Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Solano County Super. Ct. No. J40137
Pollak, J.
Father seeks extraordinary relief from an order of the Solano County Superior Court terminating his reunification services and setting a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 to select a permanent plan for his one-year-old son. Father challenges the court’s finding that he failed to participate regularly and make substantive progress in his court-ordered treatment plan and that there was not a substantial probability the child could be returned to his custody and care within six months. As discussed below, we conclude substantial evidence supports the court’s findings and, thus, we deny the petition on the merits.
All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
Factual and Procedural Background
The Solano County Department of Child Welfare Services (the department) initiated this proceeding on May 10, 2010, with a petition alleging that the child had been born testing positive for amphetamines and that the parents were unable to provide adequate care for the child. The child was detained and placed in foster care. The court established jurisdiction in June 2010 based on the following amended allegations. With respect to the mother, the amended petition alleged that she “has an untreated substance abuse problem that interferes with her ability to provide safe and adequate care for the newborn child” and that “[d]uring her pregnancy, the mother used methamphetamines and obtained limited prenatal care, placing the child at substantial risk of physical harm and compromising the child’s physical, developmental and emotional well-being.” With respect to the father, the amended petition alleged that he “left the two-day old infant... with unrelated caretakers who were unable to participate in the care and support of the infant on an extended basis. The father did not provide for the care of the child during this period. The father did not make arrangements for the infant to attend medical appointments while the child was in the care of the unrelated caretakers. The father did not make safe arrangements for the child’s care, placing the child at substantial risk of physical and emotional harm.”
Reunification services were ordered immediately for the mother, but were not ordered for the father until September 2010 after his paternity status was updated from an alleged father to a presumed father. Thereafter, the department developed a case plan that required father to consistently, adequately and appropriately parent his child, including participation in parenting classes, and obtain and maintain suitable housing.
The six-month review hearing was originally set for December 14, 2010, but was continued to February 3, 2011, for a contested hearing at the request of counsel for the child. While the department initially recommended the continuation of services for both parents, by February 2011, the department was in agreement with the child’s counsel that services should be terminated for both parents and a permanency planning hearing set.
In the report filed in advance of the hearing, the social worker reported that the mother was not participating in substance abuse treatment and that her participation in drug testing was inconsistent. She had missed numerous testing appointments, refused to submit hair samples, and the testers had raised concerns about her urine samples. The parents had not obtained stable housing and had not participated successfully in parenting classes. According to the social worker, she left messages for both parents advising them that their parenting classes would begin January 18. When they missed the first class, the mother told the social worker that they went to the location but could not find the class. At the hearing, the social worker testified that the parents attended the second parenting class but missed the third class because father was sick and mother stayed home with him. Another social worker testified that when the proceedings first began, she emphasized to father the importance of engaging in services quickly due to the age of the child and discussed the possibility that he might have to separate himself from mother and take full responsibility for the child if he wanted him returned to his custody.
The trial court found that the parents had made little effort to comply with their case plans. The court acknowledged that services had not been ordered for father until September, but found that father’s lack of effort was primarily responsible for that delay. The court terminated services for both parents and set a hearing under section 366.26. Father filed a timely notice of intent to file a writ petition.
Discussion
Because the child in this case was removed from his parent’s custody essentially at birth, reunification services were presumptively limited to six months. (Tonya M. v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 836, 840.) At the six-month hearing in such a case, the juvenile court may schedule a hearing pursuant to section 366.26, subdivision (e) if it “ ‘finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parent failed to participate regularly and make substantive progress in a court-ordered treatment plan.... If, however, the court finds there is a substantial probability that the child... may be returned to his or her parent... within six months or that reasonable services have not been provided, the court shall continue the case to the 12–month permanency [review] hearing.’ ” (Tonya M., p. 844.) The Supreme Court has construed “six months” in this context to mean “such time as remains until a potential 12-month review hearing, even if less than six months.” (Id. at p. 840.) Due to the continuance of the six-month hearing, the court could have ordered, at most, four additional months of reunification services.
The findings of juvenile courts made pursuant to section 366.21 are reviewed under the substantial evidence test. (James B. v. Superior Court (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1014, 1020.) Substantial evidence is evidence that is “ ‘reasonable, credible and of solid value, ’ ” which would allow a reasonable trier of fact to reach the conclusion the juvenile court reached. (In re Christina A. (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1073, 1080.) Where there is substantial evidence to support the order, contradicted or not, the appellate court must affirm the decision. (In re Tracy Z. (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 107, 113.) All conflicts in the evidence are resolved in favor of the finding, order, or judgment of the lower court, and all reasonable inferences are made in support thereof. (In re Ronell A. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1352, 1361.)
In this case, substantial evidence supports the court’s findings that the parents had failed to participate regularly and make substantive progress in their court-ordered treatment plans and that there was not a substantial probability that the minor could be returned to the parents within the four months allowed by statute. Although reunification services were not ordered for father until September, he was informed in June 2010 that parenting classes would be required and that he would need to engage in services quickly if he wanted to reunify with his child. Despite this warning, no attempt was made to attend classes until January 2011 and even then he missed two out of the three scheduled classes.
Likewise, father was on notice beginning in June 2010 that he would need to obtain and maintain stable housing before he could be reunified with his son. Yet, in the eight months before the hearing, he and mother had made little progress towards meeting that goal. Father notes that they saved more than half of the $350 deposit necessary to participate in a particular housing assistance program and argues that this evidence “suggests a substantial probability that they could obtain housing and therefore successfully reunify with the minor prior to or at the time of the twelve-month review.” The only evidence, however, was that the parents told the social worker in September 2010 that they had saved $200 towards housing. Assuming that is true, nothing in the record suggests that the parents had made any additional progress obtaining housing in the following five months. At the time of the hearing, parents claimed to be living at a motel despite the department’s referrals to housing shelters. Accordingly, there is no significant likelihood that father would be able to save the amount necessary to obtain and maintain suitable housing within four months under the housing assistance program they had chosen.
Finally, although we consider father’s compliance with his case plan separately, it cannot be overlooked that despite the social worker’s advice, father had taken no steps to distance himself from mother or to take full responsibility for reunifying with his son. Mother’s compliance with her case plan was virtually non-existent. There is no possibility that the child would have been returned to father’s care and custody within four months so long as he continued to cohabitate with mother under these circumstances.
Disposition
The petition for extraordinary writ is denied on the merits. (See Cal. Const., art. VI, § 14; Kowis v. Howard (1992) 3 Cal.4th 888, 894; Bay Development, Ltd. v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1012, 1024.) The decision is final in this court immediately. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.454(a), 8.490(b)(3).)
We concur: McGuiness, P. J., Jenkins, J.