Akintoye v. State

4 Citing cases

  1. Roberts v. State

    810 S.E.2d 169 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018)   Cited 4 times
    Holding that tactical decision not to object to statement in order to avoid drawing jury's attention to it did not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel

    it to an accomplice who fraudulently used it to make a purchase at a convenience store was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction for identity fraud); Smith v. State , 322 Ga. App. 433, 435-36 (1) (a), 745 S.E.2d 683 (2013) (holding that evidence the defendant and accomplice used victim’s bank-account numbers without permission to make purchases at an electronics store was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction for identity fraud); Epps v. State , 262 Ga. App. 113, 113-14 (1), 584 S.E.2d 701 (2003) (holding that evidence that defendant purchased items at a department store using a stolen credit-card number was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction for financial-transaction-card fraud); Rogers v. State , 259 Ga. App. 516, 517-18 (1), 578 S.E.2d 169 (2003) (finding that evidence that defendant used his former brother-in-law’s credit card without permission to make various purchases sufficiently supported defendant’s conviction for financial-transaction-card fraud).See Akintoye v. State , 340 Ga. App. 777, 782 (1) (d), 798 S.E.2d 720 (2017) (holding that evidence the defendant committed predicate crimes was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction on RICO charge based on such crimes); Kilby v. State , 335 Ga. App. 238, 241-42 (1) (a), 780 S.E.2d 411 (2015) (same). 2.

  2. Whaley v. State

    343 Ga. App. 701 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017)   Cited 8 times
    Affirming conviction for violation of Georgia RICO statute via a pattern of theft when there was, inter alia , evidence that funds were deposited into defendant's personal account via checks written by his girlfriend from accounts owned by company for which they both worked

    1. The evidence set forth above was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to conclude that Whaley conspired with Rice to acquire money, directly and indirectly, through a pattern of racketeering activity in violation of OCGA § 16-14-4 (a). See OCGA § 16-14-3 (5) (A) (xii) (" ‘Racketeering activity’ means to commit, [or] to attempt to commit ... any crime which is chargeable by indictment under the laws of this state involving ... theft."); see generally Akintoye v. State, 340 Ga. App. 777, 782 (1) (d), 798 S.E.2d 720 (2017) ; Brown v. State, 321 Ga. App. 198, 204 (4), 739 S.E.2d 118 (2013).Although Whaley maintains that he was not aware of the fraudulent nature of the funds, it was entirely within the purview of the jury to reject that defense.

  3. Doe v. Red Roof Inns, Inc.

    688 F. Supp. 3d 1247 (N.D. Ga. 2023)   Cited 2 times
    Finding sufficient evidence of a venture on summary judgment where, inter alia, the defendants regularly saw pimps and sex workers using hotel rooms, booked suspected sex workers in rooms at the back of the hotel, acted as lookouts and notified pimps when police were nearby, and were aware that some sex workers appeared to be underage and physically emaciated

    Cotman v. State, 342 Ga. App. 569, 585, 804 S.E.2d 672 (2017). Further, a conspiracy "may be a mere tacit understanding between two or more people that they will pursue a particular criminal objective," Akintoye v. State, 340 Ga. App. 777, 781, 798 S.E.2d 720 (2017), and a tacit understanding may be shown by circumstantial evidence or "by inference as well as deduction from conduct." Brown v. State, 177 Ga. App. 284, 295, 339 S.E.2d 332 (1985).

  4. City of Jacksonville v. Mun. Elec. Auth. of Ga.

    608 F. Supp. 3d 1262 (N.D. Ga. 2020)   Cited 2 times

    In applying the rules of statutory construction, Georgia courts "look to the plain language of the statute and ... we presume that the General Assembly means what it says and says what it means." Akintoye v. State, 340 Ga. App. 777, 782, 798 S.E.2d 720 (2017) (citing Williams v. State, 299 Ga. 632, 633, 791 S.E.2d 55 (2016) ). To that end, we must afford the statutory text its plain and ordinary meaning, we must view the statutory text in the context in which it appears, and we must read the statutory text in its most natural and reasonable way, as an ordinary speaker of the English language would.