Opinion
3:22-cv-326-MMH-MCR
07-26-2024
FERMIN ALDABE, Plaintiff, v. ASTER GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL SOLUTIONS, INC., et al., Defendants.
“Within 14 days after being served with a copy of [this Report and Recommendation], a party may serve and file specific written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). “A party may respond to another party's objections within 14 days after being served with a copy.” Id. A party's failure to serve and file specific objections to the proposed findings and recommendations alters the scope of review by the District Judge and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, including waiver of the right to challenge anything to which no specific objection was made. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(3); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B); 11th Cir. R. 3-1.
MONTE C. RICHARDSON UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint (“Motion”) (Doc. 97). The Defendants timely filed responses in opposition (Docs. 103, 104) to the Motion.
This Motion has been referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for entry of a report and recommendation under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)-(C) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(1). Upon consideration, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint (Doc. 97) be DENIED and the case be DISMISSED with prejudice.
I. Background
A. Plaintiff's Original Complaint
Plaintiff initiated this action by filing a Verified Shareholder Derivative Complaint (“Complaint”) in March 2022. (Doc. 1.) This Court sua sponte struck Plaintiff's Complaint, finding it was an impermissible “shotgun pleading” and did not provide sufficient information to determine whether this Court has subject matter jurisdiction. (Doc. 4 at 1.)
B. Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint
On April 8, 2022, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint. (Doc. 6.) Subsequently, Defendant's Environmental Services, Inc. (“ESI”), Terracon Consultants, Inc., and Aster Global Environmental Solutions, Inc. (“Aster”), each filed motions to dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint. (Docs. 15, 17, 21.)
On December 8, 2022, the Court held a hearing on the pending Motions to Dismiss. (See Doc. 86.) At the hearing, the Court informed Plaintiff that he is permitted “to file a motion for leave to file an amended complaint. And so[,] if he presents to the Court a complaint that states a viable claim, then he would be permitted to file that complaint. And if he does not, if the complaint is futile, then that would be denied and the case would be dismissed with prejudice.” (Doc. 86 at 44.) The Court then instructed Plaintiff that he would have to file a motion for leave to amend the complaint, prepare a proposed amended complaint, provide it to opposing counsel, and confer with them prior to filing the motion. (Id. at 45.)
On December 12, 2022, this Court entered an Order denying in part and granting in part the three motions to dismiss. (Doc. 83.) After multiple requests for extensions, Plaintiff had until October 16, 2023, to move for leave to amend the complaint. (Doc. 88.)
C. Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint
On October 16, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint. (Doc. 89.) On November 13, 2023, Defendant ESI filed a Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint. (Doc. 95.) On November 15, 2023, the Court entered an Order granting Defendant ESI's Motion to Strike the Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint and directed Plaintiff to move for leave to amend the complaint by December 15, 2023. (Doc. 96.) The Court once again reminded Plaintiff, consistent with the directive at the December 2022 hearing, that he must file a motion for leave to amend the complaint, prepare a proposed amended complaint, provide it to opposing counsel, and confer with them prior to filing the motion. (Doc. 96 at 2.)
D. Plaintiff's Instant Motion for Leave to Amend
On December 15, 2023, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint and attached a 66-page proposed Third Amended Complaint. (Doc. 97.) On January 12, 2024, both Defendants Aster and ESI filed Responses in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Leave. (Docs. 103, 104.)
Plaintiff mistakenly designated his proposed pleading as Plaintiff's “Second Amended Complaint”. (Doc. 97-1.) However, Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint has been stricken. (Doc. 89.) The operative pleading is Plaintiff's proposed Third Amended Complaint. For clarity, the Court will refer to Plaintiff's proposed pleading (Doc. 97) as Plaintiff's proposed Third Amended Complaint.
On January 16, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Request for Oral Argument. (Doc. 105), and Defendants Aster and ESI filed responses in opposition thereto (See Docs. 107, 108).
