Opinion
Civil Action 3:22-224
07-03-2024
KEITH ALEXANDER, Plaintiff, v. CASEY JAMES, et al., Defendants.
Kim R. Gibson Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PATRICIA L. DODGE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. RECOMMENDATION
It is respectfully recommended that the Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 96) filed by Defendant Terri Sechrengost be denied.
II. REPORT
A. Relevant Procedural History
On December 2, 2022, Plaintiff Keith Alexander (“Alexander”) filed this pro se civil rights action against Defendants Casey James, Patrick Nagle, Deanna Dellatore, Anne White, Muhammad Naji, Wellpath LLC (collectively the “Medical Defendants”), Terri Sechrengost (“Sechrengost”), Dr. Schleicher, and John and Jane Doe. (ECF No. 4.) Alexander initially brought an Eighth Amendment denial of medical care claim, a negligence/medical malpractice claim, and a Monell claim stemming from his prolonged use of a corticosteroid cream to treat a rash while being housed at State Correctional Institute (“SCI”) Houtzdale. (Id.)
In response, the Medical Defendants, Sechrengost, and Dr. Schleicher each filed a Motion to Dismiss. (ECF Nos. 21, 29, 58). On July 19, 2023, this Court issued a Report and Recommendation that each of the motions be granted in part and denied in part. (ECF No. 71.) On August 31, 2023, the Honorable Kim R. Gibson adopted the Report and Recommendation as the Opinion of the Court. (ECF No. 74.) Relevant here, Sechrengost's motion was granted with leave to amend with respect to any Eighth Amendment claim in which Sechrengost was alleged to be a non-medical prison official. The motion was denied with respect to the portion of Alexander's Eighth Amendment claim in which Sechrengost was alleged to be a medical prison official. (ECF No. 71 at 17-19, 26.)
This Court recommended that: Count II of the Complaint be dismissed without prejudice as to all Defendants; Dr. Schleicher be terminated as a defendant; Count III of the Complaint be dismissed without prejudice and with leave to amend; the Medical Defendants' motion regarding failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the PLRA be denied without prejudice; and Sechrengost's motion be granted in part and denied in part. (ECF No. 71 at 25-26.)
Alexander filed an Amended Complaint on October 5, 2023. (ECF No. 81.) Dr. Schleicher and Sechrengost again filed separate Motions to Dismiss (ECF Nos. 92, 96), and the Medical Defendants filed an Answer. (ECF No. 94.) On March 19, 2024, Alexander filed a response to Dr. Schleicher's motion in which he stated that he did not intend to oppose it. (ECF No. 105.) As a result, the motion was granted, and Dr. Schleicher was dismissed from this case with prejudice. (ECF No. 106.)
The Amended Complaint brings an Eighth Amendment denial of medical care claim and a Monell claim against Patrick Nagle, Casey James (previously known as Casey Thornley), Deanna DellaTorre, Ann White, Jane/John Dow, Terri Sechrengost, Muhammad Naji, Dr. Schleicher, and WellPath, LLC.
Sechrengost's motion is now fully briefed and ready for disposition. (ECF Nos. 96, 97, 107.)
B. Relevant Factual Allegations
At all relevant times, Alexander was in the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections and incarcerated at SCI Houtzdale. (ECF No. 81 ¶ 3.) During that same time, Sechrengost served as the Corrections Health Care Administrator at SCI Houtzdale. (Id. ¶ 9.)
Alexander was granted parole and released from SCI Houtzdale on October 7, 2023. (ECF No. 76.)
Alexander first began experiencing a rash “accompanied by severe itching and scratching” in July or August of 2016 and was prescribed a corticosteroid cream. (Id. ¶ 15.) The corticosteroid cream appeared to be working, but when Alexander would stop using it for a few days, the rash would reappear in a different location of his body. (Id. ¶¶ 16-17.) Upon reexamination, SCI Houtzdale medical staff instructed him to begin using the cream again. (Id.) This cycle continued until 2018 when Alexander saw Dr. Schleicher, an outside dermatologist, who ordered a more potent steroid cream and several skin biopsies. (Id. ¶¶ 19-20.) Alexander consulted with Dr. Schleicher several more times between 2018 and 2020 in an attempt to diagnose the cause of his skin condition. (Id. ¶¶ 19-21.) Throughout this period, SCI Houtzdale medical staff once again instructed Alexander to continue using the corticosteroid cream. (Id.)
