Aleksandr V. v. Juliya V.

Full title: Aleksandr V., Plaintiff, v. Juliya V., Defendant.

Court: Supreme Court, Kings County

Date published: Jul 11, 2023

2023 N.Y. Slip Op. 50756 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2023)

Opinion

07-11-2023

Aleksandr V., Plaintiff, v. Juliya V., Defendant.

Jonathan Edwards, Esq. Attorney for Plaintiff Juliya V. Defendant, pro se

Hon. Jeffrey S. Sunshine, J.S.C.

Unpublished Opinion

Jonathan Edwards, Esq. ¹ Attorney for Plaintiff

1 The Court notes that plaintiff initially appeared in this trial represented by Richard Geller, Esq. Mr. Geller was relieved by written order on consent dated September 20, 2018. Thereafter, plaintiff appeared self-represented for many days of the trial. Plaintiff was appointed counsel pursuant to government pay on the issue of contempt by written order [NYSCEF #16] but he relieved that attorney [NYSCEF #30]. On September 13, 2021, plaintiff retained his current counsel, Jonathan Edwards, Esq. [NYSCEF #30].

Juliya V. Defendant, pro se

Hon. Jeffrey S. Sunshine, J.S.C.

The Court is called upon after a trial on all ancillary issues of a divorce to determine a truly difficult case where the plaintiff severely under-reports his income through inter alia commingling questionable financial claims and deductions and the defendant severely exaggerates plaintiff's income while also under reporting her own income through questionable financial claims and deductions.

The parties have been engaged in vigorous litigation in various Family Courts in New York State and in Russia since on or about 2008, as well as the Appellate Divisions of the First and Second Judicial Departments.

The plaintiff-husband commenced this action for divorce before this Court in 2016. This Court repeatedly stated on the record and in written decisions and orders that this Court is not an "Appellate Court" for reviewing orders issued in Family Court prior to the commencement of this action for divorce and that this Court cannot interfere with appeals that were filed relating to Family Court orders, some of which the defendant did not notify the Court were pending (see decision and order dated April 3, 2018) and for which plaintiff defaulted. This Court notified both parties on the record that this Court must recognize the last orders from the date of those orders from the respective of the Appellate Divisions, which are controlling over all others.

During this on-going trial, defendant's attempts to "re-litigate" in various courts resulted in appeals pending in both the Appellate Division, Second Department and the Appellate Division, First Department resulting in overlapping orders at time existing for differing sums of child support. Continuously attempting to obtain what she believed would be more advantageous support orders, defendant repeatedly filed applications in multiple courts without notifying the courts that she had already pending applications and objections in other courts. In fact, during this litigation, defendant consented to consolidate her upward modification of support application pending in Kings County Family Court to this Court; however, she never notified this Court that she had already filed an appeal of the underlying Family Court support order - the one she was simultaneously attempting to upwardly modify in Family Court - while the appeal was still pending and perfected. This Court only learned about defendant's failure to disclose the pending appeal during a routine review of recent Appellate Division decisions. When defendant's filing was revealed by the Court on the record defendant offered no explanation for her failure to disclose this appeal. This Court notified defendant on the record that she must notify all Courts of pending applications in the future.

Delays Caused By Defendant's Duplicative Filings In Multiple Courts

The Court notes that while plaintiff clearly attempted to utilize Courts to his advantage at times during this litigation so too did defendant. Defendant, when unsatisfied with one Court's ruling would file for the same or similar relief in another Court.

In an attempt to move the trial to an efficient conclusion, the Court issued numerous scheduling orders, including written orders dated March 13, 2019, November 6, 2019, and December 5, 2019.

Detailed Procedural History

The full procedural history related thereto is detailed in the written decision and order dated May 5, 2020: that decision must be read in conjunction with this decision and order.

Defendant's Attempt To "Correct" Prior Support Orders

Defendant contends, in effect, that all the prior orders of support that she filed in other Courts were not properly decided claiming that the prior orders were based on what she characterizes as plaintiff's fraudulent financial representations: she now asks this Court to retroactively "correct" prior support orders all the way back to 2010. In addition to straining judicial resources, defendant's attempts to achieve her desired outcome by this methodology prolonged this litigation and, ultimately, delayed the ultimate relief for which she sought.

Parties' Representation During Trial

Plaintiff-husband initially appeared represented by privately retained counsel, then he appeared self-represented before once again retaining private counsel during the financial trial in this action. The trial record was improved and clarified through the laudable efforts of plaintiff's attorney. Plaintiff's counsel clearly understood his role as the plaintiff's counsel and an officer of the Court to present a complete record.

Defendant-wife appeared self-represented throughout the trial. The Court extensively notified and allocuted the parties on the record at each appearance of their right to be represented by counsel and provided the parties-when they appeared self-represented-with copies of the Child Support Standards Act and the Maintenance Guidelines Statute as well as information sheets of various Bar Association referral panels and the location and availability of the Office of Self-Help and online resources through the Court system's website.

Trial Dates Before This Court

This protracted trial on the financial issues between the parties took place over fourteen (14) days spanning from 2018 into 2022. By the time the parties rested, plaintiff had more than ten (10) exhibits in evidence and defendant had more than forty-five (45) exhibits in evidence. There were more than 1,100 pages of trial transcript. The extensive record required the Court to analyze and organize the facts and testimony presented by the parties who both appeared self-represented during large portions of the trial.

Defendant's numerous filings in other courts and appeals in two (2) Appellate Divisions forced this Court to stay the ongoing trial at times since the issue of modification of existing orders was before those Court. Despite defendant's insistence that she wanted a final resolution of the financial issues between the parties it was her insistence on filing duplicative applications before numerous courts that greatly delayed the Court's ability to conduct and conclude the trial and to issue a final decision and order on the merits. In fact, defendant filed yet another proposed order to show cause on the eve of trial that the Court refused to sign and issued a written decision, dated May 8, 2018, detailing the basis therefor. During the ongoing trial, this Court had to consider granting a mistrial based on defendant's attempts to litigate the issues to her perceived advantage in multiple Courts.

The Court notes that during the trial the defendant repeatedly objected to the Court taking judicial notice of court orders, including objecting to the Court taking judicial notice of the preliminary conference order and orders from Family Court; however, defendant continuously attempted to rely on "evidence" introduced in another court in the trial before this Court without providing certified copies authenticating those documents to move them into evidence. Despite her representations that this alleged "evidence" was part of the file in other Courts she never properly offered these documents into evidence before this Court and, as such, the Court was never provided an opportunity to rule on admitting them into evidence and they are not a part of the evidence before this Court to consider in reaching this determination. Defendant had years to obtain and offer any such documents she claimed existed.

The Court notes that defendant appeared to have a greater desire to attack plaintiff's credibility at trial than in presenting evidence and testimony as to her own financial means and the needs of her and the children.

The Court heard testimony on May 14, 2018; May 15, 2018; ² September 20, 2018; ³ September 21, 2018; September 25, 2018; December 7, 2018; December 11, 2018; December 17, 2018; February 2, 2019; May 2, 2022; ⁴ May 5, 2022; June 27, 2022; ⁵ August 10, 2022; and August 18, 2022. The Court heard oral summations on October 17, 2022. The decision was marked decision reserved on November 17, 2022, when the complete trial testimony transcripts were provided.

2 The trial was also held in abeyance based on motion practice related to discovery issues. The Court offered continued trial dates in August 2018; however, defendant indicated that she was unavailable.

3 On September 20, 2018, motion sequence #7 was before the Court for plaintiff's counsel seeking to be relieved. Plaintiff discharged his attorney on the record and stated that he did not want a stay pursuant to CPLR 321(c). Mr. Geller was relieved as plaintiff's attorney on the record on September 20, 2018. The Court notes that an order appointing plaintiff counsel on the limited issue of a pending contempt application was issued on July 13, 2021 [NYSECEF 16]; however, plaintiff subsequently discharged that appointed government-pay counsel.

4 Plaintiff appeared represented by Jonathan Edwards, Esq. on May 2, 2022, who noted on the record that he had aided his client in extensive efforts to settle the matter; however, those efforts had not been successful.

5 Two dates prior to this date had to be adjourned due to COVID illnesses and/or exposures.

Parties Deemed Ineligible to Continue Trial Virtually Due to Highly Disruptive In-Person Conduct

In addition to the delays previously described, in March 2020, New York City and the nation, entered a period of shelter in place in response to the global COVID-19 pandemic. This Court determined that this case could not proceed virtually given the fact that even during the pre-pandemic court appearances that were in-person the parties self-represented shouted over one another and interrupted each another and attempted to interrupt and talk over the Court. This conduct interfered with the Court making rulings on objections to such a degree that it was clear that proceeding virtually was not a viable option for these parties. In fact, when the Court did attempt to hold virtual conference appearances in this matter, they were interrupted by the parties talking over each other to such a level that court reporters were having difficulty making records. Furthermore, during the trial and court appearances, the defendant's rapid pace of speaking caused numerous delays despite the Court's and the court reporter's repeated requests on the record that the defendant slow down so that the court report could take down a complete record. The trial resumed once in-person appearances were permitted by pandemic protocols in compliance with safety protocols [NYSCEF No.68, pp. 4-5]. There were subsequent delays due to Covid exposures and positive test results.

Delays Caused By Defendant During Trial

The litigation was further delayed by defendant's mid-trial applications for extensive additional discovery, including attempts to conduct extensive discovery on the plaintiff's current partner's finances and to subpoena financial records from more than a dozen businesses that the plaintiff testified he had no association with including tax returns of those businesses back to 2011 without any demonstration of a financial connection between the plaintiff and those businesses.

When the trial recommenced in May 2022, the plaintiff once again appeared represented by counsel who made a record that he had - despite no obligation to do so - attempted to comply with defendant's improperly served discovery demands in, as he characterized it, an attempt to "clean up" the record from when the parties were both appearing self-represented [NYSCEF #68, pp. 6-12].

Both parties in this action were recalcitrantly reluctant to comply with financial discovery. During the litigation plaintiff refused to provide financial discovery or provided heavily redacted information claiming that he believed defendant would use any financial information to fraudulently open credit cards using his information. Defendant also initially refused to provide an affidavit of net worth or any other financial information to plaintiff's counsel and asserted that she would only provide required financial disclosure directly to the Court "subject to a confidentiality order". The Court addressed this issue in a written decision and order dated September 28, 2017.

Prior to the next trial date in May 2022, defendant filed yet another order to show cause dated May 2021 [NYSCEFL #14] seeking to hold plaintiff's current partner in contempt for failure to comply with a subpoena. This Court issued a written decision and order dated November 16, 2021, denying the application for contempt finding that the subpoena had not been personally served on the non-party and noting that defendant had not made any application for alternate service [NYSCEF #36; decision and order on motion sequence #15]. ⁶ Once plaintiff appeared represented by Mr. Edwards, plaintiff's current partner was produced as a witness, and she testified during the trial. ⁷

6 The Court notes that defendant filed numerous affidavits of attempted service related to this application including several where defendant had attempted to use the parties' daughter to serve the plaintiff's current partner.

7 The record revealed that plaintiff and his current partner were married after he obtained a divorce from defendant from a Court in Russia; however, plaintiff conceded during this litigation that the divorce he obtained from defendant from the Court in Russia was not valid. As such, this Court will refer to the person plaintiff "married" prior to conceding the invalidity of that divorce as his "current partner" not as his "spouse" or "wife".

On multiple trial dates, the Court had to take recesses to allow defendant to compose herself because she was interrupting and speaking over the Court during rulings and being overly argumentative with the plaintiff and/or his counsel when he retained counsel [NYSCEF #68, pp. 141-142]. The Court also took numerous recesses to allow the defendant to organize her documents and to regroup for examination of plaintiff when she would not adhere to courtroom protocol and a record could not be made. The Court notified the parties on the record that it was paramount for them to conduct themselves with decorum on the record so that an accurate record could be made by the court reporter and that doing so was nearly impossible because the defendant repeatedly attempted to talk over everyone, including the Judge [NYSCEF #69, pp. 88-89].

The Facts

The parties were married on September 23, 2000, in St. Petersburg, Russia and subsequently immigrated to the United States together. Plaintiff-husband is forty-two (42) years old and is employed as an IT computer consultant and/or home health aide. Defendant-wife is forty-three (43) years old. She worked as a dental assistant during the marriage and then studied to become a dental hygienist. She worked as a dental hygienist in 2016 but has been employed as a special education teacher for the last few years ⁸ [NYSCEF #68, p. 4].

8 Defendant testified that she is employed by an agency that receives cases from the Department of Education but that she does not work for the Department of Education.

The parties separated in or about September 2007 [NYSCEF #64, p. 7] and have lived separate and apart for the last fifteen (15) years. Plaintiff testified that there has been no period of reconciliation between the parties [NYSCEF #68, p. 74] and defendant does not dispute this.

There are three (3) children of the marriage: Y. V. [emancipated, age 21]; ⁹ A. V. [age 17]; and D. V. [age 15]. The parties' youngest child was born three (3) months after the parties separated. It is undisputed the plaintiff has not been involved with or visits with the children of the marriage since he left the marital residence in or about 2007.

9 This child of the marriage is currently an adult, fully emancipated; however, this Court must consider her for purposes of retroactive child support as she only emancipated after the trial concluded. Her date of birth is March 23, 2001.

Plaintiff conceded sole custody of the children under the age of 18 years old to the defendant and that any future parenting time be "as agreeable" with the children [NYSCEF #68, p. 135]. It appears not to be in dispute that plaintiff has no relationship with the children of this marriage.

Extensive Litigation Prior to Commencement of Divorce Action

As previously noted, starting in 2008, various courts - both in New York and in Russia - issued orders of support. Throughout the intervening years, plaintiff sought downward modifications of these orders and defendant made numerous attempts to obtain upward modifications of these support orders from other courts.

Defendant obtained an order of support from New York County Family Court, on default, for $300 monthly in 2008. She also obtained an order of support from Russia to be paid $200 U.S. monthly after plaintiff relocated to Russia in or about 2008 where he remained until in or about 2010.

Upon returning to New York in 2010, plaintiff filed a downward modification in New York County Family Court which resulted, in September 2010, in a modified support order for $50 monthly. That $50 monthly support order continued from 2010 into 2017.

In 2017, the New York County Family Court issued a final order of child support for $50 monthly [JN #2; JN #3], defendant filed objections to that order, which were denied. Defendant appealed to the Appellate Division, First Department; however, while that appeal was pending, defendant also filed for a modification in Kings County Family Court and obtained a $525 monthly support obligation from the Kings County Family Court in April 2018.

It was defendant's upward modification application filed in the Kings County Family Court that this Court consolidated into this pending divorce action by order dated September 20, 2018. ¹⁰ Thereafter, in 2021, the Appellate Division, First Department issued a decision on the appeal defendant filed of that Family Court order of which she never notified this Court was pending. That decision and order remitted the matter back to Family Court to the Judge who ruled on the objections.

10 See also written order dated May 30, 2018.

Invalid Divorce Obtained From Court in Russia By Plaintiff

The plaintiff filed for divorce in Russia in or about October 2009. Plaintiff testified that he believed that divorce was granted in or about March 2010 and that as a result he subsequently married his current partner in Russia in March 2010 [NYSCEF #70, p. 18]. There are two (2) children (twins) born of that relationship in or about March 2012.

Defendant contends that plaintiff obtained the divorce from a Court in Russia by fraud. Plaintiff initially offered no explanation for why he filed for a divorce in New York while simultaneously maintaining that there was already a divorce issued by a Court in Russia. Plaintiff eventually represented that he was not sure if the divorce from Russia was vacated; however, he subsequently requested that this Court issue a judgment of divorce and withdrew his assertion that there was a divorce in Russia which defendant had represented was obtained by "fraud" from the beginning. It is undisputed and conceded by the parties that as of the trial before this Court, there is no existing judgment of divorce from any court. ¹¹

11 Plaintiff, through counsel, conceded this on the record on May 14, 2018 [NYSCEF #60].

Grounds: Irretrievable Breakdown [DRL 107(7)]

An inquest pursuant to Domestic Relations Law 170(7) for a divorce based on irretrievable breakdown was held on August 10, 2022 [NYSCEF #71] and the Court held the granting of a divorce in abeyance pending resolution of all ancillary issues. ¹²

12 The preliminary conference order indicates that the issue of grounds was resolved pursuant to DRL 170(7); however, on the eve of trial, defendant attempted to refute plaintiff's claim for a divorce on irretrievable breakdown and sought to proceed instead on her own counterclaim of adultery and cruel and inhuman treatment which was denied in a written decision and order dated April 3, 2018.

