Opinion
21-P-407
04-28-2022
Justice AINOOSON v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION & others.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The plaintiff appeals from the allowance by a Superior Court judge of the defendants’ motion to dismiss, claiming error in the judge's interpretation of statutory language he contends entitles him to consideration for transfer to a minimum security facility, and that the Department of Correction (DOC) policy barring him from consideration for transfer violates his rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Discerning no cause to disturb the judgment of dismissal, we affirm.
We review the allowance of a motion to dismiss de novo, reading "the complaint's allegations generously and in the plaintiff's favor." Lalchandani v. Roddy, 86 Mass. App. Ct. 819, 822 (2015), quoting Vranos v. Skinner, 77 Mass. App. Ct. 280, 287 (2010). Under Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974), the judge must allow a motion to dismiss if the complaint fails to allege sufficient facts, stating a recognized cause of action, to plausibly suggest that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. See Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 636 (2008).
1. Statutory right to transfer. The plaintiff first argues that, because G. L. c. 127, § 20A, requires the superintendent of each correctional facility to establish a classification board for the purpose of the periodic grading and classification of inmates, the board is required to consider him for a transfer to a minimum-security facility. He further argues that, by applying a non-discretionary "Code H override," the board has denied him this statutory right.
As pertinent to this appeal, the Code H override at issue bars all inmates convicted of an offense resulting in loss of life from such facilities unless they are within three years of their release date or unless such a transfer is approved by a parole board.
As the judge observed, G. L. c. 127, § 20A, requires only that the superintendent of each facility establish a periodic classification board, that the board be comprised of three members, and that certain representation requirements be met. The statute is otherwise silent on the procedure the board must use for classifying inmates.
The plaintiff cites numerous statutes that restrict access to certain rehabilitation programs and facilities for certain inmates and argues that, because the Legislature did not expressly include a categorical bar on transfers to minimum-security facilities for inmates convicted of an offense resulting in loss of life, the policy establishing non-discretionary overrides violates the legislative intent of the statute and exceeds the authority granted therein.
This argument is unavailing, because the Legislature has explicitly vested in the Commissioner of Correction (commissioner) the power to "establish a system of classification" and to "assign or transfer [inmates] to appropriate facilities and programs." G. L. c. 124, § 1 (f ) and (g ). General Laws c. 124, § 1, grants the commissioner broad authority to maintain prison discipline, and therefore "the validity of a regulation promulgated thereunder will be sustained so long as it is reasonably related to the purposes of the enabling legislation." Ciampi v. Commissioner of Correction, 452 Mass. 162, 168 (2008) (internal citations omitted). The use of categorical overrides for certain offenses may be seen as a mechanism to divert certain transfer requests away from the discretionary review process, based on a presumption of dangerousness, and thereby to manage the resources required to administer the process of reviewing all such requests.
Because the system for classifying inmates, including non-discretionary overrides, is reasonably related to maintaining prison discipline and incidental to administration of the review process, the policy does not exceed the commissioner's authority, and nothing in the statutes cited conflicts with the classification system used in the plaintiff's case.
Additionally, the plaintiff argues that the Code H override violates 103 Code Mass. Regs. § 420.08 (2017), which sets an objective point-based score (OPBS) for classifying inmates, because the plaintiff's score of "4" qualifies him for a transfer to a minimum-security facility. This argument is also unavailing, as the purpose of an override is to bar otherwise eligible inmates from access to certain facilities based on their crime. That the override prevented the plaintiff, and all similarly situated inmates, from transfer to such a facility is its intended purpose and does not conflict with the DOC's OPBS system. Accordingly, the complaint fails to plausibly suggest that the plaintiff is entitled to relief.
2. Equal Protection. The plaintiff next argues that the categorical bar on his consideration for a transfer to a minimum-security facility violates his constitutional rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
The "equal protection mandate is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike" (quotation omitted), Moore v. Executive Office of the Trial Court, 487 Mass. 839, 848 (2021), and "acts as a ‘shield against arbitrary classifications.’ " Id., quoting Enquist v. Oregon Dep't of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 598 (2008).
The plaintiff's argument rests on the premise that he was treated differently than other inmates who were eligible for a transfer to a minimum-security facility. However, as the judge observed, the inquiry here is whether the plaintiff was treated differently than other similarly situated inmates, that is, those who were convicted of an offense resulting in loss of life. He was not. Moreover, the distinction between inmates drawn by the Code H override has a rational relationship to legitimate correctional institution policies and goals. Because the non-discretionary Code H override applies equally to all inmates who have been convicted of an offense resulting in loss of life and who are not within three years of their release date or otherwise authorized for a transfer by a parole board, the plaintiff's equal protection claims do not plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.
Accordingly, the plaintiff's complaint was properly dismissed with prejudice as it failed to state a claim entitling him to relief.
The plaintiff briefly argues that it was an abuse of discretion to dismiss his complaint "with prejudice." This argument was not raised below and is, in any event, without merit.
Judgment affirmed.