II. Discussion
The pleadings of pro se litigants must be liberally construed and “are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hughes v. Rowe, 448 U.S. 5, 9 (1980) (per curiam). Still, pro se litigants are subject to the same laws and rules of court as litigants who are represented by counsel. Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989). Therefore, the Court will not rewrite a pro se plaintiff's complaint to find a claim. See Peterson v. Atlanta Hous. Auth., 998 F.2d 904, 912 (11th Cir. 1993).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 provides that leave to amend a complaint prior to trial should be freely given when justice so requires. Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2). “A district court may deny a motion to amend on ‘numerous grounds, such as undue delay, undue prejudice to the defendants, and futility of the amendment.'” Kendall v. Thaxton Rd. LLC, 443 Fed.Appx. 388, 393 (11th Cir. 2011) (unpublished) (quoting Maynard v. Bd. of Regents of the Div. of Univs. of the Fla. Dep't of Educ., 342 F.3d 1281, 1287 (11th Cir. 2003)). “However, leave to amend should only be denied on the ground of futility when the proposed amendment is clearly insufficient or frivolous on its face.” Action Nissan, Inc. v. Hyundai Motor Am. Corp., No. 6:21-cv-2152-WWB-EJK, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135400, at *3 (M.D. Fla. July 28, 2023) (quoting Taylor v. Fla. State Fair Auth., 875 F.Supp. 812, 815 (M.D. Fla. 1995)). Plaintiff seeks leave to file his proposed Third Amended Complaint. (Doc. 97.) This is Plaintiff's fourth attempt to file a complaint since this action commenced in March 2022.
Defendant Aster argues that Plaintiff's Motion should be denied with prejudice because he has failed to follow this Court's express instructions; that Plaintiff fails to allege personal or subject matter jurisdiction over Aster; that the proposed Third Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; and that Plaintiff should not be permitted to join Janice McMahon to this lawsuit. (Doc. 103.)
Defendant ESI argues that Plaintiff's Motion should be denied because Plaintiff's proposed amendments are futile; that Plaintiff cannot state a claim for breach of contract as he has failed to plead damages; that Plaintiff's claims are barred by the statute of limitations; that Plaintiff's claims for damages related to Project 2 are barred by res judicata; and that Plaintiff lacks standing as he was not the party in interest with respect to project 1. (Doc. 104.)
While the undersigned acknowledges leave to amend shall be freely given by this Court when justice so requires, Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c), such leave to amend should only be freely granted in the absence of countervailing factors including undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, undue prejudice, or futility of amendment. McKinley v. Kaplan, 177 F.3d 1253, 1258 (11th Cir. 1999). Even when construed liberally, Plaintiff's proposed Third Amended Complaint fails to affirmatively allege jurisdiction, fails to meet the formal pleading requirements, and again fails to follow this Court's explicit instructions. As such, further attempts to permit Plaintiff to correct these defects would be futile.
A. Plaintiff's Proposed Third Amended Complaint Fails to Allege Jurisdiction.
First, Plaintiff has failed to affirmatively allege that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action. (See Doc. 97.) Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and, therefore, have an obligation to inquire into their subject matter jurisdiction. See Kirkland v. Midland Mortg. Co., 243 F.3d 1277, 1279-80 (11th Cir. 2001). This obligation exists regardless of whether the parties have challenged the existence of subject matter jurisdiction. See Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 410 (11th Cir. 1999) (“[I]t is well settled that a federal court is obligated to inquire into subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte whenever it may be lacking.”). “In a given case, a federal district court must have at least one of three types of subject matter jurisdiction: (1) jurisdiction under a specific statutory grant; (2) federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331; or (3) diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).” Baltin v. Alaron Trading, Corp., 128 F.3d 1466, 1469 (11th Cir. 1997).
For a court to have diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), “all plaintiffs must be diverse from all defendants.” Univ. of S. Ala., 168 F.3d at 412. Federal district courts may exercise diversity jurisdiction over cases involving citizens of different states where the amount in controversy, exclusive of interest and costs, exceeds $75,000.00. See 28 U.S.C. §1332(a); Williams v. Best Buy Co., Inc., 269 F.3d 1316, 1319 (11th Cir. 2001); Kirkland, 243 F.3d at 1280. To sufficiently allege the citizenship of an unincorporated entity or association, such as a limited liability company, the party asserting jurisdiction must identify and allege the citizenship of each member of each limited liability company. See Mallory & Evans Contractors & Eng'r, LLC v. Tuskegee Univ., 663 F.3d 1304, 1305 (11th Cir. 2011); Rolling Greens MHP, L.P. v. Comcast SCH Holdings L.L.C., 374 F.3d 1020, 1021-22 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam). Citizenship must be “distinctly and affirmatively alleged.” Martinez v. GEICO Cas. Ins. Co., No. 24-10641, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 11931, at *1 (11th Cir. May 16, 2024) (quoting McGovern v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 511 F.2d 653, 654 (5th Cir. 1975)).