Delay of Trial

Defendant, who appeared self-represented was unable or unwilling to organize her case or her examination of the defendant: this resulted in a vast and convoluted record which required extensive judicial resources to parse through the convoluted record which was further confused by defendant's jumping from topic to topic often in so rapid a succession that she herself mixed up questions she was asking related to exhibits that were not before the witness.

Defendant made numerous allegations that documents offered into evidence at trial were different from documents that were provided to her during discovery; however, the record revealed that defendant often disassembled discovery documents and did not always reassemble them which resulted in confusion and delays, inter alia, when defendant attempted to use her "reassembled" documents to question plaintiff referring to certain pages. Defendant repeatedly handed different documents to plaintiff's counsel while attempting to question plaintiff as to other documents [NYSCEF #59, Tr. 5/18/18, p. 26-27] which caused confusion and further delays.

At other times, defendant spent trial time purportedly to "remind" the Court of the provisions of the maintenance guidelines statute and to instruct the Court on how the maintenance guideline provision functions [NYSCEF #65, pp. 82-84] instead of offering testimony or evidence as to the support needs of herself and/or the children of the marriage.

Furthermore, the Court had to repeatedly admonish the defendant on the record that she must cease and desist from attempting to have ex parte communications with the Court [NYSCEF #67, p. 2-4].

Additionally, plaintiff's utter lack of candor forced the trial to continue for many more days of cross-examination where he was confronted with inconsistencies in his testimony, and which ultimately revealed that he was hiding his financial circumstances under the name of his current partner in an effort to deprive his wife - the defendant - and their children of support.

Defendant's Testimony in the Narrative

Defendant, who represented herself throughout the litigation and the trial, testified in the narrative on August 10, 2022 [NYSCEF #71]. She testified that the parties married in 2000 in Russia and moved to the United States in 2002. She testified that she experienced domestic violence by the plaintiff during the marriage which she contends increased in or about 2004 when she discovered that he was allegedly having an affair with someone at his workplace [NYSCEF #71, pp. 68-70]. She testified that she believes this alleged physical abuse by plaintiff resulted in her having a miscarriage [NYSCEF #71, p. 70].

She testified that when the parties arrived in the United States the plaintiff worked a radio station and freelanced as a DJ and that he was paid cash [NYSCEF #71, p. 72]. She testified that she worked as a dental assistant before she stopped working and enrolled in school to become a dental hygienist [NYSCEF #71, pp. 70-71] and that while she was working, she saved $17,000 in a joint account and $10,000 in cash. She did not specify as to the alleged source of this cash. She offered no other testimony about the parties' standard of living during the marriage prior to 2007 when they separated.

Defendant testified that while pregnant with the parties' youngest child she attempted to confront a person she believed the plaintiff was having an affair with by telephone and that plaintiff "twisted my arms" so that they were swollen and "beat me in my stomach" [NYSCEF #71, p. 69] causing her to fear that she would have another miscarriage. She testified that she filed a police report and that the City of New York "started a case against him" and that as a result an order of protection was issued [NYSCEF #71, p. 70] against plaintiff expiring in 2010 prohibiting him from returning to the marital residence but, she testified, after that the plaintiff still came to the marital residence while she was at school and "stole $10,000, all cash that we had at home" and that he also transferred $17,000 from a joint account to an account in his name alone [NYSCEF #71, p. 71]. She offered no documentation in support of these claims and she testified that plaintiff stopped contributing financially when he left the marital residence in October 2007.

Defendant testified that when plaintiff left the marital residence in October 2007 she had "nothing" and was forced to apply for public assistance and to seek a court order for support for herself and the parties' children. She gave birth to the parties' youngest child, D.V., in December 2007 after plaintiff left the marital residence. Defendant's mother moved in with defendant and the children in or around this time and has resided with them ever since and presently resides in public housing.

She contends that plaintiff returned to Russia in or about 2008, she alleges, to avoid his support obligation and that even though plaintiff found a job in Russia he did not pay support.

Defendant's Current Employment

Defendant testified that she graduated from a dental hygiene program and started working as a hygienist in 2016 [NYSCEF #71, p. 100]. She testified that she only worked as a dental hygienist part-time because "it is hard to find a job, the [ sic ] full time in one place as a hygienist" [NYSCEF #71, p. 100]. She testified that she also obtained a Master's degree in Special Education, which was her background while living in Russia [NYSCEF #71, p. 100]. She testified that she has not worked as a dental hygienist since 2016 because "the practice where I was working, they sold it. And then there were - - I continue working as a special education teacher" [NYSCEF #71, p. 101].

Defendant testified that since 2016 she has been employed part-time as a special education teacher working for an agency that receives referrals from the Department of Education. She testified "[s]o it is basically very difficult having five children of your own, and/or not possible to work actually full time always as a special ed teacher, knowing like when this, all this extra work [paperwork and commuting] needs to be done as part of the job" [NYSCEF #71, p. 102]. The Court notes that while defendant has five (5) children, two (2) of those children were born of another relationship after the parties to this action separated: there are three (3) children of this marriage.

Defendant testified that her work ends in June and resumes in September "[s]o the summer months, I have to, you know, [ sic ] survive on some savings from before" [NYSCEF #71, 102]. Defendant offered no testimony as to any efforts she made to seek full-time employment or employment during the summer as the children got older.

Defendant testified that the oldest child (who turned 21 and emancipated in March 2022) attends Hunter College where she has a "triple major" [NYSCEF #71, p. 103] and that the other children are involved in many extracurricular activities including hockey and theater and that they were previously in gymnastics, dance, and music classes.

Defendant's Allegations As To Plaintiff's "Hidden" Income

Defendant testified that after she returned to the United States, plaintiff attempted to avoid any further support obligations by creating corporations to "hide" his income [NYSCEF #71, p. 83] and that she believes the plaintiff paid most of his living expenses through the corporations and that "all the deductions showing on the corporations are basically made up, because there is a lot of expenses on travel" [NYSCEF #71, p. 85] and she contends that the large deductions plaintiff claimed were for contract workers and were also not substantiated [NYSCEF #71, p. 87].

Defendant contends that plaintiff "for all this [ sic ] years, like he continue [ sic ] working for the same radio station, and like hiding all this income through third parties or corporations, and the living luxurious life, they, in my opinion they bought the house through third parties somehow" [NYSCEF #71, p. 99] because of many alleged discrepancies in his tax returns [NYSCEF #71, p. 100].

Defendant also repeatedly contends that plaintiff could, in effect, work as an accountant because he has an "accounting certification" from Kingsboro College in 2004 [NYSCEF #67, pp. 6-7]; however, plaintiff testified that this certificate is not a degree but a two-week certification in a specific computer program for accounting and that he is not certified to work in accounting [NYSCEF #66].

Defendant also testified that during the marriage plaintiff worked as a freelance "DJ" earning cash. Plaintiff testified that he "never" worked as a freelance DJ or various other jobs that defendant questioned him about [NYSCEF #64, p. 27-28; p. 36-37].

Plaintiff's Affidavit of Net Worth dated September 12, 2016 [Defendant's Exhibit A]

Plaintiff's first affidavit of net worth filed in this action reports annual expenses of limited expenses including just $1,000 monthly for "rent". Plaintiff conceded during trial that these reported expenses were under-reported because he "shared" expenses with his current partner; however, his testimony at trial and the 2016 joint tax return revealed that his current partner was not working in 2016 and that he was solely supporting the family. Additionally, plaintiff did not list expenses on his affidavit that trial testimony revealed he was paying, including automobile expenses for a least one automobile that he alleged was not his but that he paid the lease for on behalf of his father.

It is clear to the Court that plaintiff's initial affidavit of net worth was not an accurate representation as to his expenses or financial means and was designed to obscure his financial circumstances to interfere with the Court's ability to award support.

Plaintiff's Education Background

Plaintiff conceded that he earned a bachelor's degree of science in business management and finance from Brooklyn College [NYSCEF #63, p. 11; Exhibit N & P] but testified that he earns almost no income. He testified that he has struggled to find employment because, he contends, he lacks the necessary education; his English is not "good enough"; and because he often has to take care of the young children, he shares in common with his current partner despite his testimony that during much of the litigation his current partner was not employed outside the home. The Court notes that the plaintiff was able to testify in English and did not seek the services of an interpreter. He also testified that he is unable to obtain a higher paying job because, he alleges, he is constantly appearing in court proceedings due to defendant's multiple applications in various courts [NYSCEF #66, p. 45-46].

Danu Media Employment 2012-2015

Defendant contends that plaintiff has employment history with a variety of Russian radio stations going back to before they separated. Plaintiff initially disputed this then later testified that he "volunteered" at a radio station to gain experience for his resume [NYSCEF #61, p. 32-33]. He subsequently testified that he may have received "some" checks but could not remember because it was many years prior in 2012 [NYSCEF #61, p. 36]; however, later during the trial he conceded on cross-examination that he worked for Danu Radio doing data entry and computer maintenance from 2012 through 2015 [NYSCEF #63, p. 16; #69, p. 42] and was paid by checks directly through Alaskat corporation [NYSCEF #69, p. 41]. He testified that he stopped working at Danu in late 2015 because he was attempting to obtain a higher-paying job elsewhere [NYSCEF #64, p. 21]. He testified that after a probation period at this new job he "can't pass it" [NYSCEF #64, p. 21] and that he was not offered the position and that when he attempted to return to his prior job at Danu it was no longer available.

He testified that he had no ability to continue in that radio career because his experience was in a "closed wave" Russian radio station that "people needed to have a special radio, with a special chip" to listen to it and that the radio station was small with "just five people working there in the basement" so, he contends, he does not have marketable experience that allows him to obtain other employment in radio now [NYSCEF #66, pp. 47-48].

Plaintiff testified that prior to commencing this divorce action he was a full-time, salaried employee at Danu Media into 2015 but that he rarely received paystubs [NYSCEF #64, p. 66-69]. Defendant called for plaintiff to produce paystubs, which she alleged he must have produced to qualify for food stamps which he conceded he received at that time, but plaintiff testified that he was unable to locate any of those pay-stubs as they were from a job that ended some years prior [NYSCEF #66, p. 6].

The Corporations

Plaintiff initially denied operating a business and vehemently denied having any involvement with two (2) corporations held in his current partner's name and he specifically denied earning any income from the corporations [NYSCEF #59, Tr. 5/18/18, p. 30]. However, plaintiff eventually conceded that he opened these corporations using his current partner's name to hide his financial resources from the defendant because she was attempting to collect support.

Testimony at trial eventually revealed that plaintiff is self-employed running an IT computer consulting and repair business [NYSCEF #60, p. 27; NYSCEF #64, p. 43] that he conducts out of those corporations. Plaintiff eventually conceded that he operated his IT consulting business out of these corporations because he believed if he opened it in his name the defendant would "harass" him [NYSCEF #68, p. 102].

The first corporation plaintiff used this way was Alaskat Corp which he opened in April 2011. ¹³ Defendant contends that once she discovered Alaskat and how plaintiff was using it in or around 2017 that he shut that corporation down and opened a different corporation - Apple Avenue Corp. - in a further attempt to obfuscating his actual income.

13 The date of incorporation listed on the corporate tax returns is April 18, 2011.

For the majority of the trial, plaintiff vehemently testified that he had "nothing" to do with his current partner's corporations, that he knew nothing about them, the work they did or any income they may generate or how that income may be used to pay for living expenses for him and the family he shares with his current partner [NYSCEF #59, Tr. 5/18/18, p. 29; NYSCEF #59, p. 46]. Instead, plaintiff consistently testified that the corporations and any income from them belonged solely to his current partner and were - in his opinion - not subject to this litigation or part of the Court's consideration of any support awards.

He consistently stated that he knew nothing about the finances of the corporations and repeatedly responded to questions about the corporations with statements that any questions about the corporations must be asked of his current partner testifying that" she's a person, and she's individual, and I don't have a deal what she wants to do, what you are doing, what everybody does. It's not my deal. It's not relevant to me" [NYSCEF #61, p. 38]. Plaintiff asserted on numerous occasions his decisions regarding finances were guided by the defendant's overwhelming harassment of others. The Court finds plaintiff's concern regarding defendant's use of financial and other personal information and the tenor of her contact with individuals involved in his life - and in the life of his current partner - credible. Defendant has demonstrated an inability or unwillingness to accept limits in her attempt to discredit plaintiff and his current partner. Plaintiff's concerns were not specious considering defendant's behavior during this litigation; however, plaintiff's attempt to use that concern as a justification for his overt efforts to hide his financial circumstances to avoid his support obligations is not condoned by this Court. The proper remedy would be to seek Court orders seeking prohibitions on further dissemination and other limitations on contact with plaintiff's witnesses who he should have voluntarily produced.

Plaintiff repeatedly testified that his current partner was the only one with any knowledge about Alaskat and Apple corporations and repeatedly testified when questioned about the financials of these corporations that "you have to ask my significant other because it was her corporation" [NYSCEF #59, Tr. 5/18/18 p. 29]; however, plaintiff opposed calling his current partner as a witness and even attempted to quash a subpoena issued for her to testify during the trial despite his repeated testimony that she was the only one with knowledge of the corporations and that defendant must ask her any questions about how money from those corporations may be used to pay family expenses.

Late in the trial, when confronted with financial documents obtained by defendant from subpoenas, plaintiff partially changed his testimony related to the corporations and conceded that he was an authorized user on credit cards and a checking account link to these corporate accounts. Initially, he insisted, he was an authorized user for convenience only because, in effect, his current partner did not know how to sign checks and he had to help her because "she ask [ sic ] me how to sign the check" [NYSCEF #65, p.88-89]; NYSCEF #59, Tr. 5/18/18, p. 37]. At that time in the trial, plaintiff continued to maintain that he did not have any involvement in the corporations and that he did not receive any income or financial benefits from those corporations [NYSCEF #59, p. 44-45].

Late in the trial, on cross-examination, plaintiff's testimony once again changed and he conceded that the corporations were created for him to operate his IT computer consulting business [NYSCEF #69, p. 95; NYSCEF #68, p. 82].

He testified that Alaskat Corp was "defunct" as of 2016 ¹⁴ and that he closed it entirely in the fall of 2017 [NYSCEF #68, p. 80-81] ¹⁵ and immediately opened another corporation and continued his computer consulting business through that new corporation, again, never revealing this information during discovery all while claiming that they were his current partner's corporations and apparently unilaterally determining that they were not subject to this litigation. Plaintiff offered no explanation for why Alaskat was allegedly "defunct" in 2016. In fact, the 2016 Alaskat corporate tax return shows gross receipts of over $74,000. Defendant contends that plaintiff knew she discovered Alaskat, so he started operating his business out of a different corporation - Apple - in 2017 in a further attempt to hide his income. Plaintiff testified that his current partner worked for his IT business [NYSCEF #68, p. 108] as his "manager". It appears from the corporate tax returns that the operation of plaintiff's IT consultation business continued uninterrupted from Alaskat to Apple.

14 This action was commenced in September 2016.

15 As of June 2022, plaintiff represented that the certificate of dissolution for Alaskat was still pending [NYSCEF #70, p. 5].

Alaskat Corporate Tax Returns: 2016-2017

The Alaskat 2016 business tax return, admitted as Plaintiff's Exhibit 6 in evidence, reports gross receipts of $74,615; cost of goods, $26,394; gross profits of $48,221; compensation of officers, $14,400; taxes and licenses, $1,638; other deductions, $32,566; resulting in a reported taxable income of "$-383". Included in the deductions were, among others: auto expenses, $6,732; office expense, $4,987; business lease, $4,114; telephone/internet, $1,869.

The Alaskat 2017 business tax return, admitted as Plaintiff's Exhibit 7 in evidence, reports gross receipts of $65,453; cost of goods, $20,673; gross profits of $44,780; compensation of officers, $12,000; taxes and licenses, $1,453; other deductions, $31,754 resulting in a reported taxable income of "$-427". Included in the deductions were: auto expenses, $6,775; office expense, $4,520; business lease, $4,293; telephone/internet, $1,942 among others.