In August 2020, after more than three years of using corticosteroid creams, Alexander made several sick call and inmate requests informing SCI Houtzdale medical staff that he had a “rash-like condition on his skin, itching, trouble breathing, dark urine, loss of memory and energy, a change in eyesight and balance, and a change in skin color.” (Id. ¶ 22.) Initially, Alexander attributed these symptoms to another medication that he was prescribed. (Id.) He also informed Sechrengost that another member of the medical staff had told him that “she was tired of seeing him.” (Id. ¶ 22.) In response to his requests, Sechrengost told Alexander that he had previously been seen by medical staff on August 12, 2020, and that if he was still having trouble, he should submit another sick call slip. (ECF No. 81-1 at 1.)
Shortly after, Alexander learned from the instructions and warning label of the corticosteroid cream that certain precautions were recommended when using the cream over a prolonged period. (ECF No. 81 ¶ 23.) The label also described several adverse reactions similar to the symptoms that he was experiencing. (Id.) Alexander submitted another medical request to Sechrengost, expressing concern that he had not been evaluated for stroke, high or low blood pressure, or had his vital signs checked despite exhibiting swollen extremities and changes in skin color. (Id. ¶ 24.) He also questioned whether a doctor should be monitoring his use of corticosteroids. (Id.) Sechrengost responded that Alexander was “scheduled to see dermatology.” (ECF No. 81-1 at 2.)
Alexander maintains that from 2020 until October 2022, he repeatedly requested follow ups with the dermatologist and testing during his regular sick calls with SCI Houtzdale medical staff. (ECF No. 81 ¶ 25.) He also sent multiple inmate request forms directly to Sechrengost “informing her that [he] was being denied adequate medical treatment and that he was being denied the consult with the dermatologist that she had informed him that he was to have in the Response to his Request dated [9/8/2020].” (Id. ¶ 26-27.) Alexander also alleges that on more than one occasion, he met with Sechrengost face-to-face and informed her “that he needed to see the dermatologist, that he needed more testing and monitoring, and that he should not be using the corticosteroid creams for as long as he had been using them.” (Id. ¶ 28.) Sechrengost continued to tell Alexander that he “would be seeing the dermatologist soon.” (Id.)
Yet, from 2020 until at least October 2022, Alexander never saw a dermatologist. During this period, he alleges that his skin condition worsened “due to the constant cycle of itching and scratching and due to the dry and cracked skin from the use of the corticosteroid creams.” (Id. ¶ 30.) This resulted in “active/open lesions,” “redness, itching, burning, and swollen or blistering spots in multiple locations all over his body including his genitalia.” (Id. ¶¶ 30, 42.) His condition was so severe at times that he claims it caused “many sleepless nights and even pushed the Plaintiff's psyche so far as to thinking that suicide was a viable possible solution to end the cycles of itching and scratching.” (Id. ¶ 42.) He also alleges permanent disfigurement due to a “progressive amount of scarring” over his abdomen, back, buttocks, and lower extremities. (Id. ¶¶ 31, 44.)
C. Legal Standard
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint may be dismissed, in whole or in part, for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must “accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008)). While “accept[ing] all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true,” the court “may disregard any legal conclusions.” Id. at 210-11. Further, in considering a motion to dismiss, the court “generally considers only the allegations in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, and documents that form the basis of a claim.” Lum v. Bank of Am., 361 F.3d 217, 222 n.3 (3d Cir. 2004).
A complaint requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). To survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Though ‘detailed factual allegations' are not required, a complaint must do more than simply provide ‘labels and conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.'” Davis v. Abington Mem'l Hosp., 765 F.3d 236, 241 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In sum, the plaintiff “must plead facts sufficient to show that [their] claim has substantive plausibility.” Johnson v. City of Shelby, Miss., 574 U.S. 10 (2014).
To assess the sufficiency of a complaint under Twombly and Iqbal, a court must take three steps: (1) outline the elements the plaintiff must plead to state a claim for relief; (2) peel away those allegations that are no more than conclusions and thus not entitled to the assumption of truth; (3) look for well-pled factual allegations, assume their veracity, and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 365 (3d Cir. 2012). The court's plausibility determination is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
D. Discussion
Sechrengost moves to dismiss Alexander's Eighth Amendment claim against her because she is a non-medical prison administrator and Alexander had access to the medical staff at SCI Houtzdale. (ECF No. 97 at 2.) Alexander argues that Sechrengost can be found liable because of her personal knowledge and involvement in his allegedly inadequate medical care. (ECF No. 107 at 3.)
