Opinion
Civil Action No. 17 - 938
04-01-2021
AKANINYENE EFIONG AKAN, Petitioner, v. SUPERINTENDENT SCI FOREST, DISTRICT ATTORNEY ALLEGHENY COUNTY, and ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA, Respondents.
District Judge Christy Criswell Wiegand
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. RECOMMENDATION
For the following reasons, it is respectfully recommended that Petitioner's Motion for Injunctive Relief (ECF No. 20), Motion for Special Relief (ECF No. 34), and Motion for Order to Superintendent of SCI-Forest for Single-Celled Protective Custody Housing (ECF No. 38) be denied.
II. REPORT
Petitioner is an inmate currently in the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections ("DOC"). He initiated this proceeding by filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which was docketed on July 17, 2017. (ECF No. 1.) At the same time, he sought to stay these proceedings until such time that he finished exhausting his claims in the state courts. (ECF No. 3.) His request was granted, and this case was administratively closed until Petitioner moved to reopen it on December 18, 2020. (ECF Nos. 6, 13-14.) His Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus was docketed on January 4, 2021. (ECF No. 15.) The Petition challenges Petitioner's 2012 judgment of sentence out of Allegheny County.
A. Pending Motions
On February 11, 2021, Petitioner filed what was construed and filed as a Motion for Preliminary Injunction. (ECF No. 20.) In the Motion, he complains about an unprovoked assault against him by his cellmate that resulted in the destruction of his typewriter on February 2, 2021, and he requests that the Court order the DOC to house him in a single-cell in protective custody pending the resolution of these habeas proceedings. He also requests that the Court order the DOC to grant him access to his legal materials and reasonable access to the law library, typing and printing equipment, tape, envelopes, and cash slips.
On March 18, 2021, Petitioner filed a Motion for Special Relief. (ECF No. 34.) In the Motion, he provides further information as to what occurred following the assault that was the subject of his previous Motion. Specifically, he blames the assault by his cellmate on the failure of prison staff to timely consider and approve his cell agreement with another inmate and suggests that the assailant who attacked him acted at the behest of others, including prison staff. He states that after the assault he was placed in the Restricted Housing Unit ("RHU") on involuntary administrative custody ("AC") status and was later offered a transfer or protective custody housing by a Security Lieutenant whom he identifies as Kundick. However, he states that on February 19, 2021, the Prison Review Committee ("PRC") converted his involuntary AC status into a self-imposed AC hold and told Petitioner that they would not pay to have his typewriter replaced. On February 23, 2021, he was given a misconduct for refusing to accept a cellmate in the RHU and sentenced to fifteen days in disciplinary custody ("DC") after he was found guilty of the offense. Petitioner states that while he was given the option to either continue accruing misconducts for refusing to accept a cellmate in the RHU or relocate to a more violent area of the prison, his assailant was released from the RHU with no misconduct or repercussions for his attack on February 2, 2021, remains employed as a Certified Peer Specialist, and is housed on an incentive unit with special privileges unavailable to the general population. As evidenced by the attack on February 2, 2021, and the disparate treatment between he and his assailant that followed, Petitioner maintains that he has been the subject of retaliation by the DOC due to these habeas proceedings wherein he challenges his ongoing detention. As a result of his confinement in the RHU, he complains that he has been unable to access the majority of his property or legal materials and unable to access the law library. He again requests an order from this Court directing the DOC to provide him with temporary single-cell housing status in protective custody and access to all of his property.
Per Court order, Respondent filed a Response to both filings, arguing that neither Motion was properly before the Court on this habeas proceeding. (ECF No. 37).
On March 30, 2021, Petitioner filed what he titled a "Request for Order to Superintendent of SCI-Forest for Single-Celled Protective Custody Housing" wherein he again recounts the assault on him by his cellmate and states that he believes that there is a conspiracy to harm him. (ECF No. 38.)
Although the document was received by the Court on March 30, 2021, and filed on March 31, 2021, it is dated February 2, 2021, and postmarked February 4, 2021.
B. Discussion
First, Petitioner's Motions should be denied because his complaints and requested relief may not be raised in a federal habeas proceeding. Prisoners may only use "habeas corpus . . . remedies when they seek to invalidate the duration of their confinement - either directly through an injunction compelling speedier release or indirectly through a judicial determination that necessarily implies the unlawfulness of the State's custody." Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81 (2005); see also Bonadonna v. United States, 446 F. App'x 407, 409 (3d Cir. 2011). The Supreme Court has explained that if a prisoner is challenging a condition of confinement or "attacking something other than the fact or length of his confinement, and he is seeking something other than immediate or more speedy release . . . [,] habeas corpus is not an appropriate or available federal remedy." Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 494 (1973).
