Opinion
1:22-cv-90
06-29-2023
AMPARO LINARES ALCIBIADE, Petitioner v. RICHARD A. LANZILLO WARDEN TRATE Respondent
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
RICHARD A. LANZILLO, Chief United States Magistrate Judge.
I. Recommendation
It is respectfully recommended that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by federal prisoner Amparo Linares Alcibiade (Petitioner) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 be dismissed.
Petitioner is incarcerated at FCI-McKean, a federal correctional institution located within the territorial boundaries of the Western District of Pennsylvania. The Warden of FCI-McKean is the Respondent in this action.
II. Report
A. Background
On May 20, 2016, Petitioner was sentenced in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico (the “sentencing court”) to a 121-month term of imprisonment. ECF No. 11-1 ¶ 3. Assuming he receives all good conduct time available to him under 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b), Petitioner's projected release date is August 12, 2023. ECF No. 11-2.
On May 18, 2021, a corrections officer at FCI McKean searched the common area inside a cell occupied by Petitioner and another inmate. ECF No. 11-4. On the floor by a desk, the officer found a black shoe with a rolled up brown sock inside. Id. Upon searching the sock, the officer discovered an altered iPhone cell phone charger adapter connected to a black wire. Id.
Later that day, the prison served Petitioner with incident report 3505419 charging him with “possession, manufacture, introduction, of a loss of a hazardous tool, portable telephone, pager, or other electronic device.” Id. Petitioner was advised of his rights, including the right to remain silent at all stages of the disciplinary process. Id. According to Petitioner, a member of the Unit Discipline Committee (UDC) then interviewed him at the door to his cell in the Special Housing Unit (SHU) without the presence of a Spanish-language interpreter. ECF No. 4 at 6. Petitioner contends that he does not speak English and that he could have provided an alibi (in the form of a statement from his cellmate admitting to possession of the contraband device) if an interpreter had been present. Id. at 7.
On May 21, 2021, the UDC referred the matter to a Discipline Hearing Officer (DHO) for further review. ECF No. 11-4. Petitioner was advised of his rights at the upcoming DHO hearing and the potential consequences of a finding of guilt. Id. Petitioner signed a form acknowledging that he had been advised of his rights and declining to request a staff representative or call witnesses. ECF Nos. 11-5 and 11-6.
Petitioner's disciplinary hearing took place on May 25, 2021, in the presence of a Spanish language translator. ECF No. 11-7. After receiving a copy of his rights in Spanish, Petitioner acknowledged that he had received the incident report, understood his rights, and that he waived his right to a staff representative or witnesses. Id. at 2-3. Speaking on his own behalf, Petitioner stated: “I am in that room. I am pretty sure it was not in my property. It isn't mine.” Id. The DHO reviewed the officer's statement, the photo of the altered cell phone charger, the unit roster, the incident report, and Petitioner's statement. Id. Based on the foregoing, the DHO concluded that the greater weight of evidence supported the conclusion that Petitioner was guilty of the offense charged. Id. at 3. The DHO ascribed “little weight” to Petitioner's statement and noted that the contraband item was located “in the common area of your cell whether both inmates had access to it” and, therefore, was within the “dominion and control of both inmates.” Id. After determining that Petitioner had committed the charged offense, the DHO sanctioned him with 41 days loss of good conduct time, 30 days of disciplinary segregation, and the loss of phone privileges for twelve months. Id.
The instant petition for writ of habeas corpus, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenges the due process provided during Petitioner's initial appearance before the UDC officer. Petitioner maintains that the “inmate responsible for [possessing the contraband] was more than willing to accept his responsibility and free me of ‘his' troubles” but that he could not obtain that inmate's confession without the assistance of a translator. ECF No. 6. This matter is fully briefed and ripe for disposition.
Under § 2241, district courts have authority to grant habeas corpus “within their respective jurisdictions.” Petitioner is confined at FCI McKean, which is located within the territorial boundaries of the Western District of Pennsylvania.
B. Standard of review
Federal prisoners have a liberty interest in statutory good time credits. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1). While “prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution and the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply,” the United States Supreme Court has identified the following minimum procedural due process rights that must be afforded to a prisoner accused of misconduct in prison which may result in the loss of good time credit: (1) the right to appear before an impartial decision-making body; (2) twenty-four hour advance written notice of the disciplinary charges; (3) an opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense when it is consistent with institutional safety and correctional goals; (4) assistance from an inmate representative if the charged inmate is illiterate or complex issues are involved; and, (5) a written decision by the fact finder of the evidence relied upon and the rationale behind the disciplinary action. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563-67.
In reviewing a disciplinary proceeding, the Court's function is not to decide whether it would have reached the same decision, but to consider “whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.” Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455-57 (1985). See also Denny v. Schultz, 708 F.3d 140, 145 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[A] reviewing court need only find that the DHO's decision had ‘some basis in fact' in order to affirm the decision as comporting with the Due Process Clause.”). This review is minimal, and “[a] challenge to the weight accorded evidence is not relevant to the question of whether the decision was supported by ‘some evidence' because the standard does not require ‘weighing of the evidence.'” McCarthy v. Warden Lewisburg USP, 631 Fed.Appx. 84, 86-87 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Hill, 472 U.S. at 455). Rather, “[o]nce the reviewing court determines that there is some evidence in the record to support the finding of the hearing officer, an inmate's challenge to the weighing of the evidence must be rejected.” Cardona v. Lewisburg, 551 Fed.Appx. 633, 637 (3d Cir. 2014).