Upon review, it would appear that the only basis of subject matter jurisdiction in this action is diversity jurisdiction. The proposed Third Amended Complaint fails to allege diversity jurisdiction or any specific allegations necessary as to any relevant parties to invoke jurisdiction. Here, in his 66-page proposed Third Amended Complaint, Plaintiff does not allege jurisdiction of any kind, and no allegation addresses any of the parties' respective citizenships. (See Doc. 97.) Additionally, Plaintiff has failed to allege personal jurisdiction over Aster, as this Court has previously instructed Plaintiff to do. (See Doc. 86.) Plaintiff has the initial burden of alleging sufficient facts in a complaint to make out a prima facie case of jurisdiction. United Tech. Corp. v. Mazer, 556 F.3d 1260, 1274 (11th Cir. 2009). Because Plaintiff has failed to adequately identify the parties' respective citizenships and plead any basis for this Court's jurisdiction- despite multiple opportunities to amend-the undersigned recommends Plaintiff's Motion should be DENIED, and this case should be DISMISSED. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3); Holmes v. R/S Logistics, No. CV422-281, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137653, at *4 (S.D. Ga. July 10, 2023); see also, e.g., Amerisure Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mammoth Constructors, LLC, No. 2:23-cv-67-SPC-NPM,, 2023 WL 1824981, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 8, 2023) (dismissing complaint for its failure to plead complete diversity of the parties' citizenship).
Plaintiff has also failed to allege personal jurisdiction over Janice McMahon, an Ohio resident. A federal court sitting in diversity may exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant to the same extent as a court of that state. Ruiz de Molina v. Merritt & Furman Ins. Agency, Inc., 207 F.3d 1351, 1355 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing Prejean v. Sonatrach, Inc., 652 F.2d 1260 (5th Cir. 1981)). In Florida, jurisdiction over nonresidents is governed by the long-arm statute, Florida Statute, section 48.193, which "bestows broad jurisdiction on Florida courts." Iconic Content, LLC, v. Unknown Officer, 522 F.Supp.3d 1179, 1184 (M.D. Fla. 2020) (quoting ExecuTech Business Systems, Inc. v. New Oil Paper Co. Ltd., 752 So.2d 582, 584 (Fla. 2000)). However, as noted in Defendant Aster's Motion, the Duval County Court dismissed McMahon for lack of jurisdiction. (Doc. 103 at 17-18.)
B. Plaintiff's Proposed Third Amended Complaint Fails to Follow the Federal Pleading Standard
The bare minimum a plaintiff must set forth in his complaint is found in Fed.R.Civ.P. 8. Under Rule 8, “[a] pleading that states a claim for relief must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although this pleading standard “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,' . . . it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” King Ocean Servs., Ltd. v. CI Mistic SAS Fruits and Vegetables, LLC, No. 23-22227-CIV, 2023 WL 8234567, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 28, 2023) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Mere “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” are insufficient. Brooks v. Kiser, No. 1:21cv541-ECM-SMD, 2022 WL 2155037, at *2 (M.D. Ala. May 13, 2022) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)) (internal quotations omitted). A complaint must contain enough well-pleaded facts to “allow [] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
Further, a motion to amend a complaint will be denied as futile when the proposed amendment would not survive a motion to dismiss. Allied Portables, LLC, v. Youmans, No. 2:15-cv-294-FTM-38CM, 2016 WL 7104863, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Sep. 16, 2016) (citing Coventry First, LLC v. McCarty, 605 F.3d 865, 869 (11th Cir. 2010)). A complaint will be dismissed if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). To survive, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotations omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The plausibility standard ‘calls for enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence' of defendant's liability.” Miyahira v. Vitacost.com, Inc., 715 F.3d 1257, 1265 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “In other words, the allegations in the complaint ‘must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.'” Hsi Chang v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 845 F.3d 1087, 1094 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 550 U.S. at 679).
