Opinion
1:20-cv-10315-ER-GRJ
11-07-2022
AIDA B., Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.
REPORT & RECOMMENDATION
Gary R. Jones United States Magistrate Judge
In May of 2018, Plaintiff Aida B.applied for Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income benefits under the Social Security Act. The Commissioner of Social Security denied the applications. Plaintiff, represented by Ny Disability, LLC, Daniel Berger, Esq., of counsel, commenced this action seeking judicial review of the Commissioner's denial of benefits under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405 (g) and 1383 (c)(3).
Plaintiff's name has been partially redacted in compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2 (c)(2)(B) and the recommendation of the Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of the Judicial Conference of the United States.
This case was referred to the undersigned for a Report and Recommendation on November 4, 2022. The parties submitted a Joint Stipulation in Lieu of Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings. (Docket No. 21). For the following reasons, it is recommended that the Commissioner should be granted judgment on the pleadings and this case should be dismissed.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Administrative Proceedings
Plaintiff applied for benefits on May 19, 2018, alleging disability beginning July 17, 2017. (T at 195-201, 202-210).Plaintiff's applications were denied initially and on reconsideration. She requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). A hearing was held on September 5, 2019, before ALJ Zachary Weiss. (T at 54). Plaintiff appeared with an attorney and testified. (T at 62-67).
Citations to “T” refer to the administrative record transcript at Docket No. 13.
B. ALJ's Decision
On February 5, 2020, the ALJ issued a decision denying the applications for benefits. (T at 15-37). The ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since July 17, 2017 (the alleged onset date) and met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through December 31, 2022. (T at 24).
The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff's depressive disorder; anxiety disorder; and obesity were severe impairments as defined under the Act. (T at 24). However, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 403, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (T at 26).
At step four of the sequential analysis the ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels, with the following non-exertional limitations: she is limited to performing simple, routine, and repetitive tasks in a “low stress” job (defined as no more than occasional decision-making and no more than occasional changes in work location); she can have no more than occasional interaction with other employees and the public in a work setting; and she can never perform any production rate or pace work. (T at 28).
The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff could not perform her past relevant work as a child monitor. (T at 31). However, considering Plaintiff's age (48 on the alleged onset date), education (not able to communicate in English), work experience, and RFC, the ALJ determined that there were jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform. (T at 32). As such, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not been under a disability, as defined under the Social Security Act, for the period between July 17, 2017 (the alleged onset date) and February 5, 2020 (the date of the ALJ's decision). (T at 33).
On October 13, 2020, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review, making the ALJ's decision the Commissioner's final decision. (T at 1-8).
C. Procedural History
Plaintiff commenced this action, by and through her counsel, by filing a Complaint on December 8, 2020. (Docket No. 1). On January 10, 2022, the parties, through their respective attorneys, filed a Joint Stipulation in lieu of motions for judgment on the pleadings. (Docket No. 20).
II. APPLICABLE LAW
A. Standard of Review
“It is not the function of a reviewing court to decide de novo whether a claimant was disabled.” Melville v. Apfel, 198 F.3d 45, 52 (2d Cir. 1999). The court's review is limited to “determin[ing] whether there is substantial evidence supporting the Commissioner's decision and whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal standard.” Poupore v. Astrue, 566 F.3d 303, 305 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
The reviewing court defers to the Commissioner's factual findings, which are considered conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). “Substantial evidence” is “more than a mere scintilla” and “means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Lamay v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 562 F.3d 503, 507 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)).
“In determining whether the agency's findings are supported by substantial evidence, the reviewing court is required to examine the entire record, including contradictory evidence and evidence from which conflicting inferences can be drawn.” Talavera v. Astrue, 697 F.3d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotations omitted).
“When there are gaps in the administrative record or the ALJ has applied an improper legal standard,” or when the ALJ's rationale is unclear, remand “for further development of the evidence” or for an explanation of the ALJ's reasoning is warranted. Pratts v. Chater, 94 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 1996).
B. Five-Step Sequential Evaluation Process
Under the Social Security Act, a claimant is disabled if he or she lacks the ability “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months ....” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
A claimant's eligibility for disability benefits is evaluated pursuant to a five-step sequential analysis:
1. The Commissioner considers whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity.
2. If not, the Commissioner considers whether the claimant has a “severe impairment” which limits his or her mental or physical ability to do basic work activities.
