116 Nev. 1165, 14 P.3d 511 (2000). 114 Nev. 154, 953 P.2d 1074 (1998).Dual coverage under the Nevada short-term rental statutes
. Hall also noted that under Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 114 Nev. 154, 953 P.2d 1074 (1998), "the short-term lessee's personal policy provides primary coverage up to the statutory minimums, and the coverage provided by the short-term lessor is deemed to be 'secondary,' i.e., excess coverage." 122 Nev. at 689, 137 P.3d at 1107 (quoting Alamo, 114 Nev. at 159, 953 P.2d at 1077). Accordingly, "absent a personal policy covering the driver, the lessor 'will step in and compensate the victim up to the minimum limits."
00 CSAA had paid pursuant to the covenant not to execute. In response to the Salases' complaint, Allstate filed a motion for summary judgment arguing primarily that it had no obligation to appellants because CSAA had paid an amount equal to the minimum liability limits set by NRS 482.305(1) as interpreted by this court in Alamo Rent-A-Car v. State Farm, 114 Nev. 154, 953 P.2d 1074 (1998). After a hearing, the district court granted summary judgment for Allstate, stating that:
Lincoln argues that as between a rental car driver's personal automobile insurance — here, GEICO — and a rental car agency's self insurance up to the state statutory minimum — here, the Primary Protection — the driver's personal automobile insurer bears the primary responsibility for covering losses. Lincoln claims that Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 114 Nev. 154, 953 P.2d 1074 (1998) supports its position. Lincoln's argument fails.
In Travelers Insurance Co. v. Lopez, 567 P.2d 471, 474 (Nev. 1977), the Nevada Supreme Court adopted the Lamb-Weston rule, originating in the Oregon Supreme Court case Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. Oregon Auto. Ins. Co., 341 P.2d 110 (1959), which holds that “the ‘other insurance' clause contained in one policy of insurance [is] null and void when it conflicts with a similar clause contained in another policy of insurance.” Travelers Ins. Co., 567 P.2d at 474. In Alamo Rent-A-Car v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 953 P.2d 1074 (Nev. 1998), the Nevada Supreme Court clarified that, under the Lamb-Weston rule, “[m]utually repugnant escape, excess, or pro-rata clauses [are] disregarded and losses [are] pro-rated according to the limits of both policies.” Alamo Rent-A-Car v. State Farm Mut.
We conclude that Nevada law governing how insurance policies are to be construed is fully applicable to the ProBuilders policies at issue in this case. ProBuilders' reliance on Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 953 P.2d 1074 (Nev. 1998), is misplaced. Unlike the car rental agency in Alamo, ProBuilders is primarily in the business of underwriting insurance.
The Supreme Court of Nevada has "concluded that 'an insurance company could not seek to "defer or limit its liability" on the basis of the availability of other insurance.'" Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 114 Nev. 154, 953 P.2d 1074, 1076 (1998) (quoting Yosemite Ins. v. State Farm Mut., 98 Nev. 460, 653 P.2d 149, 150 (1982)). Furthermore, GEICO has not proven the applicability of the "other insurance" clause because it has not demonstrated that, even if it is an excess insurer, it is not liable for any damages incurred by the Schultes.
When courts resolve disputes involving “other insurance” clauses, they typically compare all of the insurance policies involved. See, e.g., Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 953 P.2d 1074, 1076 (Nev. 1998) (discussing the Lamb-Weston rule that the Nevada Supreme Court adopted and under which varying policies' “other insurance” clauses are compared); Oregon Auto. Ins. Co. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 195 F.2d 958, 960 (9th Cir. 1952) (applying Oregon law but undertaking a similar comparison of two policies that were both in effect at the time of the car accident).
When insurance policies each contain "other insurance" clauses that conflict with each other, the clauses are disregarded and the loss is pro-rated between the respective insurers. See Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 953 P.2d 1074, 1076 (Nev. 1998); Mission Ins. Co. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 517 N.E.2d 492, 465 (Mass. 1988) (finding conflicting excess clauses to be mutually repugnant). Under Minnesota law, the courts determine the priority of coverage based on an analysis of the "total policy insuring intent" and "closeness to the risk." See Cargill, Inc. v. Evanston Ins. Co., 642 N.W.2d 80, 88 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) (explaining that under Minnesota law, "priority among insurance policies is not to be determined by the presence or absence of other-insurance clauses, but by an analysis of the function and intent of the policies").
Budget urges us to adopt the reasoning of several other jurisdictions that have determined a driver's automobile policy is primary and a car rental company's insurance is secondary. See Mercury Ins. Co. v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co., 80 Cal.App.4th 41, 48, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 222 (2000); Hertz Corp. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 245 Conn. 374, 384, 713 A.2d 820 (1998); A. Atlanta AutoSave, Inc. v. Generali-U.S. Branch, 230 Ga. App. 887, 889, 498 S.E.2d 278 (1998), aff'd, 270 Ga. 757, 514 S.E.2d 651 (1999); Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 114 Nev. 154, 160, 953 P.2d 1074 (1998); Champlain Cas. Co. v. Agency Rent-A Car, Inc., 168 Vt. 91, 100-01, 716 A.2d 810 (1998). We decline to do so and continue to adhere to the Washington rule that a rental car company, as owner of the vehicle involved in an accident, must provide primary insurance coverage consistent with the terms contained in the rental contract.