Air Terminal Services v. Matsuda

12 Citing cases

  1. Asato v. Procurement Policy Bd.

    132 Haw. 333 (Haw. 2014)   Cited 21 times
    In Asato, the plaintiff, Lloyd Y. Asato (Asato), filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief, asserting that an administrative rule promulgated by the State Procurement Policy Board (Board) conflicted with the Hawai'i Public Procurement Code, HRS Chapter 103D, and was therefore invalid.

    Third, the lack of any express provision allowing for suit by a disappointed bidder was irrelevant inasmuch as the law granted disappointed bidders standing to sue irrespective of their standing as taxpayers. Id.; see also, e.g.,In re Air Terminal Servs., 47 Haw. 499, 510–12, 393 P.2d 60, 68 (1964) (holding that a disappointed bidder who was not a taxpayer had standing to argue that it had a "clear legal right to be awarded the contract"). Thus, the requirements imposed by the dissent on taxpayer standing in this area are inconsistent with our precedent.

  2. Federal Electric Corp. v. Fasi

    56 Haw. 57 (Haw. 1974)   Cited 31 times
    In Federal Electric, the supreme court "recognized the obvious resulting injury to taxpayers where the bidding procedures used were found to be patently improper and defective" and held that "[t]he deleterious consequences to taxpayers flowing from such a method could be presumed."

    Federal has sued alternatively as a taxpayer and as an unsuccessful bidder. While it may not have standing solely as an unsuccessful bidder to challenge the validity of the bid procedure in this case, cf. Air Terminal Services v. Matsuda, 47 Haw. 499, 505, 393 P.2d 60 (1964), Federal does have the right, as a taxpayer, to assert its invalidity. Wilson v. Lord-Young Engineering Co., supra; Lucas v. Amer. Haw. E. C. Co., supra.

  3. Hi-Tech Rockfall Construction, Inc. v. County of Maui

    CV. NO. 08-00081 DAE-LEK (D. Haw. Feb. 26, 2009)   Cited 6 times
    Finding that the plaintiff could not meet the second prong of the PAG test because "Plaintiff is the only person standing to benefit from a decision on its remaining claims"

    The County also asserts that Plaintiff must show that it is likely to suffer harm or be wronged again in a similar way. Janod makes similar arguments, relying on Application of Air Terminal Servs., Inc., 393 P.2d 60, 66-67 (Haw. 1964), for its assertion that a declaration that Plaintiff is the lowest bidder is futile because the County cannot be forced to award the contract to Plaintiff. In Application of Air Terminal Servs., the Hawaii Supreme Court held that an unsuccessful bidder should not be awarded a contract where the contract has already been executed and partially performed.

  4. Working v. Jefferson Cty

    2 So. 3d 827 (Ala. 2008)   Cited 10 times

    We base this holding on Castle v. Secretary of the Territory, 16 Haw. 769 [(1905)]. Although defendant urges that Castle, as a controlling authority on the point at issue, has been eroded by Wilson v. Stainback, 39 Haw. 67 [(1951)]; Munoz v. Commissioner of Public Lands, 40 Haw. 675 [(1951)]; Air Terminal Services v. Matsuda, 47 Haw. 499, 393 P.2d 60 [(1964)]; and Helela v. State, 49 Haw. 365, 418 P.2d 482 [(1966)], and should be overruled, we see no reason for doing so. Plaintiff has alleged sufficient personal interest in the controversy to entitle him to a day in court.

  5. KAU v. CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU

    104 Haw. 468 (Haw. 2004)   Cited 27 times
    Holding that the ICA erred in remanding the issue of whether a condemnation “fulfilled the requisite public purpose of [Revised Ordinances of Honolulu] chapter 38” to the trial court because that “issue presents a question of law”

    B. Equitable Relief A declaratory judgment is a form of equitable relief. See Application of Air Terminal Services, Inc., 47 Haw. 499, 531, 393 P.2d 60, 78 (1964). "`The relief granted by a court [in] equity is discretionary and will not be overturned on review unless the [circuit] court abused its discretion by issuing a decision that clearly exceeds the bounds of reason or disregarded rules or principles of law or practice to the substantial detriment of the appellant.'"