Plaintiff testified that no tax returns were prepared or filed after 2017 for Alaskat because the business was closed. No certificate of dissolution was offered into evidence: plaintiff testified that as of June 2022, the certificate of dissolution for Alaskat was still pending [NYSCEF #70, p. 5].

Plaintiff testified that any 1099s or W-2s were either attached to the tax returns or are not in his possession [NYSCEF #68, p. 90] and that he never received any W-2s or 1099s from Alaskat [NYSCEF #68, p. 95]. Plaintiff did not provide any books and/or records for his IT consulting business when it operated out of Alaskat.

Apple Avenue ("Apple") Corporate Tax Returns: 2017-2020

Plaintiff conceded that Apple - just like Alaskat - was used to operate his IT consulting company [NYSCEF #68, p. 100]. He testified that the Apple tax returns for 2017 and 2018 were prepared by a tax preparer but initially refused to provide the name of this alleged tax preparer. Only at the end of the trial did plaintiff finally provide a name of an individual he alleged prepared the tax returns [NYSCEF #68] for Apple in 2017 and 2018. He testified that a different tax preparer prepared the 2019 and 2020 Apple tax return [NYSCEF #68, p. 117]. There is a tax preparer's name on the Apple 2019 and 2020 corporate tax returns; however, plaintiff did not call either of those alleged tax preparers as witnesses and defendant attacked the qualifications of the alleged preparer once plaintiff finally provided the name of the person, he asserts prepared the tax returns.

Plaintiff's Failure to Produce Routine Business Books and Records

Plaintiff testified that he does not have an "hourly rate" or any formal fee structure but also that he charges clients depending on how much time and resources are required for a job [NYSCEF #64, p. 48-49] or a price list for services [NYSCEF #65, pp. 25-26]. He provided no books and records of his business finances while offer a myriad of excuses for why they were not available. Plaintiff did not produce any W-2, K-1 or 1099s from clients who were paying him through those corporations.

Plaintiff testified that he invoices his clients [NYSCEF #64, p. 49] and maintains his invoice records and payments using a software program [NYSCEF #64, 49-50] but he did not provide these records despite production of these records being called for during the trial [NYSCEF #64, p. 52]. He also testified that invoices for his services were always paid by checks - never by cash or credit card - but he also claimed that he had no record of these checks because he "cash [ sic ] it in in the cashier's window" [NYSCEF #67, pp. 17-18] so the checks were not deposited into accounts. Plaintiff offered no testimony about what or how the resulting cash from these alleged checks was used.

Based on the plaintiff's failure to provide documentation or credible testimony related to his IT consulting business or even testify, the only record before the Court is the information reported on the corporate tax returns, which indicate that they were "self-prepared." ¹⁶ Given plaintiff's lack of credibility, together with the fact that these tax returns are devoid of any supporting documentation, no testimony of any alleged tax preparer, no documentation or even explanation of how the substantial claimed deductions were calculated despite these deductions consistently resulting in a negative taxable income every year, they must be scrutinized. Plaintiff's inconsistencies are glaring.

16 Initially, plaintiff testified that his income tax returns and the corporate tax returns were all prepared by tax preparers despite them all reporting to be "self prepared"; however, he initially refused to provide any names of these alleged tax preparers. When questioned why the tax returns indicate that they were "self-prepared" he answer that he did not know [NYSCEF #62, p. 45-46]. Late in the trial, after he retained counsel, he provided a name of an individual he claimed prepared the Alaskat business tax returns for 2016, 2017, 2018 and 2019 and the Apple Avenue LLC [NYSCEF #68, p. 93] tax returns for 2019 and 2020 but he did not call this individual to testify.

Plaintiff's Undocumented/Uncorroborated Business Expense Deductions

Defendant contends that the claimed deductions listed on the corporate business tax returns are "made up, inflated, and not legit, since there was no [ sic ] actually office for either corporation" [NYSCEF #73, p. 14]. In support, she pointed out that forms detailing the claimed expenses are missing from some of the corporate tax returns [NYSCEF #69, pp. 66-67].

Plaintiff was unable or unwilling to offer any explanation for these missing deduction statements. Furthermore, on cross-examination, plaintiff testified that he could not explain how the expense deductions were calculated for the corporations because "I'm not familiar with accounting so I cannot explain" [NYSCEF #69, p. 66] despite the tax returns saying "self-prepared".

"Office Expenses"

The corporate tax return for 2017 shows deductions for numerous alleged expenses including "business leasing, $4,293; business promotions, $6,743; car expenses, $6,775; computer supplies, $5,298; office expenses, $4,520; telephone/internet, $1,942" [Plaintiff's 7 in evidence; NYSCEF #69, pp. 67-68]. Plaintiff did not provide any supporting documentation of these alleged expenses or how they relate to his business which he classified as an IT consulting business without a storefront.

Plaintiff claimed deductions for business "lease" despite conceding that there was no dedicated business location for either corporation. ¹⁷ Plaintiff eventually conceded that the "office" expense deductions included part of his apartment and telephone and utility expenses for that apartment that he shares with his current partner and their children because he stores his computer and tools there. On cross-examination, he conceded that the business was really "some corner where my computer stand [ sic ], where my screwdrivers is [ sic ] there so it's just the part of my home is part of my office" [NYSCEF #69, p. 77].

17 Plaintiff testified that he used his parents' residence as his business address because it was a stabile address where he could receive mail without issues [NYSCEF #66, pp. 19-2; NYSCEF #68, pp. 139-140].

Plaintiff also conceded on cross-examination that he deducted apartment utilities "because I, as I said, I need to use electricity in my home, right, to operate" [NYSCEF #69, p. 78]. Even if some form or portion of deduction was permissible, plaintiff failed to provide the Court with any documentation or explanation for how the sums claimed as deductions were substantiated.

Also, plaintiff's testimony that he does not have an automobile appears inconsistent with this tax returns which indicate deductions for an automobile. Plaintiff offered inconsistent testimony related to this deduction and no documentation in support.

"Outsourcing"

The largest deduction on these business returns was for "outsourcing": the corporate business tax return for 2017 list a deduction for "outsourcing" of more than $20,000 for Alaskat and more than $40,000 for Apple ¹⁸ in the same year. On cross-examination, when question about this deduction, plaintiff testified that "I assume that my tax preparer included, yes, for payment to somebody to resolve some issues" that "I couldn't resolve" [NYSCEF #69, p. 73]. He testified that because he was "self-educated, I am asking somebody. It could be a - - and pay them for their job" [NYSCEF #69, p. 74]. This vague testimony was the only explanation plaintiff provided for this deduction. Plaintiff, when questioned further related to this deduction, refused to provide names of any businesses or individuals he allegedly used for "outsourcing" and did not provide any records showing payments from the corporation to any "outsourcing" providers.

18 Apparently, both corporations existed and filed business tax returns in 2017. The total gross receipts were $151,480 ($86,027 [Apple] = $65,453 [Alaskat allegedly closed in fall 2017] = $151,480).

Plaintiff subsequently conceded on cross-examination that he also deducted certain business expenses off his personal tax returns [NYSCEF #69, pp. 94-95] and that he had no documentation in support of those claimed expenses either.

This pattern of deductions for alleged (unsupported by any documentation) "business expenses" was consistent across all the corporate tax returns in evidence and plaintiff's testimony remained the same: he did not prepare the tax returns and he did not have any documentation in support of the alleged expenses and could not explain how the deductions were determined. Each year, this claimed deduction for "outsourcing" was approximately half of the reported gross receipts of the corporations, and each year this deduction fluctuated and appeared to correspond to nearly the same sum as any remaining funds in the business so that after business deductions the corporations were losing money according to the tax returns.

RUSA Radio

Defendant contends that plaintiff works for "Russian radio". Plaintiff initially testified that he was never employed by RUSA Radio [NYSCEF #63, p. 24-25]. Later in the trial, plaintiff conceded on cross-examination that he provided "computer cleaning" to RUSA Radio for a retainer of $300 monthly [NYSCEF #68, pp. 122-123] in 2016 and 2017 which was paid through Alaskat corporation (this is discussed below). He testified that the hours of work he provided "depends. Sometimes it was whole weeks, sometimes they do not call me for three four weeks" [NYSCEF #68, p. 123].

During this litigation, defendant suggested that plaintiff is, in effect, colluding with individuals involved in what she calls "Russian Radio" to work in various capacities - such as a sound engineer, etc. - at radio stations that she then contends are paid "off the books" or through obscured transfers into the corporations. Defendant asserted that the Court should - unilaterally - hold individuals related to these entities in contempt for not testifying. Given plaintiff's convoluted testimony related to his employment background with a radio station allegedly doing "data entry" and his subsequent work for the same radio station allegedly providing IT computer consulting "on call" the Court finds plaintiff's failure to call anyone from that entity troublesome. The Court also notes that the Court signed subpoenas for numerous individuals allegedly associated with this radio station and another corporation; however, none of these individuals appeared and plaintiff did not call these individuals as witnesses in support of his testimony related thereto.

Plaintiff's Post-Commencement Personal Income Tax Returns: 2016

Plaintiff reported $4,375 income on his 2016 joint tax return. He testified that he only earned income for that tax year starting in September 2016 because from January 2016 until September 2016 he was looking for work and at home with the children he shares with his current partner while she was taking classes [NYSCEF #64, p. 59-60]. However, testimony at trial ultimately revealed that plaintiff was already conducting an IT computer consulting business in 2016 operating out of Alaskat.

The Court notes that while initially claiming that he only worked a few months in 2016 and testifying that he earned less than $5,000 in 2016, testimony later revealed that plaintiff was already operating his IT consulting business through Alaskat during 2016. The 2016 Alaskat corporate tax return [admitted as plaintiff's 6 in evidence] reported gross receipts of $74,615; cost of goods, $26,394 ["outsourcing"]; gross profits of $48,221; compensation of officers, $14,400; taxes and licenses, $1,638; other deductions, $32,566 resulting in a reported taxable income of "$-383". Included in the claimed deductions as business expenses were: auto expenses, $6,732; office expense, $4,987; business lease, $4,114; telephone/internet, $1,869. Bank records subpoenaed by defendant for Alaskat corporation reveal that among other payments corporate accounts paid auto leases for cars which plaintiff alleged were owned by his father but - at times, at least - available for him to use (Defendant's exhibit E in evidence).

Plaintiff's Post-Commencement Income Tax Returns: 2017

Plaintiff's 2017 joint personal income tax return [defendant's exhibit BB in evidence] reports $27,214 income ($16,000 from W2 and $11,214 business income) and claims a refund of $7,209.

Apple 2017 business tax return [Plaintiff's 8 in evidence] reports gross receipts of $86,027; cost of goods, $40,814 [listed as "outsourcing"]; gross profits of $45,213; compensation of officers, REDACTED; ¹⁹ taxes and licenses, $1,815; other deductions, $27,547 resulting in a reported taxable income of "$-249." No statement or accounting of the $27,547 in claimed deductions is attached to the 2017 tax return. There is no indication on this tax return of who prepared it: plaintiff testified that it was prepared by a tax preparer.

19 Despite plaintiff redacting this sum, there is $16,000 reported on the plaintiff's personal income tax return filed jointly with his current partner [plaintiff's exhibit 1 in evidence].

Plaintiff's Post-Commencement Income Tax Returns: 2018

Plaintiff did not provide a copy of his 2018 personal income tax return; however, the Apple 2018 business tax return [Plaintiff's 9 in evidence] reports gross receipts of $93,461; cost of goods, $58,314 [listed as "outsourcing"]; gross profits of $35,147; compensation of officers, REDACTED; taxes and licenses, $965; other deductions, $25,478 resulting in a reported taxable income of "$-396." No statement or accounting of the $25,478 in claimed deductions is attached to the 2018 tax return. As previously noted, there is no indication on this tax return of who prepared it: plaintiff testified that it was prepared by a tax preparer but did not call that alleged preparer to testify. The reduction of compensation to officers is troublesome and suspect particularly within the framework presented by plaintiff and all the inconsistencies he offered in his testimony without supporting documentation.

Despite deducting $58,314 for alleged "outsourcing" in work in 2018 [NYSCEF #69, pp. 110-111], plaintiff did not call any of these individuals who allegedly provided "outsourcing" or provide any documentation in support of this alleged deduction. An additional deduction of $25,478 was also taken in 2018 but plaintiff was unable to recall what deductions those may be and no itemized statement with any details was annexed to the tax return [NYSCEF #69, p. 112].

Plaintiff's Post-Commencement Income Tax Returns: 2019

Plaintiff's 2019 joint tax return annexed to his updated affidavit of net worth dated March 2022 reports income of $28,934 and claims a refund of $9,029 [Plaintiff's exhibit 3 in evidence]. Included as expenses deducted are more than $8,500 in telephone, internet, transportation and "computer" expenses. Plaintiff conceded during trial that he may have deducted business expenses from his personal income tax returns. Notably, it appears that telephone and internet and transportation expenses were deducted from both the corporate and personal tax returns for corresponding years. Moreover, as previously noted, plaintiff deducted $11,525 for the alleged "business use" of his home; however, during trial he testified that the business was "some corner where my computer stand [ sic ], where my screwdrivers is [ sic ]" in his apartment yet he deducted nearly 50% of his total annual rent in 2019.

Apple 2019 business tax return [Plaintiff's 10 in evidence] reports gross receipts of $44,225; cost of goods, $16,015; gross profits of $28,210; compensation of officers, none; taxes and licenses, $57; other deductions, $26,384 resulting in a reported taxable income of "$-2,581." The 2019 Apple Avenue business tax return is the only one that includes a statement or accounting of the claimed deductions. This tax return names a CPA preparer who was not called as a witness. Listed deductions include: automobile, $15,001; computer, $8,127; telephone, $600; utilities, $936; local transportation, $377.

Plaintiff's Post-Commencement Income Tax Returns: 2020

Plaintiff's 2020 individual tax returned annexed to his updated affidavit of net worth, dated March 2022, reports income of $12,636 and claims a refund of $3,220. Plaintiff testified that he filed separately from his current partner in 2020 "for the reason to calculate the child support based on my income and not on our joint household income" [NYSCEF 369, p. 6].

Apple 2020 tax return [Plaintiff's 11 in evidence] reports no gross receipts and a loss of $-160. This return indicates that it was prepared by a named CPA. Plaintiff did not call that individual as a witness. This return was only offered into evidence at the end of the trial.

Plaintiff testified that in 2020, Apple ceased operating "because of COVID" [NYSCEF #68, p. 101]. Plaintiff testified that due to the COVID pandemic most of his business ended because "[m]ost of them are closed or don't have any offices. They are working remote from home so I don't have clients" [NYSCEF #68, p. 167]. The certificate of dissolution of Apple Avenue LLC dated January 19, 2022, was marked into evidence, without objection, as plaintiff's 12 [NYSCEF #70, p. 5].

Plaintiff testified that he was unemployed from April 2020 until September 2021 and that his only source of income was the $700 weekly in pandemic relief unemployment benefits he received [NYSCEF #68, pp. 55-56].

Plaintiff testified, in effect, that he was unable to work doing IT consulting during the pandemic because people were working from home instead of working in offices and they did not, allegedly, need IT services.

Plaintiff offered no explanation for why his IT consulting business also apparently generated no income from January through March 2020 even though he contends that that business ended because of the pandemic; however, the pandemic shelter in place protocols did not impact New York City until mid-March 2020.

He testified that his pandemic benefits terminated in September 2021 because he "found a job" [NYSCEF #68, p. 56] making $16 hourly [NYSCEF #68, p. 166] full-time as a personal assistant for a healthcare company "taking care of elder [ sic ] people". He testified that he started working for this home health company briefly in March 2020 but that due to the COVID pandemic he was not employed there against until September 2021 [NYSCEF #68, p. 41-42; NYSCEF #68, pp. 164-165]. He testified that he is currently working full-time (40 hours) with this healthcare company.

Plaintiff's Post-Commencement Income Tax Returns: 2021

On May 5, 2022, plaintiff testified that he had not provide his 2021 income tax returns because they are "on extensions" [NYSCEF #69, p. 5].

