Akiyama v. United States Judo Inc.

17 Citing cases

  1. Hardie v. National Collegiate Athletic Association

    97 F. Supp. 3d 1163 (S.D. Cal. 2015)   Cited 4 times   1 Legal Analyses
    In Hardie v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n., 97 F. Supp. 3d 1163 (S.D. Cal. 2015), the court found Title II contained no language indicative of a disparate impact claim.

    Neither the Supreme Court nor the Ninth Circuit has settled this issue, and there is a paucity of cases analyzing it. See Akiyama v. U.S. Judo Inc., 181 F.Supp.2d 1179, 1184 (W.D.Wash.2002). In light of Title II's ambiguity and the lack of precedent, many courts have avoided deciding the issue.

  2. Jalal v. Lucille Roberts Health Clubs Inc.

    254 F. Supp. 3d 602 (S.D.N.Y. 2017)   Cited 3 times

    See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (barring "discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin" but not precluding unintended adverse impacts); see also Boyle v. Jerome Country Club , 883 F.Supp. 1422, 1432 (D. Idaho 1995) ("To go beyond the intended language of Title II, and require public facilities to affirmatively accommodate patrons' religious beliefs ... is not appropriate nor allowed under the applicable legislation."). Moreover, district courts in other circuits have held that disparate impact claims are not cognizable under Title II. See, e.g. , Hardie v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n , 97 F.Supp.3d 1163, 1165–69 (S.D. Cal. 2015), appeal filed , No. 15–55576 (9th Cir.); Akiyama v. U.S. Judo Inc. , 181 F.Supp.2d 1179, 1184–87 (W.D. Wash 2002) ; LaRoche v. Denny's, Inc. , 62 F.Supp.2d 1366, 1370 n.2 (S.D. Fla. 1999). This court sees no reason to diverge from the logic set forth in those cases.

  3. Coral Ridge Ministries Media v. Amazon.com, Inc.

    406 F. Supp. 3d 1258 (M.D. Ala. 2019)   Cited 12 times
    In Coral Ridge, the Court quoted Buckley and applied its principles in holding that accusations that defendant was a member of a "hate group" were not actionable.

    Others have held that it does not. See, e.g. , Akiyama v. U.S. Judo Inc. , 181 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1187 (W.D. Wash. 2002) (Lasnik, J.); LaRoche v. Denny's, Inc. , 62 F. Supp. 2d 1366, 1370 n.2 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (Seitz, J.). This court need not resolve the open question, for Coral Ridge has not plausibly plead a prima-facie case of disparate-impact discrimination.

  4. Shepherd v. U.S. Olympic Committee

    464 F. Supp. 2d 1072 (D. Colo. 2006)   Cited 17 times

    Unlike the public and private golf courses operated or "leased" by the PGA in Martin — to which all paying customers have access regardless of ability — the training facilities operated by the USOC are accessible only to those already selected by the national governing bodies to the Olympic, Pan-American or Paralympic teams in their individual sports and identified as elite, world-class athletes. C.f. Martin, 532 U.S. at 677-78 (among the "privileges" offered members of the general public who pay to play on PGA-operated golf courses is the privilege of vying to qualify for and play in the PGA Tour); Akiyama v. United States Judo Inc., 181 F. Supp.2d 1179, 1183 (W.D. Wa. 2002) (applying Martin and holding that the Civil Rights Act's prohibition against discrimination on basis of religion applied to amateur judo competition where members of general public were welcome to test their skills and talents in preliminary tournaments designed to identify the best competitors). Absent any allegation that the privileges and benefits afforded athletes at the U.S. Olympic Training Centers are available to members of the general public vying for a berth on the U.S. Olympic or Paralympic team, it is difficult to say that Martin applies.

  5. Robinson v. Paragon Foods, Inc.

    Civil Action No. 1:04-CV-2940-JEC (N.D. Ga. Sep. 15, 2006)   Cited 2 times

    Without guidance from the Supreme Court or the Eleventh Circuit, the Court is hesitant to apply disparate impact analysis to plaintiffs' Title II claims. See Arguello v. Conoco, Inc., 207 F.3d 803, 813 (5th Cir. 2000) (noting that the law is "generally unclear as to whether disparate impact claims are recognized under Title II" and declining to decide the issue), and Akiyama v. United States Judo Inc., 181 F.Supp. 2d 1179, 1184 (W.D. Wash. 2002) (refusing to apply disparate impact analysis to a Title II claim involving religious discrimination). As the court explained in Akiyama, "Title II precludes private and public actors from segregating or depriving individuals of services on account of their [race or] religion, a formulation which is more consistent with an intent to prevent disparate treatment than to prevent unintended adverse effects."