Defendants argue Plaintiff's proposed Third Amended Complaint fails to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. The undersigned agrees. The substantive allegations of Plaintiff's proposed Third Amended Complaint are vague, speculative, and generally conclusory.
i. Plaintiff's Breach of Contract Claims
Plaintiff fails to plead sufficient facts to support his breach of contract claims against ESI, Janice McMahon, and Aster. Vega v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 564 F.3d 1256, 1272 (11th Cir. 2009) (“For a breach of contract claim, Florida law requires the plaintiff to plead and establish: (1) the existence of a contract; (2) a material breach of that contract; and (3) damages resulting from the breach.”). While Plaintiff alleges he contracted with ESI, Plaintiff's proposed Third Amended Complaint is so vague that the Court cannot determine whether Plaintiff is attempting to reallege his breach of contract claims that were previously dismissed in Duval County Court and Federal Court in Massachusetts. (Doc. 97 at 18.)
Defendant ESI asserts Plaintiff's breach of contract claim rests on misrepresentations relating to Judge Wallace's findings in the Duval County Court action. (Doc. 104 at 6-10.)
The undersigned notes that at the December 2022 hearing, Plaintiff indicated he was not suing ESI because he was already suing ESI in state court. (Doc. 86 at 41.) However, Plaintiff's proposed Third Amended Complaint does allege a breach of contract action against ESI.
In Counts 3a and 3b, Plaintiff appears to allege breach of contract claims that Aster is liable under ESI's Project 1 and Project 2 contracts. (Doc. 97 at 63.) Specifically, in Count 3a, Plaintiff alleges “[b]y conduct [Aster] agreed with [Plaintiff] to be bounded by Task 4, section 3.3 to 3.5 of ISO 14064-3 and sections 6.3, 4.5[,] and 7.1 of ESI's contract with [Plaintiff] starting on 24 April 2019.” (Id.) Plaintiff further alleges that Aster “notified [Plaintiff] through the VCS Project Database that it agreed with Verra to take over and become the party responsible for the validation of project 1 and project 2.” (Id.) Then, Plaintiff alleges “by conduct” he “accepted the replacement when he did not object to Verra.” (Id.)
Plaintiff's proposed Third Amended Complaint fails to allege what “conduct” created an agreement with Aster and Plaintiff under ESI's Project 1 and 2 contracts. As this Court noted in the December 2022 hearing, “[i]f Aster Global and Terracon entered into a valid transaction to purchase the assets of ESI, they have the right to do that. The law recognizes that.... And your attempt to hold them responsible for ESI's arguable bad acts simply because they purchased assets is not supported by the law.” (Doc. 86 at 34.)
Plaintiff fails to set forth any factual allegations establishing contractual obligations between Aster and Plaintiff, nor are there factual allegations establishing that ESI assigned-in its entirety or in part-any of its obligations under the Project 1 and 2 contracts to Aster. Moreover, this Court previously gave Plaintiff detailed instructions to properly allege Aster as ESI's successor, however, despite the Court's instructions, Plaintiff has failed to show any successorship. (See Doc. 87; Doc. 103.) As such, Plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient facts to support his breach of contract claims.
Plaintiff's complaint is also deficient with respect to damages. For example, Plaintiff alleges he “lost the entire value of project 1 [and] the entire value of project 2”, lost over seven years invested in projects to save the Amazon forest, and lost opportunities to develop a carbon credit market. (Doc. 97 at 28, 38). Plaintiff's allegations are vague and insufficient to allege damages. See Heyward v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, No. 8:20-cv-572-T-33AAS, 2020 WL 10353829, at *3-4 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 6, 2020) (holding conclusory allegations that plaintiff “suffered damages as a result of the breach of contract” are insufficient to plead the damages requirement for breach of contract).
ii. Plaintiff's Fraudulent Misrepresentation Claims
Even if Plaintiff properly joined Janice McMahon, American National Standards Institute (“ANSI”), and Verra, Plaintiff still fails to plead sufficient facts to support claims for fraudulent misrepresentation. (Doc. 97.) Under Florida law, the elements of fraudulent misrepresentation are: “(1) a false statement of a material fact; (2) known by the defendant to be false; (3) made to induce the plaintiff to act in reliance; (4) the plaintiff's acts in reliance upon the representations; and (5) that proximately caused his injury.” Butterworth v. Quick & Reilly, Inc., 998 F.Supp. 1404, 1410 (M.D. Fla. 1998) (citations omitted).
