Opinion
No. 05-04-00125-CV
Opinion Filed November 1, 2004.
On Appeal from the 191st Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 02-30703-T-J.
Affirm in part; Reverse and Render in part.
Before Justices WHITTINGTON, BRIDGES, and FRANCIS.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Dallas County brought suit against Al-Nayem International Trading Company to recover delinquent property taxes on two tracts of land. Irving Independent School District (IISD) and the City of Irving intervened in the lawsuit seeking taxes owed to them. After a trial before the court, judgment was rendered against appellant and in favor of all three taxing authorities. Appellant challenges the judgment with respect to IISD and Irving only. In two issues, appellant contends the trial court erred in admitting into evidence the tax statements offered by appellees because they were not properly authenticated. Appellant maintains there is no evidence to support the judgment rendered in favor of appellees because the only evidence offered by appellees was the inadmissable tax statements. After reviewing the record, we affirm the trial court's judgment with respect to IISD. but with respect to the City of Irving, we reverse and render judgment that Irving take nothing on its claims against appellant.
We review a trial court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Malone, 972 S.W.2d 35, 43 (Tex. 1998). We cannot conclude the trial court erred if there is any legitimate basis for the ruling. Id. at 43. Even if we conclude the ruling is erroneous, we will not reverse unless it is shown that the error probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment. Id.
We begin our analysis with the tax statements admitted as IISD's exhibit 1. The exhibit contained a notarized affidavit page signed by Lisa Freeman as IISD tax assessor-collector. Freeman certified the attached tax statements were true and correct copies of the delinquent property tax statements for the properties in question and that they accurately reflected the amount due and owing to IISD. Each of the two tax statements attached to the affidavit contained a certification by Freeman as IISD tax collector that the statement was a true and correct copy of the original record from the IISD tax roll now in the custody of the IISD tax assessor-collector office.
Appellant objected to IISD's exhibit 1 on the basis that it was not properly authenticated because it was not a record under seal and not signed by someone authorized within the political subdivision under seal who could attest to the signator's authority. The trial court overruled appellant's objection on the basis that it was a certified public record.
Rule 902(4) of the Texas Rule of Civil Evidence identifies the following certified public records as self-authenticating:
A copy of an official record or report or entry therein, or of a document authorized by law to be recorded or filed and actually recorded or filed in a public office, including data compilations in any form certified as correct by the custodian or other person authorized to make the certification, by certificate complying with paragraphs (1) (2) or (3) of this rule or complying with any statute or other rule prescribed pursuant to statutory authority.
Tex. R. Civ. Evid. 902(4). Rule 902(1) requires the document to bear the seal of a public entity and a signature purporting to be an attestation or execution. Rule 902(2) addresses public documents without a seal and provides that any signature of an employee or officer of the public entity must be certified under seal by a public officer having a seal and having official duties in the signer's district or political subdivision verifying the genuineness and official capacity of the signer. The third paragraph of Rule 902 specifies the requirements for self-authenticating foreign public documents.
Because the IISD tax statements did not bear a seal or contain a certification under seal from a public officer, the tax statements were not self-authenticating as certified public records under Rule 902(4); See also, Fullick v. City of Baytown, 820 S.W.2d 943, 945 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991 no pet.). However, our review of IISD's exhibit 1 reveals that it was properly authenticated as a business record under affidavit pursuant to Rule 902(10).
Paragraph ten of Rule 902 permits self-authentication of records admissible under 803(6) (records kept in the regular course of business) provided they are accompanied by an affidavit verifying the admissibility requirements of 803(6) and the affidavit and records are filed with the clerk of the court fourteen days before trial and prompt notice is given of the filing to the other parties. Tex. R. Civ. Evid. 902(10).
In the case before us, the IISD tax statements were certified as true and correct by Lisa Freeman, tax assessor-collector for IISD. Freeman's affidavit substantially complies with the affidavit required to be filed under Rule 902(10). Although there is nothing the record to indicate the tax statements and affidavit were filed with the court clerk fourteen days before trial or that appellant received prompt notice of the filing, appellant does not complain about these matters on on appeal. Because we conclude the trial court's ruling is sustainable under Rule 902(10), we resolve appellant's first issue against him.
We next turn to the tax statements admitted as Irving's exhibit 1. Like IISD's tax statements, Irving's tax statements were not under seal and did not contain a certification under seal as required for self-authentication under Rule 902(4). However, appellant also objected to the admission of these statements asserting he was not given timely notice of the statements and the accompanying business records affidavit as required by Rule 902(10); the trial court sustained the objection as to notice and this ruling is not challenged on appeal. Because these records were not properly authenticated under either rule 902(4), the trial court erred in admitting them into evidence. Without the tax statements, there is no evidence to support the trial court's judgment in Irving's favor. We therefore resolve appellant's second issue in his favor.
We affirm the trial court's judgment with respect to IISD, concluding the tax statements were self-authenticating under rule 902(10). We reverse that part of the trial court's judgment in favor of Irving, however, concluding the tax statements comprising the sole evidence supporting its claims were not properly authenticated. We render judgment that Irving take nothing on its claims against appellant.