Opinion
B302207
02-25-2021
DARRION LARRY ALEXANDER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Defendant and Respondent.
Darrion Larry Alexander, in pro. per, for Plaintiff and Appellant. Office of the County Counsel, Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva, County Counsel, Adrian G. Gragas, Assistant County Counsel, Kelsey C. Nau, Deputy County Counsel for Defendant and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BS162731) APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Mary H. Strobel, Judge. Affirmed. Darrion Larry Alexander, in pro. per, for Plaintiff and Appellant. Office of the County Counsel, Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva, County Counsel, Adrian G. Gragas, Assistant County Counsel, Kelsey C. Nau, Deputy County Counsel for Defendant and Respondent.
Petitioner Darrion Alexander appeals from the judgment entered following denial of his petition seeking disclosure of certain documents from respondent County of Los Angeles, erroneously sued as Jackie Lacey, District Attorney (the County). He contends the trial court erred in finding the records exempt from disclosure under the California Public Records Act (CPRA) (Gov. Code, § 6250, et seq.). We find no error and therefore affirm.
All further statutory references are to the Government Code unless otherwise indicated.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On August 5, 2015, appellant sent a letter to the Los Angeles District Attorney's office (DAO) requesting disclosure of records pursuant to the federal Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. § 552). Appellant requested disclosure of the following records related to his two prior criminal cases: (1) a color copy of his booking photograph taken on November 20, 1997 by the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) for court case number BA159821; (2) two fingerprint comparison reports submitted by the LAPD to the DAO under court case number BA159821; (3) the probable cause arrest warrant and search warrant issued by the court on July 1, 1996 under court case number BA134616; (4) the preliminary hearing transcripts for court case number BA134616; and (5) the information filed on December 2, 1996 under court case number BA134616.
The DAO, the trial court, and respondent construed this request as one under the CPRA. We do the same, as the CPRA applies to state and local agencies, such as the DAO. (§ 6252, subd. (d).) Appellant appears to recognize this, as his briefing to the trial court and on appeal includes argument and citation to statutory and case law under the CPRA.
The DAO provided appellant a copy of item number five, the information. It advised appellant that he needed to request transcript copies directly from the court reporter who prepared them, and that it did not have copies of the warrants. As for the warrants, booking photograph and fingerprint comparison reports, the DAO advised appellant that those records were exempt from disclosure as law enforcement investigatory records under section 6254, subdivision (f) (section 6254(f)).
Appellant filed a petition for writ of mandate, in propria persona, in the trial court on October 19, 2015. Respondent filed an answer in February 2018. In 2019, the parties filed briefs regarding the petition. Appellant's brief in support of the petition argued for the production of three of the original five items: the booking photograph, the fingerprint comparison reports, and the warrants. Those three items were the focus of the trial court's order and are the subject of this appeal.
The court held a hearing on October 3, 2019. Appellant, who was and remains incarcerated, did not appear. Following the hearing, the court denied appellant's petition. The court found that the three items at issue were exempt from disclosure as investigatory records under section 6254(f). The court explained that the booking photograph, the fingerprint comparison reports, and the warrants were "records of a criminal investigation conducted by a local police agency for enforcement purposes." The court also found that appellant had not shown that the DAO had possession of the warrants in light of the DAO's contention it did not have the documents and the fact that more than 20 years had passed since they were executed.
Appellant filed a written objection to the court's ruling, which the court overruled. The court entered judgment in favor of respondent and dismissed the case on November 18, 2019. Appellant timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Appellant contends the trial court erred in finding that the booking photograph, the fingerprint comparison reports, and the warrants were exempt from disclosure under section 6254(f). We disagree.
The CPRA was enacted "for the purpose of increasing freedom of information by giving members of the public access to information in the possession of public agencies." (Filarsky v. Superior Court (2002) 28 Cal.4th 419, 425.) Accordingly, the CPRA requires disclosure of all public records except where "the Legislature has expressly provided to the contrary." (Williams v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 337, 346 (Williams); see also § 6253, subd. (a).)