The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment, which has been interpreted to include deliberate indifference to an inmate's serious medical needs. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). To succeed on a claim brought under the Eighth Amendment, a prisoner must show: (1) that they were subjected to a deprivation that was “objectively, sufficiently serious; a prison official's act or omission must result in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities”; and (2) that prison officials acted with “deliberate indifference to the prisoner's . . . needs,” which occurs only if the official “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 837 (1994).
With respect to a non-medical prison administrator, the Third Circuit has held:
As our precedent makes clear, “a non-medical prison official” cannot “be charge[d] with the Eighth Amendment scienter requirement of deliberate indifference” when the “prisoner is under the care of medical experts” and the official does not have “a reason to believe (or actual knowledge) that prison doctors or their assistants are mistreating (or not treating) a prisoner.” Spruill [v. Gillis], 372 F.3d [218,] 236 [(3d Cir. 2004)]; see also Durmer [v. O'Carroll], 991 F.2d [64,] 69 [(3d Cir. 1993)] (holding that non-physicians cannot “be considered deliberately indifferent simply because they failed to respond directly to the medical complaints of a prisoner who was already being treated by the prison doctor”).Pearson v. Prison Health Serv., 850 F.3d 526, 543 (3d Cir. 2017).
In Twitty v. Barns, No. 3:20-142, 2021 WL 2419323 at *4 (W.D. Pa. May 25, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 2419303 (W.D. Pa. June 14, 2021), a pro se prisoner plaintiff alleged that he had submitted two DC-135A Inmate Request to Staff Member forms to Sechrengost informing her that he was being denied access to medical treatment and testing ordered by an outside gastrointestinal specialist. In his DC-135A requests, the plaintiff also alleged that his sick call requests were being ignored by medical staff, that his symptoms were worsening, and that he had not been rescheduled for a twice cancelled colonoscopy. Id. In that instance, the court denied Sechrengost's motion to dismiss, finding that the plaintiff stated a plausible claim pursuant to the Eighth Amendment because Sechrengost had reason to believe that medical personnel were not providing medical care. Id.
Here, Alexander alleges that he submitted DC-135A requests to Sechrengost on numerous occasions between August 2020 to July 2022. (ECF No. 81-1 at 1-3, 5-6.) In these requests, Alexander informed Sechrengost of his ongoing skin condition and the various symptoms that he was experiencing, including “itching skin, trouble breathing, memory problems, change in balance, bruises without cause and change in eyesight, dark urine and always tired.” (Id. at 1.) He expressed concern that SCI Houtzdale medical staff was not taking his condition seriously, accusing staff members of ignoring his sick call requests and of commenting that they were “sick of seeing [him]” and that he “was not going to die” from a rash. (Id.) He repeatedly indicated that he had not been scheduled for his dermatology follow up appointment. (Id. at 1-3.) He also informed Sechrengost that he believed that his use of corticosteroid creams should be more closely monitored in order to ensure his safety. (Id. at 3.) Additionally, there are two DC-135A requests that do not contain a written response from Sechrengost. (Id. at 5-6.) Both requests accuse SCI Houtzdale medical staff of ignoring Alexander's attempts to seek medical care, describe his condition, and plead for help. (Id.) In response to the DC-135A requests, Alexander also alleges that he was “called up to medical to see [Sechrengost] a few times to explain his issues to her directly.” (ECF No. 81 ¶ 28.)
Although there are five completed DC-135A Inmate Request to Staff Member forms attached as exhibits to Alexander's amended complaint, only three contain a response from Sechrengost. (ECF No. 81-1 at 1-3, 5-6.)
Therefore, in accordance with the principles set forth under Pearson and applied in Twitty, Alexander has stated a plausible claim for relief under the Eighth Amendment for deliberate indifference against Sechrengost. Accepting all factual allegations as true and construing the Amended Complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, Sechrengost would have had reason to believe that SCI Houtzdale medical staff were not providing adequate care to Alexander. See Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210.
III. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the Court deny the Motion to Dismiss of Defendant Terri Sechrengost (ECF No. 96).
IV. NOTICE
Pursuant to the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C), and Rule 72.D.2 of the Local Civil Rule, the parties may, within fourteen (14) days, file objections to this Report and Recommendation. Failure to do so will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011).