Plaintiff's Updated Affidavit of Net Worth dated March 21, 2022[NYSCEF #42; Plaintiff's Exhibit 3]

In his updated affidavit of net worth, dated March 21, 2022, plaintiff reports that his projected 2022 income is $37,500 ²⁰ and that his current partner's income, with whom he shares a residence and children, as reported on her 2020 income tax return she earned $53,471. ²¹

20 Plaintiff lists his employer as "Global Home Care" on his affidavit of net worth [Plaintiff's exhibit 3]. He testified that he projects to earn $38,000 in 2022 inclusive of overtime [NYSCEF #68, p. 47].

21 Plaintiff testified that the parties filed or were filing separate tax returns for 2020 and 2021.

Plaintiff listed the following monthly expenses on his updated affidavit of net worth dated March 21, 2022 totaling $4,783.33 [$57,399.96 annually]: rent, $2,175; gas, $200; electric, $50; internet, $40; groceries, $800; dining out, $200; clothing for self, $50; clothing for children, $150; automotive gas, $400; school supplies, $30; school events, $15; school other, $50; barber, $20; toiletries, $10; commuting expenses, $130; child support; ²² $353.33; alimony, $100. ²³

22 Family Court order of child support dated April 12, 2021 (Docket F-02830-10/13C)

23 Family Court order of spousal support dated April 12, 2021 (Docket F-02830-10/13C)

Plaintiff listed assets of "N/A" but listed $3,000 in a checking account and also listed $13,000 in credit card debts and $7,500 in counsel fees due and owing to his current attorney.

Living Expenses

Defendant contends that plaintiff never provided proof of his living expenses or financial records showing how these expenses were paid. He asserts that he lives with his current partner and their children in a three (3) bedroom apartment for $2,100 monthly [NYSCEF #60, p. 61]. On cross-examination, when confronted with his March 13, 2018 affidavit of net worth [Defendant's A] he conceded that he listed his rent expense as $1,000 monthly. He testified that he only listed his "share" of his expenses on his affidavit of net worth and did not list the full sum for the apartment because he resides there with his current partner [NYSCEF #60, p. 70]. He subsequently testified that he and his current partner "decide, with both of us, we decide who will pay for something" and that sometimes he pays the full rent and sometimes he pays less [NYSCEF #65, p. 89]. Plaintiff testified that his current rent is $2,100 monthly and that it is paid from the joint account he shares with his current partner [NYSCEF #66, p. 52].

Defendant questioned plaintiff about how he could afford a rent payment that was more than his reported income on his joint tax returns and plaintiff testified that he did not know [NYSCEF #66, p. 54-55]. Subsequently, plaintiff testified that he had a joint account with his current partner from 2010 until 2021 and that expenses were paid from that account but then asserted that they closed that account in 2021 and each have separate bank accounts. He testified that he withdraws money from his personal account and gives it to his current partner to use toward paying the family's living expenses or that he pays an expense directly from his account [NYSCEF #68, pp. 160-162].

Plaintiff's Residence

Defendant testified that she believes plaintiff purchased a house in Staten Island. She provided only speculation as to this proposition and failed to provide any proof as to this allegation. Plaintiff testified that neither he nor his current partner own any real estate and never has owned any real estate [NYSCEF #68, p. 47-48] and testified that he lives in an apartment in Staten Island with his current partner, his step-daughter and the twins born to plaintiff's relationship with his current partner and his current partner's mother [NYSCEF #68, pp. 43-44; NYSCEF #70, p. 14]. A copy of a lease for May 1, 2022 through May 1, 2025 for $2,350 monthly was accepted into evidence [Plaintiff's 13 in evidence].

Defendant questioned plaintiff extensively about discrepancies in the lease document [NYSCEF #69, pp. 15-16] including why no children were listed on the lease and why the total lease amount for a 3-year lease was only the amount for one year of rent and not the total for three (3) years.

The Court does not find defendant's assertion that somehow the defendant is in "conspiracy" with the landlord of the apartment where he and his current partner live credible or that the lease term or the children are not listed as credible concerns nor the method of payment. The Court does not find defendant's claims that the rent is deposited into the landlords account as a basis to find that there is some form of fraud.

Witness Testimony: A. K. [Plaintiff's Current Partner]

Plaintiff's current partner A. K. testified [NYSCEF #70] that she and the plaintiff filed joint tax returns throughout their relationship including 2019, but that they started filing married filing separately in 2020 because "[a]ll the returns [refunds] that I received during the pandemic and all the money that were received for the children, they were taken by child support" [NYSCEF #70, p. 15].

The witness testified that Alaskat Corporation was shut down and the business was moved to a new corporation - Apple Avenue - because the defendant "started coming to our clients' places, she started telling them how bad I was, she was complaining, and her mom started complaining as well, and, and she wanted me to share the profits of the company with her" [NYSCEF #70, p. 28].

She testified that she and the plaintiff pay rent of $2,250 exclusive of utilities (gas, electric and water) [NYSCEF #70, p. 32]. She testified that prior to the corporations closing that the parties paid personal expenses through the corporations including rent and utilities. She testified that:

" that company had an office in my apartment. I was paying from my personal bank account, and I had on office in my apartment. If the office was used a lot, and the cooler was needed for the computer, and it is energy consuming, in those cases, I would pay 90 percent of the bills from my personal apartment - account, and ten percent from the business account, it all varied [NYSCEF #70, p. 38].

The witness testified that the business was "on call" with a Russian radio company and had other clients [NYSCEF #70, pp. 60-62]. She testified that sometimes the corporation outsourced work; however, she offered no testimony as to who allegedly did this outsourcing or how it was paid.

The witness testified that she was paid a salary through the businesses [NYSCEF #70, p. 66-67] until the business closed in 2020 [NYSCEF #70, p. 73] and that she now worked as an assistant for an elder care service [NYSCEF #70, p. 73].

Plaintiff's Current Partner's Income

Initially during the trial plaintiff testified that he did not know how much his current partner earns. Subsequently, he testified that she earns approximately $53,000 annually [NYSCEF #68, p. 169] and that together they earn approximately $70,000 annually [NYSCEF #68, p. 170]. He testified that there are no other sources of income that he uses to cover his new family's living expenses [NYSCEF #68, p. 170]. Later still in the testimony, plaintiff testified that his current partner is a "manager" for the corporation that he uses this corporation to run his IT consultation business [NYSCEF #69, p. 96-97]. It appears from the business tax returns that the corporation paid his current partner between $12,000 and $15,000 annually from the corporation, not over $50,000 as plaintiff initially testified. Plaintiff offered no explanation for this discrepancy.

The Parties' Passports

Defendant's affidavit of net worth included $200-500 monthly for vacations. On cross-examination defendant conceded that she traveled to the following places between 2017 and 2022: Turkey in 2017; Russia, Iceland and Hungary in 2018; Barcelona, California, Amsterdam, Lisbon, Hawaii and Colombia in 2019; Aruba, San Diego, Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, and Chile in 2022. Attempting to explain how she affords this level of discretionary international travel, defendant testified that when she travels to Russia she buys "the cheapest tickets" using credit card points [NYSCEF #72, pp. 24-25] and that many times these cheaper fares "requires stop overs" [NYSCEF #71, p. 109-127; NYSCEF #72, p. 4]. A copy of defendant's passport pages were entered into evidence as defendant's exhibit FFF.

A copy of plaintiff's passport was also entered into evidence as plaintiff's exhibit 14. It shows a three (3) day trip to Dominican Republic since it was issued on August 1, 2016.

Plaintiff's Tax Returns Prior to Commencement

Plaintiff reported $16,043 as self-employment income on his 2012 income tax return [NYSCEF #61, p. 20] which included approximately $7,000 earned from a data entry job [NYSCEF #61, p. 22].

Plaintiff reported $15,606 income on his 2013 joint tax return. He listed his occupation as "miscellaneous services" and his current partner's occupation was listed as "housewife" not earning any income outside the home [NYSCEF #62, p. 41].

Plaintiff reported $17,163 income on his 2014 joint tax return. He testified that his current partner was not working outside the home or earning income in 2014.

Plaintiff reported $16,140 income on his 2015 joint tax return. He testified that he worked full-time (10 a.m. to 6 p.m.) in 2015 for Danu Media doing data entry. He testified that he did not receive paystubs from that employment unless he requested them. On the joint 2015 tax return, plaintiff's current partner's occupation was listed as "manager" [NYSCEF #63, p. 5-6; Defendant's O in evidence].

Credit Cards

Plaintiff testified that he holds credit cards in his name alone and that he is an authorized user on "five or six" credit cards opened by his current partner [NYSCEF #59, Tr. 5/18/18, p. 35; NYSCEF #62, p. 9]. Plaintiff testified that he "could not submit somebody else's credit card statement. If I have - if I was - I was an authorized user on this credit card, and I buy something, but I cannot ask somebody's else statement from the credit card" [NYSCEF #62, p. 15]. He testified that "how she [his current partner] pays for it, I don't know" [NYSCEF #62, p. 18].

Corporate Credit Cards

Subpoenaed records that were offered and accepted into evidence [Defendant's exhibit JJ] that plaintiff was an authorized user on several corporate credit cards. These subpoenaed records show that plaintiff charged some air travel, restaurants, entertainment; personal household expenses; and expenses for automobiles including car washes, gas, DMV fees, red light camera tickets and Geico automobile insurance on these corporate credit cards.

Automobile Payments

Plaintiff testified that he has never leased an automobile but eventually conceded that throughout the years he has consistently had "access" to his father's automobiles when his father was not using them [NYSCEF #67, p. 20-21] and that lease payments for at least some of these automobiles were made through his corporate accounts and deducted as expenses [NYSCEF #69, pp. 11-12]. He testified that $300 monthly was deducted from a corporate account for one of those automobiles [NYSCEF #69, p. 12]. Chase bank records from the corporation in evidence as defendant's exhibit NN show auto lease payments of $342.83 to Nissan. Plaintiff maintained that the automobiles he incurred these costs for and paid through the corporation all belonged to his father.

He also conceded on cross-examination that he pays some other expenses related to this automobile and testified that "I could pay for some monthly payments instead of my father. But it was just so we discussed. So, for example, I paid for this afternoon, he'll pay for something else. So I could pay for some monthly payments for his car." [NYSCEF #67, p. 25]. He testified that he spends approximately $200 monthly on gas to use his father's car [NYSCEF #68, p. 49].

He testified that a Honda Odyssey is leased in his current partner's name and that she pays that expense [NYSCEF #68, p. 49]; however, subsequently, he testified that he and his current partner share all expenses [NYSCEF #68, p. 151].

On cross-examination, defendant questioned plaintiff regarding the lack of any expense for automobile insurance on his affidavit of net worth and plaintiff, through counsel, stipulated that he pays automobile insurance of $1,600 annually [NYSCEF #68, p. 151-152, 154] which he concedes was inadvertently not listed on his affidavit of net worth.

Defendant asserted that the automobiles were really plaintiff's and that he was engaged in a fraud to hide his ownership of the cars. While plaintiff enjoys the benefit of access and use to at least one automobile, including the one leased by his current partner, the defendant did not establish that he leased or owned this vehicle himself. Defendant's contention that he secretly owns or leases another automobile is not supported by the record despite some evidence that plaintiff made at least some payments toward that automobile. It is credible that he has access to automobiles: it is unclear whether those automobiles are leased by the business or others. His claim that he uses his father's automobile is not credible under the totality of the facts and circumstances here.

Spousal Support Claim

Defendant contends that the Court should "correct" and "restore" - back to 2010 - awards of spousal support because, she contends, the prior award of spousal support was terminated based upon plaintiff's false claim that he received a divorce from her in Russia in or about 2010 when, in fact, there was no valid divorce - Russian or otherwise - in 2010 or subsequent [NYSCEF #63, p. 12].

There is no jurisdiction for this Court to relitigate all the years of litigation and objections that were filed during the more than nine (9) years of litigation between the parties in Family Court. This Court is not an "appellate court" for the Family Court and, in fact, defendant exercised her right to seek appeals of Family Court orders in the past. The Court only has jurisdiction in this action from the date of commencement.

Plaintiff's Name Change

Plaintiff testified that he changed his name from Aleksandr V[REDACTED] to Aleksandr V[REDACTED] by court order in or about May 2015 and that he changed his name when he obtained his United States citizenship "to make [ sic ] more comfortable for me and my kids" [NYSCEF #60, p. 15]. Defendant contends that plaintiff changed his name to obfuscate her ability to discover his financial means and resources. Throughout this trial, defendant challenged plaintiff's name change claiming it was yet another attempt to deceive the Court at almost each and every appearance when names were placed on the record. The Court found the plaintiff's explanation of his name change credible.

Plaintiff testified that he has one bank account: a joint TD Bank account with his current partner comprised of a joint checking and joint savings account [NYSCEF #59, Tr. 5/18/18, p. 34].

Defendant's Income

Defendant testified that she works as a special education teacher for a company that receives referrals from the Department of Education. She is a W-2 employee. She reported income as follows on those tax returns:

YEAR	ADJUSTED GROSS INCOME	Exhibit
2020	$30,336	BBB
2019	$46,986	AAA
2018	$48,423	ZZ
2017	$38,504	YY
2016	$32,849 24	XX

24 Defendant also claimed numerous business deductions on her income tax returns which were not supported by the testimony or evidence.

Defendant also claimed numerous business deductions on her income tax returns which were not supported by the testimony or evidence.

In 2020, defendant claimed the following: $4,033 in business losses in 2020, including $1,176 for cell phone/internet, $390 job search, $650 for laundry and clothing, $550 for laptop, $1,100 for transportation, $530 for "toys games educational materials", $250 for "gifts" and $660 for "meals entertainment."

In 2019, defendant claimed the following: $6,842 in business losses in 2019, including $360 for job search, $1,020 for cell phone/internet, $200 laundry, $450 clothing, $1,200 for transportation, $200 for gifts, $420 for "toys games educational materials" and $980 for meals/entertainment.

In 2018, defendant claimed the following: $6,650 in business losses in 2018, including $200 for laundry, $420 for clothing, ²⁵ $1,660 for transportation, $1,116 for phone/internet; $680 "other equipment" and $250 "gifts." The 2017 information was not provided.

25 The Court notes that defendant represented that she has not worked as a dental assistant since 2016.

In 2016, defendant claimed the following: $12,321 in business losses in 2016, including $269 for laundry, $990 for clothing, $250 for "gifts", $1,600 for "toys, games, books, educational materials, furniture other"; $200 phone, $180 laptop, $50 printer and $980 public transportation.

Like plaintiff, defendant offered no documentation in support of the claimed deductions. Defendant claimed numerous deductions to her income including for cell phone, internet, clothing, laundry and "gifts". While certainly in some cases, such deductions may be permissible, here, there is no indication in the record that defendant is self-employed or that she is required to wear a uniform nor did defendant offer any testimony or records showing supporting her claim that her cell phone or internet were permissible deductions. The Court notes that in 2016, while a W-2 employee (not self-employed), defendant deducted telephone expenses, etc. There were numerous opportunities for defendant to offer support for these claimed deductions but she failed to do so. Based on the record before the Court, there is no support for the claimed deductions.

