DeSmet ex rel. Estate of Hays v. Cty. of Rock Island , 219 Ill.2d 497, 302 Ill.Dec. 466, 848 N.E.2d 1030, 1041 (2006). Section 4-102 codified the common law public-duty rule that a public entity is under no duty to provide and is not liable for its failure to provide adequate government services, such as police protection. Albert v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chi. , 388 Ill.Dec. 120, 24 N.E.3d 28, 43 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014) (citing Aikens v. Morris , 145 Ill.2d 273, 164 Ill.Dec. 571, 583 N.E.2d 487, 490 n.1 (1991) ). Immunity under Section 4-102 attaches only if the safeguards the Board allegedly failed to implement constitute "police protection services."

Immunity for the Board under Section 2-109 necessarily follows from the immunity of Dr. Jackson, LeMone, and Passman under Section 2-210. See Arteman v. Clinton Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 15, 763 N.E.2d 756, 762-64 (Ill. 2002) (holding that a school district enjoyed immunity under Section 2-109 given that the district's employees enjoyed immunity under Section 2-201 of the Tort Immunity Act); Albert v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi., 24 N.E.3d 28, 40 (Ill. App. 2014) (“[T]hrough section 2-109 of the Tort Immunity Act, a public entity is afforded the individual immunities of its employees and ‘may assert any immunity granted an employee to preclude its own liability.'”)

Moreover, the Illinois Supreme Court has emphasized that, before a court can determine whether a governmental unit or employee is immune from negligence liability based upon willful and wanton acts or omissions, it must first determine if any duty of care by the public entity exists. Village of Bloomingdale v. CDGEnterprises, Inc., 752 N.E.2d 1090 (Ill. 2001) (cited in Albert v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chicago, 24 N.E.3d 28, 37-38 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014)). The operative complaint does not explain who made the decision to hire McGriggs or to address (or not address) any relationship between McGriggs and Plaintiff (or McGriggs and Plaintiff's mother); nor does the limited record before the Court explain the specific actions taken in connection with the revelations about McGriggs' behavior.

On the contrary, the courts dismissed each case because the plaintiffs were attempting to hold state actors liable for some sort of failure to act in the first place. See Lacey v. Vill. of Palatine, 232 Ill.2d 349, 365 (2009) (allegations of failure to protect from domestic violence not a claim under § 2-202); Albert v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chicago, 24 N.E.3d 28, 41 (Ill.App.Ct. 2014) (“Alleging a failure to act means section 2-202 is inapplicable.”)

Among those considered "local public entities" are school districts and school boards. 745 ILCS 10/1-206; Albert v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi., 2014 IL App (1st) 123544, ¶ 52, 24 N.E.3d 28, 43 ("Under the Tort Immunity Act, a 'local public entity' includes school districts and all other local governmental bodies such as the Board."). And injuries under the Tort Immunity Act include "any injury alleged in a civil action, whether based upon the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the State of Illinois, and the statutes or common law of Illinois or of the United States."

Consequently, the Tort Immunity Act, 745 ILCS 10/2-109, provides Watson and St. Clair County no immunity from liability stemming from the Wrongful Death Act claims against Harris, Wilson, Knyff or Lanzante based on their wrongful conduct. See, e.g., Albert v. Board of Educ. of Chi., 24 N.E.3d 28, 40 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014) (finding board of education was an appropriate party under the Tort Immunity Act in wrongful death suit based on its employees' conduct).

See, e.g.,Mers, 216 Ill.Dec. 31, 664 N.E.2d at 675 ("The decision to hire or not to hire a police officer is an inherently discretionary act and, thus, is subject to the immunities contained in the Immunity Act."), cited with approval,Doe v. Vill. of Arlington Hts., 782 F.3d 911, 922 (7th Cir. 2015) ; Brooks v. Daley, 390 Ill.Dec. 838, 29 N.E.3d 1108, 1116–17 (2015) ("Here, when Brooks was accused of sexual harassment, defendants made a decision concerning the effect that the allegations would have on efficacy and harmony in the workplace. Such a judgment call is both a policy determination and a discretionary action, since the outcome is not predetermined but left to defendants' judgment."); Albert v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chicago, 388 Ill.Dec. 120, 24 N.E.3d 28, 46 (2014) (affirming the lower court's reasoning that "[t]he act and omissions alleged on the part of the Board here involve decisions with regard to administering student discipline and punishment involve [sic ] the determination of policy and an exercise of discretion" because the "Board had to balance competing interests and make a judgment call, thus engaging in policy determination") (internal quotation marks omitted); Hanania v. Loren–Maltese, 319 F.Supp.2d 814, 834–36 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (holding that the city of Cicero was immune from liability for decisions to reduce the powers of the town collector's office and to fire its town collector); Mann v. City of Chicago, 182 F.3d 922 (Tbl.) (N.D. Ill. 1999) (affirming summary judgment on immunity grounds in favor of defendants because "Illinois appellate courts have held that the hiring and firing of employees is inherently discretionary, within the meaning of § 2–201 of the Tort Immunity Act") (citations omitted).

¶ 66 There is no question that this immunity protects the Board from liability where it is alleged that the Board's failure to provide adequate security resulted in a crime being committed against a student. See, e.g. , Castillo v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago , 2018 IL App (1st) 171053, ¶ 2, 422 Ill.Dec. 464, 103 N.E.3d 596 (no liability where student was attacked off campus); Albert v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago , 2014 IL App (1st) 123544, ¶ 56, 388 Ill.Dec. 120, 24 N.E.3d 28 (no liability where student was killed on his way home from school); Green v. Chicago Board of Education , 407 Ill. App. 3d 721, 723, 348 Ill.Dec. 506, 944 N.E.2d 459 (2011) (no liability where student was shot and killed by a fellow student). Our supreme court has extended section 4-102 immunity to conduct that, though not itself the provision of police protection services, "implicate[s] the structural adequacy of [such] services."

Not everything passed by the Board is a law under the Act. In Albert v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago , 2014 IL App (1st) 123544, ¶¶ 43-44, 388 Ill.Dec. 120, 24 N.E.3d 28, the court found that the "Student Code of Conduct," which was adopted by the Board, was not a "law" within the meaning of section 2-202 of the Act. Section 2-202 of the Act, which is not at issue here, states that "[a] public employee is not liable for his act or omission in the execution or enforcement of any law unless such act or omission constitutes willful and wanton conduct."