Opinion
A166398
06-14-2023
In re I.V., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. ALAMEDA COUNTY SOCIAL SERVICES AGENCY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. G.H., Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Alameda County Super. Ct. No. JD03369601, JD03369701
BOWEN, J. [*]
G.H. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court's finding at a combined six- and twelve-month review hearing that reasonable reunification services had been provided to her. Mother asserts that insufficient evidence supports this finding because therapeutic counseling services for her and her children were delayed. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
On June 25, 2021, the Alameda County Social Services Agency (Agency) filed a petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1), alleging that Mother's two children-three-year-old I.V. and 14-month-old K.S.-were at substantial risk of harm as a result of Mother's failure or inability to supervise or adequately protect them. The petition was based on an incident that had occurred a few days earlier, when Mother was arrested while she was in a car with the children. The children were not in car seats, and large amounts of drugs, including crystal methamphetamine and fentanyl, were located in the car within their reach. Drugs were found in the children's diaper bags under the front seat of the car and in a Kool-Aid container. The Agency removed the children from Mother's care.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
The trial court record at times refers to I.V. and K.S. as I.H. and K.H., respectively. For consistency, we refer to the children as I.V. and K.S.
The Agency later amended the petition to allege pursuant to subdivision (g) of section 300 that the children had been left without any support, as the whereabouts of their alleged fathers were unknown.
The Agency's detention report stated that Mother denied knowing there were drugs in the car. She claimed that her boyfriend, who she had known for about two months, had borrowed his cousin's car and picked her and the children up. She also denied that there were drugs in the diaper bag. The court ordered the children detained.
A. Jurisdiction and Disposition
The contested jurisdiction/disposition hearing was originally scheduled for October 7, 2021, but was continued at Mother's request to January 20, 2022. By the time it occurred, Mother had been visiting the children regularly since July 2021, had participated in parenting classes to which the Agency referred her, and had consistently tested negative for all controlled substances.
However, Mother continued to deny any involvement with the drugs found in the vehicle, maintained that she did not know drugs were stored inside the children's items, and provided conflicting statements about the incident. Moreover, Mother was aware that her boyfriend had prior drug charges and was a known drug dealer in the community. She had a history of being in relationships with men who use drugs or are involved in drug sales. The Agency suspected Mother was still associating with her boyfriend, her claims to the contrary notwithstanding. Based on the foregoing, the Agency was concerned that Mother prioritized her relationship with her boyfriend above her children's safety, and that her ability to enter healthy relationships and understand the "warning signs" of dangerous situations was "questionable ...." The Agency also suspected Mother was involved in or aware of drug sales given the quantities of drugs found in the car.
In January 2022, a couple of weeks before the disposition hearing, the children's foster parent informed the social worker that Mother was incarcerated for criminal charges related to the incident that initially led to the children's removal. It is not clear from the record for how long Mother was incarcerated, but the record shows that the social worker was in contact with Mother as of late January, and Mother "had not missed a visit with the children" during the six-month review period that began on January 25.
B. Mother's Court-Ordered Reunification Plan at Disposition
At the conclusion of the combined jurisdiction/disposition hearing, the juvenile court found true the petition's allegations, declared the children juvenile dependents, and ordered reunification services. The specifics of Mother's court-ordered case plan were as follows: within the following six months, she was to (1) demonstrate during visits with the children that she can provide appropriate care and supervision for them; (2) work with a therapist or counselor to develop the ability to take ownership over decisions that directly affect the children, "unpack all of her trauma and [its relation to] her decision making[,]" understand how her decisions directly affect her children, gain knowledge on how to place her children's needs above her own, and make a list of "warning signs" to look for when choosing a partner; and (3) develop a positive support system with friends and family.
C. The Sixth-Month Review
The Agency filed a six-month status review report on June 27, 2022, in connection with a review hearing initially scheduled for July 7, 2022. For that review, the Agency recommended that reunification services continue, with the children remaining in out-of-home placement.
