it to an accomplice who fraudulently used it to make a purchase at a convenience store was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction for identity fraud); Smith v. State , 322 Ga. App. 433, 435-36 (1) (a), 745 S.E.2d 683 (2013) (holding that evidence the defendant and accomplice used victim’s bank-account numbers without permission to make purchases at an electronics store was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction for identity fraud); Epps v. State , 262 Ga. App. 113, 113-14 (1), 584 S.E.2d 701 (2003) (holding that evidence that defendant purchased items at a department store using a stolen credit-card number was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction for financial-transaction-card fraud); Rogers v. State , 259 Ga. App. 516, 517-18 (1), 578 S.E.2d 169 (2003) (finding that evidence that defendant used his former brother-in-law’s credit card without permission to make various purchases sufficiently supported defendant’s conviction for financial-transaction-card fraud).See Akintoye v. State , 340 Ga. App. 777, 782 (1) (d), 798 S.E.2d 720 (2017) (holding that evidence the defendant committed predicate crimes was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction on RICO charge based on such crimes); Kilby v. State , 335 Ga. App. 238, 241-42 (1) (a), 780 S.E.2d 411 (2015) (same). 2.
1. The evidence set forth above was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to conclude that Whaley conspired with Rice to acquire money, directly and indirectly, through a pattern of racketeering activity in violation of OCGA § 16-14-4 (a). See OCGA § 16-14-3 (5) (A) (xii) (" ‘Racketeering activity’ means to commit, [or] to attempt to commit ... any crime which is chargeable by indictment under the laws of this state involving ... theft."); see generally Akintoye v. State, 340 Ga. App. 777, 782 (1) (d), 798 S.E.2d 720 (2017) ; Brown v. State, 321 Ga. App. 198, 204 (4), 739 S.E.2d 118 (2013).Although Whaley maintains that he was not aware of the fraudulent nature of the funds, it was entirely within the purview of the jury to reject that defense.
Cotman v. State, 342 Ga. App. 569, 585, 804 S.E.2d 672 (2017). Further, a conspiracy "may be a mere tacit understanding between two or more people that they will pursue a particular criminal objective," Akintoye v. State, 340 Ga. App. 777, 781, 798 S.E.2d 720 (2017), and a tacit understanding may be shown by circumstantial evidence or "by inference as well as deduction from conduct." Brown v. State, 177 Ga. App. 284, 295, 339 S.E.2d 332 (1985).
In applying the rules of statutory construction, Georgia courts "look to the plain language of the statute and ... we presume that the General Assembly means what it says and says what it means." Akintoye v. State, 340 Ga. App. 777, 782, 798 S.E.2d 720 (2017) (citing Williams v. State, 299 Ga. 632, 633, 791 S.E.2d 55 (2016) ). To that end, we must afford the statutory text its plain and ordinary meaning, we must view the statutory text in the context in which it appears, and we must read the statutory text in its most natural and reasonable way, as an ordinary speaker of the English language would.