Opinion
CIV No 4:21-CV-794
11-03-2022
ANDRE AINA, Plaintiff, v. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, et al., Defendants.
Brann Chief Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Martin C. Carlson United States Magistrate Judge
I. Factual Background
This case, which comes before us for consideration of a motion to dismiss, has a painful and protracted history. Aina's initial complaint was filed in April of 2021, comprised some 558 pages of pleading and exhibits, and named 24 individual and institutional defendants, including police, prosecutors, judges, prison staff, state agencies, and branches of county government. (Doc. 1). Aina then catalogued a series of incidents involving a state criminal firearms prosecution of the plaintiff spanning from 2015 through 2020 in which he contends that various defendants violated his rights. (Id.) According to Aina, as a result of this misconduct, he suffered a loss of consortium, defamation of character, personal injury and disfigurement, false arrest and imprisonment, malicious prosecution and abuse of process, as well as loss of liberty, constitutional rights, wages, and time. (Id.)
All of these matters arose out of a nearly six-year course of criminal litigation in the state courts, which began on August 8, 2015, when Aina was arrested during a traffic stop and was charged with state firearms, drug possession, and traffic offenses. (Id., ¶ 1). Following his arrest, Aina's complaint detailed a legal odyssey which involved his trial, conviction, appeals, and post-conviction litigation and appeal. (Id., ¶¶ 1-57). According to the plaintiff, in March of 2020, the Pennsylvania Superior Court vacated Aina's state firearms conviction and remanded his criminal case for further consideration of Aina's other post-conviction claims. Commonwealth v. Aina, No. 1469 MDA 2018, 2020 WL 1528032, at *5 (Pa. Super. Ct. Mar. 31, 2020). Thus, Aina while ultimately enjoyed a favorable outcome in his state criminal case, at multiple steps in the legal process it was found that there was a sufficient legal and factual basis to charge and convict the plaintiff. On the basis of these alleged infractions, Aina's initial complaint sought $20,318,000 in compensatory damages along with punitive damages totaling $100,000,000. (Id.)
Upon an initial screening review, we found this complaint to be flawed in numerous respects and entirely unwieldly. Accordingly, we recommended the dismissal of the complaint, without prejudice to Aina attempting to file an amended complaint which met federal pleading standards. (Doc. 7). The district court adopted this recommendation, (Doc. 11), and Aina filed a proposed amended complaint. (Doc. 12). On March 4, 2022, this proposed amended complaint was then referred to the undersigned for a second screening review. (Doc. 15).
Our review of this amended complaint led us to conclude that it corrected some, but not all, of the deficiencies which we previously noted in our first Report and Recommendation. To be sure, at 53 pages, this filing was less prolix than Aina's initial 558 page pleading. (Compare Docs. 1 and 12). Further, while the amended complaint was somewhat enigmatic on this score, it appeared that Aina had also endeavored to narrow the previously sweeping reach of the complaint. While the amended complaint, like Aina's original complaint, listed some two-dozen individuals and entities as “defendants,” Aina's amended complaint now noted that as many as eighteen of these previously identified “defendants” were now considered by the plaintiff to be “witnesses.” While the meaning of this “Defendant/Witness” designation was not entirely clear, we construed this curious nomenclature to indicate that Aina was no longer seeking to pursue legal claims against these former party-defendants that were now designated solely as witnesses.
Construed in this way, Aina's amended complaint sought to sue five persons and two entities. The five individual defendants were Trooper Luke Straniere; Assistant District Attorneys Luke Morris and Jessica Lathrop; Deputy Attorney General Jason Lambrino; and Centre County Correctional Officer Corl. The remaining institutional defendants, in turn, were the Pennsylvania State Police and the Centre County District Attorney's Office.
With the respect to these individual defendants, liberally construed, Aina's amended complaint alleged that Trooper Straniere, Assistant D.A.s Morris and Lathrop, along with deputy Attorney General Lambrino participated in a meritless and malicious prosecution of the plaintiff. (Doc. 12, passim). In contrast, the only allegation against Correctional Officer Corl related to an alleged excessive use of force against Aina on May 24, 2015, nearly seven years ago. (Id., ¶ 4.) As for the State Police and the Centre County district Attorney's Office as institutional defendants, Aina apparently sought to hold them liable simply because their staff “went outside of the official capacity.” (Id.)
