Opinion
Civ. 4:21-CV-794
05-09-2022
ANDRE AINA, Plaintiff, v. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, et al., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Martin C. Carlson United States Magistrate Judge
I. Factual Background
This case comes before us for a second legally mandated screening review of the plaintiff's amended complaint. (Doc. 12). Aina submitted this amended complaint after a screening review of his initial filing revealed that it was flawed in several material respects. (Docs. 7, 11).
Aina's initial complaint comprised some 558 pages of pleading and exhibits, and named 24 individual and institutional defendants, including police, prosecutors, judges, prison staff, state agencies, and branches of county government. (Doc. 1). Aina then catalogued a series of incidents spanning from 2015 through 2020 in which he contends that various defendants violated his rights. (Id.) According to Aina, as a result of this misconduct, he suffered a loss of consortium, defamation of character, personal injury and disfigurement, false arrest and imprisonment, malicious prosecution and abuse of process, as well as loss of liberty, constitutional rights, wages, and time. (Id.) All of these matters arose out of a nearly six-year course of criminal litigation in the state courts, which began on August 8, 2015 when Aina was arrested during a traffic stop and was charged with state firearms, drug possession, and traffic offenses. (Id., ¶ 1). Following his arrest, Aina's complaint detailed a legal odyssey which involved his trial, conviction, appeals, and postconviction litigation and appeal. (Id., ¶¶ 1-57). According to the plaintiff, in March of 2020, the Pennsylvania Superior Court vacated Aina's state firearms conviction and remanded his criminal case for further consideration of Aina's other postconviction claims. Commonwealth v. Aina, No. 1469 MDA 2018, 2020 WL 1528032, at *5 (Pa. Super. Ct. Mar. 31, 2020). Thus, Aina ultimately enjoyed a favorable outcome in his state criminal case. On the basis of these alleged infractions, Aina's initial complaint sought $20,318,000 in compensatory damages along with punitive damages totaling $100,000,000. (Id.)
Upon an initial screening review, we found this complaint to be flawed in numerous respects and entirely unwieldly. Accordingly, we recommended the dismissal of the complaint, without prejudice to Aina attempting to file an amended complaint which met federal pleading standards. (Doc. 7). The district court adopted this recommendation, (Doc. 11), and Aina filed a proposed amended complaint. (Doc. 12). On March 4, 2022, this proposed amended complaint was then referred to the undersigned for a second screening review. (Doc. 15).
Our review of this amended complaint leads us to conclude that it corrects some, but not all, of the deficiencies which we previously noted in our first Report and Recommendation. To be sure, at 53 pages, this filing is less prolix than Aina's initial 558 page pleading. (Compare Docs. 1 and 12). Further, while the amended complaint is somewhat enigmatic on this score, it appears that Aina has also endeavored to narrow the previously sweeping reach of the complaint. While the amended complaint, like Aina's original complaint, lists some two-dozen individual and entities as “defendants, ” Aina's amended complaint now notes that as many as eighteen of these previously identified “defendants” are now considered by the plaintiff to be “witnesses.” While the meaning of this “Defendant/Witness” designation is not entirely clear, we construe this curious nomenclature to indicate that Aina is no longer seeking to pursue legal claims against these former partydefendants that are now designated solely as witnesses.
Construed in this way, Aina is now suing five persons and two entities. The five individual defendants are Trooper Luke Straniere; Assistant District Attorneys Luke Morris and Jessica Lathrop; Deputy Attorney General Jason Lambrino; and Centre County Correctional Officer Corl. The remaining institutional defendants, in turn, are the Pennsylvania State Police and the Centre County District Attorney's Office.
With the respect to these individual defendants, liberally construed, Aina's amended complaint alleges that Trooper Straniere, Assistant D.A.s Morris and Lathrop, along with deputy Attorney General Lambrino participated a meritless and malicious prosecution of the plaintiff. (Doc. 12, passim). In contrast, the only allegation against Correctional Officer Corl relates to an alleged excessive use of force against Aina on May 24, 2015, nearly seven years ago. (Id., ¶ 4.) As for the State Police and the Centre County district Attorney's Office as institutional defendants, Aina apparently seeks to hold them liable simply because their staff “went outside of the official capacity.” (Id.)
