The purpose of post-judgment discovery is to aid a litigant in obtaining satisfaction of a judgment, โand any question that seeks information which would lead to any property or sources of income of the judgment debtor is pertinent and allowable.โ Aldridge v. Mercantile Nat. Bank, 132 Ga.App. 788, 789(2), 209 S.E.2d 234 (1974). OCGA ยง 9โ11โ69 provides, in relevant part:
(b) The purpose of post-judgment discovery under OCGA ยง 9-11-69 is to enable litigants to recover on a liability already established by judgment. Aldridge v. Mercantile Nat. Bank, 132 Ga. App. 788, 789 (2) ( 209 S.E.2d 234). "Any question that seeks information which would lead to any property or holdings of the defendant in fi. fa. which are subject to levy to satisfy the judgment . . . is pertinent and allowable." Bradley v. Coach Six Restaurants, 112 Ga. App. 278, 280 (2) (a) ( 145 S.E.2d 55). Accordingly, "interrogatories pertaining to information as to the following matters [are] all legitimate subjects of inquiry: The [judgment debtor's] ownership and location of residence; engagement in any type of proprietorship or partnership; holdings of corporation stock; employment; salary; other sources of income; bank accounts; ownership of vehicles, personal property and real estate; accounts receivable; transfers of property within the last year; possession, control and custody of certificates of vehicle registration and property tax returns; source of information for each answer to an interrogatory not based upon personal knowledge; and identity of each person rendering assistance
U.S. Shelter Corporation is the judgment-debtor on a default judgment which is not subject to being set aside by reason of any nonamendable defect appearing upon the face of the record or pleadings. "The purpose of post judgment discovery under [OCGA ยง 9-11-69] is to aid a litigant to recover on a liability which has been established by a judgment and any question that seeks information which would lead to any property or sources of income of the judgment debtor is pertinent and allowable. [Cit.]" Aldridge v. Mercantile Nat. Bank, 132 Ga. App. 788, 789 (2) ( 209 S.E.2d 234) (1974). Judgment reversed. McMurray, P. J., and Pope, J., concur.
On the contrary, the interrogatories objected to by appellants appear on their face to be clearly within the ambit of Code Ann. ยง 81A-169, which is "to aid a litigant to recover on a liability which has been established by a judgment and any question that seeks information which would lead to any property or sources of income of the judgment debtor is pertinent and allowable. [Cit.]" Aldridge v. Mercantile Nat. Bank, 132 Ga. App. 788, 789 ( 209 S.E.2d 234) (1974). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in failing to hold that, as a matter of law, appellants' broad and conclusory allegations of incrimination were sufficient. See Johnson v. Heifler, 149 Ga. App. 860, 861 (2) ( 256 S.E.2d 143) (1979).
On the record before us we cannot say that, under Code Ann. ยง 81A-137 (a) (4), the trial judge abused his discretion in ordering Nickerson to pay $300 in attorney's fees after partially granting the Candler Building's motion. Aldridge v. Mercantile Nat. Bank, 132 Ga. App. 788 ( 209 S.E.2d 234) (1974). 3.
Code ยง 81A-169. Any question which would lead to any property or sources of income of the judgment debtor is pertinent and allowable. Aldridge v. Mercantile Nat. Bank, 132 Ga. App. 788 ( 209 S.E.2d 234) (1974). Post-judgment discovery procedures have for their purpose identifying assets to satisfy the judgment.
2. Why answering any or all of the questions posed would work a forfeiture of the defendant's estate is not explained. This objection, if it means merely that answering would interfere with the defendant's mode of earning a living, is not acceptable. Aldridge v. Mercantile Nat. Bank, 132 Ga. App. 788 (1) ( 209 S.E.2d 234). Nor does it cover a pledge by the defendant not to reveal the information. Plunkett v. Hamilton, 136 Ga. 72 (7) ( 70 S.E. 781). Forfeitures to the state for crime are of course abolished.
Code ยง 38-1205, which defines as privileged those matters which tend to work a forfeiture of estate, is inapplicable to post-judgment discovery proceedings geared toward uncovering or identifying assets to satisfy the judgment. We have found no Georgia case which speaks clearly on the subject, but a decision by the federal district court, although erroneously reliant upon two cases which held merely that answers which might cause the loss of employment are not within the purview of the forfeiture privilege ( Plunkett v. Hamilton, 136 Ga. 72 ( 70 S.E. 781) (1911); Aldridge v. Mercantile Nat. Bank, 132 Ga. App. 788 ( 209 S.E.2d 234) (1974)), has stated cogent reasoning for our interpretation: "It is clear that any forfeiture in the instant case would not result from the answering of the questions or production of documents, but rather, as a result of the judgment already entered by this Court. Any other interpretation of this privilege would make the Georgia post-judgment discovery rules meaningless.
On the other hand, Georgia courts have specifically held that s 38-1205, or its predecessor statute, does not protect a person from answering financial questions on post-judgment discovery because such answer may tend to work a forfeiture of a person's estate. Plunkett v. Hamilton, 136 Ga. 72, 70 S.E. 781 (1911); Aldridge v. Mercantile National Bank, 132 Ga.App. 788, 209 S.E.2d 234 (1974). In Plunkett, the Court rejected an argument similar to the one advanced by defendants here on the ground that there would be no forfeiture by law resulting from any answers.