Viewing Aina's amended complaint as less flawed than his original pleading, but still flawed in some respects, we recommended that the two institutional defendants named in this amended complaint-the Pennsylvania State Police and the Centre County District Attorney's Office-be dismissed. We also recommended that the claims against C.O. Corl be dismissed as time barred. However, we recommended that the amended complaint be served upon Trooper Straniere, Assistant D.A.s Morris and Lathrop, as well as Deputy Attorney General Lambrino.
The recommendation was adopted by the district court, and the amended complaint was served upon these defendants who moved to dismiss the complaint on September 8, 2022. (Doc. 22). When Aina neglected to respond to this motion to dismiss, on October 18, 2022, we entered an order which stated in clear and precise terms as follows:
IT IS ORDERED that the plaintiff is directed to respond to this motion on or before October 28, 2022 . Pursuant to Local Rule 7.7 the movants may then file reply briefs on or before November 11, 2022 . All briefs
must conform to the requirements prescribed by Local Rule 7.8. No further extensions shall be granted, absent compelling circumstances. The plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, is advised that Local Rule 7.6 of the Rules of this Court imposes an affirmative duty on the plaintiff to respond to motions, and provides that:
Any party opposing any motion, other than a motion for summary judgment, shall file a brief in opposition within fourteen (14) days after service of the movant's brief, or, if a brief in support of the motion is not required under these rules, within seven (7) days after service of the motion. Any party who fails to comply with this rule shall be deemed not to oppose such motion. Nothing in this rule shall be construed to limit the authority of the court to grant any motion before expiration of the prescribed period for filing a brief in opposition. A brief in opposition to a motion for summary judgment and LR 56.1 responsive statement, together with any transcripts, affidavits or other relevant documentation, shall be filed within twenty-one (21) days after service of the movant's brief.
Local Rule 7.6 (emphasis added).
It is now well settled that “Local Rule 7.6 can be applied to grant a motion to dismiss without analysis of the complaint's sufficiency ‘if a party fails to comply with the [R]ule after a specific direction to comply from the court.'” Williams v. Lebanon Farms Disposal, Inc., No. 091704, 2010 WL 3703808, *1 (M.D. Pa. Aug.26, 2010) (quoting Stackhouse v. Mazurkiewicz, 951 F.2d 29, 30 (1991)). Therefore, a failure to comply with this direction may result in the motion being deemed unopposed and granted.(Doc. 24 at 1-2).
Despite this clear admonition, Aina has not filed a response to this motion, and the time for responding has now passed. Therefore, the motion will be deemed ripe for resolution.
For the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that the motion to dismiss be granted.
II. Discussion
A. Under The Rules of This Court This Partial Motion to Dismiss Should Be Deemed Unopposed and Granted .
At the outset, under the Local Rules of this Court the plaintiff should be deemed to concur in this motion, since the plaintiff has failed to timely oppose the motion or otherwise litigate this case. This procedural default completely frustrates and impedes efforts to resolve this matter in a timely and fair fashion, and under the rules of this court warrants dismissal of the action, since Local Rule 7.6 of the Rules of this Court imposes an affirmative duty on the plaintiff to respond to motions and provides that:
Any party opposing any motion, other than a motion for summary judgment, shall file a brief in opposition within fourteen (14) days after service of the movant's brief, or, if a brief in support of the motion is not required under these rules, within seven (7) days after service of the motion. Any party who fails to comply with this rule shall be deemed not to oppose such motion. Nothing in this rule shall be construed to limit the authority of the court to grant any motion before expiration of the prescribed period for filing a brief in opposition. A brief in opposition to a motion for summary judgment and LR 56.1 responsive statement, together with any transcripts, affidavits or other relevant documentation, shall be filed within twenty-one (21) days after service of the movant's brief.Local Rule 7.6 (emphasis added).
It is now well settled that “Local Rule 7.6 can be applied to grant a motion to dismiss without analysis of the complaint's sufficiency ‘if a party fails to comply with the [R]ule after a specific direction to comply from the court.' ” Williams v. Lebanon Farms Disposal, Inc., No. 09-1704, 2010 WL 3703808, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 26, 2010) (quoting Stackhouse v. Mazurkiewicz, 951 F.2d 29, 30 (3d Cir. 1991)). In this case, the plaintiff has not complied with the local rules, or this Court's order, by filing a timely response to this motion. Therefore, these procedural defaults by the plaintiff compel the court to consider:
[A] basic truth: we must remain mindful of the fact that “the Federal Rules are meant to be applied in such a way as to promote justice. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 1. Often that will mean that courts should strive to resolve cases on their merits whenever possible. However, justice also requires that the merits of a particular dispute be placed before the court in a timely fashion ....” McCurdy v. American Bd. of Plastic Surgery, 157 F.3d 191, 197 (3d Cir.1998).Lease v. Fishel, 712 F.Supp.2d 359, 371 (M.D. Pa. 2010).