Here, Petitioner is challenging his placement in the RHU on either AC or DC status and seeks an order directing the DOC to transfer him into protective custody and provide him with a single cell, as well as access to, among other things, his legal materials and the law library. He is therefore challenging the conditions of his confinement, not the fact or duration of his sentence. He makes no allegation that his placement in the RHU on either AC or DC status is inconsistent with his sentencing judgment, and he makes no allegation that his removal from such status would shorten his confinement. Accordingly, his claims are not cognizable in this habeas proceeding and his Motions therefore must be denied. See, e.g., Lewis v. Phelps, 2010 WL 3907626, at *1 (D. Del. Sept. 28, 2010) (denying habeas petitioner's motion for preliminary injunction as it related to the conditions of his imprisonment because "his allegations are not properly raised in this federal habeas proceeding"). If Petitioner desires to pursue his complaints, then he must proceed through a civil rights action after exhausting his administrative remedies through the prison's grievance process. See, e.g., Bedenfield v. Lewisburg, 393 F. App'x 32, 33 (3d Cir. 2010) (challenge to placement in the SMU is analogous to the "garden variety prison transfer" that we have indicated should be challenged in a civil rights action, not via a habeas petition) (citing Woodall v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, 243 (3d Cir. 2005)).
Alternatively, even if the Court were to consider Petitioner's Motions under the standard for granting motions for preliminary injunctions, Petitioner cannot show that he would be entitled to the requested relief. "Preliminary injunctive relief is 'an extraordinary remedy' and 'should be granted only in limited circumstances.'" Kos Pharms., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 708 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Winback & Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421, 1427 (3d Cir. 1994)). In order to obtain a preliminary injunction, a movant is required to establish four elements: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits, (2) probability of irreparable injury if relief is not granted, (3) a favorable balance of the hardships among the parties, and (4) that the public interest favors such relief. Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 903 F.2d 186, 197-98 (3d Cir. 1990). As these elements suggest, "there must be a relationship between the injury claimed in the party's motion and the conduct asserted in the complaint." Ball v. Famiglio, 396 F.App'x 836, 837 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation omitted). Failure to establish any element renders a preliminary injunction inappropriate. NutraSweet Co. v. Vit-Mar Enterprises, Inc., 176 F.3d 151, 153 (3d Cir. 1999).
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has defined irreparable injury as "potential harm which cannot be redressed by a legal or equitable remedy following a trial." Instant Air Freight Co. v. C.F. Air Freight, Inc., 882 F.2d 797, 801 (3d Cir. 1989). A court may not grant preliminary injunctive relief unless "[t]he preliminary injunction [is] the only way of protecting the plaintiff from harm." Id. The moving party must demonstrate that he is likely to suffer "actual or imminent harm which cannot otherwise be compensated by money damages," or he "fail[s] to sustain [his] substantial burden of showing irreparable harm." Frank's GMC Truck Center, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 847 F.2d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 1988). "Furthermore, a showing of irreparable harm is insufficient if the harm will occur only in the indefinite future. Rather, the moving party must make a 'clear showing of immediate irreparable harm.'" Campbell Soup Co. v. ConAgra, Inc., 977 F.2d 86, 91 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Hohe v. Casey, 868 F.2d 69, 72 (3d Cir. 1989)). --------
Here, there is no relationship between the injury claimed in Petitioner's Motions for injunctive relief, which challenge the conditions of his confinement, and the conduct complained of in the Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, which challenges the fact and/or duration of his detention. Nevertheless, Petitioner has not demonstrated that even if he pursued his claims in a civil rights action that he would likely succeed on the merits given that the Supreme Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment does not give a prisoner a liberty interest in any particular housing location or custody level while under the jurisdiction of correctional authorities. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245 (1983); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976); Montayne v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242 (1976). Additionally, Petitioner has not demonstrated that his custody status and other conditions of his confinement have placed him at an imminent risk of suffering irreparable injury absent the Court granting him the requested injunctive relief. Thus, under these circumstances, Petitioner is not entitled to the extraordinary relief requested and his Motions should therefore be denied.
III. CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, it is respectfully recommended that Petitioner's Motion for Injunctive Relief (ECF No. 20), Motion for Special Relief (ECF No. 34), and Motion for Order to Superintendent of SCI-Forest for Single-Celled Protective Custody Housing (ECF No. 38) be denied.
In accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C), and rule 72.D.2 of the Local Rules of Court, Petitioner is allowed fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this Report and Recommendation to file objections. Failure to file timely objections will constitute a waiver of any appellate rights.
/s/_________
Lisa Pupo Lenihan
United States Magistrate Judge Dated: April 1, 2021. Cc: Akaninyene Effiong Akan
KP-8782
SCI Forest
PO Box 945
Marienville, PA 16239-0945
Counsel for Respondents
(Via CM/ECF electronic mail)