Plaintiff joined Janice McMahon, Verra, and ANSI to this lawsuit after the August 10, 2022 deadline to move or join a new party. (See Doc. 46.)
It is well settled that a claim of fraudulent misrepresentation must be pleaded with particularity pursuant to Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Brooks v. Brooks Consultants, Inc., No. 6:22-cv-669-WWB-LHP, 2022 WL 18492552, at *7-8 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 7, 2022); V.C. v. Evenflo Co., Inc., No. 6:20-cv-2-ORL-40GJK, 2020 WL 5803097, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 20, 2020). “Rule 9(b) is satisfied if the complaint sets forth: (1) the precise statements, documents, or misrepresentations made; (2) the time, place, and person responsible for the statement; (3) the content and manner in which these statements misled the plaintiffs; and (4) what the defendants gained by the alleged fraud.” Garfield v. NDC Health Corp., 466 F.3d 1255, 1262 (11th Cir. 2006).
Although the pleadings of pro se parties must be construed liberally, the Plaintiff must still comply with the heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9 that the circumstances of alleged fraud must be pleaded with particularity. Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b). Here, Plaintiff's fraudulent misrepresentation claims in Counts 2(c), 4, and 5 fail to meet the requirements of Rule 9(b). For example, in Count 5, Plaintiff alleges Verra falsely misrepresented they had the necessary skills to validate and verify his projects. (See Doc. 97 at 70.) Plaintiff's allegations fall short and do not provide details about what was precisely said, and the allegations do not explain the content and manner in which these statements misled him or what the Defendants gained by the alleged fraudulent misrepresentations. Garfield, 466 F.3d at 1262. As such, the undersigned finds that Counts 2(c), 4, and 5 fail to state claims for fraudulent misrepresentation because Plaintiff does not satisfy the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b).
The undersigned also examined Counts 2(c) and 4. In Count 2(c), Plaintiff alleges McMahon made fraudulent misrepresentations to Plaintiff through an affidavit. (Doc. 97 ¶164.) However, Plaintiff failed to state the precise statements that McMahon made. In Count 4, Plaintiff alleges ANSI fraudulently misrepresented that ESI had the skills to validate and verify projects. (Id. ¶192.) However, Plaintiff fails to assert the content and manner of how this statement misled him. Rather, Plaintiff baselessly concludes that his reliance on these representations affords him the right to use Projects 1 and 2. (Id. ¶202.) Plaintiff fails to substantiate the exacting details supporting his position.
C. Plaintiff's Failure to Comply with Court Orders
The Eleventh Circuit explained that “[a] district court has inherent authority to manage its own docket so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.” Woods v. Copeland, No. 4:24-CV-00081-WS-MAF, 2024 WL 2125627, at *3 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 2, 2024) (quoting Equity Lifestyle Props., Inc. v. Fla. Mowing & Landscape Serv., Inc., 556 F.3d 1232, 1240 (11th Cir. 2009) (internal quotations omitted)). Such authority includes the power to dismiss a case for failure to prosecute or for failure to comply with a court order under Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b). Id.
Here, Plaintiff's proposed Third Amended Complaint once again fails to follow this Court's explicit instructions from the December 8, 2022 hearing. Plaintiff was instructed that “if the [amended] complaint is futile, then [the motion for leave] would be denied and the case would be dismissed with prejudice.” (Doc. 86 at 44; see Doc. 96 at 2.) Plaintiff had multiple opportunities to cure the deficiencies in the pleading, but despite these instructions, he failed to do so. In his instant Motion, Plaintiff did not follow the Court's instructions, he did not provide opposing counsel with his proposed Third Amended Complaint, and he did not confer with them before filing. (See Docs. 96 at 2, 86 at 45; see generally Doc. 97.) The record supports that Plaintiff received ample guidance from the Court on fixing the deficiencies in his Complaint. The Court also finds Plaintiff's request for an oral argument is unnecessary. Thus, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff's Motion for Leave (Doc. 97) and Request for Oral Argument (Doc. 105) be DENIED and the case be DISMISSED.
III. Recommendation
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned respectfully RECOMMENDS: Plaintiff's Motion for Leave (Doc. 97) and Request for Oral Argument (Doc. 105) be DENIED, and this action be DISMISSED with prejudice.
DONE AND ENTERED at Jacksonville, Florida, on July 26, 2024.