Viewing Aina's amended complaint as less flawed than his original pleading, but still flawed in some respects, as discussed below we recommend that the two institutional defendants named in this amended complaint-the Pennsylvania State Police and the Centre County District Attorney's Office-should be dismissed. We also recommend that the claims against C.O. Corl be dismissed as time barred. However, liberally construing Aina's amended complaint, acknowledging Aina's malicious prosecution and false arrest claims, and recognizing that Aina's criminal charges were dismissed after protracted litigation, it is recommended that the amended complaint be served upon the following individual defendants: Trooper Straniere, Assistant D.A.s Morris and Lathrop, as well as Deputy Attorney General Lambrino.
II. Discussion
A. Screening Review of Pro Se Petitions - Standard of Review
This court has an on-going statutory obligation to conduct a preliminary review of pro se complaints brought by plaintiffs given leave to proceed in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Specifically, we are obliged to review the complaint to determine whether any claims are frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. This statutory text mirrors the language of Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that a complaint should be dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
With respect to this benchmark standard for the legal sufficiency of a complaint, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has aptly noted the evolving standards governing pleading practice in federal court, stating that:
Standards of pleading have been in the forefront of jurisprudence in recent years. Beginning with the Supreme Court's opinion in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), continuing with our opinion in Phillips [v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir.
2008)], and culminating recently with the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, __U.S__, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009), pleading standards have seemingly shifted from simple notice pleading to a more heightened form of pleading, requiring a plaintiff to plead more than the possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss.Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2009).
In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, Inc., 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court “need not credit a complaint's bald assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion to dismiss.” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Additionally, a court need not “assume that a . . . plaintiff can prove facts that the . . . plaintiff has not alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). As the Supreme Court held in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), in order to state a valid cause of action, a plaintiff must provide some factual grounds for relief which “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of actions will not do.” Id., at 555. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id.
In keeping with the principles of Twombly, the Supreme Court has underscored that a trial court must assess whether a complaint states facts upon which relief can be granted when ruling on a motion to dismiss. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court held that, when considering a motion to dismiss, a court should “begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id., at 679. According to the Supreme Court, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id., at 678. Rather, in conducting a review of the adequacy of a complaint, the Supreme Court has advised trial courts that they must:
[B]egin by identifying pleadings that because they are no more than conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.Id., at 679.
Thus, following Twombly and Iqbal, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and conclusions; it must recite factual allegations sufficient to raise the plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has stated:
[A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, district courts should conduct a two-part analysis. First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Second, a District Court must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.” In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief. A complaint has to “show” such an entitlement with its facts.Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-11.
As the Court of Appeals has observed:
The Supreme Court in Twombly set forth the “plausibility” standard for overcoming a motion to dismiss and refined this approach in Iqbal. The plausibility standard requires the complaint to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. A complaint satisfies the plausibility standard when the factual pleadings “allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). This standard requires showing “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. A complaint which pleads facts “merely consistent with” a defendant's liability, [ ] “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement of relief.' ”Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220-21 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 1861 (2012).
In practice, consideration of the legal sufficiency of a complaint entails a three-step analysis:
First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1947. Second, the court should
identify allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id., at 1950. Finally, “where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.”Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950).
In considering a motion to dismiss, the court generally relies on the complaint, attached exhibits, and matters of public record. Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007). The court may also consider “undisputedly authentic document[s] that a defendant attached as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's claims are based on the [attached] documents.” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Moreover, “documents whose contents are alleged in the complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically attached to the pleading, may be considered.” Pryor v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002); see also U.S. Express Lines, Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 382, 388 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that “[a]lthough a district court may not consider matters extraneous to the pleadings, a document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint may be considered without converting the motion to dismiss in one for summary judgment”). However, the court may not rely on other parts of the record in determining a motion to dismiss, or when determining whether a proposed amended complaint is futile because it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994).
In addition to these pleading rules, a civil complaint must comply with the requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, which defines what a complaint should say and provides that:
(a) A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional support; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.Fed. R. Civ. P. 8.
