They further assert that Joseph was the second-largest shareholder of LLKL Trading. "Generally, a court may not assert general jurisdiction over an individual based on that individual's association with a corporation unless the corporation is the alter ego of the individual." Ali-Turki v. Taher, 958 S.W.2d 258, 263 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1999, pet. denied). We have rejected Falcon and Falrey's alter ego theory, and while ownership of stock by a foreign defendant in a Texas corporation is a relevant contact, it is insufficient to establish general jurisdiction.
As noted earlier, the general rule is that a court may not assert personal jurisdiction over an individual based on the individual's relation to a corporation unless the corporation is the individual's alter ego. Royal Mortgage Corp. v. Montague, 41 S.W.3d 721, 738 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2001, no pet. h.); Al-Turki v. Taher, 958 S.W.2d 258, 263 (Tex.App.-Eastland 1997, pet. denied); Vosko v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 909 S.W.2d 95, 99 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, writ denied). But if a plaintiff pierces the corporate veil by proving alter ego, insider fraud, or use of the corporation for illegal purposes, the trial court may base personal jurisdiction over the corporate agent on the contacts of the corporation.
The Fourth Court of Appeals has held that, because personal jurisdiction involves both legal and factual questions, appellate courts should review the trial court's decision for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Klenk v. Bustamante, 993 S.W.2d 677, 681 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet.). However, other courts of appeals review the trial court's factual findings for legal and factual sufficiency and review the trial court's legal conclusions de novo. See, e.g., E.L.M. LeBlanc v. Kyle, 28 S.W.3d 99, 101 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2000, pet. denied); In re Estate of Judd, 8 S.W.3d 436, 440-41 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1999, no pet.); C-Loc Retention Sys., Inc. v. Hendrix, 993 S.W.2d 473, 476 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.); Cadle v. Graubart, 990 S.W.2d 469, 471 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1999, no pet.); Ball v. Bigham, 990 S.W.2d 343, 347 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1999, no pet.); Garner v. Furmanite Australia Party, Ltd., 966 S.W.2d 798, 802 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied); Al-Turki v. Taher, 958 S.W.2d 258, 260-61 (Tex.App.-Eastland 1997, pet. denied). We agree with the latter view and disapprove of those cases applying an abuse of discretion standard only. Whether a court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant is a question of law.
To analyze a factual sufficiency challenge, we "must consider and weigh all of the evidence" and may "set aside a verdict only if the evidence is so weak or if the finding is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence that it is clearly wrong and unjust." Id.; see Al-Turki v. Taher, 958 S.W.2d 258, 261 & n.2 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1997, pet. denied). In conducting our review of factual insufficiency challenges, we do not reweigh the evidence and set the finding aside merely because we feel that a different result is more reasonable.
Without evidence of any other contacts sufficient to show that Syphers was essentially "at home" in Texas, this single contact does not suffice to establish general jurisdiction over him. See Booth v. Kontomitras, 485 S.W.3d 461, 480 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2016, no pet.); Furie Petroleum Co. v. Ben Barnes Grp., L.P., No. 03-14-00181-CV, 2015 WL 6459606, at *8 (Tex. App.—Austin Oct. 23, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.); Martinez v. de Anda, No. 13-09-00277-CV, 2010 WL 2543892, at * 1, *17 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi June 24, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.); Yfantis, 115 S.W.3d at 181-82; Smith v. Cattier, No. 05-99-01643, 2000 WL 893243, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 6, 2000, no pet.) (not designated for publication); Al-Turki v. Taher, 958 S.W.2d 258, 263 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1997, pet. denied); see also Mower v. Nibley, 2016 UT App 174, ¶ 20-32, 382 P.3d 614, 620-23 (citing authority for proposition that individual can have only one domicile for any particular purpose and concluding that, even if applying Daimler's analysis of contacts that would render a corporate defendant "at home," plaintiff did not show sufficient contacts to allow court to exercise general jurisdiction over individual); cf. Daimler AG, 134 S. Ct. at 760-62 (holding that California court could not exercise jurisdiction over German company based on its subsidiary's assumed "at home" California contacts). Appellants argue that Syphers should not be rewarded for being untruthful about his Texas contacts in discovery.