Section 6254(f) contains one such express exemption for law enforcement investigatory records. That subdivision exempts from disclosure: "Records of complaints to, or investigations conducted by, or records of intelligence information or security procedures of, the office of the Attorney General and the Department of Justice, . . . and any state or local police agency, or any investigatory or security files compiled by any other state or local agency for correctional, law enforcement, or licensing purposes." (§ 6254(f).) Our Supreme Court has found that this subdivision "articulates a broad exemption from disclosure for law enforcement investigatory records." (Williams, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 349.) Moreover, "the exemption for law enforcement investigatory files does not end when the investigation ends." (Id. at p. 355.)
This subdivision itself has exceptions, none of which are at issue here.
We review de novo a trial court's interpretations of the CPRA and the application of that interpretation to undisputed facts. (Consolidated Irrigation Dist. v. Superior Court (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 697, 709, citing BRV, Inc. v. Superior Court (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 742, 750.) We defer to the trial court's determination of any express or implied factual findings, upholding those findings if based on substantial evidence. (See Times Mirror Co. v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1325, 1336; Rackauckas v. Superior Court (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 169, 173-174.)
The trial court found that the booking photograph, fingerprint comparison reports, and warrants were records of investigations created or compiled by the LAPD, a local police agency, for law enforcement purposes, and therefore were exempt from disclosure under section 6254(f). We agree. Both the booking photograph and the fingerprint reports are part of the record of arrest made during the booking procedure. (See Pen. Code, § 7 ["To 'book' signifies the recordation of an arrest in official police records, and the taking by the police of fingerprints and photograph of the person arrested, or any of these acts following an arrest."].) The information derived from an arrest, including the arrestee's booking photograph and fingerprints, are part of the investigative record, and "may be used by the police in several ways for the important purpose of investigating and solving similar crimes in the future." (Loder v. Municipal Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 859, 865; see also 65 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 563, 567 (1982) [finding that "records of arrest . . . are exempt from disclosure under section 6254(f)"]; 86 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 132 at *3 (2003) ["We have no hesitation in finding that mug shots fall within the 'records of investigations' exemption of section 6254, subdivision (f)."].) Similarly, the arrest and search warrants were prepared as part of the criminal investigation into appellant, conducted by a local police agency for law enforcement purposes. Thus, they are exempt under section 6254(f).
Appellant argues that the trial court improperly relied on his description of the documents, including that they were created by the LAPD and the references to DAO and court case numbers, as the basis for its determination that the documents were investigative records. He does not contend that his descriptions were incorrect. The record demonstrates that the trial court properly considered the content of the documents in determining whether they were properly subject to exemption. (See Weaver v. Superior Court (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 746, 750 (Weaver) [finding that "the content of the document at issue, not the location in which it is stored, [is] determinative" for purposes of the exemption] (citation omitted.)
Appellant's citation to Weaver, supra, 224 Cal.App.4th 746 does not assist his claim regarding the warrants. In Weaver, the court found no exemption under section 6254(f) for "the District Attorney's file copies of 'court documents' whose originals were filed in the superior court." (Id. at p. 749.) Because the documents were publicly filed, they were not subject to exemption, and placing a copy in an investigatory file did not convert a public record into an investigatory one. (Id. at pp. 750-751.) In contrast, there is no evidence here that the warrants were publicly filed or improperly placed in an investigatory file.
Appellant also has provided no evidence to contradict the trial court's finding that the DAO was no longer in possession of the warrants, and therefore could not produce them even if an exemption did not apply.
Appellant further contends that the documents he seeks reflect "standard police procedure and not investigative" processes exempt from disclosure. He relies on the definition of "public records" under section 6252, subdivision (e). It is undisputed that the records at issue here qualify as "public records" subject to the CPRA. However, that conclusion does not determine whether the records are also subject to the exemption under section 6254(f). We agree with the trial court that they are exempt. Appellant has not provided any basis to find otherwise.
During oral argument, appellant also contended that the booking photo and fingerprint comparison reports were not exempt because they were not confidential material under section 6254.5, subdivision (e). Appellant did not raise this argument in his appellate brief, and it is therefore forfeited. (See In re I.C. (2018) 4 Cal.5th 869, 888, fn. 5 [contention raised for first time at oral argument is forfeited]; County of Sonoma v. Superior Court (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1312, 1326, fn. 10 [party forfeits contention not made in briefs but raised for first time at oral argument].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The parties are to bear their own costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
COLLINS, J. We concur: MANELLA, P. J. CURREY, J.