Based upon all the files, records and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petitions of Paper Calmenson Company and MAK Oil Company for further review of a decision of the court of appeals, 515 N.W.2d 59, be, and the same are, granted for the limited purpose of allocating the proceeds of the suit brought by the employee against the third party who was entitled to Lambertson contribution from the employer. The mechanics of the allocation that includes a Lambertson obligation are that the "third party tortfeasor * * * should pay the entire verdict * * * to the plaintiff.
Because of this awkward situation and the risks of incompatible results on remand, we remand both cases to the Washington County District Court. See generally Minn. Stat. 480A.07 (2002) (stating court of appeals may transfer a case to appropriate district court if it determines further findings of fact are required); Minn. Stat. 480A.06, subd. 5 (2002) (stating court of appeals may issue orders necessary to enforce its rulings); cf. Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.04 (allowing appellate court to take action "as the interests of justice may require"); Albert v. Paper Calmenson Co., 515 N.W.2d 59, 69 (Minn.App. 1994) (considering judicial efficiency and convenience in remanding a complex case), review denied in part (Minn. Jun. 29, 1994), aff'd as modified 524 N.W.2d 460 (Minn.
The district court excluded evidence of the deputy's failure to have a complete oxygen kit because it concluded that any relevance was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice and jury confusion. See Minn.R.Evid. 403; see also Albert v. Paper Calmenson Co., 515 N.W.2d 59, 68 (Minn.App. 1994) (excluding evidence relating to a dismissed third party's possible negligence was proper because the evidence would have misled the jury), aff'd as modified, 524 N.W.2d 460 (1994). Because Allina has advanced no supportable theory that Scott County could be held liable for the injuries, additional evidence on the deputy's conduct would not reasonably have helped the jury and could have caused confusion.
And prejudice is shown if the district court refuses to consider additional evidence in opposition to the summary judgment motion. Albert v. Paper Calmenson Co., 515 N.W.2d 59, 65 (Minn.App. 1994), affirmed as modified, 524 N.W.2d 460 (Minn. 1994); see Niazi v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 265 Minn. 222, 228, 121 N.W.2d 349, 354 (1963) (supreme court considered specific facts appellant claimed district court failed to consider).
In Kiser v. Schulte, 538 Pa. 219, 648 A.2d 1, 7 (Pa. 1994) the Pennsylvania Supreme Court defined a "compromise verdict" as one where "the jury, in doubt as to the defendant's negligence or plaintiff's contributory negligence, returns a verdict for the plaintiff but in a lesser amount than it would have if these questions had been free from doubt." See also Albert v. Paper Calmenson Co., 515 N.W.2d 59, 65 (Minn.Ct. App. 1994) ("A `compromise verdict' occurs when the jury awards an amount that reflects a compromise between liability and proven damages."); Carlson v. Lampert, 190 Wis.2d 650, 529 N.W.2d 905 (Wis. 1995) (A "compromise verdict" occurs when the jury, unable to agree on liability, compromises that disagreement and enters a grossly low award of damages.) Consistent with the foregoing definitions is the notion that the jury, although determining that the defendant is liable, nonetheless awards either zero damages or damages which are inconsistent with the facts introduced at trial.
However, case law indicates that this requirement is not absolute. For example, in Albert v. Paper Calmenson Co., 515 N.W.2d 59 (Minn.App. 1994), modified in part on other grounds, 524 N.W.2d 460 (Minn. 1994), we upheld the district court's grant of a motion for summary judgment that had earlier been denied but was renewed on the first day of trial.
The record, however, contains no probative evidence to support Boitnott's argument. See Albertv. Paper Calmenson Co., 515 N.W.2d 59, 64 (Minn.App. 1994) ("To resist summary judgment, the evidence must be significantly probative, not merely colorable."). Boitnott relies on (1) the fact that Cascarano received a larger fee because the case went to trial, (2) another attorney's affidavit stating that "[i]t appears from the record
Appellate courts are "loath to interfere with a trial court ruling which appears, in effect, to correct an earlier error." Albert v. Paper Calmenson Co., 515 N.W.2d 59, 65 (Minn.App. 1994), aff'd as modified, 524 N.W.2d 460 (Minn. 1994).