With this basic truth in mind, we acknowledge a fundamental guiding tenet of our legal system. A failure on our part to enforce compliance with the rules, and impose the sanctions mandated by the rules when such rules are repeatedly breached, “would actually violate the dual mandate which guides this Court and motivates our system of justice: ‘that courts should strive to resolve cases on their merits whenever possible [but that] justice also requires that the merits of a particular dispute be placed before the court in a timely fashion.' ” Id. Therefore, we are obliged to ensure that one party's refusal to comply with the rules does not lead to an unjustified prejudice to those parties who follow the rules.
These basic tenets of fairness apply here. In this case, the plaintiff has failed to comply with Local Rule 7.6 by filing a timely response to this motion to dismiss. This failure now compels us to apply the sanction called for under Rule 7.6 and deem the motion unopposed.
B. Dismissal of this Case Is Warranted Under Rule 41.
Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also authorizes a court to dismiss a civil action for failure to prosecute, stating that: “If the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with these rules or a court order, a defendant may move to dismiss the action or any claim against it.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b). Decisions regarding dismissal of actions for failure to prosecute rest in the sound discretion of the court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion. Emerson v. Thiel College, 296 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 2002). That discretion, however, while broad is governed by certain factors, commonly referred to as the Poulis factors. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has noted:
To determine whether the District Court abused its discretion [in dismissing a case for failure to prosecute], we evaluate its balancing of the following factors: (1) the extent of the party's personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the adversary caused by the failure to meet scheduling orders and respond to discovery; (3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party or the attorney was willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions other than
dismissal, which entails an analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the meritoriousness of the claim or defense. Poulis v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir.1984).Emerson, 296 F.3d at 190.
In exercising this discretion, “there is no ‘magic formula' that we apply to determine whether a District Court has abused its discretion in dismissing for failure to prosecute.” Lopez v. Cousins, 435 Fed.Appx. 113, 116 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Briscoe v. Klaus, 538 F.3d 252 (3d Cir. 2008)). Therefore, “[i]n balancing the Poulis factors, [courts] do not [employ] a . . . ‘mechanical calculation' to determine whether a District Court abused its discretion in dismissing a plaintiff's case.” Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 263 (quoting Mindek v. Rigatti, 964 F.2d 1369, 1373 (3d Cir. 1992)). Consistent with this view, it is well settled that “ ‘no single Poulis factor is dispositive,' [and it is] clear that ‘not all of the Poulis factors need be satisfied in order to dismiss a complaint.' ” Id. (quoting Ware v. Rodale Press, Inc., 322 F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 2003); Mindek, 964 F.2d at 1373). Moreover, recognizing the broad discretion conferred upon the district court in making judgments weighing these six factors, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has frequently sustained such dismissal orders where there has been a pattern of dilatory conduct by a pro se litigant who is not amenable to any lesser sanction. See, e.g., Emerson, 296 F.3d 184; Tillio v. Mendelsohn, 256 Fed.Appx. 509 (3d Cir. 2007); Reshard v. Lankenau Hospital, 256 Fed.Appx. 506 (3d Cir. 2007); Azubuko v. Bell National Organization, 243 Fed.Appx. 728 (3d Cir. 2007).
In this case, a dispassionate assessment of the Poulis factors weighs heavily in favor of dismissing this action. At the outset, a consideration of the first Poulis factor-the extent of the party's personal responsibility-shows that the failure to respond to this motion is entirely attributable to the plaintiff, who has failed to abide by court orders or respond to a motion to dismiss in this case.
Similarly, the second Poulis factor-the prejudice to the adversary caused by the failure to abide by court orders-also calls for dismissal of this action. Indeed, this factor-the prejudice suffered by the party seeking sanctions-is entitled to great weight and careful consideration. As the Third Circuit has observed:
“Evidence of prejudice to an adversary would bear substantial weight in support of a dismissal or default judgment.” Adams v. Trustees of N.J. Brewery Employees' Pension Trust Fund, 29 F.3d 863, 873-74 (3d Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Generally, prejudice includes “the irretrievable loss of evidence, the inevitable dimming of witnesses' memories, or the excessive and possibly irremediable burdens or costs imposed on the opposing party.” Id. at 874 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)....However, prejudice is not limited to “irremediable” or “irreparable” harm. Id.; see also Ware v. Rodale Press, Inc., 322 F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 2003); Curtis T. Bedwell & Sons, Inc. v. Int'l Fidelity Ins. Co., 843 F.2d 683, 693-94 (3d Cir. 1988). It also includes “the burden imposed by impeding a party's ability to prepare effectively a full and complete trial strategy.” Ware, 322 F.3d at 222.Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 259-60.
