Opinion
2:21-cv-04139-DCC-MGB
05-03-2022
Bilal A. Al-Haqq, #126806, Plaintiff, v. Warden Evonne Willingham; Associate Warden Elaine Freeman; Bryan P. Stirling; Warden Brian Kendall; Associate Warden Ann Sheppard; Nurse Grissom; Patti Britt-Pooser; and Ms. Brown, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARY GORDON BAKER, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Bilal A. Al-Haqq (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this civil action seeking relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review all pretrial matters in this case and submit findings and recommendations to the United States District Judge. For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned recommends that the Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 8) be summarily dismissed, in part.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The instant case stems from Plaintiff's transfer from Trenton Correctional Institution (“Trenton”) to Lieber Correctional Institution (“Lieber”) during a travel ban in August 2020. Upon reviewing Plaintiff's original Complaint (Dkt. No. 1), the undersigned issued an order dated January 11, 2022, notifying Plaintiff that portions of his pleading were subject to summary dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). (Dkt. No. 5.) In light of Plaintiff's pro se status, however, the undersigned gave him an opportunity to cure the deficiencies in his Complaint by filing an amended pleading within twenty-one days, plus three days for mail time. The undersigned warned Plaintiff that the amended pleading would completely replace his original Complaint and should therefore include all of the claims he wished to assert and identify all of the defendants against whom those claims are asserted. (Id. at 3.) The undersigned also emphasized that failure to file an amended complaint or cure the identified pleading deficiencies within the time permitted by the order would result in the dismissal of certain claims. (Id.)
In response to the undersigned's order, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on January 27, 2022, reiterating many of his original allegations, but also raising new claims regarding the conditions of confinement he allegedly experienced once at Lieber. (Dkt. No. 8.) The undersigned reviewed Plaintiff's amended pleading and issued a second order on February 3, 2022, noting that portions of the Amended Complaint were likewise subject to summary dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B). (Dkt. No. 10.) In an abundance of caution, the undersigned gave Plaintiff one more opportunity to cure the identified pleading deficiencies by filing a second amended complaint with the Court. The undersigned once again warned Plaintiff that failure to comply with these instructions within twenty-one days would result in partial summary dismissal. (Id. at 4.)
Following the undersigned's second order, Plaintiff submitted a series of miscellaneous letters and declarations generally discussing certain conditions of confinement at Lieber-in particular, the way in which the facility is handling the spread of COVID-19-and requesting emergency release in relation thereto. (See Dkt. Nos. 12, 15, 18.) In response to each of these filings, the undersigned repeatedly warned Plaintiff that, to the extent he wished to raise additional facts and/or constitutional violations in the instant case, he must do so in compliance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by filing an amended pleading that contains all of his claims. (See Dkt. Nos. 13, 16, 20.) He may not, however, amend his pleadings “in piecemeal fashion” by submitting additional factual allegations through periodic, informal letters. McClary v. Searles, No. 3:15-cv-77-FDW, 2015 WL 2259312, *1 n.1 (W.D. N.C. May 13, 2015); see also Wells v. Spartanburg Cty. Det. Ctr. Facility Employees, No. 8:10-cv-1490-CMC-BHH, 2010 WL 4853868, at *2 (D.S.C. Oct. 26, 2010), adopted, 2010 WL 4853836 (D.S.C. Nov. 23, 2010) (explaining that piecemeal pleading is generally not allowed because of the confusion it causes parties and courts). Notwithstanding the undersigned's numerous warnings, Plaintiff has not filed a second amended complaint and the time to comply with the undersigned's instructions has lapsed. Accordingly, this Report and Recommendation considers only those allegations in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 8), which defines the scope of this case.
The undersigned notes that following the Court's warnings regarding piecemeal pleadings, Plaintiff eventually repackaged his letters and declarations into a motion for an order of release under 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3), which is discussed in greater detail below. (Dkt. No. 22.)