The Agency determined that Mother was in "minimal" compliance with the therapeutic counseling component of her case plan. The report noted that during the review period, Mother "needed to transfer her Medi-Cal to reflect her Oakland address" so that she could receive mental health services in Alameda County, because "Medi-cal [sic] continued to be a barrier." Mother was not scheduled to begin therapy until early May 2022, approximately three months after the disposition hearing.
During this review period, Mother had not missed any visits with the children and "always show[ed] engagement" with them. The report noted that Mother would "benefit to expand her ability to visit in a monitored or unsupervised manner." The Agency also sought to secure therapeutic services for the family and the children from several providers and clinics, but those attempts proved unsuccessful due in part to the family's language needs, as Mother spoke only Spanish.
At the six-month review hearing, the children's counsel made a "plea for therapeutic support for these children" because the transitions between caregivers was causing "some extreme disregulation [sic]" for them. The court ultimately continued the six-month review hearing twice, and eventually combined it with the twelve-month review.
D. The Twelve-Month Review
The Agency filed a second status review report on August 30, 2022, in connection with the review period from July 7, 2022 through August 30, 2022. The Agency recommended that Mother continue reunification services. While the report noted that Mother continued to have "successful and appropriate" visitation with the children, the Agency again found that Mother was in minimal compliance with the therapeutic counseling component of her case plan. Mother had informed her social worker that her therapist was not seeing her due to Mother" 'not needing services.'" The social worker learned in late August, however, that Mother had actually cancelled her May therapy appointment and missed her June appointment completely, and had not contacted her therapist since then. The social worker set up another therapy appointment for Mother for August 25.
After the court continued the August 31, 2022 review hearing for further trial to October 6, the Agency filed an addendum report on October 5, which showed that Mother continued to miss her appointments. Her therapist reported that Mother failed to engage in therapy, as she "always communicates that things are fine" and does not have anything to talk about. The Agency determined Mother had completed the "parenting" component of her case plan and encouraged her to attend additional parenting classes to gain more skills.
The addendum report further showed that on October 4, shortly after visitation had progressed to two overnights a week, Mother informed the social worker that the children were always fighting with each other and that I.V. was throwing toys at her. Mother stated that "it almost feels as visits happened quickly to overnight." The social worker asked Mother about reducing overnight visits to one night a week while the children received support in dyadic therapy, and Mother agreed with that plan. The family was supposed to begin dyadic therapy the prior month, but Mother missed the first two appointments, and the children's caregiver missed the third appointment.
E. The Six- and Twelve-Month Review Hearing
The combined six- and twelve-month review hearing commenced on August 31, 2022 and concluded on October 11, 2022. The court received the Agency's reports into evidence and heard testimony from Mother's social worker. Mother did not testify, as she had been arrested on October 6, 2022 for four felony counts of possession for sale of a controlled substance for an incident unrelated to the one that led to the children's initial removal. After learning of the new arrest, the court ordered that Mother's visits were again to be supervised.
The social worker testified that she had reviewed the case plan twice a month with Mother. She further testified that Mother "could not be connected to a therapist in person or virtual" in Alameda County, where Mother lived, because of "a barrier with the mother having her Medi-Cal transferred to Alameda County" from San Francisco County. Mother made "contradicting statements" about transferring her Medi-Cal coverage, and she was eventually assigned a therapist through her San Francisco Medi-Cal.
When asked about I.V.'s behavioral issues, the social worker testified that these had existed "throughout" the case, "regardless if [he was] transitioning [between caregivers] or not." Those behaviors included biting, hitting, and being dishonest, and they had decreased over time. To help I.V. with those issues, the Agency referred him to "Help Me Grow" for an assessment and to "Regional Services," and he also received language support at school. The social worker testified that after she received the case in February 2022, she made a mental health services referral and reached out to "around five" service providers for the children.
Following evidence, the court heard argument. The children's counsel argued that the Agency had not provided reasonable reunification services because the children had received no therapeutic support. She argued that the evidence showed the children were experiencing anxiety and that their behavioral issues demonstrated they were "in distress and unable to regulate their emotions." Mother's counsel agreed that reasonable services were not provided based on the lack of therapeutic support for the children.