Thus, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and conclusions. Rather, a pro se plaintiff's complaint must recite factual allegations that are sufficient to raise the plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation, set forth in a “short and plain” statement of a cause of action.
Judged against these legal guideposts, this amended complaint is fatally flawed in a number of respects as set forth below, but liberally construed may state a claim against some defendants. Accordingly, it is recommended that this amended complaint be dismissed, in part, and served, in part.
B. Aina's Claims for Damages Against The Pennsylvania State Police Fail as a Matter of Law.
At the outset, dismissal of Aina's continued claim for damages from the Pennsylvania State Police is warranted because the amended complaint still fails to meet the substantive standards required by law, in that it does not set forth a “short and plain” statement of a cognizable violation of some right guaranteed by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Instead, this pro se amended complaint runs afoul of basic constitutional and statutory rules limiting lawsuits against state agencies and officials.
First, as a matter of constitutional law, the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution provides that “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the ... States....”, U.S. Const. amend XI. By its terms, the Eleventh Amendment strictly limits the power of federal courts to entertain cases brought by citizens against the state and state agencies. Moreover, a suit brought against an individual acting in his or her official capacity constitutes a suit against the state and therefore also is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989).
Pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment, states, state agencies and state officials who are sued in their official capacity are generally immune from lawsuits in federal courts brought against them by citizens. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996). Under the Eleventh Amendment, the Commonwealth's immunity exists as a matter of law unless waived by the state, or expressly and unequivocally abrogated by Congress. Congress has not expressly abrogated this constitutional immunity with respect to federal civil rights lawsuits against the Pennsylvania State Police and the Commonwealth clearly has not waived its immunity. Quite the contrary, the Commonwealth has specifically by statute invoked its Eleventh Amendment immunity in 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8521(b). This, while Pennsylvania has, by law, waived sovereign immunity in limited categories of cases brought against the Commonwealth in state court, see 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8522, Section 8521(b) flatly states that: “Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be construed to waive the immunity of the Commonwealth from suit in federal courts guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.” § 8521(b).
The constitutional protections afforded to the states under the Eleventh Amendment also expressly apply to the state agencies that are integral parts of Pennsylvania's criminal justice system like the Pennsylvania State Police. This proscription directly applies here because the: “Eleventh Amendment bars claims for damages against the Pennsylvania] S[tate] P[olice], a state agency that did not waive its sovereign immunity.” Atkin v. Johnson, 432 Fed.Appx. 47, 48 (3d Cir. 2011) (internal citations omitted). See Andresen v. Pennsylvania, No. 1:20-CV-989, 2020 WL 9048193, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 15, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:20-CV-989, 2021 WL 1178171 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2021). Moreover, as a matter of statutory interpretation, the plaintiff cannot bring a damages action against this state agency since it is also well-settled that a state, a state agency, or a state official acting in an official capacity is not a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the principal federal civil rights statute. Will, 491 U.S. at 71.
In sum, Aina's federal civil rights claim for damages against the Pennsylvania State Police is barred both by the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution and by cases construing the federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Therefore, since this state agency cannot be sued for damages in this fashion in federal court, the Pennsylvania State Police should be dismissed as a defendant in this action.
C. Aina's Claims Against The Centre County District Attorney's Office Fail.
Aina has also named the Centre County District Attorney's Office as an institutional defendant in this case. However, in support of this claim of institutional liability, Aina simply avers that the office is “liable because ADA went outside official capacity.”
This claim fails for at least two reasons. First, To the extent that the plaintiff attempts to bring a lawsuit against the county district attorney's office as an institution the plaintiff may not maintain a prisoner civil rights action against this particular defendant. Rather, inmate civil rights actions under § 1983 may be brought against
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws [of the United States].§ 1983 (emphasis added). Thus, by its terms § 1983 limits the scope of liability to specific persons or entities who violate constitutional rights, and it has been held that a “County District Attorney's Office is not an entity for purposes of § 1983 liability”. Reitz v. Cnty. of Bucks, 125 F.3d 139, 148 (3d Cir. 1997).
