Because no evidence was offered at the hearing, however, there was no evidence from which the trial court could determine Robson's motives. See McCain, 856 S.W.2d at 757 ("Motions and arguments of counsel are not evidence."); see also Alejandro v. Bell, 84 S.W.3d 383, 393 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.) ("In order for the trial court to consider documents as evidence in a Rule 13 context, they must be admitted in compliance with the rules of evidence at the evidentiary hearing. . . . The letter was neither offered nor admitted into evidence."). The majority equates its conclusion that Robson failed to make a reasonable inquiry prior to filing the negligent entrustment claim with an implied finding of bad faith, citing to Monroe v. Grider, 884 S.W.2d 811, 819 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1994, writ denied).
In the case that Gonzales cites to support this issue, the trial court refused to rule at all on evidentiary objections. See Alejandro v. Bell, 84 S.W.3d 383, 388 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi- Edinburg 2002, no pet.) (holding that appellant preserved complaint that "trial court erred by refusing to rule on his objections to appellee's summary judgment evidence" because "record shows the trial court refused to rule on appellant's objections"). In contrast, in this case, the trial court confirmed on the record that he was overruling the objections and signed an order overruling the objections.
We review a trial court's ruling on a summary judgment motion de novo. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Joachim, 315 S.W.3d 860, 862 (Tex. 2010); Alejandro v. Bell, 84 S.W.3d 383, 390 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.). In reviewing the granting of a traditional motion for summary judgment, we follow these well-established rules: (1) the movant has the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; (2) in deciding whether there is a disputed material fact issue precluding summary judgment, evidence favorable to the nonmovant will be taken as true; and (3) every reasonable inference must be indulged in favor of the nonmovant and any doubts must be resolved in favor of the nonmovant.
(6) the power to enforce decisions or impose penalties.Fiske v. City of Dallas, 220 S.W.3d 547, 551 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2007, no pet.); Alejandro v. Bell, 84 S.W.3d 383, 391 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.); Blankenship v. Brazos Higher Educ. Auth., 975 S.W.2d 353, 360 (Tex.App.-Waco 1998, pet. denied); Village of Bayou Vista v. Glaskox, 899 S.W.2d 826, 829 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, no writ) (quoting Parker v. Holbrook, 647 S.W.2d 692, 695 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.)). The City code explicitly confers two of those powers on the City council — the power to hear and ascertain facts and the power to subpoena and examine witnesses.
In determining whether sanctions are appropriate, the trial court must examine the facts available to the litigant and the circumstances existing when the litigant filed the pleading. Alejandro v. Bell, 84 S.W.3d 383, 392 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.). The trial court uses an objective standard to determine if a pleading was groundless: did the party and counsel make a reasonable inquiry into the legal and factual basis of the claim?
See, e.g., Keith, 256 S.W.3d at 917; N.Y. Underwriters Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 856 S.W.2d 194, 205 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1993, no writ). "In order for the trial court to consider documents as evidence in a rule 13 context, they must be admitted in compliance with the rules of evidence at the evidentiary hearing." Alejandro v. Bell, 84 S.W.3d 383, 393 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.); see also Bedding Component Mfrs., Ltd. v. Royal Sleep Prods., Inc., 108 S.W.3d 563, 564 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.) ("Without a hearing on a motion for sanctions, the trial court has no evidence before it to determine that a pleading is sanctionable."). Because the Lindsley affidavit was not admitted into evidence at the sanctions hearing, it was not before the trial court and cannot supply the required evidence of O'Donnell's alleged bad faith.
We review summary judgments de novo. Valence Op. Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005); Alejandro v. Bell, 84 S.W.3d 383, 390 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.). A no-evidence summary judgment is equivalent to a pretrial directed verdict, and we apply the same legal sufficiency standard on review.
We review the trial court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2003); Alejandro v. Bell, 84 S.W.3d 383, 390 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.). We take as true all evidence that is favorable to the nonmovant and indulge every reasonable inference and resolve all doubts in favor of the non-moving party.
In determining whether sanctions are appropriate, the trial court must examine the facts available to the litigant and the circumstances existing when the litigant filed the pleading. Alejandro v. Bell, 84 S.W.3d 383, 392 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.). The trial court uses an objective standard to determine if a pleading was groundless: did the party and counsel make a reasonable inquiry into the legal and factual basis of the claim?
"In determining if sanctions are proper [under rule 13], the trial court must examine the circumstances existing when the litigant filed the pleading." Id. at 182-83; Rudisell, 89 S.W.3d at 237; Alejandro v. Bell, 84 S.W.3d 383, 392 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.). "The trial court considers the acts or omissions of the represented party or counsel, not merely the legal merit of a pleading or motion."