Defendant's Updated Affidavit of Net Worth dated May 10, 2022 [WW in evidence]

Defendant listed monthly expenses of $7,827 [$93,924 annually] itemized as follows: Rent, $1,139; ²⁶ cell phone, $78; internet, $20; groceries, $400; dining out, $100; clothing (self), $100; clothing (children), $300; laundry, $50; automotive insurance, $120; dental (unreimbursed), $50; pharmaceutical (unreimbursed), $20; household repairs, $100; extermination, $20; household help, $1,200; gas, $150; car repairs, $200; parking/tolls, $100; car (other), $100; college, $150; school supplies, $100; school lunches, $100; tutoring, $100; school events, $100; extracurricular activities, $200; education costs (other), $50; vacations, $200-500; ²⁷ movies, $100; recreation clubs, $150; activities for self, $50; summer camp, $100; birthday parties, $200-300; state taxes, $200; city taxes, $150; social security and MediCare, $400; beauty parlor, $50; toiletries, $60; books, $15; gifts to others, $50; charitable contributions, $25; commutation expenses, $120; veterinarian, $50; unreimbursed business expenses, $400; toys/games, $50, ²⁸ furniture/electronics, $150; ²⁹ children's allowances, $100. ³⁰ Defendant's updated affidavit of net worth dated May 10, 2022 lists assets as follows: checking account, $1,399; savings account, $5,300; automobile [Kia Sedona 2012] which she lists as acquired in August 2021 for $3,000 with a current fair market value of $2,000 and a moped acquired in October 2021 for $1,200 with a current fair market value of $1,200. She lists a 529 college savings plan held in the names of her children with current value listed as "varies 4-10k (sic)" which she contends is from "tax refunds." She lists liabilities of $620 in parking and inspection fines; $18,150 due and owing for afterschool from 2016-2018 which she contends was originally $30,717. Defendant provided no documentation or testimony in support of this alleged debt. She listed that she has "multiple" credit cards with a combined balance of "~$4,500" Defendant testified that her expenses exceed her income and that she earns between $40,000-55,000 annually. She testified that she expected to earn $50,000 in 2022 [NYSCEF #71, p. 108] and she testified that she can cover her monthly expenses between her income, the child support she receives from plaintiff, the child support she receives from the father of her twins [approximately $2,400 monthly] together with income tax refunds and moving balances from one credit card to another [NYSCEF #72, p. 12]. She asserts that "[i]t is not enough" [NYSCEF #72, p. 12]. She testified that the children of this marriage are getting older and their expenses are increasing because they want nicer clothing and things now [NYSCEF #72, p. 21-22] and maintains that while plaintiff may be current on his child support obligation set by the Family Court that he, in effect, lied on his financial disclosures to that Court and that the award of support was not calculated on his actual income. As noted, she repeatedly seeks review by this Court of the prior orders of the Family Court and, most recently, what she perceives to be the errors of the Appellate Division in the appeals she filed and the decisions therein.

26 Defendant apparently resides in NYCHA housing.

27 Defendant provided a wide monthly range of "$200-500"

28 Defendant handwrote this category in.

29 Defendant handwrote this category in.

30 Defendant handwrote this category in.

Equitable Distribution

The parties entered a preliminary conference order in which the parties represented that any issues of equitable distribution were resolved [JN1]. At trial, neither party offered evidence of any equitable distribution. As such, no award of equitable distribution is made. Credibility It is well established that the "trial court, which had the opportunity to view the demeanor of the witnesses, was in the best position to gauge their credibility" (Massirman v. Massirman, 78 A.D.3d 1021, 911 N.Y.S.2d 462 [2 Dept., 2010], quoting Peritore v. Peritore, 66 A.D.3d 750, 888 N.Y.S.2d 72 [2 Dept., 2009]; see also Varga v. Varga, 288 A.D.2d 210, 732 N.Y.S.2d 576 [2 Dept., 2001], quoting Diaco v. Diaco, 278 A.D.2d 358, 717 N.Y.S.2d 635 [2 Dept., 2000]; Ferraro v. Ferraro, 257 A.D.2d 596, 684 N.Y.S.2d 274 [2 Dept., 1999]), and that, generally, in a "non-jury trial, evaluating the credibility of the respective witnesses and determining which of the proffered items of evidence are most credible are matters committed to the trial court's sound discretion" (In re Elam, 140 A.D.3d 754 [2 Dept.,2017]; Bouffard v Befese, LLC, 111 A.D.3d 866 [2 Dept.,2013]; Goldstein v. Guida, 74 A.D.3d 1143, 904 N.Y.S.2d 117 [2 Dept.,2010], quoting Ivani v. Ivani, 303 A.D.2d 639, 757 N.Y.S.2d 89 [2 Dept.,2003], quoting L'Esperance v. L'Esperance, 243 A.D.2d 446, 663 N.Y.S.2d 95 [2 Dept.,1997]; see also Schwartz v. Schwartz, 67 A.D.3d 989, 890 N.Y.S.2d 71 [2 Dept.,2009]; Krutyansky v. Krutyansky, 289 A.D.2d 299, 733 N.Y.S.2d 920 [2 Dept.,2001]). The trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses and evidence is afforded great weight on appeal (see Fairchild v Fairchild, 149 A.D.3d 810 [2 Dept.,2017]; Alper v. Alper, 77 A.D.3d 694, 909 N.Y.S.2d 131 [2 Dept.,2010]; see also Massirman v. Massirman, 78 A.D.3d 1021, 911 N.Y.S.2d 462 [2 Dept.,2010]; Schwartz v. Schwartz, 67 A.D.3d 989, 890 N.Y.S.2d 71 [2 Dept.,2009]; Jones-Bertrand v. Bertrand, 59 A.D.3d 391, 874 N.Y.S.2d 152 [2 Dept.,2009]; Wortman v. Wortman, 11 A.D.3d 604, 783 N.Y.S.2d 631 [2 Dept.,2004]). This Court had the opportunity to observe the parties at many court appearances, during numerous days of the trial on the financial issues between them. Based thereon, this Court finds that there are severe credibility issues with the plaintiff's testimony. There is ample evidence in the record which indicates to this Court that the plaintiff lacks credibility. There were also credibility issues with the defendant's testimony. Maintenance The legislature enacted DRL 236 [B], effective January 25, 2016, requiring Courts to calculate and award both temporary and permanent maintenance awards derived from applying statutory formulas to parties' annual income to regulate and create more consistency among pendente lite maintenance awards. This statutory provision is commonly referred to as the maintenance guidelines. The legislation established factors that a Court may consider when deviating from awarding the presumptively correct temporary maintenance under the guidelines. In applying the statutory formulas, the Court must first determine the parties' respective annual incomes pursuant to the Child Support Standards Act.

The Parties' Income

It is well settled that a parties' rendition of their own income and tax returns need not be adopted by the Court if not credible (see Anyanwu v Anyanwu, 216 A.D.3d 1128 [2 Dept., 2023]; see also Sufia v Khalique, 189 A.D.3d 1499 [2 Dept.,2020]; see Klein v Klein, 178 A.D.3d 820 [2 Dept.,2019]; see also Weitzner v. Weitzner, 120 A.D.3d 1406, 1407, 992 N.Y.S.2d 576 [2d Dept., 2014]. "A court is justified in imputing income to a spouse when it is shown that the marital lifestyle was such that, under the circumstances, there was a basis for the court to conclude that the spouse's actual income and financial resources were greater than what he or she reported on his or her tax returns." Id; see Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (5-a); Domestic Relations Law § 240 [1-b]; see also Barnett v. Ruotolo, 49 A.D.3d 640, 641, 854 N.Y.S.2d 155 [2d Dept., 2008]. The Court may exercise discretion in imputing income to parties when submitted financial documentation contains considerable discrepancies. In Anyanwa v Anyanwu the Appellate Division, Second Department found that "[w]here a party's account is not believable, the court may impute a true or potential income higher than alleged" ( 216 A.D.3d 1128, *1 [2 Dept.,2023], citing Sufia v Khalique, 189 A.D.3d 1499, 1501 [2 Dept.,2020]). The Appellate Division has found that financial documentation contained considerable discrepancies when the party's "financial documentation indicated that his monthly income was only approximately one-third of his stated monthly expenses, and no evidence was submitted to show that these monthly expenses were not being paid in a timely manner." (Barnett v Tuotolo, at 640-41). It is well-established that the Court is not required to rely on a party's account of his or her finances and may instead impute income based on the party's past income or demonstrated earning potential and the Court is afforded "considerable discretion" in determining whether to impute income (see Vaysburd v Vaysburd, 2023 NY Slip Op 03039 [June 7, 2023]; see also Anyanwa v Anyanwu, 216 A.D.3d 1128 [2 Dept.,2023]; Sufia v Khalique, 189 A.D.3d 1499 [2 Dept.,2020]; see also Siskind v Siskind, 89 A.D.3d 832, 834 [2 Dept.,2011]). At trial, the only semblance of consistency between the parties related to their financial circumstances is that they earned limited income and deducted living expenses freely from their reported income - and did not substantiate any of their claimed deduction from their tax returns. Both parties offered implausible explanations for their financial circumstances with the plaintiff's representation of his financial circumstances defying any semblance of credibility.

Plaintiff's Income for Purposes of Calculating His Support Obligation

Plaintiff deducted many or most of his living expenses from his corporate and personal tax returns - and that he even, at least at times, deducting similar expenses from both tax returns. What resulted was that while reporting gross income of $75,000-93,000 for his IT consulting business by the time he was done deducting unsubstantiated expenses he alleged that he only earned a few thousand dollars while his current partner, who was paid a salary of only $12,000-15,000 annually from the corporations, so that the parties reported a joint income of approximately $20,000 annually and receiving tax refunds of $6,000-9,000 annually. The Court notes that the full income reported by the plaintiff would not even cover the rental cost of his residence at times. Clearly, plaintiff was unable or unwilling to offer credible testimony as to his income and/or his financial means. It is evident to the Court that plaintiff actively attempted to obfuscate his income to deprive defendant from accessing support of their three (3) children. When questioned about these discrepancies plaintiff repeatedly chose to not be forthcoming on the witness stand. Based on the development of plaintiff's testimony at trial plaintiff initially was untruthful about his financial circumstances. Plaintiff's inconsistent and often directly contradictory testimony as to his income and how he and his current partner pay living expenses defies any credible explanation other than that he attempted to hide his income from defendant and avoid a support order based on his income. It was only after plaintiff retained his current attorney and faced with contempt did plaintiff begin to acknowledge the true nature of his employment and financial situation. In addition to not being forthcoming about his income or how he earned that income - insisting vehemently that he knew nothing about the corporations that were later revealed as his consulting business - the plaintiff also engaged in unsubstantiated deductions that were often duplicated between his business tax returns and his personal tax returns all without any supporting documentation. While some of the claimed deductions could be legitimate in some circumstances, here, plaintiff was unable to offer any testimony in support of how the deduction were arrived at, provided no documentation in support, offered tax returns that were missing deduction statements and refused to call alleged accountants who prepared the returns or to offer any business books and records all while apparently living a lifestyle that far, far exceeded his reported income. As such, the plethora of deductions must be scrutinized and under examination of the testimony and evidence the Court has no option but to find that there is a lack of proof to uphold these deductions. The Court will include these sums - such as auto expenses, telephone, rent, utilities, etc. - back into the income for purposes of calculating plaintiff's support obligation. Based upon the totality of the circumstances as detailed hereinabove the Court finds that there is no basis to deduct any of the alleged expenses from the gross receipts reported by plaintiff. Plaintiff's lack of candor together with his failure of proof related to his nebulous deductions warrant such a determination. Plaintiff's tax returns and recitation of his deductions are so inconsistent and inconceivable that the Court has no alternative but to discredit them all. Plaintiff testified that pursuant to an April 2018 support order of Support Magistrate Robert Ross of New York County Family Court he was ordered to pay $25 weekly for spousal support to defendant [JN4]. Plaintiff testified that he is in compliance with that spousal support order despite [NYSCEF #68, p. 124-125] having had nothing to do with defendant since 2007. Plaintiff testified that based on the fact and circumstances presented he opposed any further award of spousal support and/or maintenance to the defendant [NYSCEF #68, pp. 136-137]. Plaintiff requests that, despite the parties having been married since 2000, the Court deny defendant's request for maintenance because the parties only lived together for seven (7) years and have been living separate, self-sufficient financial lives for the last fifteen (15) years of their marriage. He argues that defendant failed to demonstrate a disparity in the parties' incomes that would warrant an award of maintenance. Furthermore, he argued, defendant failed to articulate what award of maintenance she requested and instead merely requested a total "lump sum" of support of $3,500 monthly for both her and the parties' three (3) children even though one of the children has since emancipated. Defendant contends that a prior order of spousal support was "inappropriately cancelled" in 2010 when plaintiff presented an alleged Russian divorce which was later vacated. She contends that she is entitled to an award of final maintenance that should continue if she is "taking care of the disabled child" because, she contends, she cannot have a full-time job and an award of retroaction maintenance. Throughout the trial, defendant repeatedly represented that the parties' child A.V. (age 17 years old) is "disabled"; however, she offered no substantive testimony or evidence related to this alleged disability. ³¹ Without any information as to this alleged "disability" there is a failure of proof at this time as to whether the Court should consider whether the child is entitled to support up to the age of twenty-six (26) years old (see DRL 240-d). It is evident that the plaintiff went to exceptional lengths to obfuscate his earnings and to hide his income from defendant to avoid supporting his first family. As such, the Court has no alternative but to impute income to him based on the testimony and evidence from trial. Despite alleging that he was earning little or no income since the commencement of this litigation (or, according to him, making less than $10,000 annually), the plaintiff offered no credible explanation for how he paid his expenses: defendant listed his annual expenses in his updated affidavit of net worth dated March 21, 2022 of over $57,000. The plaintiff's exceedingly inconsistent and entirely unsubstantiated representations, his lack of candor with the Court, his self-serving inability to recall the source or basis for his financial circumstances and his attempts to interfere with financial discovery in this litigation by purposefully "hiding" his business in corporations held in another's name all while vehemently representing over many days of trial that he knew nothing about these corporations and that he earned, in effect, little or no income himself all result in the necessity that this Court reject his representations regarding his income and to impute income to him for the purposes of calculating support. Plaintiff used his current partner's name to hide his business through corporations set up in her name in an attempt to shield those business activities from being considered in support awards for defendant and the three (3) children he shares with her. Plaintiff's full reported income - even when taken together with the income allegedly earned by his current partner (which was all paid to her through his business) - before any deductions would barely cover the annual rent on the apartment and it appears for some years was below what was required to satisfy the annual lease of his residence, they live in with their three (3) children much less pay for any other expenses detailed on plaintiff's affidavit of net worth which includes automotive expenses. Plaintiff insisted that he was, in effect, of limited financial means and lived on the support of his current partner; however, testimony and evidence at trial belied that representation. Once trial testimony concluded it was clear that the corporations and the IT consulting computer business plaintiff operated out of them were really his businesses and not his current partner's business: plaintiff purposefully structured his business in such a way to attempt to defeat defendant's efforts to obtain financial support for herself and the parties' three (3) children. An attempt that plaintiff persistently attempt to foil. It is suspect that all of the witnesses subpoenaed who could support plaintiff's claim as to his relationship to these businesses failed to appear and he himself failed to call any of them to the stand. Clearly, plaintiff's rendition of his income and access to financial resources was not forthcoming. The Court does not find plaintiff's contention that he was, in effect, unable to work as an IT consultant once the pandemic started because there was not a need for computer services. While certainly some industries were unable to continue during the height of the pandemic, plaintiff's proposition that IT computer services were one of those industries is belied by common experience where IT computer services remained - or became even more sought after - as many industries transitioned to remote-work that continued virtually during the pandemic. The Court finds based on the totality of the circumstances that any reduction in plaintiff's IT consulting computer services business during this litigation was a direct result of an on-going attempt to limit his obligation for financial support of the defendant and the three (3) children he shares with her. The Court notes that the plaintiff offered no credible explanation for how he pays for his basic living expenses which far, far exceed his reported income. Plaintiff contends that his monthly expenses are nearly $4,783.33 [$57,399.96 annually] [ in his updated Affidavit of Net Worth dated March 2022 [Plaintiff's exhibit 3] while rarely reporting income of more than $20,000. Plaintiff's reported consulting business generated more than $93,000 in 2018 in receipts annually, but that plaintiff managed to deduct-without credible explanation or substantiation-nearly same amount so that the IT computer consulting business reported a taxable income of $-396 with the only compensation going to his current partner. Plaintiff's 2018 personal income tax return is not in evidence but testimony at trial revealed that despite him providing the IT consulting work for the business it was his current partner who solely drew any compensation from the business. As such, the Court finds that it is appropriate under the circumstances to imputed to the plaintiff $90,000 in gross income for the purposes of calculating maintenance and child support. The Court notes that the plaintiff asserts that his annual expenses are $57,396 and there is no indication that he cannot meet these expenses. The Court finds that this reported sum is an admission that he can earn that amount and he has offered no credible explanation for why he would not be electing to work in another field [apparently as an elder home health aide] earning far less. As detailed herein, the Court finds that plaintiff failed to meet his burden of substantiating his claimed deductions and as such does not find credible the 2018 business tax return reporting a negative taxable income. It appears that once the trial commenced in 2018 and plaintiff began to understand that his attempt to hide his income behind his current partner's name that his IT computer consulting business precipitously decreased even during the pandemic when demand for IT computer resources was in high demand. The Court notes that plaintiff's protestation that, in effect, all the financial resources and income of his IT computer business is not available to pay support to defendant-wife and the three (3) children born to these parties because he attempted to hide it in the name of another is not supported by the trial testimony. The Court will not condone plaintiff's blatant attempt to avoid his child support obligation by hiding his income in the name of his new partner. Plaintiff's financial obligation to support his first family remains despite his decision to start another family prior to finalizing any financial obligation to the support of his first family (see generally Patell v Patell, 91 A.D.2d 1028 [2 Dept.,1983]; see also Matter of Windwer v Windwer, 39 A.D.2d 927 [2 Dept.,1972, affirmed 33 N.Y.2d 599 [1973]; see also generally Gallager v Flaherty, 220 A.D.2d 867 [3 Dept.,1995]).