More fundamentally, even if we deemed the district attorney's office to be an entity subject to suit under § 1983, this claim would still fail because Aina has not pleaded facts which would give rise to institutional civil rights liability. It is well settled that local governmental entities may not be held liable under § 1983 for the acts of others under a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662; see also Colburn v. Upper Darby Twp., 946 F.2d 1017, 1027 (3d Cir. 1991). Instead, such an agency may only be held liable “when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).
Thus, to sustain a claim against this institutional defendant, a plaintiff must “identify a . . . ‘policy' or ‘custom' that caused the plaintiff's injury.” Bd. of County Comm'rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997). This custom must be “so widespread as to have the force of law.” Id. at 404; see also Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 971 (3d Cir. 1996) (a policy is an official proclamation or edict of a municipality, while a custom is a practice that is “so permanent and well settled as to virtually constitute law”) (quoting Andrews v. City of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469, 1480 (3d Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). The plaintiff must further “allege that a ‘policy or custom' of [the defendants] was the ‘moving force' behind the [constitutional] violation.” Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 107 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Brown, 520 U.S. at 404).
To be sure, a municipality may be held liable under § 1983 for failure to train, monitor or supervise, but only where a plaintiff can “identify a failure to provide specific training that has a causal nexus with their injuries and must demonstrate that the absence of that specific training can reasonably be said to reflect a deliberate indifference to whether the alleged constitutional deprivations occurred.” Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 207 n.7 (3d Cir. 2005). A municipality may only be found liable under Section 1983 “when the municipality itself causes the constitutional violation at issue.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989). This is so because government entities are not vicariously liable for their employees' acts under Section 1983. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694-95.
The plaintiff must also allege well-pleaded facts which show that, through this official deliberate conduct, the municipality was the “moving force” behind the injury alleged. Reitz, 125 F.3d at 145. Courts have recognized that this is a high burden. Id.; Watson v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 629 F.Supp.2d 481, 487 (E.D. Pa. 2009). With respect to such claims, a plaintiff must show a policy or custom of insufficient screening of potential employees that is “so widespread as to have the force of law.” M.S. ex rel. Hall v. Susquehanna Twp. Sch. Dist., 43 F.Supp.2d 412, 426 (M.D. Pa. 2014) (citing Brown, 520 U.S. at 403-04). A municipality may only be found liable under Monell “when the alleged constitutional transgression implements or executes a policy, regulation or decision officially adopted by the governing body or informally adopted by custom.” Beck, 89 F.3d at 971. Accordingly, “although the municipality may not be held liable for a constitutional tort under § 1983 on the theory of vicarious liability, it can be held responsible as an entity when the injury inflicted is permitted under its adopted policy or custom.” Id.
“In limited circumstances, a local government's decision not to train certain employees about their legal duty to avoid violating citizens' rights may rise to the level of an official government policy for purposes of § 1983.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011). However, a failure to train or supervise “must amount to ‘deliberate indifference to the rights of a person with whom the untrained employees come into contact.'” Id. (quoting Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989)). Deliberate indifference for a failure-to-train claim is a “stringent” standard, which requires “proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action.” Brown, 520 U.S. at 410. To demonstrate deliberate indifference based on a failure to train or supervise, a plaintiff typically must show a “pattern of similar constitutional violation by untrained employees.” Thomas v. Cumberland Cnty., 749 F.3d 217, 223 (3d Cir. 1999).
Thus, while it is sometimes possible “to establish deliberate indifference based on a single incident[, ] this showing is available in a very narrow range of circumstances.” Peters v. Cmty. Educ. Ctrs., Inc., No. 11-850, 2014 WL 981557, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 13, 2014). “To find deliberate indifference from a single-incident violation, ” the risk of injury must be a “highly predictable consequence” of the municipality's failure to train and supervise its employees. Thomas, 749 F.3d at 225 (quoting Connick, 563 U.S. at 63-64). Thus, “[liability in single-incident cases depends on ‘[t]he likelihood that the situation will recur and the predictability that an officer lacking specific tools to handle that situation will violate citizens' rights.'” Id. at 223-24 (quoting Brown, 520 U.S. at 409).
