(“Plaintiffs' right to any payment from the government at all, whether in full as charged, or in a lesser amount reduced by offset, is created in the first instance by their contracts, not by GSA's regulations.”). Plaintiffs point to Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Austin, 801 F.Supp. 760 (D.D.C.1992), in support of its argument that its claims are not contractual in nature. But, in addition to being not binding on this Court, that case provides little guidance on whether plaintiffs' claims are founded upon a contract.

At the time of its Chapter 11 filing, TWA was a party to an action brought by several airlines against the General Services Administration (GSA) and the United States of America, challenging the legality of GSA's post-payment audits of airline transportation bills. On August 12, 1992, more than six months after TWA filed its voluntary petition, the District Court for the District of Columbia ruled against the GSA in Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Austin, 801 F. Supp. 760 (D.D.C. 1992), aff'd in relevant part, 8 F.3d 791 (Fed.Cir. 1993). The Alaska Airlines court ordered the GSA to return to TWA and the other plaintiff airlines all monies improperly withheld by the GSA because of faulty agency post-payment audits of airline services provided by the airlines to federal employees.

Multiple claims may be joined in a case, resulting in a large aggregate amount in controversy, but each claim joined must be $10,000 or less in order for the court to retain jurisdiction. See, e.g., Glover v. Johns-Manville Corp., 662 F.2d 225, 231 (4th Cir. 1981) United States v. Louisville Nashville R.R. Co., 221 F.2d 698, 701-02 (6th Cir. 1955); Alaska Airlines v. Austin, 801 F. Supp. 760, 762 (D.D.C. 1992) (aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom., Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Johnson, 8 F.3d 799 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Jones Motor Co. v. Teledyne, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 310, 316 (D.Del. 1988). The parties agree on the jurisdictional standard under the Little Tucker Act. What is at issue is whether joint owners of an undivided interest in real property may assert separate claims for an alleged taking of that property. If so, jurisdiction is proper under the Act up to $10,000 for each claim. If not, this court may not assert jurisdiction unless the plaintiffs waive any claim in excess of $10,000.

GSA refused to abide by the ruling, claiming that the Comptroller General lacked constitutional authority to issue a binding decision. Consequently, the airlines filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Richard Austin, 801 F.Supp. 760 (D.D.C.1992), to enforce the Comptroller's decision.         On August 11, 1992, the court ruled in the airlines favor and entered an injunction which, inter alia, ordered GSA to return money improperly withheld from the airlines.

On April 12, 1993, the Federal Circuit issued an order denying the Government's request for a stay, but instead permitted it to deposit the disputed sum into the registry of the bankruptcy court while the Government attempted to set-off the $4.8 million it owed against the $14.5 million in claims due its agencies. Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Austin, 801 F. Supp. 760 (D. D.C. 1992). The facts of Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Austin are not relevant to the issues raised on this appeal.

The Administrator of the General Services Administration and the United States bring this consolidated appeal of the judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in favor of the party airlines, holding that the government's postpayment audits of airline transportation bills are not authorized by law and ordering the return of all money held by the government because of the improper audits. 801 F. Supp. 760 (D.D.C. 1992). We affirm in-part, reverse in-part, and remand.

"A suit in district court under the Little Tucker Act may seek over $10,000 in total monetary relief, as long as the right to compensation arises from separate transactions for which the claims do not individually exceed $10,000." Class Certification Op., 235 F. Supp. 3d at 38 (citing Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Austin, 778 F. Supp. 72, 76-77 (D.D.C. 1991); Alaska Airlines v. Austin, 801 F. Supp. 760, 762 (D.D.C. 1992); United States v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 221 F.2d 698, 701 (6th Cir. 1955)). This argument makes some sense in the abstract.

A suit in district court under the Little Tucker Act may seek over $10,000 in total monetary relief, as long as the right to compensation arises from separate transactions for which the claims do not individually exceed $10,000. Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Austin , 778 F.Supp. 72, 76–77 (D.D.C. 1991) ; Alaska Airlines v. Austin , 801 F.Supp. 760, 762 (D.D.C. 1992), aff'd in relevant part byAlaska Airlines, Inc. v. Johnson , 8 F.3d 791, 797 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ; United States v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. , 221 F.2d 698, 701 (6th Cir. 1955). Plaintiffs assert that no class member has a claim exceeding $10,000 for a single PACER transaction, and defendant does not dispute this. (Pls.

In essence, the Government improperly has taken Plaintiffs' property from them without any legal basis for doing so.Alaska Airlines v. Austin, No. CIV. 90-2879, 1992 WL 464711, at *2 (D.D.C. 1992). Referring to the District Court's decision, the Federal Circuit found: