ, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Rebecca Alexander appeals from the district court's orders denying sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and granting a reduced award of attorney's fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion. Gibson v. Chrysler Corp., 261 F.3d 927, 950 (9th Cir. 2001) (amount of attorney's fees under § 1447(c)); Barber v. Miller, 146 F.3d 707, 709 (9th Cir. 1998) (sanctions under § 1927). We affirm.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding attorney's fees under § 1447(c) in the amount of $3,000 because the record supports the district court's calculation under the lodestar method. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 978-79 (9th Cir. 2008) (discussing proper application of the lodestar method and the district court's "great deal of discretion" to determine the reasonableness of the fee (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Alexander's request for sanctions because the record does not support a finding of recklessness or bad faith. See 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (authorizing an award of attorney's fees reasonably incurred because of conduct that "multiplies the proceedings . . . unreasonably and vexatiously"); Barber, 146 F.3d at 711 (an award of sanctions under § 1927 requires a showing of recklessness or bad faith); Newton v. Thomason, 22 F.3d 1455, 1463 (9th Cir. 1994) ("A district court abuses its discretion . . . when it bases its decision on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence." (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Alexander's motions for reconsideration because Alexander failed to demonstrate grounds for such relief. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1993) (standard of review and grounds for relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) or 60(b)).
Alexander's contention that the district court erred by denying as moot the motion to dismiss filed by defendants Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., Nationstar Mortgage LLC, and U.S. Bank, N.A. is unpersuasive.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
This case remains administratively closed as to defendant-appellee Northwest Trustee Services, Inc. See Docket Entry Nos. 37, 40.
AFFIRMED.