Even if that showing can be made, the plaintiff still must demonstrate that the failure to train “proximately caused his constitutional injury by identifying a particular failure in a training program that is ‘closely related to the ultimate injury.'” Buoniconti v. City of Phila., 148 F.Supp.3d 425, 441 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (quoting Canton, 489 U.S. at 391). Furthermore, a municipality can only be liable under § 1983 where the failure to train “demonstrates a ‘deliberate' or ‘conscious' choice by the municipality.” Doe v. Luzerne Cnty., 660 F.3d 169, 179 (3d Cir. 2011). Thus,
To determine whether a municipality's alleged failure to train its employees amounted to a deliberate or conscious choice, it must be shown that “(1) municipal policymakers know that employees will confront a particular situation; (2) the situation involves a difficult choice or a history of employees mishandling; and (3) the wrong choice was made by an employee will frequently cause deprivation of constitutional rights.”Id. at 179-80 (quoting Carter, 181 F.3d at 357).
Judged against these settled legal precepts, Aina's institutional liability claim against the district attorney's office in this case fails since the plaintiff's allegation that the office is “liable [because] ADA[s] went outside official capacity, ” (Doc. 12 at 1), is utterly insufficient and falls well short of what is needed to plead a viable institutional liability claim under § 1983. Therefore, the district attorney's office should be dismissed as a defendant.
D. Aina's Claims Against C.O. Corl Are Time Barred.
Further, with respect to C.O. Corl, Aina's amended complaint alleges matters reaching back nearly seven years to May of 2015, As pleaded, this claim runs afoul of the statute of limitations which governs federal civil rights lawsuits. When conducting a screening review of a pro se complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, a court may consider whether the complaint is barred under the applicable statute of limitations. As the Third Circuit explained when it affirmed the screening dismissal of a pro se complaint on statute of limitations grounds:
Civil rights claims are subject to the statute of limitations for personal injury actions of the pertinent state. Thus, Pennsylvania's two year statutory period applies to [these] claims. See Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 368 (3d Cir.2000). The limitations period begins when the plaintiff knows or had reason to know of the injury forming the basis for the federal civil rights action. Gera v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 256 Fed.Appx. 563, 564-65 (3d Cir.2007). Although we have not addressed the issue in a precedential decision, other courts have held that although the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, district court may sua sponte dismiss a complaint under' 1915(e) where the defense is obvious from the complaint and no development of the factual record is required. See Fogle v. Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1258 (10th Cir.2006); see also Eriline Co. S.A. v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 648, 656-57 (4th Cir.2006) (citation omitted)(finding that a district court's screening
authority under' 1915(e) “differentiates in forma pauperis suits from ordinary civil suits and justifies an exception to the general rule that a statute of limitations defense should not be raised and considered sua sponte.”).Smith v. Delaware County Court 260 F. App'x. 454, 455 (3d Cir. 2008); see also Jackson v. Fernandez, No. 08-5694, 2009 WL 233559 (D.N.J. Jan. 26, 2009); Hurst v. City of Dover, No. 04-83, 2008 WL 2421468 (D. Del. June 16, 2008).
It is well-settled that claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are subject to the state statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-67 (1985). In Pennsylvania, the statute of limitations for a personal injury action is two years. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524. A cause of action accrues for statute of limitations purposes when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that constitutes the basis of the cause of action. Sameric Corp. of Delaware, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir. 1998); see also Nelson v. County of Allegheny, 60 F.3d 1010 (3d Cir. 1995).