3. If the claimant has a “severe impairment,” the Commissioner must ask whether, based solely on medical evidence, claimant has an impairment listed in Appendix 1 of the regulations. If the claimant has one of these enumerated impairments, the Commissioner will automatically consider him disabled, without considering vocational factors such as age, education, and work experience.
4. If the impairment is not “listed” in the regulations, the Commissioner then asks whether, despite the claimant's severe impairment, he or she has residual functional capacity to perform his or her past work.
5. If the claimant is unable to perform his or her past work, the Commissioner then determines whether there is other work which the claimant could perform.See Rolon v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 994 F.Supp.2d 496, 503 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v), 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v).
The claimant bears the burden of proof as to the first four steps; the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five. See Green-Younger v. Barnhart, 335 F.3d 99, 106 (2d Cir. 2003). At step five, the Commissioner determines whether claimant can perform work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy. See Butts v. Barnhart, 416 F.3d 101, 103 (2d Cir. 2005); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(c)(2).
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff raises three main arguments in support of her challenge to the ALJ's decision. First, she contends that the ALJ failed to adequately assess the medical opinion evidence. Second, she argues that the ALJ disregarded evidence concerning her vision. Third, Plaintiff challenges the ALJ's Listings analysis. This Court will address each argument in turn.
A. Medical Opinion Evidence
“Regardless of its source, the ALJ must evaluate every medical opinion in determining whether a claimant is disabled under the [Social Security] Act.” Pena ex rel. E.R. v. Astrue, No. 11-CV-1787 (KAM), 2013 WL 1210932, at *14 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2013) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c), 416.927(d) (2020)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In January of 2017, the Social Security Administration promulgated new regulations regarding the consideration of medical opinion evidence. The revised regulations apply to claims filed on or after March 27, 2017. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c. Because Plaintiff's application for benefits was filed after that date, the new regulations apply here.
The ALJ no longer gives “specific evidentiary weight to medical opinions,” but rather considers all medical opinions and “evaluate[s] their persuasiveness” based on supportability, consistency, relationship with the claimant, specialization, and other factors. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c (a), (b)(2). The ALJ is required to “articulate how [he or she] considered the medical opinions” and state “how persuasive” he or she finds each opinion, with a specific explanation provided as to the consistency and supportability factors. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c (b)(2).
Consistency is “the extent to which an opinion or finding is consistent with evidence from other medical sources and non-medical sources.” Dany Z. v. Saul, 531 F.Supp.3d 871, 882 (D. Vt. 2021)(citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(c)(2)). The “more consistent a medical opinion” is with “evidence from other medical sources and nonmedical sources,” the “more persuasive the medical opinion” will be. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(2).
Supportability is “the extent to which an opinion or finding is supported by relevant objective medical evidence and the medical source's supporting explanations.” Dany Z, 531 F.Supp.3d at 881. “The more relevant the objective medical evidence and supporting explanations presented by a medical source are to support his or her medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s), the more persuasive the medical opinions or prior administrative medical finding(s) will be.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (c)(1), 416.920c(c)(1).
In the present case, Dr. Eleanor Murphy performed a consultative psychiatric evaluation in October of 2019. She described Plaintiff as anxious, with appropriate orientation, but displaying impaired attention and concentration, along with poor insight and judgment. (T at 395). Due to Plaintiff's level of distress during the examination, Dr. Murphy could not assess her memory skills. (T at 395).
Dr. Murphy opined that Plaintiff had moderate limitation in her ability to understand, remember, or apply simple directions and instructions; extreme limitation with respect to using reason and judgment to make work-related decisions; marked limitation with respect to interacting adequately with supervisors, co-workers, and the public; and marked limitation in sustaining concentration and performing a task at a consistent pace. (T at 396). Dr. Murphy found Plaintiff's ability to sustain an ordinary routine and regular work attendance moderately limited. (T at 396). She assessed extreme limitation in Plaintiff's capacity to regulate her emotions, control her behavior, and maintain well-being. (T at 396).
Dr. Murphy diagnosed major depressive disorder (recurrent, severe, with psychotic features) and unspecified anxiety disorder. (T at 396). She opined that Plaintiff's psychiatric and cognitive problems may significantly interfere with her ability to function on a daily basis and characterized Plaintiff's prognosis as “fair.” (T at 396-97).
The ALJ found Dr. Murphy's opinion the “least persuasive” of the various medical opinions regarding Plaintiff's mental impairments. (T at 31). Plaintiff challenges this conclusion, arguing that the ALJ should have given greater weight to Dr. Murphy's assessment. For the following reasons, the Court concludes the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence and is consistent with applicable law.