31 The Court notes that defendant's tax returns do not indicate that any of the children are disabled. Defendant's exhibit AAA in evidence, her 2019 personal income tax return Earned Income Credit form, question 4 (b) ("Was the child permanently and totally disabled during any part of 2019") was left blank as it also was on the same form in defendant's 2017 personal income tax return (Defendant's Exhibit YY in evidence).

Imputation of Income to Defendant

The Court notes that the defendant asserted that she is unable to work full-time because she is caring for five (5) children; however, she also contends that she pays for child-care. The Court notes that one of the children is emancipated and the other two (2) children of this marriage are fifteen (15) and seventeen (17) years old. Defendant's proposition that she is unable to work full-time because of child-care duties is wholly inconsistent with her other positions at trial. Defendant testified on cross-examination to more than a dozen international trips during this litigation and while she testified that these trips were possible due to budget travel arrangements it is clear that she has time and resources to travel and, according to her testimony, sufficient childcare to leave several of the children at home during some of these trips. Furthermore, the Court notes that defendant testified that she obtained her license to work as a dental hygienist in 2016 but did not continue to work as a dental hygienist after 2016 allegedly because of child-care obligations. However, the Court notes that defendant also attempted to collect child-care expenses from plaintiff back to 2016. Defendant both claims that she had child-care expenses to work and that she could not work full-time because she did not have child-care. Defendant was unable to offer a plausible explanation for this inconsistency. Furthermore, defendant offered no explanation for why she is not working as a dental hygienist now that the children are now emancipated and/or ages fifteen (15) and seventeen (17) where she is receiving child support for the children of her subsequent relationship. Given the age of the children, it does not appear that defendant's choice of current employment level is a result of the plaintiff's actions. The Court notes that once the trial began defendant's income reduced from more than $59,000 to nearly $53,000. She offered no testimony to explain her employment circumstances during 2020 and no copies of her 2021 or 2022 personal income taxes are in evidence. The Court does not find defendant's contention that she cannot work full-time as a special education teacher because of child-care obligations related to the children of this marriage credible. Taken together with the defendant's unsubstantiated tax deductions defendant is earning or capable of earning at least $60,000 annually where she reported more than $59,000 in 2018 and more than $53,000 in 2019 by her own admission at trial working part-time and taking summers off from work. There appears to be no reason-other than her election to do so-why defendant is working part-time and taking summers off from working. This Court finds that imputing income to the defendant in the sum of $60,000 is appropriate. It is clear to the Court that the defendant-wife is a capable person having obtained a dental hygienist license in 2016 while raising five (5) children who were considerably younger at that time. However, it appears to the Court based on the totality of the circumstances that the defendant's choice to remain employed only part-time since 2016 despite the children of this marriage being emancipated and/or in middle and high school now has been an elective choice and not based on external employment limits. As noted, the defendant reduced her reported taxable income using many unsubstantiated deductions-including alleged deductions like those she criticized the plaintiff for deducting from his reported income. Here, defendant is a W-2 employee and, as such, while the Court finds that she did not substantiate her alleged "business deductions" from her income tax return and must base her income on her full W-2 wages there is no allegation that defendant is earning additional income. ³² Here, both parties were simply not credible about their respective financial circumstances and the Court has imputed income to them both. This action was commenced in September 2016: therefore, the current maintenance guidelines for Maintenance Guidelines apply (see DRL §236(B)(6)). Therefore, the calculation of post-divorce maintenance award would include a current cap of $203,000, ³³ subject to any deviation pursuant to the factors enunciated in DRL 236(B)(6)(b)(4). Utilizing the sum of imputed income detailed above - plaintiff, $90,000; defendant, $60,000 - and the current maintenance guidelines, the calculation provides as follows:

32 The Court notes that defendant spent many days of trial cross-examining plaintiff on his alleged "business deduction" on his tax returns and many of the "deductions" defendant objected to on plaintiff's tax returns are similar to "deductions" she took on her personal tax returns such as for laundry, cellphone and internet costs all without any substantiating documentation or testimony in support of those alleged deductions. While such deductions are certainly permissible under specific circumstances the testimony at trial was devoid of any such testimony that may lend credibility to these deductions. Rather, it appears that both parties were freely deducting expenses without substantiation to limit taxable income.

33 The income cap was lower at the date of commencement; however, here the combined income did not exceed that cap during this litigation.

1st Calculation: 20% of the payor's income up to and including the cap ($18,000) - 25% of the payee's income ($15,000) = $3,000;

2nd Calculation: Payor's income up to and including the cap ($90,000.00) + Payee's income ($60,000) = Combined income ($150,000). 40% of combined income ($150,000 x.40 = $60,000) - Payee's income ($60,000) = $0.00.

Lower of the two results: here, is the second calculation resulting in $0.00. The Court finds that defendant's contention that she was required to pay her mother for child care of $1,000 monthly - regardless of how many children were involved or how old those children were - is not credible under the facts and circumstances presented. It appears that defendant circulated this money to her mother - who lived with her - for tax benefit purposes and there is no indication that she was required to pay this sum or that those funds were not recirculated back into supporting the household. Additionally, defendant appears to continue to live a comfortable lifestyle while enjoying extensive international travel despite her protestations that it is budget travel with lay overs in various countries. Despite these less than transparent aspects of defendant's income tax returns the Court finds that given the disparity in income between the parties and the fact that the plaintiff is the monied spouse, the Court finds that it is not appropriate to award the defendant post-divorce maintenance. The Court also finds, for the reasons previously stated, that the plaintiff-husband is the monied spouse and that his income far exceeds that of the defendant-wife. The Court has considered the factors in DRL 236(B)(6)(e)(1)(a-o) - including, but not limited to: (a) the age and health of the parties - the parties are both still many years from retirement age; (b) the present and future earning capacity of the parties - the plaintiff has far greater access than the defendant to earning substantially higher income and he has done so consistently throughout the marriage.

Child Support Standards Act: The Parties' Contentions

There are three (3) children of the marriage. ³⁴ One of those children emancipated in March 2022. Defendant contends that plaintiff has done everything he can to avoid paying child support. She contends, in effect, that all the many court orders of support from the various courts who have been involved in these parties' lives since 2010 where all, in effect, "inappropriate." Despite these numerous Family Court orders of support and the decisions of the Appellate Division, First Department and the Appellate Division, Second Department related thereto based on her appeals of the objections to those orders, defendant continues to argue that this Court should award her child support retroactive to the date the parties separated in or about 2007 many, many years prior to the date of commencement in September 2016. She continues to insist that this Court can, in effect, correct what she believes were insufficient child support orders from various Courts prior to the commencement of this divorce action in 2016. Plaintiff contends that he is in full compliance with the April 18, 2018, order of support issued out of Kings County Family Court child for $522 [JN #4]. The Court took judicial notice that the Appellate Division, First Department modified a New York County Family Court support order from $50 to $453 ³⁵ monthly by decision and order dated April 12, 2021 [JN #5]; however, plaintiff testified that he continues to pay support in full compliance with the prior, higher Kings County Family Court support order [April 18, 2018] and that no arrears are due and owing [NYSCEF #68, pp. 52-53]. Plaintiff's exhibit 4 in evidence is a summary of plaintiff's support obligation issued by the New York City Office of Child Support Enforcement showing no arrears and that plaintiff had a credit to his account exceeding $700. Plaintiff testified that he continued to pay the higher sum of $525 notwithstanding the downward modification by the Appellate Division, First Department to $453 and even though the parties' oldest child Y. V. had since emancipated. Plaintiff, in effect, contends that he is paying "extra" child support. Plaintiff requested that this Court continue the current award of child support in the sum of $525 monthly until the parties' youngest child turns twenty-one (21) years of age in December 2028. He offered no legal basis for the Court to award support based on this sum.

34 The defendant has two (2) children of another relationship that are not the subject of this divorce action.

35 $453 comprised of: $80 weekly for A.V; $33 monthly for each D.V. and Y.V; and $25 weekly spousal support for defendant.

Child Support Standards Act

Effective January 31, 2010," [t]he court shall multiply the combined parental income up to the amount set forth in paragraph (b) of subdivision two of section one hundred eleven-I of the social services law by the appropriate child support percentage and such amount shall be prorated in the same proportion as each parent's income is to the combined parental income." (DRL 240 1-b [c][2]). The Social Services law states that:

[t]he combined parental income amount to be reported in the child support standards chart and utilized in calculating orders of child support in accordance with subparagraph two of paragraph (c) of subdivision one of section four hundred thirteen of the family court act and subparagraph two of paragraph (c) of subdivision one-b of section two hundred forty of the domestic relations law shall be one hundred thirty thousand dollars; provided, however, beginning January thirty-first, two thousand twelve and every two years thereafter, the combined parental income amount shall increase by the product of the average annual percentage changes in the consumer price index for all urban consumers (CPIU) as published by the United States department of labor bureau of labor statistics for the two year period rounded to the nearest one thousand dollars. (Social Services Law § 111-I[2][b]). Domestic Relations Law section 240 1-b (b)(5)(iii) further defines gross income.

"[T]o the extent not already included in gross income in clauses (I) and (ii) of this subparagraph, the amount of income or compensation voluntarily deferred, and income received, if any, from the following sources: (A) workers' compensation, (B) disability benefits, (C) unemployment insurance benefits, (D) social security benefits, (E) veteran's benefits, (F) pensions and retirement benefits, (G) fellowships and stipends, and (H) annuity payments;" In determining a party's child support obligation, the Court need not rely upon a party's own account of his or her finances, but may impute income based upon the parties' past income or demonstrated earning potential or on the income the parent is capable of earning "by honest efforts" (Morille-Hinds v. Hinds, 87 A.D.3d 526, 928 N.Y.S.2d 727 [2 Dept., 2011]; see also Aslam v Younas, 198 A.D.3d 747 [2 Dept.,2021]; Genender v. Genender, 40 A.D.3d 994, 836 N.Y.S.2d 291 [2 Dept., 2007]; Westenberger v. Westenberger 23 A.D.3d 571 [2 Dept., 2005]; Rocanello v. Rocanello, 254 A.D.2d 269, 678 N.Y.S.2d 385 [2 Dept., 1998]). This is particularly true where the record supports a finding that a parties' reported income on a tax return is suspect (see Ivani v. Ivani, 303 A.D.2d 639, 757 N.Y.S.2d 89 [2 Dept., 2003]; see also Maharaj-Ellis v. Laroche, 54 A.D.3d 677, 863 N.Y.S.2d 258 [2 Dept., 2008]; Matter of Graves v. Smith, 284 A.D.2d 332, 725 N.Y.S.2d 367 [2 Dept.,2001]). Further, it is well-established that the court can award child support based on the needs of the child where the court finds that a payor spouse's representations regarding income are not credible (see Domestic Relations Law § 240[1-b][k]; see also Halley-Boyce v Boyce, 108 A.D.3d 503 [2 Dept.,2013]; Lew v. Lew, 82 A.D.3d 1171, 920 N.Y.S.2d 230 [2 Dept., 2011]; Evans v. Evans, 57 A.D.3d 718, 870 N.Y.S.2d 394 [2 Dept., 2008]). Here, despite a full and fair opportunity to do so - in this case the Court specified on the record in open court that defendant could provide testimony and evidence as to her and the children's needs - the defendant failed to testify about her and the children's needs. Additionally, the Court notes that plaintiff has been absent from the children's lives since on or about 2007 when he left the marital residence and defendant has been forced to attempt to collect support from him on two (2) continents while plaintiff has gone to extraordinary efforts to obfuscate his income to deprive his wife and their children from awards of support based on his income. Whatever current living expenses the defendant and the parties' children survive on now has been based on necessity not on needs and is a direct result of the plaintiff's efforts to avoid his financial obligation to his first family. Domestic Relations Law 240 1-b (b)(5)(iv) states that "... at the discretion of the court, the court may attribute or impute income from, such other resources as may be available to the parent, including, but not limited to: (A) non-income producing assets, (B) meals, lodging, memberships, automobiles or other perquisites that are provided as part of compensation for employment to the extent that such perquisites constitute expenditures for personal use, or which expenditures directly or indirectly... confer personal economic benefits, (C) fringe benefits provided as part of compensation for employment, and (D) money, goods, or services provided by relatives and friends; Domestic Relations Law section 240 1-b (b)(5)(v) specifically permits "an amount imputed as income based upon the parent's former resources or income, if the court determines that a parent has reduced resources or income in order to reduce or avoid the parent's obligation for child support." The Court next multiplies the combined parental income figure up to an initial statutory cap, which is currently combined parental income up to the current cap of $163,000.00, by a designated percentage based on the number of children to be supported, and then allocates that amount between the parents, applying each parent's respective portion of the total income to reach the amount of each parent's support obligation (see Holterman v. Holterman, 3 N.Y.3d at 11, 781 N.Y.S.2d 458, 814 N.E.2d 765, supra, quoting DRL 240[1-b][b][3]; [c][2]). In the final step, where combined parental income exceeds the statutory cap, "the court shall determine the amount of child support for the amount of the combined parental income in excess of such dollar amount through consideration of the factors set forth in paragraph (f) of [Domestic Relations Law § 240(1-b)] and/or the child support percentage" (id). The "paragraph (f)" factors include the financial resources of the parents and child, the health of the child and any special needs, the standard of living the child would have had if the marriage had not ended, tax consequences, non-monetary contributions of the parents toward the child, the educational needs of the parents, the disparity in the parents' incomes, the needs of other nonparty children receiving support from one of the parents, extraordinary expenses incurred in exercising visitation and any other factors the Court determines are relevant. Finally, the Court is required to articulate its reasons for awarding child support in addition to basic child support above the statutory cap (see Monaco v Monaco, 214 A.D.3d 659 [2 Dept.,2023]; see also Bari v Bari, 200 A.D.3d 835 [2 Dept., 2021]; Wallach v. Wallach, 37 A.D.3d 707, 831 N.Y.S.2d 210 [2 Dept., 2007], quoting Matter of Cassano v. Cassano, 85 N.Y.2d 649, 654-655, 628 N.Y.S.2d 10, 651 N.E.2d 878, supra; see also Clerkin v. Clerkin, 304 A.D.2d 784, 759 N.Y.S.2d 500 [2 Dept., 2003]; Wagner v. Dunetz, 295 A.D.2d 501, 744 N.Y.S.2d 344 [2 Dept., 2002]). The current amount of basic child support in the case at bar would be calculated on the $163,000.00 cap. ³⁶ On October 26, 2015, the Child Support Standards Act (DRL §240(1-b) (5)(iii)) was amended, effective January 26, 2016, to provide that in a calculation of child support in Family and Supreme Court, maintenance awards were to be considered income to the payee spouse for the calculation. This action was commenced on September 12, 2016. As such, any maintenance award from plaintiff to defendant must be considered income for the purpose of calculating child support: here, as detailed above, there is no award of post-divorce maintenance. The plaintiff's income for the purposes of child support is $90,000 and defendant's income is $60,000. There is no deduction for New York City or FICA taxes as these incomes were imputed to the parties and neither party provided any proof of payment of any New York City or FICA taxes from 2021 or 2022 despite a full and fair opportunity to do so (see generally Sinnott v Sinnott, 194 A.D.3d 868, 149 N.Y.S.3d 441 [2 Dept.,2021]). Accordingly, the plaintiff's presumptively correct basic child support obligation for two (2) children up to the current cap would be as follows: Combined income up to and including the current $163,000.00 cap = $163,000.00 x.25 ³⁷ = $37,500 total child support annually. The plaintiff's pro rata share being = 60% or $22,500 annually ($1,875 monthly) and the defendant's pro rata = 40% or $15,000 annually ($1,250 monthly). This is also the sum of retroactive child support from March 23, 2022, through June 2023. "[T]he court may disregard the formula if 'unjust or inappropriate' but in that event, must give its reasons in a formal written order, which cannot be waived by either party (Family Ct Act § 413 [1] [g])." Cassano, 85 N.Y.2d at 654. "Whenever the basic child support obligation derived by application of the formula would be 'unjust or inappropriate, the court must consider the 'paragraph (f)' factor," including, "the financial resources of the parents and child, the health of the child and any special needs, the standard of living the child would have had if the marriage had not ended, tax consequences, non-monetary contributions of the parents toward the child, the educational needs of the parents, the disparity in the parents' incomes, the needs of other nonparty children receiving support from one of the parents, extraordinary expenses incurred in exercising visitation and any other factors the court determines are relevant." id. at 649. The Court of Appeals has held that when "there was sufficient record indication that no extraordinary circumstances were present," application of statutory child support percentage of combined parental income exceeding the statutory cap was justified and not an abuse of discretion (Cassano, 85 N.Y.2d at 655). The Appellate Division, Second Department has held that the requirements of Cassano were satisfied when the Court set forth in detail that "based upon the standard of living the children would have enjoyed if the parties remained together" the formula set forth in the Child Support Standards Act was to apply to parental income in excess of the statutory cap (Kennedy v. Kennedy, 62 A.D.3d 755, 757 880 N.Y.S.2d 97 [2 Dept., 2009]). The Court notes that there was a failure of proof by defendant as to the lifestyle of the parties during the marriage when they resided together that may have supported a Cassano analysis. Here, the Court found that neither party's representations as to their income was credible and has exercised its discretion to impute income to both parties. Based upon that imputation, the parties total combined income is $150,000. As such, there is no income above the current cap of $163,000. The Court exercises its discretion in imputing that income to the parties for each year during this litigation. The Court notes that neither party offered testimony as to any tax impacting implications for awards of support. Thus, the plaintiff's child support obligation to the defendant shall be $22,500 annually ($1,875 monthly) for the two (2) unemancipated children commencing on the 1st day of August 2023 and continuing the 1st day of each month thereafter for the two (2) unemancipated children.

