Opinion
Civil Action No. 7:00-CV-131-R.
February 22, 2001.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before this Court is the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed February 5,2001. For the reasons stated below, the Defendant's Motion is GRANTED in part, and DENIED in part.
I. BACKGROUND
This case arises from a Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") request made by the Plaintiff, John Aldridge ("Aldridge") to the Defendant on May 14, 2000. After a search of its records, the Defendant determined that there were forty-two pages of documents that were relevant to Aldridge's request. On July 21, the Defendant sent Aldridge a response containing thirty-three full pages and two pages in part of the forty-two total pages. The Defendant explained in its response that seven fill pages and part of two others contained information that was exempt from disclosure under Title 5, United States Code section 552(b)(7)(C) (hereinafter "Exemption 7(C)").
The right to information under FOIA does not apply to "records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes . . . [which] could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(7)(C) (1996).
The sensitive information withheld consisted of IRS employees' personal information, including social security numbers, home addresses, home phone numbers, and dates of birth. In addition, the direct dial number of the Acting Chief of the Examination Division of the IRS and the recommendation by the IRS concerning whether any action should be taken regarding the conduct of IRS employees were withheld.
On August 24, the Defendant received Aldridge's administrative appeal and, as a result of a further search, found two additional pages of information responsive to Aldridge's request. The Defendant also determined that of the eleven pages of information that had not been previously disclosed to Aldridge, three pages could be released in full and the remaining eight could be released in part. In the end, Aldridge received thirty-six full pages and eight partial pages of the total forty-four pages responsive to his request.
On July 12, 2000, Aldridge filed his Original Complaint requesting that the Court instruct the Defendant to disclose information requested or cite exemptions to support any non-disclosure. The Defendant filed its Motion for Summary Judgment on February 5, 2001 in which it argues that there exists no material issue of fact since Aldridge has received an explanation for the partial non-disclosure, Exemption 7(C), and the explanation offered is proper as a matter of law.
II. ANALYSIS
1. Summary Judgment Standard
"Summary judgment is proper when, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, `there is no genuine issue of material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" Wilson Industries, Inc., v. Aviva America, Inc., 185 F.3d 492,494 (5th Cir. 1999) (quotingAmburgey v. Corhart Refactories Corp., 936 F.2d 805,809 (5th Cir. 1991)); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). However, all reasonable doubts and inferences must be decided in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. See Thornbrough v. Columbus Greenville R.R. Co., 760 F.2d 633, 640 (5th Cir. 1985). Furthermore, as long as there appears to be some evidentiary support for the disputed allegations, the motion must be denied.See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986); Coke v. General Adjustments Bureau, 640 F.2d 584, 595 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Where the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof on a claim upon which summary judgment is sought, the moving party may discharge its summary judgment burden by showing that "there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Id. at 325. Once the moving party satisfies this burden, the nonmoving party may then oppose the motion by going "beyond the pleadings and by [its] own affidavits, or by the `depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designat[ing] `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Id. at 324; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. Summary judgment will be granted against "a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
While pro se litigants should not be required to meet the same standards of compliance with formal or technical pleading rules as attorneys, a pro se litigant is still required to meet the evidentiary standards of summary judgment set out above. See Gordon v. Watson, 622 F.2d 120, 123 (5th Circ. 1980).
2. FOIA
"The basic purpose of FOIA is to ensure an informed citizenry, vital to the functioning of a democratic society, needed to check against corruption and to hold the governors accountable to the governed." NLRB v. Robbins Tire and Rubber Co., 98 S.Ct. 2311, 2327 (1978) (citation omitted). Despite FOIA's "general philosophy of Fill agency disclosure," Congress designed the Act to take into account the need for protection of individual privacy concerns as well. Halloran v. Veteran's Admin., 874 F.2d 315, 318 (5th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted). Under Exemption 7(C), the Court must balance the public interest in disclosure against the possibility that "disclosure could reasonably be expected to constitute" an invasion of privacy.Id. at 319. The Court notes that in 1986 Congress amended the language of Exemption 7(C) to ease the burden on an agency in invoking the Exemption, by changing the phrasing from "would constitute" to "could reasonably be expected to constitute" an invasion of privacy. Id. Thus, the Defendant is granted some leeway to withhold information that not only blatantly invades privacy, but also to withhold information that could be expected to cause an invasion of privacy.
Once the Defendant shows that the redacted information could reasonably be expected to constitute an invasion of privacy, Aldridge must present some evidence that the information redacted by the Defendant did not actually fall under Exemption 7(C). There are two categories of information withheld from Aldridge in this case. First, there was personal information including IRS employees' social security numbers, home addresses, home phone numbers, dates of birth as well as the direct dial number of the Acting Chief of the Examination Division of the IRS (the "personal information"). Second, there was "the recommendation by the IRS concerning whether any action should be taken regarding the conduct of IRS employees" (the "recommendation"). Defendant's Memorandum at 3.
With regard to the personal information, Aldridge has failed to present any evidence that the Defendant was not acting within its rights under Exemption 7(C) in withholding the information. That is, the Defendant has persuaded the Court that the personal information was properly withheld from disclosure as disclosure of such information could be reasonably expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy. Further, the expected invasion of privacy far outweighs the minimal interest of the public in disclosure of such personal information. Thus, the Court holds that, as a matter of law, the personal information was properly redacted from the disclosed information.
With regard to the recommendation, the Court is persuaded by Aldridge that there remain material issues of fact. That is, it is not entirely clear to the Court why all information surrounding potential disciplinary action against IRS employees needed to be redacted. In fact, it seems that this scenario represents exactly the situation for which FOIA was designed to aid the public. The public has an interest in knowing how well a particular agency's employees behave on the job. While an individual employee certainly has an interest in maintaining his anonymity in the event that a recommendation that he be disciplined be made public, an agency cannot refuse to disclose all records relating to such a recommendation merely because an employee's name is mentioned in it. The Court finds that Aldridge correctly points out that the privacy of IRS employees could be adequately protected provided their names were redacted from such recommendations. Further, the Defendant has produced no case law, nor has the Court found any in its research, which supports its allegation that all or the information contained in the recommendation falls under Exemption 7(C). Therefore, the Court holds that the Defendant has failed to meet its summary judgment burden with regard to the information contained in the recommendation.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED as to Aldridge's request for disclosure of the personal information, and DENIED as to Aldridge's request for disclosure of information regarding the recommendation.
It is so ORDERED.