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
According to the Amended Complaint, Defendants Willingham and Freeman (Warden and Associate Warden at Trenton, respectively) retaliated against Plaintiff for pursuing lawsuits against their colleagues by purposefully transferring him to Lieber when the facility was experiencing a massive surge in COVID-19 cases in August 2020. (See Dkt. No. 8 at 3-5, stating that Trenton had “no reported cases of COVID-19” at the time Defendants Willingham and Freeman allegedly ordered Plaintiff's transfer to Lieber.) Plaintiff claims that upon arriving at Lieber, he was placed in the “most dangerous unit, ” wherein “he witnessed daily stabbings and knife fights” with little to no intervention from the correctional officers. (Id. at 5-6, alleging that the officers “turned a blind eye to the assaults and mayhem.”) Plaintiff further describes his living conditions as “deplorable, ” noting that his unit was infested with rats and roaches. (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff suggests that he was eventually moved to a different unit and promised the return of his confiscated tennis shoes and eyeglasses; however, Defendant Sheppard (Associate Warden at Lieber) apparently refused to give Plaintiff his items “because [he] had reported her for interfering in his mental health session.” (Id. at 6.)
On October 1, 2021, Plaintiff tested positive for COVID-19. (Id.) Plaintiff emphasizes that during the weeks leading up to his positive diagnosis, his “entire living unit had been quarantined” and he had interacted only with the Lieber nurses and staff. (Id.; see also id. at 10, suggesting that Plaintiff was “infected with COVID-19 due to the acts of the Defendants.”) Plaintiff was then taken to Lieber's infirmary and placed in a cell beside three inmates on ventilators. (Id. at 6; see also Dkt. No. 8-2 at 2-3.) Plaintiff contends that he was the only inmate from his unit moved to the infirmary after contracting COVID-19, and that he could have continued to quarantine safely in his private cell. (Dkt. No. 8 at 6-7; Dkt. No. 8-2 at 2-3.) According to Plaintiff, when he asked the nurse why he had been moved to the infirmary, she told him that Defendant Sheppard had ordered the transfer. (Dkt. No. 8-2 at 3.) Due to a staffing shortage, Plaintiff claims that he was “left in the care of untrained non-medical staff” while in the infirmary. (Id.)
On or around October 3, 2021, Plaintiff was moved from the infirmary to an “abandoned building” that had been reopened for the purpose of housing approximately forty infected Lieber inmates. (Dkt. No. 8 at 7.) Plaintiff claims that he had to quarantine in the abandoned building for over thirty days, during which time he was denied access to his legal materials/supplies. (Id. at 67.) Although not entirely clear, the Amended Complaint seems to suggest that Plaintiff may have missed certain deadlines in his pending federal lawsuits as a result thereof. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that while he filed internal grievances regarding these conditions of confinement, Defendant Brown (Lieber's Grievance Coordinator) refused to process them. (Id. at 7-8.) Plaintiff also “apprised” Defendant Stirling (Director of SCDC) “of the facts . . . in an inmate request, ” but Defendant Stirling allegedly “chose to ignore” Plaintiff's complaints. (See id. at 9.)
Based on the above, Plaintiff seeks a “declaration that the acts and omissions described herein violated [his] rights under the Constitution and laws of the United States” and at least $125,000 in damages from each Defendant. (Id. at 10-11.) Plaintiff also requests a “preliminary and permanent injunction ordering [his] immediate emergency release” under 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3) due to “underlying health conditions” that apparently heighten his vulnerability to COVID-19. (See id. at 1, 10.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se Amended Complaint pursuant to the procedural provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996). This action has been filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit, and is also governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires the court to review a complaint filed by a prisoner that seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.
To protect against possible abuses, the court must dismiss any prisoner complaints, or portions of complaints, that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). Indeed, a claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte “at any time” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989). The United States Supreme Court has explained that the statute “is designed largely to discourage the filing of, and waste of judicial and private resources upon, baseless lawsuits.” Id. at 326.
As to failure to state a claim, a complaint filed in federal court must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” as required under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). In order to satisfy this standard, a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining that the court need not accept as true a complaint's legal conclusions). Rather, the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” See id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). When “it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations, ” Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), the complaint fails to state a claim.
Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is therefore charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a Pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure to allege facts that set forth a cognizable claim under Rule 8(a)(2). See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 39091 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8, Fed. R. Civ. P., for “all civil actions”). Such is the case here.
DISCUSSION
A civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). Thus, to state a claim to relief under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Here, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff's allegations may be liberally construed as raising First and Eighth Amendment violations against Defendants Willingham, Freeman, and Sheppard, and an Eighth Amendment violation against Defendant Stirling. Plaintiff's remaining claims, however, are subject to summary dismissal for the following reasons.
This Report and Recommendation makes no determinations regarding the potential success or merits of Plaintiff's claims. Rather, the undersigned addresses only whether Plaintiff's claims meet the most minimal pleading standard required for service in a pro se action.
I. Defendants Kendall and Grissom
First, it is well-established that a person acting under color of state law can be held liable under § 1983 only if he or she was personally involved in the deprivation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights. Wilcox v. Brown, 877 F.3d 161, 170 (4th Cir. 2017). Thus, the doctrines of vicarious liability and respondeat superior generally are not applicable in § 1983 actions. See Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981) (noting that “Section 1983 will not support a claim based on a respondeat superior theory of liability”); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”). To establish supervisor liability, the plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that his subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed “a pervasive and unreasonable risk” of constitutional injury to citizens like the plaintiff; (2) the supervisor's response to that knowledge was so inadequate as to show “deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices;” and (3) there was an “affirmative causal link” between the supervisor's inaction and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff. Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994).
With respect to Defendant Kendall, the Amended Complaint notes only that he “is the warden at [Lieber]. He is legally responsible for the operation of [Lieber] . . . and for the welfare of all the inmates in that prison.” (Dkt. No. 8 at 3.) Similarly, the Amended Complaint states that Defendant Grissom “is the Health Care Authority (HCA) at [Lieber] . . . and is responsible for the healthcare needs of the inmates at the prison. (Allows non-medical to dictate inmate treatment).” (Id.) As the undersigned previously warned Plaintiff, such general allegations do not show the level of personal involvement required under § 1983, nor do they demonstrate the knowledge or response necessary to otherwise trigger supervisory liability. (See Dkt. No. 10 at 3.) See, e.g., Graham v. Ozmint, No. 0:11-cv-2406-MBS-PJG, 2012 WL 6907983, at *4 (D.S.C. Oct. 5, 2012), adopted, 2013 WL 214162 (D.S.C. Jan. 18, 2013) (finding allegation that defendant was responsible for supervision of medical staff at correctional institution insufficient to state a claim to relief under § 1983); Ouzts v. Cummins, 825 F.2d 1276, 1277 (8th Cir. 1987) (“[A] warden's general responsibility for supervising the operations of a prison is insufficient to establish personal involvement.”). Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Kendall and Grissom are therefore subject to summary dismissal.
II. Defendant Brown
Turning to Defendant Brown, inmates do not have a constitutionally protected right to a grievance procedure or to access any grievance procedure that a state establishes. Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75 (4th Cir. 1994). Consequently, the undersigned reiterates that Plaintiff cannot bring a § 1983 claim against Defendant Brown based on her alleged failure to process his grievances. (See Dkt. No. 10 at 3.) See Booker v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., 855 F.3d 533, 541 (4th Cir. 2017) (explaining that an inmate cannot bring a § 1983 claim alleging denial of a specific grievance procedure); see also Roberts v. Lewis, No. 2:17-cv-177-RMG-MGB, 2017 WL 1148594, at *6 (D.S.C. Mar. 3, 2017) (concluding that prisoner had failed to raise a viable constitutional claim where officials ignored his grievances); Goss v. Morley, No. 2:19-cv-2469-BHH-MGB, 2019 WL 6075575, at *3 (D.S.C. Oct. 29, 2019), adopted, 2019 WL 6050375 (D.S.C. Nov. 8, 2019) (same). Any such claims are therefore subject to summary dismissal.