In this case, the plaintiff's failure to litigate this claim, or to comply with court orders, now wholly frustrates and delays the resolution of this action. In such instances, the defendant is plainly prejudiced by the plaintiff's continuing inaction and dismissal of the case clearly rests in the discretion of the trial judge. Tillio, 256 Fed.Appx. 509 (failure to timely serve pleadings compels dismissal); Reshard, 256 Fed.Appx. 506 (failure to comply with discovery compels dismissal); Azubuko, 243 Fed.Appx. 728 (failure to file amended complaint prejudices defense and compels dismissal).
When one considers the third Poulis factor-the history of dilatoriness on the plaintiff's part-it becomes clear that dismissal of this action is now appropriate. In this regard, it is clear that “ ‘[e]xtensive or repeated delay or delinquency constitutes a history of dilatoriness, such as consistent non-response . . ., or consistent tardiness in complying with court orders.' ” Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 260-61 (quoting Adams, 29 F.3d at 874) (some citations omitted). Here, the plaintiff has failed to comply with court orders or file a response in opposition to a motion to dismiss in this case as directed. Thus, the plaintiff's conduct begins to display “[e]xtensive or repeated delay or delinquency [and conduct which] constitutes a history of dilatoriness, such as consistent non-response . . ., or consistent tardiness in complying with court orders.” Adams, 29 F.3d at 874.
The fourth Poulis factor-whether the conduct of the party or the attorney was willful or in bad faith-also cuts against the plaintiff in this case. In this setting, we must assess whether this conduct reflects mere inadvertence or willful conduct, in that it involved “strategic,” “intentional or self-serving behavior,” and not mere negligence. Adams, 29 F.3d at 875. At this juncture, when the plaintiff has failed to comply with instructions of the court, the court is compelled to conclude that the plaintiff's actions are not isolated, accidental, or inadvertent but instead reflect an ongoing disregard for this case and the court's instructions.
While Poulis also enjoins us to consider a fifth factor, the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, cases construing Poulis agree that in a situation such as this case, where we are confronted by a pro se litigant who will not comply with the rules or court orders, lesser sanctions may not be an effective alternative. See, e.g., Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 262-63; Emerson, 296 F.3d at 191. This case presents such a situation where the plaintiff's status as a pro se litigant severely limits the ability of the court to utilize other lesser sanctions to ensure that this litigation progresses in an orderly fashion. In any event, by entering our prior orders and counseling the plaintiff on his obligations in this case, we have endeavored to use lesser sanctions, but to no avail. The plaintiff still ignores his responsibilities as a litigant. Since lesser sanctions have been tried, and have failed, only the sanction of dismissal remains available to the court.
Finally, under Poulis, we are cautioned to consider one other factor, the meritoriousness of the plaintiff's claims. In our view, however, consideration of this factor cannot save this particular plaintiff's claims, since the plaintiff is now wholly non-compliant with the court's instructions. The plaintiff cannot refuse to comply with court orders which are necessary to allow resolution of the merits of his claims, and then assert the untested merits of these claims as grounds for declining to dismiss the case. Furthermore, it is well settled that “ ‘no single Poulis factor is dispositive,' [and it is] clear that ‘not all of the Poulis factors need be satisfied in order to dismiss a complaint.' ” Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 263 (quoting Ware, 322 F.3d at 222; Mindek, 964 F.2d at 1373). Therefore, the untested merits of the non-compliant plaintiff's claims, standing alone, cannot prevent dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute.
In any event we note that, at a minimum, it is apparent that the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from damages. Therefore, all of the Poulis factors weigh in favor of dismissal of this lawsuit.
In the present case, Aina brings civil rights claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging false arrest and malicious prosecution. Yet it is clear that the Commonwealth repeatedly throughout the process of litigating this case, satisfied the court and a jury that there were ample grounds and probable cause to proceed with Aina's prosecution. Indeed, Aina was convicted, and that conviction was only set aside following an appeal.