Dr. Arlene Rupp-Goolnick performed a consultative psychiatric evaluation in June of 2018. Dr. Rupp-Goolnick described Plaintiff as nervous, with mildly impaired sensorium, appropriate orientation, and mildly impaired attention and concentration. (T at 323-24). Plaintiff displayed mildly impaired memory skills, below average cognitive functioning, and fair insight and judgment. (T at 324).
Dr. Rupp-Goolnick assessed no limitation with respect to Plaintiff's ability to understand, remember, or apply simple directions and instructions and no limitation in regulating her emotions, controlling her behavior, or maintaining well-being. (T at 324). She assessed mild limitation in Plaintiff's capacity to: use reason and judgment to make work-related decisions; sustain concentration and maintain pace; interact adequately with supervisors, co-workers, and the public; and sustain an ordinary routine and regular work attendance. (T at 324-25).
Dr. Rupp-Goolnick concluded that Plaintiff's psychiatric problems did not appear to be significant enough to interfere with her ability to function on a daily basis. (T at 325). She diagnosed depressive disorder and generalized anxiety disorder and characterized Plaintiff's prognosis as “guarded.” (T at 325).
The ALJ found Dr. Rupp-Goolnick's opinion “highly persuasive.” (T at 30). This Court finds the ALJ's conclusion supported by substantial evidence.
Although Plaintiff's treatment records certainly documented symptoms of depression and anxiety,along with treatment for those symptoms, the ALJ reasonably found the mental status examinations generally unremarkable and more consistent with the less significant level of limitation assessed by Dr. Rupp-Goolnick. (T at 30, 365, 366, 368, 370, 372, 374, 376, 382, 383, 385, 386, 389). See, e.g., Knief v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 20 Civ. 6242 (PED), 2021 WL 5449728, at *1-2, 8-9 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2021) (affirming ALJ decision based on treatment records and mental status examinations that claimant had “meaningful, but not profound, mental restrictions” with chronic anxiety and mood disturbances, adequately treated with regular psychiatric appointments and psychiatric medications); Burchette v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 19 CIV. 5402 (PED), 2020 WL 5658878, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2020)(“In sum, Dr. Phillips' opinion, combined with largely unremarkable mental status examination findings in the treatment record and plaintiff's ADLs, provide substantial evidence for the ALJ's RFC determination.”).
Plaintiff points to several instances in which her complaints of anxiety and depression were documented in the record. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ overrated the evidence that her symptoms improved with treatment. This argument is unavailing for the reasons discussed above.
The ALJ's assessment is also supported by the findings of Dr. T. Harding, a non-examining State Agency review physician. In July of 2018, Dr. Harding reviewed Plaintiff's records and assessed mild limitation in her ability to understand, remember, or apply information; mild limitation in interacting with other; moderate limitation in concentration, persistence, and pace; and mild limitation in adapting or managing herself. (T at 76). The ALJ found this assessment “partially persuasive” to the extent Dr. Harding found Plaintiff capable of performing a range of unskilled work; but concluded that the record supported a greater degree of limitation in Plaintiff's ability to engage in social interaction. (T at 30). See Distefano v. Berryhill, 363 F.Supp.3d 453, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)(“‘[S]tate agency physicians are qualified as experts in the evaluation of medical issues in disability claims,' and as such, ‘their opinions may constitute substantial evidence if they are consistent with the record as a whole.'”)(quoting Leach ex rel. Murray v. Barnhart, 02 Civ. 3561, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 668, at *26 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2004)).
Notably, the ALJ did not dismiss the evidence of impairment in Plaintiff's mental functioning. Rather, the ALJ developed an RFC that limited Plaintiff to simple, routine, repetitive work in a “low stress” environment requiring no more than occasional decision-making, no production rate or pace work, and only occasional interaction with coworkers and the public. (T at 28). This RFC adequately took into account the impairments in Plaintiff's mental functioning.
“Substantial evidence is “a very deferential standard of review - even more so than the ‘clearly erroneous' standard." Brault v. SSA, 683 F.3d 443, 447-48 (2d Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (citation omitted). “The substantial evidence standard means once an ALJ finds facts, [a court] can reject those facts only if a reasonable factfinder would have to conclude otherwise.” Id. at 448 (emphasis in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “The role of the reviewing court is therefore quite limited and substantial deference is to be afforded the Commissioner's decision.” Johnson v. Astrue, 563 F.Supp.2d 444, 454 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Indeed, “[i]f the reviewing court finds substantial evidence to support the Commissioner's final decision, that decision must be upheld, even if substantial evidence supporting the claimant's position also exists.” Id. (citing Alston v. Sullivan, 904 F.2d 122, 126 (2d Cir. 1990)); see also McIntyre v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 146, 149 (2d Cir. 2014) (“If evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the Commissioner's conclusion must be upheld.”)(citation omitted).