" J J Marine, Inc. v. Le, 982 S.W.2d 918, 927 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1998, no pet.); see MacMorran v. Wood, 960 S.W.2d 891, 898 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1997, pet. denied) ("Jurisdiction over an individual cannot be based on jurisdiction over a corporation unless the corporation is the alter ego of the individual."), overruled on other grounds by Tuscano v. Osterberg, 82 S.W.3d 457 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2002, no pet.); Al-Turki v. Taher, 958 S.W.2d 258, 263 (Tex.App.-Eastland 1997, pet. denied) (same). In this case, appellees alleged generally that Wolf and Reid used Roly Poly LLC as a sham to perpetrate fraud and other tortious acts.
Appellant cites several cases for the proposition that jurisdiction over an individual may not be predicated on jurisdiction over a corporation unless the corporation is the alter ego of the individual. See J J Marine, 982 S.W.2d at 927; Garner v. Furmanite Australia Pty., Ltd., 966 S.W.2d 798, 803 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied) (citing Stuart v. Spademan, 772 F.2d 1185, 1197 (5th Cir.1985)); MacMorran v. Wood, 960 S.W.2d 891, 898 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1997, pet. denied), overruled on other grounds by Tuscano v. Osterberg, 82 S.W.3d 457 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2002, no pet.); Al-Turki v. Taher, 958 S.W.2d 258, 263 (Tex.App.-Eastland 1997, pet denied); Vosko v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 909 S.W.2d 95, 99 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, writ denied); Clark v. Noyes, 871 S.W.2d 508, 518 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1994, no writ) (citing Spademan, 772 F.2d at 1197). Cappuccitti also cites Siskind v. Villa Foundation for Education, Inc., for the proposition that a nonresident employee of a foreign corporation cannot be sued in Texas based on his employer's solicitation of business in Texas because due process considerations forbid such "bootstrapping" of minimum contacts.
Accordingly, we hold that Yfantis's relationship with Eye-Gate did not amount to the type of continuous and systematic contact with Texas that is required for general jurisdiction. See Haught v. Agric. Prod. Credit Ass'n, 39 S.W.3d 252, 263 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2000, no pet.) (holding that defendant who served as director, but was not authorized to sign checks and received no compensation, was not subject to personal jurisdiction in Texas); Al-Turki v. Taher, 958 S.W.2d 258, 263 (Tex.App.-Eastland 1997, pet. denied) (holding that nonresident defendant's ownership of stock in Texas corporation and participation in shareholder's meeting were not the type of continuous and systematic contact with Texas required to subject him to general jurisdiction in an unrelated action). We sustain Yfantis's second issue.
As a general rule, a court may not assert personal jurisdiction over an individual based on the individual's relation to a corporation unless the corporation is the individual's alter ego. Royal Mortg. Corp. v. Montague, 41 S.W.3d 721, 738 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2001, no pet.); Al Turki v. Taher, 958 S.W.2d 258, 263 (Tex.App.-Eastland 1997, pet. denied); Vosko v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 909 S.W.2d 95, 99 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, writ denied). That Tuscano signed checks in New York for York-Tex in his corporate capacity is not an individual contact related to the gravamen of this suit concerning the ownership of Tierra.
granting or denial of a special appearance. Compare Joe Guerra Exxon Station v. Michelin Tyre Public Ltd. Co., 32 S.W.3d 383, 386 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2000, no pet.) (reviewing for an abuse of discretion) and Case v. Grammar, 31 S.W.3d 304, 307-08 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2000, no pet.) (same) with LeBlanc v. Kyle, 28 S.W.3d 99, 101 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2000, no pet.) (applying factual sufficiency review); Daimler-Benz Aktiengesellschaft v. Olson, 21 S.W.3d 707, 715 (Tex.App.-Austin 2000, pet. filed) (same); In re Estate of Judd, 8 S.W.3d at 440-41 (same); C-Loc Retention Sys., Inc., v. Hendrix, 993 S.W.2d 473, 476 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (same); Ball v. Bigham, 990 S.W.2d 343, 347 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1999, no pet.) (same); Cadle v. Graubart, 990 S.W.2d 469, 471 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1999, no pet.) (same); Happy Indus. Corp., 983 S.W.2d at 847 (same); Garner v. Furmanite Australia Party, Ltd., 966 S.W.2d 798, 802 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied) (same); Al-Turki v. Taher, 958 S.W.2d 258, 260-61 (Tex.App.-Eastland 1997, pet. denied) (same). We do not view the amendment to the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, which adds the granting or denial of a special appearance to the list of interlocutory orders that may be appealed, as intending to change previous case law holding that sufficiency of the evidence was the standard of review of a final judgment granting a special appearance.