III. Defendant Britt-Pooser
Finally, with respect to Defendant Britt-Pooser, the Amended Complaint states that she was “responsible for certifying . . . legal supplies for inmates at [Lieber]” and denied Plaintiff “legal materials and proper indigency status . . . blatantly and repeatedly restricting [his] access to the courts.” (Dkt. No. 8 at 3, 9.) It is well-established that inmates have a fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350-51 (1996). However, to prove a violation of this right, the plaintiff “must show actual injury or prejudice resulting from the official conduct.” Carelock v. Boone, No. 5:19-cv-00116-JMC, 2020 WL 5810408, at *4 (D.S.C. Sept. 30, 2020) (internal citations omitted); see also Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351 (explaining that for a plaintiff to state a claim for denial of access to courts, he must demonstrate actual injury or prejudice by alleging that his facility's shortcomings have “hindered, or are presently hindering, his efforts to pursue a nonfrivolous legal claim”).
As the undersigned previously explained, while the Amended Complaint alludes to certain “deadlines” in Plaintiff's pending civil actions, it does not confirm whether the alleged denial of legal materials caused Plaintiff to miss any such deadlines and, if so, whether those lawsuits were adversely affected. (See Dkt. No. 10 at 3-4.) See Jenkins v. Riley, No. 3:13-cv-0274-DCN, 2014 WL 101668, at *3 (D.S.C. Jan. 8, 2014) (finding that plaintiff failed to allege a claim for denial of access to the courts because he did not show what deadline he missed or how missing the deadline adversely affected his legal matter); see also Curran v. Unknown Supervising Emp. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 5:17-ct-3034-FL, 2017 WL 7693400, at *1 (E.D. N.C. Nov. 16, 2017) (finding no actual injury where petitioner missed deadline but was granted permission to reopen his appeal). Accordingly, the undersigned finds that the Amended Complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to show that Defendant Britt-Pooser violated Plaintiff's constitutional right of access to the courts, and any such claims are therefore subject to summary dismissal.
Additionally, it is unclear what Plaintiff means when he states that Defendant Britt-Pooser denied him “proper indigency status, ” as the Court granted Plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis on January 11, 2022. (Dkt. No. 5.)
IV. Plaintiff's Motion for a Release Order
On March 3, 2022, Plaintiff filed a motion seeking a prisoner release order pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3) based on certain conditions of confinement at Lieber. (Dkt. No. 22.) In support of this motion, Plaintiff contends that purported staff shortages and overcrowding at Lieber have resulted in inadequate medical care and unsanitary living conditions-both of which have contributed to the facility's alleged “inability to control the surge of COVID.” (Dkt. No. 22; Dkt. No. 22-1 at 2-5, 12-13.) Plaintiff seems to allege that he is particularly vulnerable to COVID-19 due to certain unspecified “health conditions, ” and that Defendants' “practices” in handling the virus are “placing [his] life and health at risk for danger.” (Dkt. No. 22-1 at 8.) Plaintiff further suggests that “self-improvement [is] unlikely because of the conditions” at the facility. (Id. at 10; see also Dkt. No. 8 at 9, stating that Plaintiff “will continue to be irreparably injured by the conduct of the Defendants unless this Court intervenes....”) Plaintiff therefore requests that he be “release[d] to house arrest home monitoring” and that “SCDC properly man the prisons with the appropriate number of staff and security or reduce the prison population.” (Dkt. No. 22-1 at 13.) Plaintiff also asks for “an order that sick call and overall healthcare at the prison improve.” (Id.)
As noted above, Plaintiff filed this motion after several unsuccessful attempts to seek the same relief through miscellaneous letters and declarations. (See infra pp. 2-3; Dkt. Nos. 12, 15, 18.)
Because Plaintiff's motion for a release order appears to seek immediate injunctive relief, the undersigned considers the motion akin to a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction. Such relief is “an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). Thus, a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction should issue only when the movant has established all four of the following elements: (1) he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) the balance of the equities tips in his favor; and (4) an injunction is in the public interest. Id. at 20; Henderson for Nat'l Lab. Rels. Bd. v. Bluefield Hosp. Co., LLC, 902 F.3d 432, 439 (4th Cir. 2018) (noting that “Winter made clear that each of these four factors must be satisfied to obtain preliminary injunctive relief”).