36 As of March 1, 2022, the CSSA cap increased from $154,000 to $163,000.

37 Under the Child Support Standards Act the percentages are: 1 child, 17%; 2 children, 25%; 3 children, 29%; 4 children, 31%; and 5 or more children, 35%. See DRL 240(1-b)(b)(3).

Support Collection Unit (SCU)

The defendant-wife requested that future payments of basic child support be payable through SCU. The defendant may, as is her statutory right, elect to have child support payments and child support arrears payable through the Support Collection Unit (SCU). Retroactivity The Court notes that an award of child support is effective as of the date of application (see Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B][6][a]; see also Elimelech v. Elimelech, 58 A.D.3d 672, 874 N.Y.S.2d 490 [2 Dept., 2009]; Evans v. Evans, 57 A.D.3d 718, 870 N.Y.S.2d 394 [2 Dept., 2008]. "Courts have continuing jurisdiction to modify or vacate support orders until they are completely satisfied, except that they have no discretion to reduce or cancel arrears of child support which accrue before an application for downward modification of the child support obligation" (Dembitzer v. Rindenow, 35 A.D.3d 791, 828 N.Y.S.2d 139 [2 Dept., 2006] [quoting Hasegawa v. Hasagawa, 290 A.D.2d 488, 490, 736 N.Y.S.2d 398 [2 Dept., 2002]; see Matter of Dox v. Tynon, 90 N.Y.2d 166, 659 N.Y.S.2d 231, 681 N.E.2d 398 [1997]; Matter of Jenkins v. McKinney, 21 A.D.3d 558, 799 N.Y.S.2d 904 [2 Dept., 2005]; Matter of Miller v. Miller, 308 A.D.2d 541, 764 N.Y.S.2d 850 [2 Dept., 2003]; Howfield v. Howfield, 250 A.D.2d 573, 574, 671 N.Y.S.2d 988 [2 Dept., 1998]; Domestic Relations Law section 236[B][9][b]). The Court notes that SCU was collecting child support payments based on existing Family Court orders during this litigation and plaintiff is entitled for a credit for payments made against this retroactive award paid by the plaintiff to the defendant by negotiable instrument and/or through SCU collection. Given the protracted litigation engaged in by these parties, the Court must calculate the presumptively correct basic child support calculation under several prior statutory caps since this litigation was commenced in September 2016 and because when the litigation started there were three (3) unemancipated children and one of those children turned twenty-one (21) in March 2022 and emancipated out of child support. From September 2016 until March 2018 there were three (3) unemancipated children and the statutory cap was $136,000. As such, for that duration, the plaintiff's presumptively correct basic child support obligation for three (3) children up to the then existing cap, for the same reasons as previously stated, would be as follows: Combined income up to and including the cap of $136,000 = $136,000 x.29 ³⁸ = $39,440 total child support annually. The plaintiff's pro rata share being = 60% or $23,664 annually ($1,972 monthly; $493 weekly) and the defendant's pro rata = 40% or $15,776 annually ($1,314.66 monthly). This is also the sum of retroactive child support from September 16, 2016, through February 2018 was $34,510 ³⁹ subject to reduction for any sums actually paid by plaintiff to defendant by negotiable instrument or collection by SCU.

38 Under the Child Support Standards Act the percentages are: 1 child, 17%; 2 children, 25%; 3 children, 29%; 4 children, 31%; and 5 or more children, 35%. See DRL 240(1-b)(b)(3).

39 September 16, 2016 through February 2018 = 17 months and 2 weeks = $1,972 x 17 [months] + $493 x [2 weeks] = $34,510.

Child Support: March 2018 - February 2020 [Statutory Cap of $148,000]

In March 2018, the cap increased to $148,000. Here, the parties' combined parental income is $150,000. The Court finds that it is appropriate to apply the calculation to the statutory cap but not to the parties' income above the statutory cap for the same reasons as previously stated. There were still three (3) unemancipated children at that time. As such, the presumptively correct basic child support obligation for three (3) children from March 2018 through February 2020 was: Combined income up to and including the cap of $148,000 cap = $148,000 x.29 ⁴⁰ = $42,920 total child support annually. The plaintiff's pro rata share being = 60% or $25,752 annually ($2,146 monthly) and the defendant's pro rata = 40% or $17,168 annually ($1,430.66 monthly). This is also the sum of retroactive child support from March 2018 through February 2020 was $51,504 ⁴¹ subject to reduction for any sums actually paid by plaintiff to defendant by negotiable instrument or collection by SCU.

40 Under the Child Support Standards Act the percentages are: 1 child, 17%; 2 children, 25%; 3 children, 29%; 4 children, 31%; and 5 or more children, 35%. See DRL 240(1-b)(b)(3).

41 March 2018 through February 2020 = $2,146 x [24 months] = $51,504.

Child Support: March 2020 - February 2022 [Statutory Cap of $154,000]

In March 2020, the cap increased to $154,000. Here, the parties' combined parental income of $150,000. The Court finds that it is appropriate to apply the calculation to the statutory cap but not to the parties' income above the statutory cap for the same reasons as previously stated. There were still three (3) unemancipated children at that time. As such, the presumptively correct basic child support obligation for three (3) children from March 2020 through March 23, 2022, was: Combined income up to the cap of $154,000 cap = $154,000 x.29 ⁴² = $44,660 total child support annually. The plaintiff's pro rata share being = 60% or $26,796 annually ($2,233 monthly) and the defendant's pro rata = 40% or $17,864 annually ($1,488.66 monthly). This is also the sum of retroactive child support from March 2020 through February 2022 was $53,592 ⁴³ subject to reduction for any sums actually paid by plaintiff to defendant by negotiable instrument or collection by SCU.

42 Under the Child Support Standards Act the percentages are: 1 child, 17%; 2 children, 25%; 3 children, 29%; 4 children, 31%; and 5 or more children, 35%. See DRL 240(1-b)(b)(3).

43 LEFT BLANK INTENTIONALLY.

Child Support: March 2022 - July 2023 [Statutory Cap of $163,000]

In March 2022, the cap increased to $163,000. Here, the parties' combined parental income of $150,000. The Court finds that it is appropriate to apply the calculation to the statutory cap but not to the parties' income above the statutory cap for the same reasons as previously stated. The Court notes that the oldest child emancipated on March 23, 2022. As such, the Court must also calculate the child support for three (3) children on the statutory cap of $163,000 from March 1, 2022, through March 23, 2022 and the Court must also calculate the child support for two (2) children on the statutory cap of $163,000 from March 24, 2022 through July 2023. Here, the parties' combined parental income is $150,000, which is below the statutory cap of $163,000. The presumptively correction child support for three (3) children from March 1, 2022, through March 23, 2023 is as follows: Combined income up to the combined parental income of $150,000 (which is below the cap of $163,000.00) = $150,000.00 x.29 ⁴⁴ = $43,500 total child support annually. The plaintiff's pro rata share being = 60% or $26,100 annually ($2,175 monthly; $543.75 weekly) and the defendant's pro rata = 40% or $17,400 annually ($1,450 monthly). The retroactive child support due from March 1-23, 2022, is $1,631.25 ⁴⁵ subject to reduction for any sums actually paid by plaintiff to defendant by negotiable instrument or collection by SCU. The presumptively correction child support for two (2) children from March 24, 2022, through July 2023 is as follows: Combined income up to the combined parental income of $150,000 (which is below the cap of $163,000.00) = $150,000.00 x.25 ⁴⁶ = $37,500 total child support annually. The plaintiff's pro rata share being = 60% or $22,500 annually ($1,875 monthly; $468.75 weekly) and the defendant's pro rata = 40% or $15,000 annually ($1,250 monthly). As such, the sum of retroactive child support from March 24, 2022, through July 2023 was $28,593.75 ⁴⁷ subject to reduction for any sums actually paid by plaintiff to defendant by negotiable instrument or collection by SCU. The total sum of retroactive basic child support due from September 16, 2016, through July 2023 is: $169,831 subject to reduction for any sums actually paid by plaintiff to defendant by negotiable instrument or collection by SCU. ⁴⁸ Retroactive sums due by reason of this award shall be paid, together with the monthly support obligation through Support Collection Unit with a credit for any basic child support payments made by check or other negotiable instrument (see Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B][6][a]). (See Mosso v. Mosso, 84 A.D.3d 757, 924 N.Y.S.2d 394 [2 Dept., 2011]). SCU to set schedule of payment of retroactive sums.

44 Under the Child Support Standards Act the percentages are: 1 child, 17%; 2 children, 25%; 3 children, 29%; 4 children, 31%; and 5 or more children, 35%. See DRL 240(1-b)(b)(3).

45 3 weeks = $543.75 x [3 week] = $1,631.25

46 Under the Child Support Standards Act the percentages are: 1 child, 17%; 2 children, 25%; 3 children, 29%; 4 children, 31%; and 5 or more children, 35%. See DRL 240(1-b)(b)(3).

47 March 24, 2022, through July 2023 is 15 months and 1 week = $1,875 x 15 [months] + $468.75 [1 week] = $28,593.75.

48 September 16, 2016 - February 2018 [$34,510] + March 2018 - February 2020 [$51,504] + March 2020 - February 2022 [$53,592] + March 1, 2022 - March 23, 2022 [$1,631.25] + March 24, 2022 - June 2023 = $26,718.75 = $167,956.

Life Insurance

Pursuant to DRL 236(8)(a): "[t]he court may...order a party to purchase, maintain or assign a policy of insurance on the life of either spouse, and to designate either spouse or children of the marriage as irrevocable beneficiaries during a time fixed by the court. The interest of the beneficiary shall cease upon termination of such party's obligation to provide maintenance, child support or a distributive award...." This provision empowers the Court to secure future payments of maintenance and child support, as well as payments pursuant to any distributive award, by directing the payor spouse to purchase, maintain or assign life insurance to protect the recipient in the event the payor dies prior to the time the future obligation is satisfied (see Pilkington v Pilkington, 185 A.D.3d 844 [2 Dept.,2020]; Marichal v. Marichal, 83 A.D.3d 942, 920 N.Y.S.2d 731 [2 Dept., 2011]; see generally Moran v Grillo, 44 A.D.3d 859, 843 N.Y.S.2d 674 [2 Dept., 2007]; Penna v Penna, 29 A.D.3d56 970, 817 N.Y.S.2d 313 [2 Dept.,2006]; Corless v. Corless, 18 A.D.3d 493, 795 N.Y.S.2d 273 [2 Dept., 2005]; Comstock v. Comstock, 1 A.D.3d 307, 766 N.Y.S.2d 220 [2 Dept., 2003]). Appellate case law has held that to require that a life insurance policy be reduced each year "...by the amount of child support paid in the prior year, is difficult to administer" (Fogarty v. Fogarty, 284 A.D.2d 300, 302, 725 N.Y.S.2d 673 [2 Dept.,2001]) and that a fixed amount of life insurance for collateralization of support obligations is preferable (see Lueker v. Lueker, 72 A.D.3d 655, 898 N.Y.S.2d 605 [2 Dept.,2010]; see also Corless v. Corless, 18 A.D.3d 493, 795 N.Y.S.2d 273 [2 Dept.,2005]; Morton v. Morton, 130 A.D.2d 558, 515 N.Y.S.2d 499[2 Dept.,1987]). Defendant requests that the Court order plaintiff to maintain a life insurance policy in the sum of $500,000 with the unemancipated children as the sole beneficiaries to secure his child support obligation. Plaintiff contends that no award of life insurance is appropriate because there was no life insurance in place during the parties' marriage. The case law is clear that the award of life insurance, if any, is to secure the aware of support. Here, the sum to be secured is $265,456. ⁴⁹ The plaintiff shall obtain a life insurance policy in the sum of $265,456. The plaintiff shall designate the children the irrevocable beneficiaries until his child support obligation ceases or the death of either of the parties or the children. The plaintiff shall provide proof of the existence of said policy to the defendant by January 15th of each year by regular and certified mail to an address provided by the defendant.

49 Retroactive child support of $167,956 + prospective child support of $1,875 x 52 months = $97,500 = $265,456.

Health Insurance

Pursuant to Domestic Relations Law section 255, both parties are on notice "...that once the judgment is signed, a party thereto may or may not be eligible to be covered under the other party's health insurance plan, depending on the terms of the plan" (DRL 255). In the event that either party maintains health insurance for the benefit of their spouse, the other party may be entitled to health insurance through a COBRA option, or otherwise, may be required to secure their own health insurance. Plaintiff and defendant shall each be financially responsible for the cost, if any, associated with their own dental and vision coverage. Here, both parties testified that they maintain their own health insurance coverage.

Defendant's Request for Retroactive Add-On "Child Care" Expenses

Defendant called her mother, L. V., to testified on August 10, 2022 [NYSCEF #71]. L. V. testified that she has lived with the defendant and defendant's children since 2007. She testified that there are five (5) children in the home: the three (3) children of the parties' marriage, one of whom emancipated in March 2022, and a set of twins born to defendant out of another relationship after the parties separated. ⁵⁰ L. V. testified that she began providing child-care for all the children starting in 2010. She testified that defendant pays her $1,000 a month for child-care services [NYSCEF #71, p. 7-8] to cover all the children, including the two (2) children from defendant's subsequent relationship. L.V. testified that her child-care duties included walking the children to school, taking care of the children during school vacations and taking the children to extracurricular activities [NYSCEF #71, p. 8]. In Defendant's Exhibit MM, the witness, L.V., represented that she was paid $600 monthly as of April 28, 2017, for the two (2) youngest children of this marriage and that the remaining $400 she received is for the two (2) children defendant had with another partner after the parties separated [NYSCEF #71, 42]. Neither the witness nor defendant offered any explanation for why more money was allegedly paid for the older children of this marriage and why less money was allegedly paid for the care of the two (2) younger children from defendant's subsequent relationship who are not the subject of this litigation. In support of her claim, defendant offered bank accounts showing monthly transfers from her to her mother, L.V.. These bank records are in evidence as Defendant's Exhibit CCC. Pursuant to DRL 240(1-b)(c)(4), the Court has jurisdiction to consider necessary child-care expenses required for a party to work and/or to seek employment as part of statutory add-on expenses. Defendant contends that she paid her mother the following sum as and for total child-care expenses since September 2016 through 2021:

50 Defendant testified that she receives "a little over $2,000" monthly in child support from the father of the twins [NYSCEF #71, p. 127]. She testified that no one else was financially supporting the three (3) children shared by plaintiff and defendant [NYSCEF #71, p. 5]. Plaintiff testified that from 2010 to 2017 he believes that defendant was cohabitating with another adult male [NYSCEF #68, pp. 131-132]. Defendant's mother testified that the father of the children defendant had after plaintiff left the marital residence never lived with defendant. That sum in not included in defendant's income for the purposes of calculating maintenance and/or child support of the three (3) children of this marriage as that other source of child support is for the support of children not of this marriage.