  6. Colclazier v. State

    1997 OK 161 (Okla. 1997)   Cited 3 times

    Westinghouse Electric Corp., 1986 OK at ¶ 17, 720 P.2d at 718. If such is the case with an injunction, the same may be applied to a writ of mandamus since a court cannot order a governmental agency to award a contract for services that have already been completed. Application of Air Terminal Services, Inc., 47 Haw. 499, 508-509, 393 P.2d 60, 67 (1964). ¶ 8 After Judge Leamon Freeman found that the Board had no legal authority to solicit new bids, had voided the contract and restrained the Board from implementing the contract, the Board fell back on the rotation system pursuant to 22 O.S.Supp. 1992 § 1355.8[ 22-1355.8](G)(2).

  7. Iuli v. Fasi

    62 Haw. 180 (Haw. 1980)   Cited 19 times
    In Iuli v. Fasi, 62 Haw. 180, 184, 613 P.2d 653, 656 (1980), this court outlined " specific requirements which must be met before standing to taxpayers [may be] granted."

    Furthermore, in the absence of a statute governing such suits, demand upon the proper public officer to take appropriate action is a condition precedent to maintenance of a taxpayer's action unless facts alleged sufficiently show that demand to bring suit would be useless. Accord, Helela v. State of Hawaii, 49 Haw. 365, 418 P.2d 482 (1966); Air Terminal Services v. Matsuda, 47 Haw. 499, 393 P.2d 60 (1964). Thus, what emerges from these cases are specific requirements which must be met before standing to taxpayers is granted.

  8. Bulgo v. County of Maui

    50 Haw. 51 (Haw. 1967)   Cited 13 times
    Holding the entity had taxpayer standing

    We base this holding on Castle v. Secretary of the Territory, 16 Haw. 769. Although defendant urges that Castle, as a controlling authority on the point at issue, has been eroded by Wilson v. Stainback, 39 Haw. 67; Munoz v. Commissioner of Public Lands, 40 Haw. 675; Air Terminal Services v. Matsuda, 47 Haw. 499, 393 P.2d 60; and Helela v. State, 49 Haw. 365, 418 P.2d 482, and should be overruled, we see no reason for doing so. Plaintiff has alleged sufficient personal interest in the controversy to entitle him to a day in court.

  9. Solarana v. Indust. Electronics

    50 Haw. 22 (Haw. 1967)   Cited 22 times
    Holding that a stay pending a related appeal is within the circuit court's discretion

    " James W. Glover, Ltd. v. Fong, 42 Haw. 560, 578, emphasis added. The doctrine of the law of the case was so applied in Air Terminal Services, Inc. v. Matsuda, 47 Haw. 499, 504-06, 393 P.2d 60, 65-66, cited by defendant. Moreover, in the cited case plaintiff was given leave to amend but did not choose to do so.

  10. Brescia v. Edens-Huff

    354 P.3d 186 (Haw. Ct. App. 2015)

    “A declaratory judgment, like other forms of equitable relief, should be granted only as a matter of judicial discretion, exercised in the public interest. It is always the duty of a court of equity to strike a proper balance between the needs of the plaintiff and the consequences of giving the desired relief. Especially where governmental action is involved, courts should not intervene unless the need for equitable relief is clear, not remote or speculative.”Application of Air Terminal Services, Inc., 47 Haw. 499, 531, 393 P.2d 60, 78 (1964) (formatting altered) (quoting Eccels v. Peoples Bank of Lakewood Village, 333 U.S. 426, 431, 68 S.Ct. 641, 92 L.Ed. 784 (1948).3.