C. Discussion
Petitioner challenges the sanction imposed by the DHO on the grounds that he was not provided due process during his initial interview with the UDC. By way of background, BOP regulations require staff members to prepare an Incident Report when there is a reasonable belief that a violation of BOP regulations has been committed by an inmate. 28 C.F.R. § 541.14. The incident is then referred to the UDC for an initial hearing pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 541.15. If the UDC finds that a prisoner has committed a prohibited act, it may either impose minor sanctions or refer the matter to a DHO for a hearing. Id. If the alleged violation is serious and warrants consideration for more than minor sanctions or involves certain “severe” acts, the UDC must refer the matter to a DHO for a hearing. Id. The DHO then renders a decision and imposes any appropriate sanction. 28 C.F.R. § 541.17(g).
In the instant case, Petitioner's claim focuses entirely on the early stages of this process. Specifically, Petitioner contends that his due process rights were violated because he was not permitted to have a Spanish language interpreter present during his initial interview with the UDC. Petitioner argues that the assistance of a translator at that stage would resulted in the charge being thrown out because, had Petitioner understood what was going on, he could have identified the inmate who was responsible for the contraband. Petitioner does not offer any explanation as to why he failed to call that inmate as a witness during his subsequent DHO hearing.
After carefully reviewing the record, the Court concludes that Petitioner has failed to establish an entitlement to relief. As an initial matter, Petitioner does not dispute that he received the full panoply of due process rights contemplated by Wolff during his hearing before the DHO, including the assistance of a Spanish interpreter. While the lack of an interpreter during his earlier interview was unfortunate, the only action taken by the UDC was to refer the matter to the DHO for full adjudication. Petitioner had the benefit of an interpreter at that hearing, as well as the ability to call witnesses in his defense and to request the assistance of a staff representative. He has not identified any evidence that he could have presented to the UDC that was not available at his DHO hearing and has cited no authority for the proposition that due process independently requires the presence of a translator during the early stages of an investigation that ultimately culminates in a full and fair hearing before a DHO. Each of these deficiencies is fatal to his claim.
Secondly, even if Petitioner could establish a technical violation of the prison's procedural rules, he cannot demonstrate that he suffered prejudice. See Donaldson v. Samuels, 2007 WL 3493654, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 13, 2007) (“[T]he true measure of whether a due process violation occurred ... is whether he suffered harm or some form of prejudice as a result.”) (citing Van Kahl v. Brennan, 855 F.Supp.2d 1413, 1418 (M.D. Pa. 1994)). Petitioner does not dispute that he received all the constitutional safeguards required by law during his DHO hearing, including the assistance of a Spanish language translator. After being advised of his rights in Spanish and indicating that he understood them, Petitioner had an opportunity to call witnesses - including the other inmate that he claims would have taken responsibility for the contraband phone charger - but declined to do so. As required by Wolff, Petitioner ultimately received a written decision setting forth the evidence relied upon by the DHO and the rationale behind the decision. Because Petitioner had a full and fair opportunity to present his alibi defense during his DHO hearing, he cannot establish that he was harmed, prejudiced, or otherwise disadvantaged by his inability to do so during his UDC interview.
Finally, to the extent that Petitioner's complaints amount to a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence against him, that challenge also fails. In reaching its decision, the DHO relied on statements from Petitioner and the investigating officer, photos of the contraband, the unit roster, and the incident report. These exhibits clearly amount to “some evidence” in support of the charge and, therefore, Petitioner's due process rights were not violated by the DHO's determination. See Donahue v. Grondolsky, 398 Fed.Appx. 767, 772 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting that courts are not “required to re-weigh the evidence, or re-assess the credibility of [a petitioner's] defense”); Sepulveda v. Warden Canaan USP, 645 Fed.Appx. 115, 118 (3d Cir. 2016) (reviewing court may not independently assess the credibility of witnesses or re-weigh the evidence so long as the DHO's decision is supported by “any evidence in the record”) (quoting Hill, 472 U.S. at 454-56).
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus be dismissed.
Because “[fiederal prisoner appeals from the denial of a habeas corpus proceeding are not governed by the certificate of appealability requirement,” the Court need not make a certificate of appealability determination in this matter. Williams v. McKean, 2019 WL 11 18057, at *5 n. 6 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2019) (citing United States v. Cepero, 224 F.3d 256, 264-65 (3d Cir. 2000), abrogated on other grounds by Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134 (2012)); 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B).
IV. Notice
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, the parties may seek review by the district court by filing Objections to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of Objections to respond thereto. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file timely objections may constitute a waiver of appellate rights. See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 194 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011); Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007).