Section 1983 offers private citizens a means to redress violations of federal law committed by state officials. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.(Id.) “Section 1983 is not a source of substantive rights, but merely a method to vindicate violations of federal law committed by state actors.” Pappas v. City of Lebanon, 331 F.Supp.2d 311, 315 (M.D. Pa. 2004) (quoting Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284-85 (2002)). To establish a claim under this section, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) the conduct complained of was committed by persons acting under color of state law; and (2) the conduct violated a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Harvey v. Plains Twp. Police Dep't, 421 F.3d 185, 189 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42,48 (1988)).
When a plaintiff brings civil rights claims against government actors the doctrine of qualified immunity may shield that government actor from civil liability.The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for civil damages “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). “Qualified immunity balances two important interests-the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Id. Qualified immunity “provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). “Thus, so long as an official reasonably believes that his conduct complies with the law, qualified immunity will shield that official from liability.” Sharp v. Johnson, 669 F.3d 144, 159 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Pearson, 555 U.S. at 244). Although qualified immunity is generally a question of law that should be considered at the earliest possible stage of proceedings, a genuine dispute of material fact may preclude summary judgment on qualified immunity. Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 325-26 (3d Cir. 2009).
We note that in proper cases, the court may consider the question of qualified immunity sua sponte. See Doe v. Delie, 257 F.3d 309, 312 (3d. Cir. 2001).
Qualified immunity shields officials from liability for civil damages brought pursuant to section 1983 “so long as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Bland v. City of Newark, 900 F.3d 77, 83 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015)). The official seeking qualified immunity has the burden of establishing their entitlement to the affirmative defense. Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 288 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Reedy v. Evanson, 615 F.3d 197, 223 (3d Cir. 2010)). To determine whether an official is entitled to the affirmative defense of qualified immunity for a section 1983 claim, a court must determine (1) whether the official violated a constitutional right and, if so, (2) whether the right was clearly established. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001), overruled in part by Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236 (permitting federal courts to exercise discretion in deciding which of the two Saucier prongs should be addressed first).
A right is clearly established if “every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.” Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 11. To be clearly established, there does not have to be a case that is directly on point, “but existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731,741 (2011)). In determining whether a right is clearly established, courts must not define the right “at a high level of generality.” Id. (quoting Al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742, 131 S.Ct. 2074.) Rather, the analysis should focus on “whether the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly established.” Id. quoting Al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742)).
Such specificity is “especially important in the Fourth Amendment context,” where it is “sometimes difficult for an officer to determine how the relevant legal doctrine will apply to the factual situation the officer confronts.” Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12. “The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202. It is the plaintiff who bears the initial burden of demonstrating that the constitutional right at issue was clearly established at the time of the claimed violation. See Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 197 (1984) (“A plaintiff who seeks damages for violation of constitutional or statutory rights may overcome the defendant official's qualified immunity only by showing that those rights were clearly established at the time of the conduct at issue.”); Sherwood v. Mulvihill, 113 F.3d 396, 399 (3d Cir. 1997) (“Where a defendant asserts a qualified immunity defense in a motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of showing that the defendant's conduct violated some clearly established statutory or constitutional right.”).
To determine whether a right is clearly established, the court may look to cases from the Supreme Court, controlling circuit precedent, or “a robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority” from other circuit courts. Porter v. Pa. Dep't of Corrs., 974 F.3d 431, 449 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Barna v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of Panther Valley Sch. Dist., 877 F.3d 136, 142 (3d Cir. 2017)). However, unpublished cases cannot establish such a right because they do not constitute binding authority. El v. City of Pittsburgh, 975 F.3d 327, 340 (3d Cir. 2020). In rare cases, the unlawfulness of a government official's conduct may be established from the obviously unlawful nature of the defendant's conduct “even though existing precedent does not address similar circumstances.” Wesby, 138 S.Ct. at 590 (citing Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 199 (2004)).