The Agency's counsel disagreed and argued that visitation had progressed "along a normal timeline" and was not delayed due to services not being provided. The Agency pointed out that Mother's request to reduce her overnight visits was a "moot" point since the court had again ordered supervised visitation based on Mother's new arrest. Counsel for the Agency pointed out that while Mother had been offered individual counseling, she had delayed obtaining those services through her own actions in refusing to transfer her Medi-Cal to Alameda County. The Agency's counsel acknowledged that the children had not yet engaged in therapy, but he contended that the Agency made efforts to obtain such services, and that Mother's social worker provided her instruction on parenting matters as they arose.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found that Mother presented an active and continuing danger to the children based on her "ongoing denials about her involvement in wrongdoing" and her failure to progress in mitigating the circumstances that led to the children's removal. The court further found that the Agency had provided reasonable reunification services. The court was disappointed by the lack of Spanish-language services and therapeutic support for the children, as there was "obviously a need for that therapeutic support from the outside of the case." Nonetheless, the court found that those issues did not "necessarily wash away all of the other efforts made by the Agency here[,]" which, "in the aggregate, . . . have been reasonable under the circumstances of the case." The court further noted that Mother was an obstacle to the provision of services and had herself contributed to their delay. The court ordered reunification services to continue to the permanency hearing.
Mother appeals from the review order.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Mootness
Before turning to the merits, we briefly address mootness. As mentioned, at the conclusion of the combined six- and twelve-month review hearing, the juvenile court ordered the continuation of reunification services for Mother to the permanency hearing, to occur no later than 18 months from the initial date the children were removed from her care. The Agency argues that the juvenile court's decision to continue reunification services renders the appeal moot.
"When no effective relief can be granted, an appeal is moot and will be dismissed." (In re Jessica K. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1313, 1315, disagreed with on other grounds by In re Darlice C. (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 459, 464.) However, while no immediate consequences to Mother flowed from the juvenile court's reasonable services finding at the combined six- and twelvemonth hearing, we cannot say for certain that this finding will not affect Mother's rights at future hearings. (See In re Alvin R. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 962, 974 (Alvin R.) [reversing order finding that services were reasonable even though the juvenile court ordered an additional six months of services: "Unless the order is reversed, however, the prejudice to father from the ruling will come later, at each successive phase of the proceedings"].) In particular, absent reasonable services findings at each required hearing throughout a dependency case, the court can terminate parental rights at the permanency hearing. (See § 366.26, subd. (c)(2)(A) [court "shall not" terminate parental rights if at each review hearing, "the court has found that reasonable efforts were not made or that reasonable services were not offered or provided"].) A reasonable services finding may also be a factor in the juvenile court's decision on whether to discontinue reunification services at an 18-month review hearing. (See Michael G. v. Superior Court of Orange County (2023) 14 Cal.5th 609, 632-633 [court may extend reunification services beyond the 18-month time limit for "good cause," which may exist when"' "inadequate services" are offered by the child welfare agency' "].)
In light of the possibility Mother's rights could be affected in a future proceeding, we will consider her challenge to the juvenile court's finding that the Agency provided reasonable reunification services. (In re C.C. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1488, disagreed with on other grounds by In re Matthew C. (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 1090, 1102 [" 'An issue is not moot if the purported error infects the outcome of subsequent proceedings' "].) We therefore turn to the merits of Mother's appeal.
B. The Merits
Mother argues that the court erred in finding reasonable reunification services were provided. Her contention is based on delays in providing two categories of services: individual counseling for Mother and therapeutic services involving the children. We reject her claim.
"[T]he reasonable services finding contained within the order made at the [six- and twelve-month] hearing is adverse to [Mother's] parental interest in reunification. The finding and order made at the [ ] hearing is therefore appealable under section 395." (In re T.G. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 687, 696.)
1. Legal Standards
Reunification services are typically "available to parents for a maximum of 18 months from the physical removal of the children from their home." (T.J. v. Superior Court (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 1229, 1251, disapproved of on another ground by Michael G. v. Superior Court, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 631, fn. 8.) "To support a finding that reasonable services were offered or provided to the parent, 'the record should show that the supervising agency identified the problems leading to the loss of custody, offered services designed to remedy those problems, maintained reasonable contact with the parents during the course of the service plan, and made reasonable efforts to assist the parents in areas where compliance proved difficult ....' [Citation.] Reunification services should be tailored to the particular needs of the family." (In re A.G. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 994, 1001, italics in original.) But the" 'standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances.' [Citation.] The 'adequacy of reunification plans and the reasonableness of the [Agency's] efforts are judged according to the circumstances of each case.'" (Ibid., brackets in original.)
We review the juvenile court's reasonable services finding for substantial evidence, bearing in mind the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof which the juvenile court was bound to apply. (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 995-996.) "Substantial evidence is that which is reasonable, credible and of solid value." (T.J. v. Superior Court, supra, 21 Cal.App.5th at p. 1238.) In reviewing the record for substantial evidence, we "do not evaluate the credibility of witnesses, reweigh the evidence, or resolve evidentiary conflicts. Rather, we draw all reasonable inferences in support of the findings, consider the record most favorably to the juvenile court's order, and affirm the order if supported by substantial evidence even if other evidence supports a contrary conclusion." (In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 947, criticized on another point in In re Jacob S. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1011, 1017.)
"Ordinarily, our review would be limited to that period following the last reasonable services finding, which if unchallenged is final and binding." (Serena M. v. Superior Court of Fresno County (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 659, 675.) However, because the juvenile court in this case combined the sixmonth and twelve-month review hearings, we will consider whether the Agency provided Mother reasonable reunification services "during the entire reunification period" up to the combined six- and twelve-month review hearing. (See ibid. [juvenile court combined the six-, twelve-, and eighteen-month review hearings, and thus "left open the question whether mother was provided reasonable visitation during the entire reunification period"].) Accordingly, the review period at issue here runs from the date of the disposition hearing, January 20, 2022, through October 11, 2022. (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(1)(A).)
2. Mother's Individual Counseling
The Agency does not dispute that there was a significant delay in Mother receiving individual therapy. The Agency maintains, however, that the delay can be attributed to "Mother's lack of initiative, her failure to schedule and appear for therapy, and her lack of engagement once services were in place." Based on the Agency's efforts to provide Mother with individual counseling, we agree that the delay in obtaining such services does not mean the Agency failed to provide reasonable services." '[A]n unwilling or indifferent parent cannot be forced to comply with [reunification services].'" (In re Ronell A. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1352, 1365.)
The record shows that the Agency attempted to connect Mother with therapeutic services beginning in late October 2021, prior to the review period. In the following two months, the Agency sought referrals through several clinics for a Spanish-speaking therapist in Alameda County, where Mother lived. It appears that Mother had an appointment with one therapist in early January 2022, but she missed that appointment, presumably because she was incarcerated.
Despite the Agency's early and multi-pronged efforts, it was unable to obtain a therapist for Mother in Alameda County because her Medi-Cal coverage was not active there. During this period, Mother repeatedly told the social worker that she would transfer her Medi-Cal coverage from San Francisco to Alameda County. She apparently failed to do so, because the social worker learned in early March 2022, about a month into the review period, that a therapy referral in Alameda County had been denied due to Mother's Medi-Cal coverage. By April, after the social worker made additional referrals, Mother reversed her position, and told the social worker that she no longer wanted to change her coverage from Alameda County because she was receiving medical services in San Francisco. At that point, the social worker instructed Mother to contact the number on the back of her Medi-Cal card for mental health services if she did not wish to transfer her coverage. By the end of April, Mother was scheduled to begin therapy in early May-approximately four months before the combined review hearing in late August 2022. By the time of the hearing, Mother had missed or cancelled appointments and failed to engage meaningfully in her therapy.
We conclude, based on the foregoing, the Agency's efforts to provide therapeutic services to Mother were reasonable under the circumstances of this case. There is substantial evidence that during most of the review period, it was Mother's lack of interest in individual therapy, and not any lack of reasonable efforts by the Agency, that prevented her from complying with the therapeutic counseling component of her case plan. The initial three-month delay in obtaining a therapist for Mother during the review period was attributable to a problem with Mother's health coverage that was mostly one of her own creation. While the Agency was trying to connect Mother with a provider who would accept her health coverage, it was Mother's own actions and her shifting Medi-Cal coverage preferences that caused the delay, not any failure on the part of the Agency to provide her services. Mother faults the Agency for not providing referrals for therapists in San Francisco or for providers not dependent upon her Medi-Cal coverage. But she ignores the evidence that she herself led the Agency to believe she would transfer her Medi-Cal coverage to Alameda County. And given that Medi-Cal "continued to be a barrier" to services despite the Agency making numerous mental health referrals, it is reasonable to conclude that such services were not available absent appropriate medical coverage.
It does appear that a change in social workers in February 2022 resulted in a temporary disruption in the Agency's efforts and communication with Mother early during the review period. But again, "[t]he' "adequacy of reunification plans and the reasonableness of the [Agency's] efforts are judged according to the circumstances of each case." '" (T.J. v. Superior Court, supra, 21 Cal.App.5th at p. 1240.)" 'The standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world [citation],'" but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances. (Id. at p. 1249.)
Mother also points out that the Agency's twelve-month review report stated that she was in minimal compliance "with the counseling and psychiatric medication component of her case plan, even though psychiatric medication had never been mentioned before ...." Mother is referring to a heading in the report that states "Counseling and Psychiatric Medication[.]" The report's reference to psychiatric medication appears to be in error, however, because nowhere in the report does the Agency discuss any requirement for Mother to take or be assessed for psychiatric medication, nor does Mother point to any evidence indicating that she was being judged based on her compliance with psychiatric medication services. Rather, that section of the report discusses Mother's progress with individual counseling.
While delays in providing services have been found to support a finding of no reasonable services, the cases Mother cites-In re J.P. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 616 and In re T.W.-1 (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 339-are readily distinguishable.
In In re J.P., supra, 14 Cal.App.5th 616, the Court of Appeal held that the juvenile court abused its discretion by ordering a Burmese-speaking father to complete an alcohol treatment program even though there was no program in his language and no language assistance was provided. (Id. at pp. 624-625.) The father thus could not complete any component of the court-ordered case plan except for alcohol testing, "resulting in the foreseeable result that father received no treatment for his very serious alcohol problem[,]" a problem that led to the removal and detention of his children. (Id. at pp. 618-619, 624-630.) The record in this case, however, supports the conclusion that the delay in obtaining mental health services for Mother was largely due to Mother's lack of engagement with the services and issues with her health coverage, not the Agency's inability to obtain Spanish-language therapeutic services for her.
In In re T.W.-1, supra, 9 Cal.App.5th 339, the Court of Appeal held that no substantial evidence supported the juvenile dependency court's finding that reasonable services had been provided to an out-of-state parent. (Id. at p. 345.) There, the parent's counsel objected at the disposition hearing that the proposed case plan was inadequate, and the court ordered the department to develop a more specific plan. (Id. at pp. 342-343.) The parent's counsel objected to the revised plan, and the dependency court again ordered the department to develop a more specific case plan. (Id. at pp. 343344.) The second revised case plan was not prepared until three months after the disposition hearing, and even then was deficient in several respects, including in failing to include some services that the juvenile dependency court had ordered. (Id. at pp. 346-347.) In addition, the parent was deprived of visitation during a six-month review period except for a single telephone call with his children, despite his requests for more visits and the case plan's provision for weekly calls. (Id. at p. 347.) The Court of Appeal explained that the delay in preparing a revised case plan might be excused by the parent's out-of-state location if that were the only problem with the services provided, but that in addition the Department failed to identify service objectives, failed to provide information about programs, and failed to arrange more than one telephone visit, and in those circumstances the dependency court's finding that reasonable services were provided was not supported by substantial evidence. (Id. at pp. 348-349.)
Here, in contrast, Mother cites no evidence that she ever objected to the adequacy of the Agency's proposed reunification plan. And, as noted, the Agency began seeking referrals for Mother prior to the review period and then made additional referrals about six weeks into it. Nor was Mother ever deprived of meaningful and frequent visitation.
Finally, Mother argues that the social worker failed to maintain reasonable contact with her, because the evidence shows that the social worker did not realize Mother was missing therapy appointments until late August 2022, more than three months after her first scheduled appointment. The record demonstrates, however, that the social worker reviewed the case plan with Mother twice a month, which included asking her questions about her progress in therapy, and there is no indication Mother disclosed she was having any issues with her individual therapy. (See In re T.G., supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 698 [evaluation of what constitutes "reasonable contact" takes into account whether the parent was cooperative with such efforts to maintain contact].) The social worker also attempted to contact Mother's therapist a couple of times in late June but received no response and was unable to leave a message because the therapist's voicemail was full. When the social worker learned in August that Mother had missed multiple therapy appointments, she contacted Mother's therapist and promptly made an appointment for her. While the social worker could have made additional attempts to contact the therapist, the Agency was not required to" 'take the parent by the hand and escort . . . her to and through classes or counseling sessions.'" (In re Nolan W. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1217, 1233.)
In sum, Mother has not shown that the delay in obtaining individual counseling services requires us to overturn the juvenile court's finding that the Agency provided her with reasonable reunification services.
3. Therapeutic Services Involving the Children
Mother next contends the Agency did not provide reasonable reunification services because it failed to provide timely dyadic therapyand/or therapeutic visitation for the family and individual therapy for the children. The record demonstrates instead that the Agency did not secure dyadic therapy services for the family until August 2022, around the time of the first session of the combined review hearing. Relying on Patricia W. v. Superior Court (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 397, Mother suggests that the Agency failed to identify a service that was necessary, as the Agency "appeared confused" about whether the family required dyadic therapy, therapeutic visitation, or both, as it set about having the family do both, and it never assessed the family to "make that determination."
The Agency reports and the testimony at the review hearing appears to refer to "dyadic" and "didactic" interchangeably. There is no indication in the record that those terms refer to different types of therapy. The record further indicates that dyadic therapy was designed to help Mother manage the children's behavioral issues.
We first consider Mother's latter argument. In Patricia W., the mother had serious mental health issues but failed to take her medication, which caused her to suffer from dangerous delusions and hallucinations. (Patricia W. v. Superior Court, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 403.) This led to the removal of her child. (Ibid.) On appeal from the trial court's finding that she had been provided adequate reunification services, Patricia W. argued that her mental illness should have been the starting point for specifically tailored reunification services. (Id. at p. 420.) Our colleagues in Division 2 of this court agreed. (Ibid.) Patricia W.'s case plan did not include a psychological evaluation, and the social worker did not make efforts to obtain a clear diagnosis of her mental illness, determine whether she was taking the right medication, or confirm that she had been taking her medication during the reunification period. (Id. at pp. 423-424.) Although it was clear that Patricia W.'s medication compliance was of paramount importance, the social worker failed to make an "effort to ascertain how [the] mother could better manage her medications." (Id. at p. 425.)
Here, in contrast, the children's mental health and Mother's ability or lack thereof to manage their behavior were not what led to their removal from her care. Although the case plan calls for the children's participation in mental health services "if necessary," there is no dispute that Mother's case plan adequately addressed the issues that led to the children's removal. The Agency's failure to perform a mental health assessment of the children is therefore of less significance to the overall adequacy of reunification services. (See In re Precious J. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1475 [" 'the focus of reunification services is to remedy those problems which led to the removal of the children' "].)
Mother's primary contention on appeal is that the Agency's failure to provide timely therapeutic services to the children "imped[ed]" her ability "to support the children's emotional, behavioral, and mental health needs," thus hindering "the successful progression of visitation towards reunification." As Mother has pointed out, the children displayed concerning behavioral issues throughout the dependency case. She cites to evidence that shortly after her visitation with the children progressed from supervised to overnight visits, and after the combined review hearing had commenced, she agreed to reduce overnight visits from two nights a week to one based on the children fighting with each other and not listening to her. The question then is whether there is substantial evidence that the services provided were reasonable under the circumstances, and that the Agency "made reasonable efforts to assist [Mother] in areas where compliance proved difficult." (In re Riva M. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 403, 414, disagreed with on another ground by In re Jonathon S. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 334, 342.)
As we have already emphasized, reunification services must be reasonable, not perfect or ideal. (Katie V. v. Superior Court (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 586, 598-599.) While Mother and the children may have benefitted from the provision of dyadic therapy or similar therapeutic services, the delay in providing such services did not establish that the reunification services were unreasonable overall. There is substantial evidence that Mother received an array of services and referrals that were designed to address the problems that led to the children's removal, including parenting classes, drug testing, frequent visitation, and individual therapeutic counseling. The record further demonstrates that the Agency considered other ways to assist Mother in managing the children's behavioral issues. The Agency assigned Mother a Spanish-speaking social worker, who instructed her during monitored visits on how to redirect the children when they were misbehaving. The social worker additionally provided Mother with pamphlets and online articles in Spanish on how to manage the children's behaviors and learn effective ways to discipline them. Mother makes no showing that the services provided were deficient in remedying the problems that led to the children's removal. Because the lack of therapeutic support for the children did not impair Mother's ability to participate in her case plan or prevent her from addressing her parenting skills and progressing in visitation during the review period, the record supports a conclusion that the services overall were reasonable.
Moreover, there is substantial evidence that the Agency made reasonable efforts to secure a referral for therapeutic services involving the children. In the months following the disposition hearing, the social worker contacted numerous mental health clinics to inquire about therapeutic services for the family and the children, including specifically therapeutic visitation and dyadic therapy. Those attempts were unsuccessful until August 2022, when the children were finally assessed by a therapist, who determined that the family would be served as a unit under dyadic therapy.
The delay in obtaining mental health services for the children appears to be due to the lack of available clinicians, and particularly Spanish-speaking clinicians, rather than the lack of reasonable efforts by the Agency to provide services. The record demonstrates that at least one of the providers the Agency contacted early in the review period placed the family on a weeks-long waitlist, while other providers told the social worker that they did not have any Spanish-speaking clinicians available at that time. The social worker followed up with most of those providers throughout the review period and contacted additional providers but was still unable to secure a referral for the family. Additionally, when one provider did not have a Spanish-speaking clinician available, the family was placed with a clinician to start therapeutic visitation with the assistance of a language interpretation line, showing the Agency did not limit its search to Spanish-speaking clinicians. Given the Agency's many unsuccessful efforts to locate viable mental health services for the children, it is reasonable to conclude that such services were not immediately available. Mother does not contend, and we are aware of no authority which holds, that the Agency is obliged to provide non-existent services or to exhaust every possible avenue to obtain specific services. Rather, the Agency must make a "good faith effort" to provide "reasonable" services. (Christopher D. v. Superior Court (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 60, 74 [agency did not make a good faith effort to provide visitation services based on social worker's excuses of "being too busy" and the visitation place being "too far"].)
In her reply, Mother argues for the first time that "[w]here the services needed are not available, the lack of or inability to access services should not be interpreted as a lack of parental compliance." As support for her argument, she cites a letter from the Department of Health and Human Services Administration for Children and Families. Mother has not complied with the Rules of Court regarding judicial notice, which require a separate motion, so we may disregard her reliance on that document. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.25(a)(1).) Moreover, Mother does not cite any evidence showing that the Agency interpreted the lack of therapeutic support involving the children as a lack of parental compliance. To the contrary, the Agency determined in its twelve-month review report that Mother had completed the "parenting" component of her case plan. Mother further argues that the unavailability of Spanish-speaking services resulted in meaningful services not being provided in a timely manner. While the services provided may have been less than ideal, for the reasons discussed in this opinion, we conclude the juvenile court did not err in finding that the services overall were reasonable under the circumstances.
