Opinion
No. 09-15847.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Filed June 22, 2010.
Suzanne M. Ainslie, Sitka, AK, pro se.
Kurtis A. Ainslie, Sitka, AK, pro se.
Timothy E. Ainslie, Sitka, AK, pro se.
Illa L. Garcia, Bieber, CA, pro se.
Gail I. Griffith, Likely, CA, pro se.
Gilbert E. Jasso, Likely, CA, pro se.
Janice L. Lopez, Likely, CA, pro se.
Dorothy M. Tiffee, Likely, CA, pro se.
Gilbert Tiffee, Likely, CA, pro se.
Kathleen Margaret Rhoads, Esquire, Gordon Rees LLP, Sacramento, CA, Christine Kim Son, Catherine Valerio Barrad, Tamar B. Kelber, Eugene A. Schoon, Andrew G. McBride, Esquire, Brendan J. Morrissey, Esquire, Joshua Turner, Wiley Rein LLP, Washington, DC, Todd Michael Noonan, Russ J. Wunderli, Esquire, Porter Scott, Sacramento, CA, David A. Mason, Alturas, CA, Susan H. Handelman, Esquire, Ropers, Majeski, Kohn Bentley, Redwood City, CA, Dennis J. Ward, Esquire, Ropers Majeski Kohn Bentley, PC, San Jose, CA, Janine Candace Prupas, Wiliam Eugene Peterson, Morris Peterson, Reno, NV, for Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California, Garland E. Burrell, Jr., District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. 2:05-cv-02649-GEB-EFB.
Before: CANBY, THOMAS, and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed.R.App.P. 34(a)(2).
Two individuals formerly employed as fire lookouts, and members of their families, appeal pro se from the district court's judgment in their action claiming that defendants caused them to be exposed to electromagnetic radiation in excess of federally-permissible limits and thereby violated 47 U.S.C. § 206 and California state law. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Proctor v. Vishay Intertechnology, Inc., 584 F.3d 1208, 1218 (9th Cir. 2009). We affirm.
The district court dismissed the plaintiffs' claim of strict liability based on ultra-hazardous activity. By failing to raise any arguments in their opening brief addressing the district court's ruling on this claim, the plaintiffs waived this challenge. See Smith v. Marsh, 194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on the claims of negligence per se and violation of 47 U.S.C. § 206. Those claims were litigated and decided in an earlier state court action brought by some of the plaintiffs here (with whom the remainder are in privity). See Jasso v. Cal. Dep't of Forestry, Superior Court of California, County of Lassen No. 41697; see also First Nat'l Bank v. Russell (In re Russell), 76 F.3d 242, 244-45 (9th Cir. 1996) (describing the elements of collateral estoppel under California law to be: (1) the issue decided in the earlier case is identical to the issue presented, (2) the earlier case culminated in a final judgment on the merits, and (3) the party against whom estoppel is asserted was a party to, or was in privity with a party to, the earlier case).