oyment contract on the ground that plaintiff failed to proceed pursuant to her collective bargaining agreement ( see Matter of Board of Educ., Commack Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Ambach, 70 N.Y.2d 501, 508, 522 N.Y.S.2d 831, 517 N.E.2d 509, cert. denied485 U.S. 1034, 108 S.Ct. 1593, 99 L.Ed.2d 908), and plaintiff's cause of action against Middaugh, Paravati, Lisi and Copperwheat for tortious interference with plaintiff's employment contract ( see Lama Holding Co. v. Smith Barney Inc., 88 N.Y.2d 413, 424–425, 646 N.Y.S.2d 76, 668 N.E.2d 1370; LaBarte v. Seneca Resources Group, 285 A.D.2d 974, 977, 728 N.Y.S.2d 618). Plaintiff failed to state a claim for prima facie tort ( see generally Posner v. Lewis, 18 N.Y.3d 566, 570 n. 1, 942 N.Y.S.2d 447, 965 N.E.2d 949; Mancuso v. Allergy Assoc. of Rochester, 70 A.D.3d 1499, 1501, 895 N.Y.S.2d 756), and we further conclude that plaintiff's negligence causes of action should be dismissed ( see Ciapa v. Misso, 103 A.D.3d 1157, 1158, 959 N.Y.S.2d 774; Alabisi v. Bonda, 262 A.D.2d 948, 948, 692 N.Y.S.2d 557), and that the punitive damages claim should be dismissed as against all defendants except for the estate of James English ( see Rocanova v. Equitable Life Assur. Socy. of U.S., 83 N.Y.2d 603, 613, 616–617, 612 N.Y.S.2d 339, 634 N.E.2d 940; cf. Englert v. Schaffer, 61 A.D.3d 1362, 1363, 877 N.Y.S.2d 780). In sum, only plaintiff's seventh and eighth causes of action, which allege that Middaugh, Paravati, and the County breached their agreement with plaintiff not to publish information about plaintiff's official misconduct, and plaintiff's causes of action against the estate of James English remain for trial, and we therefore modify the order and judgment accordingly.

Supreme Court properly granted that part of defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint against Michael based on the affirmative defense of Workers' Compensation Law § 29 (6), and denied that part of plaintiffs cross motion for partial summary judgment seeking dismissal of that affirmative defense with respect to Michael. The responsibilities of Michael as sole owner and officer of the corporation were indistinguishable from his responsibilities as property owner for safety precautions at the work site ( see Macchirole v Giamboi, 97 NY2d 147, 151; Alabisi v Bonda, 262 AD2d 948; McFarlane v Chera, 211 AD2d 764; Roll v Murphy, 174 AD2d 1030). Furthermore, "[r]egardless of his status as owner of the premises where the injury occurred, [Michael] remains a coemployee in his relations with plaintiff in all matters arising from and connected with their employment" ( Heritage v Van Patten, 59 NY2d 1017, 1019).

I agree with the majority that Supreme Court erred in granting defendant's motion for summary judgment but, in my view, the court properly denied plaintiffs' cross motion to strike the affirmative defense that the action is barred by the exclusivity provisions of Workers' Compensation Law 29(6). Under well-established precedent, if Joseph DiPizio, the sole principal of plaintiff's employer, Four Angels Construction Corp., was himself the property owner or general contractor, any action by plaintiffs against DiPizio would be barred by the mandate of section 29(6) that workers'compensation benefits "shall be the exclusive remedy to an employee * * * when such employee is injured or killed by the negligence or wrong of another in the same employ" ( see Macchirole v. Giamboi, 97 N.Y.2d 147, 150-151; Heritage v. Van Patten, 59 N.Y.2d 1017, 1019; Stephan v. Stein, 226 A.D.2d 364). In Alabisi v. Bonda ( 262 A.D.2d 948), we granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint based on the exclusivity provisions of the Workers' Compensation Law. The defendant in Alabisi was the owner and president of the plaintiff worker's corporate employer as well as the owner of the premises where the plaintiff worker was injured, and we granted the motion on the ground that the defendant "had `indistinguishable responsibilities, as an executive employee * * * and as a property owner, for safety precautions to avoid the plaintiff's injury'" ( id. at 948, quoting Cusano v. Staff, 191 A.D.2d 918, 920). Here, DiPizio's responsibilities for the safety of Dominic Laudisio (plaintiff) as a principal of plaintiff's employer and as a principal of defendant, the owner and general contractor, were likewise indistinguishable.