Plaintiff's claims of false arrest and malicious prosecution implicate his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which provides that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.U.S. Const. amend IV. Under the Fourth Amendment, an arrest without probable cause and subsequent prosecution without probable cause are constitutional violations that may be redressed under § 1983. See Walmsley v. Philadelphia, 872 F.2d 546, 551 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing Patzig v. O'Neill, 577 F.2d 841, 848 (3d Cir. 1978)); Watson v. Witmer, 183 F.Supp.3d 607, 612-13 (M.D. Pa. 2016). To bring a claim for false arrest, a plaintiff must establish: “(1) that there was an arrest; and (2) that the arrest was made without probable cause.” Harvard v. Cesnalis, 973 F.3d 190, 199 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting James v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 680 (3d Cir. 2012)). Similarly, to state a claim for malicious prosecution under § 1983, a claimant must show that:
(1) [The] defendant commenced a criminal proceeding; (2) the proceeding terminated in plaintiff's favor; (3) defendant “initiated the proceeding without probable cause”; (4) defendant acted maliciously or with a purpose apart from bringing plaintiff to justice; and (5) plaintiff “suffered deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding.”Watson, 183 F.Supp.3d at 612-13 (M.D. Pa. 2016) (quoting Johnson v. Knorr, 477 F.3d 75, 81-82 (3d Cir. 2007)). We note that, in a case where a claim of malicious prosecution is brought against a police officer:
Police officers (as opposed to prosecutors) may be liable for malicious prosecution if they “conceal or misrepresent material facts” to the prosecutor. Halsey, 750 F.3d 1279, 1292 (10th Cir. 2004)). In particular, an officer is liable if he “fails to disclose exculpatory evidence to prosecutors, makes false or misleading reports to the prosecutor, omits material information from the reports, or otherwise interferes with the prosecutor's ability to exercise independent judgment in deciding whether to prosecute.”Thomas v. City of Phila., 290 F.Supp.3d 371, 379 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (quoting Finneman v. SEPTA, 267 F.Supp.3d 639 (E.D. Pa. 2017)).
Thus, in order for Aina to succeed on either claim of false arrest or malicious prosecution, he must establish that the defendants Smith did not have probable cause to arrest him at the time of his arrest. See Dowling v. City of Philadelphia, 855 F.2d 136, 141 (3d Cir. 1988) (stating “[t]he proper inquiry in a section 1983 claim based on false arrest . . . is not whether the person arrested in fact committed the offense but whether the arresting officers had probable cause to believe the person arrested had committed the offense.”) For purposes of the Fourth Amendment, probable cause to arrest exists “whenever reasonably trustworthy information or circumstances within a police officer's knowledge are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to conclude that an offense has been committed by the person being arrested.” United States v. Myers, 308 F.3d 251, 255 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964)). In conducting an inquiry into whether probable cause to arrest existed, a court should consider the totality of the circumstances presented, and “must assess the knowledge and information which the officers possessed at the time of arrest, coupled with the factual occurrences immediately precipitating the arrest.” United States v. Stubbs, 281 F.3d 109, 122 (3d Cir. 2002). The inquiry into probable cause is an objective one, determined from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer. District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S.Ct. 577, 585 (2018). “[S]ummary judgment for false arrest ... is proper only if no reasonable juror could find a lack of probable cause for any of the charged crimes.” Harvard, 973 F.3d at 199.
“The standard for arrest is probable cause, defined in terms of facts and circumstances ‘sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the (suspect) had committed or was committing an offense.' ” Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111-12 (1975) (citing Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964)); see also Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 80 (1959); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 1617576 (1949). While the Court has expressed a preference for the use of arrest warrants when feasible, Beck v. Ohio, 79 U.S. at 96; Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479-82 (1963), it has never invalidated an arrest supported by probable cause solely because the officers failed to secure a warrant. See Ker. v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959); Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 705 (1948). Additionally, the Fourth Amendment requires a judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty following an arrest. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 113.
In this case the lower state courts repeatedly determined that there was probable cause to charge Aina, and he was in fact convicted at trial, only to have that conviction set aside on appeal. While state court probable cause findings do not automatically confer qualified immunity upon the defendants, government officials whose probable cause determinations have been reviewed by the courts are often cloaked with qualified immunity as a matter of law. See e.g., Wright v. City of Philadelphia, 409 F.3d 595, 602 (3d Cir. 2005); Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781 (3d Cir. 2000); Sherwood v. Mulvihill, 113 F.3d 396 (3d Cir. 1997).
So it is here. In light of these state court findings, it simply cannot be said that these defendants should have known that this prosecution transgressed Aina's clearly established constitutional rights. Therefore, the defendants are cloaked in qualified immunity and Aina's claims, which he has chosen not to defend, fail on their merits. Thus, all of the discretionary Poulis factors now favor dismissal of this case.
III. Recommendation
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the defendants' motion to dismiss, (Doc. 22) be GRANTED.
The plaintiff is further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and
all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.