  6. Hardie v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n

    861 F.3d 875 (9th Cir. 2017)   Cited 20 times
    Affirming grant of summary judgment where there was no genuine issue of material fact at each step of the disparate-impact analysis

    Neither the Supreme Court nor we have decided whether disparate-impact claims are cognizable under Title II. A few courts have found that Title II authorizes disparate-impact claims, see Olzman v. Lake Hills Swim Club, Inc. , 495 F.2d 1333, 1341–42 (2d Cir. 1974) ; Robinson v. Power Pizza, Inc. , 993 F.Supp. 1462, 1464–66 (M.D. Fla. 1998), while others have rejected disparate-impact liability under Title II, see, e.g. , Akiyama v. U.S. Judo Inc. , 181 F.Supp.2d 1179, 1187 (W.D. Wash. 2002) ; LaRoche v. Denny's, Inc. , 62 F.Supp.2d 1366, 1370 n.2 (S.D. Fla. 1999). Several courts have declined to decide the issue altogether.

  7. Brown v. Alaska Airlines, Inc.

    2:22-cv-668 (W.D. Wash. May. 22, 2024)   Cited 1 times

    The Court finds instructive on this point a collection of recent district court cases analyzing disparate impact claims challenging employers' COVID-19 vaccine mandates. These courts have reasoned that “allowing disparate impact claims for groups holding a particular religious belief would give ‘limitless relief' because ‘any policy impacting a plaintiff's specific religious belief would generally impact 100% of the members of a class defined by that belief, which would virtually always amount to a disproportionate impact as compared to those falling outside the class.'” Id. (citing Dunbar, 2022 WL 18357775, at *3; Coral Ridge Ministries Media, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 406 F.Supp.3d 1258, 1306 (M.D. Ala. 2019), aff'd, 6 F.4th 1247 (11th Cir. 2021)); Akiyama v. U.S. Judo Inc., 181 F.Supp.2d 1179, 1186 (W.D. Wash. 2002).

  8. Cox v. Nw. Reg'l Educ. Serv. Dist.

    3:22-cv-01073-HZ (Lead Case) (D. Or. Feb. 23, 2024)   Cited 7 times

    That court adopted the reasoning of several other district courts which explained that allowing disparate impact claims for groups holding a particular religious belief would give “limitless relief” because “any policy impacting a plaintiff's specific religious belief would generally impact 100% of the members of a class defined by that belief, which would virtually always amount to a disproportionate impact as compared to those falling outside the class.” Id. (quoting Coral Ridge Ministries Media, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 406 F.Supp.3d 1258, 1306 (M.D. Ala. 2019), aff'd, 6 F.4th 1247 (11th Cir. 2021)); see also Akiyama v. U.S. Judo Inc., 181 F.Supp.2d 1179, 1186 (W.D. Wash. 2002) (addressing a similar issue and coming to the same conclusion).

  9. Nathaniel v. Hertz Location Edition Corp.

    Case No. 19-CV-11154 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 20, 2020)

    See, e.g., Arguello v. Conoco, Inc., 207 F.3d 803, 813 (5th Cir. 2000); Jefferson v. City of Fremont, 73 F.Supp.3d 1133, 1145-46 (N.D. Cal. 2014). Other federal courts have decided that Title II requires intentional discrimination. In Akiyama v. U.S. Judo Inc., 181 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1185 (W.D. Wash. 2002), the court held Title II does not provide for a claim of disparate impact. The court stated the primary purpose of Title II was:

  10. Ellis v. Circle K Corp.

    No. CV-18-4088-PHX-JAT (D. Ariz. Dec. 21, 2018)   Cited 2 times

    Generally, Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a, applies to non-government actors who provide a "public accommodation." See Akiyama v. U.S. Judo Inc., 181 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1183 (W.D. Wash. 2002). Specifically,