While this two-year limitations period may be extended based upon a continuing wrong theory, a plaintiff must make an exacting showing to avail himself of this grounds for tolling the statute of limitations. For example, it is well settled that the “continuing conduct of [a] defendant will not stop the ticking of the limitations clock [once] plaintiff obtained requisite information [to state a cause of action]. On discovering an injury and its cause, a claimant must choose to sue or forego that remedy.” Barnes v. American Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 154 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting Kichline v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 800 F.2d 356, 360 (3d Cir. 1986)). See also Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 266-68 (3d Cir. 2000). Instead:
The continuing violations doctrine is an “equitable exception to the timely filing requirement.” West v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 45 F.3d 744, 754 (3d Cir.1995). Thus, “when a defendant's conduct is part of a continuing practice, an action is timely so long as the last act evidencing the continuing practice falls within the limitations period; in such an instance, the court will grant relief for the earlier related acts that would otherwise be time barred.” Brenner v. Local 514, United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners of Am., 927 F.2d 1283, 1295 (3d Cir.1991).In order to benefit from the doctrine, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant's conduct is “more than the occurrence of isolated or sporadic acts.” West, 45 F.3d at 755 (quotation omitted). Regarding this inquiry, we have recognized that courts should consider at least three factors: (1) subject matter-whether the violations constitute the same type of discrimination, tending to connect them in a continuing violation; (2) frequency-whether the acts are recurring or more in the nature of isolated incidents; and (3) degree of permanence-whether the act had a degree of permanence which should trigger the plaintiff's awareness of and duty to assert his/her rights and whether the consequences of the act would continue even in the absence of a continuing intent to discriminate. See id. at 755 n. 9 (citing Berry v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State Univ., 715 F.2d 971, 981 (5th Cir.1983)). The consideration of “degree of permanence” is the most important of the factors. See Berry, 715 F.2d at 981.Cowell v. Palmer Township. 263 F.3d 286, 292 (3d Cir. 2001).
In the instant case, with respect to Defendant Corl, Aina's amended complaint simply alleges that this defendant used excessive force against the plaintiff in May of 2015. (Doc. 12, ¶ 4). The plaintiff's May 24, 2015, excessive force claim against C.O. Corl plainly had the degree of permanence which put Aina on notice of his duty to timely file this complaint. Yet Aina has not done so. Accordingly, this claim is barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations and should also be dismissed.
E. Aina's Claim for a Specific Amount of Unliquidated Damages is Improper.
Further, we note that the plaintiff's amended complaint still demands specified compensatory and punitive damages from the defendants, totaling $20,318,000 in compensatory damages along with punitive damages totaling $100,000,000. As we previously informed Aina, this particular prayer for relief is inappropriate. Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure imposes a duty on the Court to review pleadings and provides that the Court may upon its own initiative at any time order stricken from any pleading any immaterial matter. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f). Decisions regarding whether claims may be stricken from a complaint are properly presented to a United States Magistrate Judge for determination in the first instance. Singh v. Superintending School Committee of the City of Portland, 593 F.Supp. 1315 (D. Me. 1984).
In this case, the plaintiff's claim for a specified amount of unliquidated damages violates Local Rule 8.1 which provides, in part, that:
The demand for judgment required in any pleading in any civil action pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(3) may set forth generally that the party claiming damages is entitled to monetary relief but shall not claim any specific sum where unliquidated damages are involved. The short plain statement of jurisdiction, required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(1), shall set forth any amounts needed to invoke the jurisdiction of the court but no other.Local Rule 8.1 (emphasis added). Since this prayer for relief violates Local Rule 8.1 by specifying a particular amount of unliquidated damages, it is further recommended that this specific dollar claim be stricken from the amended complaint. See Hayward v. Monroe Cty. Corr. Facility, No. 3:18-CV-610, 2019 WL 407473, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 14, 2019), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Haywood v. Martynowicz, No. 3:18-CV-00610, 2019 WL 398557 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 31, 2019); Holmes v. Eck, No. 3:16-CV-644, 2016 WL 1729489, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 20, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:16CV644, 2016 WL 1756907 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 29, 2016).
F. The Complaint Should Be Served on The Remaining Defendants.
While a number of Aina's claims still fail as a matter of law, liberally construing Aina's amended complaint as one which alleges false arrest and malicious prosecution, and recognizing that Aina's criminal charges were dismissed after protracted litigation, it is recommended that the amended complaint be served upon the following individual defendants: Trooper Straniere, Assistant D.A.s Morris and Lathrop, as well as Deputy Attorney General Lambrino. Of course, this recommendation is made without prejudice to these defendants mounting a vigorous legal and factual defense to Aina's claims.
III. Recommendation
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Plaintiff's amended complaint be dismissed with respect to the following Defendants: The Pennsylvania State Police, the Centre County District Attorney's Office and Correctional Officer Corl. However, IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the amended complaint be served upon the following individual defendants: Trooper Straniere, Assistant D.A.s Morris and Lathrop, as well as Deputy Attorney General Lambrino.
The plaintiff is further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge,
however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.