The case Mother relies on to support her argument-Alvin R., supra, 108 Cal.App.4th 962-is distinguishable. In Alvin R., an 11-year-old boy was declared a dependent of the juvenile court after the father pleaded no contest to allegations that he had abused his son. The juvenile court, among other things, ordered the father and son to participate in conjoint counseling after the child had completed eight sessions of individual counseling. (Id. at pp. 966-967.) The child did not want to visit his father, and the court recognized that visitation would probably not take place without conjoint therapy. (Id. at pp. 967-968.) But there was a five-month delay before the child's individual counseling began because the grandmother, with whom the child had been placed, was unable to arrange for counseling due to scheduling and transportation problems. (Id. at pp. 968, 971-972.) The Court of Appeal reversed the juvenile court's finding that reasonable services had been provided because the social services agency made no efforts to assist the grandmother in overcoming those obstacles so that the child could engage in individual counseling. (Id. at pp. 972-973.) The Court of Appeal noted that counseling was necessary before visitation with the father could take place, and visitation was essential to reunification. (Id. at p. 973.) Since the father had complied with his case plan except for the conjoint counseling, completion of the child's individual therapy was the one service that stood in the way of the father complying with all the terms of his reunification plan. (Ibid.) The agency's inaction effectively precluded any chance of reunification. (Ibid.)
Here, Mother regularly participated in visitation with the children throughout the review period. This case is further distinguishable from Alvin R. because, as previously discussed, on this record we cannot say the Agency did not make good faith efforts to obtain mental health services for the children. Moreover, the provision of therapeutic services involving the children did not "[stand] in the way of all measures remaining under the reunification plan" as was the case in Alvin R. (Id. at p. 973), because, as mentioned, Mother was provided multiple other services to complete her case plan. Finally, unlike the father in Alvin R., Mother had not done all that was required of her to comply with her case plan. Specifically, Mother failed to engage in individual counseling, a key component of two of the four service objectives in her plan. The juvenile court therefore could have concluded that "the barrier to reunification was not the children's relationship with [Mother]." (Denny H. v. Superior Court (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1501, 1509, fn. 2, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Earl L. v. Superior Court (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1490, 1504 [finding that while the juvenile court erred in sustaining the department's relevance objection to questions regarding the efforts it made to provide the children necessary counseling, the error was harmless because the barrier to reunification was father's inability to provide housing and financial support].)
T.J. v. Superior Court, supra, 21 Cal.App.5th 1229, another case relied upon by Mother, is distinguishable for similar reasons. T.J. v. Superior Court was a neglect case involving an intellectually disabled single mother. (Id. at p. 1223.) There were significant delays that prevented her from accessing vital services. (Id. at p. 1243.) One of the referrals was to a regional center for developmentally disabled individuals, but it was "so backed up that it [could] not help a parent within a reasonable time." (Ibid.) The agency placed her on a six- to twelve-month waiting list for individual therapy, and then waited another four more months before making an alternate appropriate referral. (Id. at p. 1244.) As a result, the mother had not been provided any "actual services" except visitation and referrals to services by the six-month review hearing. (Id. at p. 1242.) But in this case, Mother was provided vital services. Moreover, the Agency made consistent efforts to secure mental health services for the family throughout the review period. It did not merely place the family on a waiting list as occurred in T.J. v. Superior Court and then allow nearly a year to pass before seeking another service provider.
"In almost all cases it will be true that more services could have been provided more frequently and that the services provided were imperfect. The standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances." (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547.) The services the Agency provided here were directed to the case issues: Mother's lack of judgment, her parenting skills, and her prioritization of her relationship with her boyfriend over her children's safety and needs. The Agency facilitated Mother's involvement with these services and made reasonable efforts to assist her in managing the children's behavioral issues during visitation so that she could progress towards reunification. Substantial evidence supported the juvenile court's finding that the Agency provided Mother reasonable reunification services under the circumstances of this case.
III. DISPOSITION
The court's order from the combined six- and twelve-month review hearing is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: HUMES, P. J., MARGULIES, J.
[*] Judge of the Contra Costa County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.