Third, the lack of any express provision allowing for suit by a disappointed bidder was irrelevant inasmuch as the law granted disappointed bidders standing to sue irrespective of their standing as taxpayers. Id.; see also, e.g.,In re Air Terminal Servs., 47 Haw. 499, 510–12, 393 P.2d 60, 68 (1964) (holding that a disappointed bidder who was not a taxpayer had standing to argue that it had a "clear legal right to be awarded the contract"). Thus, the requirements imposed by the dissent on taxpayer standing in this area are inconsistent with our precedent.
Federal has sued alternatively as a taxpayer and as an unsuccessful bidder. While it may not have standing solely as an unsuccessful bidder to challenge the validity of the bid procedure in this case, cf. Air Terminal Services v. Matsuda, 47 Haw. 499, 505, 393 P.2d 60 (1964), Federal does have the right, as a taxpayer, to assert its invalidity. Wilson v. Lord-Young Engineering Co., supra; Lucas v. Amer. Haw. E. C. Co., supra.
The County also asserts that Plaintiff must show that it is likely to suffer harm or be wronged again in a similar way. Janod makes similar arguments, relying on Application of Air Terminal Servs., Inc., 393 P.2d 60, 66-67 (Haw. 1964), for its assertion that a declaration that Plaintiff is the lowest bidder is futile because the County cannot be forced to award the contract to Plaintiff. In Application of Air Terminal Servs., the Hawaii Supreme Court held that an unsuccessful bidder should not be awarded a contract where the contract has already been executed and partially performed.
We base this holding on Castle v. Secretary of the Territory, 16 Haw. 769 [(1905)]. Although defendant urges that Castle, as a controlling authority on the point at issue, has been eroded by Wilson v. Stainback, 39 Haw. 67 [(1951)]; Munoz v. Commissioner of Public Lands, 40 Haw. 675 [(1951)]; Air Terminal Services v. Matsuda, 47 Haw. 499, 393 P.2d 60 [(1964)]; and Helela v. State, 49 Haw. 365, 418 P.2d 482 [(1966)], and should be overruled, we see no reason for doing so. Plaintiff has alleged sufficient personal interest in the controversy to entitle him to a day in court.
B. Equitable Relief A declaratory judgment is a form of equitable relief. See Application of Air Terminal Services, Inc., 47 Haw. 499, 531, 393 P.2d 60, 78 (1964). "`The relief granted by a court [in] equity is discretionary and will not be overturned on review unless the [circuit] court abused its discretion by issuing a decision that clearly exceeds the bounds of reason or disregarded rules or principles of law or practice to the substantial detriment of the appellant.'"
Westinghouse Electric Corp., 1986 OK at ¶ 17, 720 P.2d at 718. If such is the case with an injunction, the same may be applied to a writ of mandamus since a court cannot order a governmental agency to award a contract for services that have already been completed. Application of Air Terminal Services, Inc., 47 Haw. 499, 508-509, 393 P.2d 60, 67 (1964). ¶ 8 After Judge Leamon Freeman found that the Board had no legal authority to solicit new bids, had voided the contract and restrained the Board from implementing the contract, the Board fell back on the rotation system pursuant to 22 O.S.Supp. 1992 § 1355.8[ 22-1355.8](G)(2).
Furthermore, in the absence of a statute governing such suits, demand upon the proper public officer to take appropriate action is a condition precedent to maintenance of a taxpayer's action unless facts alleged sufficiently show that demand to bring suit would be useless. Accord, Helela v. State of Hawaii, 49 Haw. 365, 418 P.2d 482 (1966); Air Terminal Services v. Matsuda, 47 Haw. 499, 393 P.2d 60 (1964). Thus, what emerges from these cases are specific requirements which must be met before standing to taxpayers is granted.
We base this holding on Castle v. Secretary of the Territory, 16 Haw. 769. Although defendant urges that Castle, as a controlling authority on the point at issue, has been eroded by Wilson v. Stainback, 39 Haw. 67; Munoz v. Commissioner of Public Lands, 40 Haw. 675; Air Terminal Services v. Matsuda, 47 Haw. 499, 393 P.2d 60; and Helela v. State, 49 Haw. 365, 418 P.2d 482, and should be overruled, we see no reason for doing so. Plaintiff has alleged sufficient personal interest in the controversy to entitle him to a day in court.
" James W. Glover, Ltd. v. Fong, 42 Haw. 560, 578, emphasis added. The doctrine of the law of the case was so applied in Air Terminal Services, Inc. v. Matsuda, 47 Haw. 499, 504-06, 393 P.2d 60, 65-66, cited by defendant. Moreover, in the cited case plaintiff was given leave to amend but did not choose to do so.
“A declaratory judgment, like other forms of equitable relief, should be granted only as a matter of judicial discretion, exercised in the public interest. It is always the duty of a court of equity to strike a proper balance between the needs of the plaintiff and the consequences of giving the desired relief. Especially where governmental action is involved, courts should not intervene unless the need for equitable relief is clear, not remote or speculative.”Application of Air Terminal Services, Inc., 47 Haw. 499, 531, 393 P.2d 60, 78 (1964) (formatting altered) (quoting Eccels v. Peoples Bank of Lakewood Village, 333 U.S. 426, 431, 68 S.Ct. 641, 92 L.Ed. 784 (1948).3.