YEAR	AMOUNT PAID	AGE OF CHILDREN OF THIS MARRIAGE BY YEAR
September 2016-December 2016 51	$2,490	YV (15) AV (11) DV (09)
2017	$11,900	YV (16) AV (12) DV (11)
2018	$11,400	YV (17) AV (13) DV (12)
2019	$11,740	YV (18) AV (14) DV (13)
2020	$10,500	YV (19) AV (15) DV (14)
2021	$5,000	YV (20 - emancipated in March 2021) AV (16) DV (15)

51 The financial records defendant provided for 2016 (Chase transfer statement) shows payments marked "babysitter". There is no indication whether these payments were for child-care for the children of this marriage or for the younger children of defendant's subsequent relationship.

The Court does not find the defendant's proposition that she must pay her mother - who lives with her without contributing financially - to provide child-care credible. While defendant does appear to have routinely transferred between $1,000 and $1,200 monthly to her mother, there is no credible evidence before the Court that there was a written or binding agreement or business relationship between the defendant and her mother that required defendant to financially compensate the maternal grandmother to watch her own grandchildren. Nor are there any records submitted to establish an employer/employee relationship. It is undisputed that L.V. has lived with defendant full-time since 2007 and while allegedly being paid for child-care she testified that she does not contribute financially to any household expenses such as rent or utilities.

Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, there is no indication that there was an agreement between defendant and her mother as to an hourly rate for alleged child-care services or that defendant was required to pay for the children's grandmother to be with the children or what, if any, any rate for this alleged "child-care expenses" was dependent on how many children defendant's mother was providing child-care for.

This $1,000 monthly "transfer" apparently took place without any corresponding connection to the age of the children and these transfers continued even once the children of this marriage were all in middle-school or high-school. The Court notes that the defendant used this transfer to claim a deduction on her income tax returns which decreased her taxable income.

If defendant does make this transfer as and for legitimate child-care costs, she failed to delineate what portion of that cost was required for the children of this marriage and what portion was required to cover the children of the subsequent relationship who are much younger and for whom she concedes she receives more than $2,000 in monthly child support. Defendant's self-serving representation that most of the expense was for the older children she shares with plaintiff is not credible.

In reaching this determination, the Court notes that the Chase Bank transfer records provided by defendant as late as March 2020 have a notation that this "child-care" payment is for four (4) children specifically naming D.V.; A.V.; and the two younger children of defendant's subsequent relationship without any delineation as to what portion is for which child(ren). In March 2020, A.V. was 14 years old and D.V. was 12 years old. Defendant offered no testimony as to any special circumstances as to why children of this age still - allegedly - required the same level of child care that they allegedly required in 2016 when they were younger. There was no testimony regarding if the father of the defendant's other two (2) children pays child care costs.

Additionally, defendant represented that she was unemployed for a period in 2020 during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic. In fact, her 2020 tax return reports she collected unemployment benefits; however, there appears to be no change in her alleged "child-care expenses" for the children during 2020 when she contends, she still paid her mother, L.V., more than $10,000 during that period when she was not working. As such, based on the testimony and evidence before the Court it appears that any application for child care costs during that prior would not be appropriate.

Furthermore, defendant did not testify or provide any documentation to explain any special circumstances why child care would be necessary for children who were in high school and/or middle school during much of the claimed period and during which time she also claims that the parties' youngest child, D.V., was attending an after-school and summer camp program for child care (2016-2018) for which she also contends that she incurred nearly $20,000 in additional child care expenses. Notably, even during 2016-2018 when she contends that D.V. was in alternative child care, defendant alleges that her "obligation" for $1,000 monthly in child care to her mother did not decrease. Neither defendant nor her mother, L.V., offered any testimony to explain the many inconsistencies in defendant's alleged child care expense. The Court does not find credible the defendant's monthly transfer of $1,000 to her mother was for child care for the children of this marriage and her other children rather than as a transfer designed for tax purposes.

The credibility of the claim is further belied by the fact that in her updated affidavit of net worth dated May 10, 2022, defendant lists her current monthly unified "domestic (housekeeper, etc.), nanny/au pair/child-care; babysitter/ other" expense as $1,200. It is evident that there appears to be no corresponding decrease in the alleged expense for "child-care" claimed by defendant from 2016 to 2022 despite the fact that as of 2022 the parties' oldest child has emancipated and the other children of this marriage are now 17 and 15 years old and there is no explanation for while children of this age require the same alleged level of child-care that was required in 2016. ⁵²

52 Defendant alleged that the parties' child, A.V. has some disabilities including ADHD; however, she did not offer any testimony as to how or if the alleged disabilities relate to child-care costs.

The Court finds that defendant's transfers to her mother, who has lived without cost in her home for more than fifteen (15) years, allegedly for "child care" for children in middle-school and high-school and even during period of the pandemic when defendant was, by her own admission, not working, makes this systematic transfer appear orchestrated to circulate money in such a way as to generate a beneficial tax implication rather than an actual child care expense required for defendant to work or seek employment. For all the foregoing reasons, defendant's application for plaintiff to pay retroactive child care expenses is denied for failure of proof (see generally Massimi v Massimi, 35 A.D.3d 400 [2 Dept.,2006]).

After-Care/Summer Camp: D.V.

While claiming a consistent $1,000 monthly child-care expense, defendant also requests additional reimbursement for more child-care expenses for D.V. - the parties' youngest child - to attend after-care and summer camp programs from 2016-2018 in the sum of $19,802. Defendant offered no explanation for this apparent inconsistency between her claim that her mother, L.V., provided her child-care and her claim that she had to obtain child care for the parties' youngest child [D.V.] from after care and summer camp programs. This fact reinforces the Court's finding that the defendant's routine transfers to her mother throughout this litigation were not linked to legitimate child-care expenses as determined herein-above.

While the claimed child care to her mother was not credible for the children of this marriage, the Court notes that defendant did provide invoices from an after-school child care program showing sums due of $6,009.50 for D.V. from September 2016-June 2018 and two (2) invoices for D.V.; however, both invoices appear to reflect expenses for summer camp from July-August 2017 one showing a balance due of $1,800 and the other showing a balance due of $2,080 also for July-August 2017. ⁵³

53 The only difference on these invoices appears to be that D.V. is listed as entering grade 5 and wearing a size small shirt on one and entering grade 6 and wearing a size medium shirt on the other. Defendant offered no testimony as to these expenses. The dates listed on both invoices appear to be July-August 2017, so it is unclear if there is a typographical error in the second invoice for the year of 2018 or whether the sum shown is a roll over expenses from previously unpaid fees due and owing. Defendant did not offer any testimony as to this inconsistency in the invoices provided.

Inasmuch as there is an inconsistency in the proffered invoices, the Court can only consider the following as valid child-care expenses for D.V. from September 2016 through 2018: $6,009.50 for after-school and $1,800 for summer camp for the summer prior to him entering fifth (5th) grade. The Court finds that defendant met her burden of establishing these child-care expenses for D.V. and the parties shall be responsible for the sum of $7,809.50 according to their pro rata shares as delineated herein-above.

Defendant's application for summer camp expenses allegedly as child-care for D.V. in 2018 must be denied for failure of proof as there is no indication that any such expenses were incurred or paid by defendant.

The plaintiff shall pay to the defendant $4,685.70 ($7,809.50 x.60 ^[54] = $4,685.70) within sixty (60) days of service of the judgment of divorce with notice of entry by regular and certified mail. If the plaintiff fails to pay this $4,685.70 as detailed herein, the defendant may enter judgment with the Office of the County Clerk against the plaintiff, together with costs and statutory interest from the date of service with notice of entry of the judgment of divorce, together with an affirmation of non-payment without need for further Court order on fourteen (14) days notice by regular and certified mail.

[54] As detailed herein-above, plaintiff's pro rata share of child support is 60%.

Tax Exemption

Defendant, who is the custodial parent of the parties' children on consent, shall continue to have the right to claim the parties' three (3) children on her income tax returns as permitted by applicable tax code and law (see generally IRS form 8332).

Extracurricular Activities

It is undisputed that defendant never sought contribution from plaintiff for the extracurricular activities that she now claims plaintiff must contribute towards. She requests that the Court order plaintiff to pay a share of certain elective extracurricular activity costs she contends that she incurred from 2016 to the present.

In support of her claimed extracurricular activities she offered a collection of invoices and receipts which are in evidence as defendant's exhibit CCC. These invoices appear to include both extracurricular activities such as gymnastics and hockey and expenses for after-care for D.V.. Many of the invoices include both the parties' children and expenses for the two (2) children defendant had with another partner after the parties separated in 2007. Defendant did not itemize which alleged expenses relate only to the children of this marriage. As such, defendant's application for reimbursement for retroactive extracurricular expenses from September 2016 through the date of trial are denied for failure of proof.

Generally, basic child support is presumed to meet all the child's basic needs including the "expenses of leisure, extracurricular and enrichment activities, such as after-school clubs, sporting activities, etc., are usually not awarded separately but are encompassed within the basic child support award" (Sinnott v Sinnott, 194 A.D.3d 868, 876 [2 Dept.,2021]). The Court has authority to order a parent to pay these expenses over and above basic child support but doing so is a deviation from the basic statutory formula and requires an analysis under the factors in DRL 240(1-b)(f) (id.; see also Michael J.D. v Carolina E.P., 138 A.D.3d 151 [1st Dept.,2016]).

Domestic Relations Law 240 [1-b][f] enumerates ten (10) "f-factors" for the Court to consider before deviating. They include the financial resources of the parties and child, the health, needs and aptitude of the child; the standard of living the child would have enjoyed had the household not been dissolved; tax consequences; nonmonetary contributions that a parent makes; educational needs of either parent; disparity in income of the parents; other child support obligation of the non-custodial parent; extraordinary expenses incurred in visitation and any other factor that the court finds relevant (Domestic Relations Law § 240 [1-b][f]). Although all the factors do not have to be present, the Court needs to articulate its reasons for making a deviation from basic child support and relate those reasons to the statutory paragraph "f-factors" (see generally Monaco v Monaco, 214 A.D.3d 659 [2 Dept.,2023]; see also Hepheastou v Spaliaras, 201 A.D.3d 793 [2 Dept.,2022]; Peddycoart v MacKay, 145 A.D.3d 1081 [2 Dept.,2016]; Matter of Pitman v. Williams, 127 A.D.3d 755, 756-757, 7 N.Y.S.3d 227 [2d Dept.2015]; Matter of Gluckman v. Qua, 253 A.D.2d 267, 270-271, 687 N.Y.S.2d 460 [3d Dept.1999], lv. denied 93 N.Y.2d 814, 697 N.Y.S.2d 561, 719 N.E.2d 922 [1999]).

Here, the Court finds that basic award of child support is sufficient to meet the needs of the children. Defendant offered no testimony or evidence related to the DRL 240 "f-factors" that this Court believes would make a deviation over basic child support appropriate here. As such, the Court declines to deviate above the basic child support calculation by awarding additional support for extracurricular expenses. The basic child support award should cover the reasonable extracurricular and weekend activities of the children (see generally Sinnott v Sinnott, 194, A.D.3d 868 [2 Dept.,2021]).

College Expenses for Emancipated Child (Y.)

Defendant's request for pro rata financial contribution from plaintiff towards college expenses allegedly incurred on behalf of the parties' oldest - emancipated - child, Y., is denied. It is undisputed that the child Y. emancipated in March 2022. Here, the Court cannot reach the issue of whether an award of college expenses would have been appropriate because the Court notes that there was a failure of proof that defendant paid anything directly towards the cost associated with Y.V.'s college tuition in 2021 and the Court has awarded child support for this period of time herein-above.

Defendant offered only a 20211098-T addressed to the adult child showing payments and scholarships received. Despite the opportunity to do so, defendant provided no evidence documenting that she paid towards the alleged tuition cost for Y.V. There is no evidence of who paid the tuition balance after scholarships were adjusted. Nor did defendant prove that she incurred any liability for any student loans potentially incurred by Y.V. despite a full and fair opportunity to do so (see generally DRL 236(B)(1)(c); see also Feldman v Feldman, 204 A.D.2d 268 [2 Dept.,1994]). Additionally, as noted above, an award of basic child support is presumed sufficient to cover the financial needs of a child absent a record that establishes otherwise. Defendant failed to meet her burden on this issue.

Children's Health Insurance

Pursuant to Domestic Relations Law 236[B][8][a], the Court has the authority "to order a party to purchase, maintain or assign a policy of insurance providing benefits for health and hospital care and related services for either spouse or children of the marriage...."

Defendant testified that she and the parties' children currently have medical insurance through Fidelis Medicaid [NYSCEF #71, p. 61]. That medical coverage shall continue as available with the parties cooperating as necessary to continue that coverage.

Defendant requests that plaintiff maintain health insurance for the unemancipated children if they are no longer eligible for "state sponsored health insurance" and that the parties should share (50/50%) the cost of unreimbursed medical and dental expenses for the unemancipated children.

Plaintiff testified that he was willing to contribute toward necessary out-of-pocket medical insurance expenses and any necessary out-of-pocket unreimbursed medical expenses for the children [NYSCEF #68, p. 136] upon proper proof and notice. Based upon plaintiff's testimony, all reasonable unreimbursed, medical, dental, optical, therapeutic and prescription drug expenses incurred for the parties' children, including all deductibles and co-payments shall be apportioned pro rata: the plaintiff, 60%; the defendant, 40%. The parties shall utilize in-network providers where possible unless there is an agreement to use an out-of-network provider or no in-network provider is reasonably available. The unemancipated children shall, to the extent allowed by law and program requirements, remain on Child Health Plus.

Credit Cards Debts

Defendant contends that the parties have not lived together since 2010 and that the Court should hold the plaintiff is solely (100%) financially responsible for any and all debts in his name. Plaintiff did not dispute this. The Court finds that neither party offered any testimony or proof as to any marital debts and, as such, the Court find that each party shall be sole (100%) for any debts in his or her name.

Cost of Transcripts

Plaintiff requested that the court "split" the cost of the trial transcripts between the parties. The Court held the issue of allocating the cost of the trial transcripts in abeyance pending the conclusion of the parties' testimony as to income [NYSCEF #69, p. 37]. Invoices for the transcripts and proof of payment were not provided and, as such, there is a failure of proof as to this alleged cost (see generally Massimi v Massimi, 35 A.D.3d 400 [2 Dept.,2006]).

Counsel Fees

Plaintiff testified that he paid approximately $10,000 in counsel fees to his prior counsel in this action, Mr. Geller which were paid $2,500 by him on a credit card and remaining $7,500 was paid by his father [NYSCEF #66, p. 10].

He subsequently testified that he paid a $7,500 retainer to Mr. Edwards using a credit card [NYSCEF #68, p. 51]. He requested that the Court order that each party was solely (100%) financially responsible for their counsel fees incurred in this divorce action [NYSCEF #68, p. 137].

Defendant was not represented by counsel and did not oppose plaintiff's request that each party be responsible for their own counsel fees. As such, there is no issue of counsel fees before the Court.

Conclusion

This constitutes the trial decision on all ancillary issues.

Plaintiff's counsel shall settle the completed judgment roll for a judgment of divorce in favor of the plaintiff on the grounds of DRL 170(7), together with the minutes of the inquest on grounds, on notice to the other party within sixty (60) days.