Plaintiff does not directly address any of the aforementioned requirements in his motion for a prisoner release order; nevertheless, the first factor is clearly dispositive here as Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that he is likely to succeed on the merits. In the context of preliminary injunctive relief, the PLRA mandates that the court reach “no further than necessary” to correct an alleged constitutional violation. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2) (“Preliminary injunctive relief must be narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the harm the court finds requires preliminary relief, and be the least intrusive means necessary to correct that harm.”). When fashioning the appropriate remedy, the court must give “substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system caused by the preliminary relief.” Id. Thus, “the PLRA imposes an important backstop against judicial micro-management of prison and detention facilities, even in the face of public health crises.” See Seth v. McDonough, 461 F.Supp.3d 242, 255 (D. Md. 2020) (referencing Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 511 (2011)).
A prisoner release order, as Plaintiff seeks here, is defined broadly as “any order, including a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunctive relief, that has the purpose or effect of reducing or limiting the prison population, or that directs the release from or non-admission of prisoners to a prison.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(4). In keeping with the PLRA's concern for public safety and an efficient criminal justice system, the statute directs that such a release order may not issue unless a court previously entered an order for less intrusive relief that failed to remedy the constitutional deprivation at issue and the defendant had a reasonable amount of time to comply with that order. Id. § 3626(a)(3)(A). Assuming these perquisites are satisfied, a prisoner release order may be entered “only by a three-judge court” upon a finding that “crowding is the primary cause of the violation” and “no other relief will remedy the violation.” Id. § 3626(a)(3)(C), (E).
In the instant case, Plaintiff plainly fails to meet the requirements for a prison release order, as he has not obtained a previous order for relief of any kind, nor is the undersigned aware of such. To be sure, while Plaintiff claims that he has no “remedy at law to redress [Defendants'] wrongs” (Dkt. No. 8 at 9), his motion alludes to the very conditions that, if remedied, would mitigate the risk of infection to all inmates, including those in the more vulnerable subclass. “Put differently, Plaintiff[] [has] not pleaded facts which make plausible that no set of conditions can reduce the risk of COVID-19 exposure to the medically vulnerable subclass to an acceptable level.” Seth, 461 F.Supp.3d at 257. The undersigned therefore finds that Plaintiff is not entitled to immediate injunctive relief under the Winter factors and recommends that the Court deny Plaintiff's request for a release order at this time. See id. at 265 (finding injunctive relief in the form of release unwarranted under first prong of Winter where “relief short of release [could] adequately address the constitutional harms” at issue); see also Gess v. USMS, No. 1:20-cv-01790-PAB-STV, 2020 WL 8838280, at *11-12 (D. Colo. Dec. 10, 2020), adopted in part, 2021 WL 423436 (D. Colo. Feb. 5, 2021) (collecting cases where “[c]ourts consistently have refused to grant injunctive relief for release where, as here, the plaintiff's claims fail to satisfy the PLRA's requirements for the issuance of a prisoner relief order”).
CONCLUSION
Despite the opportunity to cure the deficiencies in his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff did not file a second amended pleading with this Court. For the reasons discussed above, the undersigned therefore RECOMMENDS that the Court summarily dismiss Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Kendall, Grissom, Britt-Pooser, and Brown in their entirety with prejudice. See Ackbar v. Monaco, No. 4:19-cv-2774-RMG, 2020 WL 1164194, at *3 (D.S.C. Mar. 11, 2020), aff'd, 828 Fed.Appx. 913 (4th Cir. 2020) (dismissing complaint with prejudice where Pro se plaintiff failed to amend the pleading after notices and warnings that his complaint was subject to dismissal); see also Workman v. Morrison Healthcare, 724 F. App'x. 280, 281 (4th Cir. June 4, 2018). The undersigned further RECOMMENDS that the Court deny Plaintiff's motion for a prisoner release order (Dkt. No. 22) as premature at this time, with leave to refile if and when appropriate.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties' attention is directed to an important notice on the following page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).