Here, the ALJ's evaluation of Plaintiff's mental functioning, and decision to discount Dr. Murphy's consultative examination findings, were supported by substantial evidence, including the assessments of Dr. Rupp-Goolnick and Dr. Harding, as well as a reasonable reading of the treatment record. This aspect of the ALJ's decision should therefore be sustained.
B. Vision
The ALJ noted that Plaintiff underwent limited treatment for vision issues, obtained an ophthalmological examination in December of 2018, complained of blurry visual, and was diagnosed with cataracts bilaterally. (T at 25). The ALJ found, however, that Plaintiff's vision complaints were not well-documented in the treatment record. This, combined with the minimal treatment Plaintiff received, led the ALJ to find Plaintiff's cataracts were a “non-severe” impairment. (T at 25).
Plaintiff challenges this conclusion, pointing to a reference in the treatment record indicating that she “sees [her] eye doctor regularly.' (T at 361). Plaintiff argues that the ALJ should have developed the record further regarding her vision issues. The Court disagrees for the reasons explained below.
First, the ALJ asked Plaintiff about vision treatment during the administrative hearing. Plaintiff testified that she saw her eye doctor “last year.” (T at 67). Plaintiff's attorney advised the ALJ that they had no further eye doctor records to submit. (T at 67-68).
Second, the record includes a consultative ophthalmological evaluation from Dr. Robert Auerbach. In September of 2018, Dr. Auerbach described Plaintiff's visual prognosis as “very good” and explained that he could finding nothing on examination that would account for decreased vision. (T at 336).
Third, the ALJ requested that Dr. Hema Sugumaran, an ophthalmologist, complete written interrogatories regarding Plaintiff's vision. Dr. Sugumaran found that Plaintiff had a visual impairment but opined that it would not significantly limit her ability to perform basic work activities. (T at 421-27).
Accordingly, the Court concludes that the ALJ satisfied his duty to develop the record concerning Plaintiff's vision and, therefore, this aspect of the ALJ's decision should be sustained.
C. Listings Analysis
At step three of the sequential evaluation, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or equals an impairment listed in Appendix 1 of the Regulations (the “Listings”). See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). If a claimant meets or equals a listed impairment, she is “conclusively presumed to be disabled and entitled to benefits.” Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 471, 106 S.Ct. 2022, 90 L.Ed.2d 462 (1986). “The claimant bears the burden of establishing that his or her impairments match a Listing or are equal in severity to a Listing." Henry v. Astrue, 32 F.Supp.3d 170, 182 (N.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing Naegele v. Barnhart, 433 F.Supp.2d 319, 324 (W.D.N.Y.2006)).
In the present case, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled one of the Listings impairments. (T at 26). Plaintiff challenges this finding, arguing that she meets the criteria of paragraph B of Listing 12.04. The “B” criteria for that Listing are met when a claimant has extreme limitation of one, or marked limitation of two, of the following areas of mental functioning: understanding, remembering, or applying information; interacting with others; maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace; and adapting or managing oneself.
This Court concludes that the ALJ did not err in his Listings analysis. Here's why. The ALJ expressly considered Listing 12.04 and discussed, in detail, his reasons for finding the Listing criteria not satisfied. (T at 27-28). The ALJ found moderate limitation in the applicable domains of functioning. (T at 27-28). The ALJ's assessment was supported by substantial evidence, including the consultative examination report of Dr. Rupp-Goolnick, the findings of Dr. Harding (the State Agency review physician), and a reasonable reading of the treatment records and consideration of Plaintiff's activities of daily living. (T at 27-28).
Plaintiff points to some evidence (and, in the case of Dr. Murphy, a medical opinion) indicating a greater level of limitation. The ALJ, however, reasonably reconciled the conflicting evidence and reached a conclusion that must be sustained under the deferential standard of review applicable here. See Genier v. Astrue, 606 F.3d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (“Even where the administrative record may also adequately support contrary findings on particular issues, the ALJ's factual findings must be given conclusive effect so long as they are supported by substantial evidence.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the Commissioner of Social Security should be GRANTED judgment on the pleadings and this case should be DISMISSED.
PROCEDURE FOR FILING OBJECTIONS TO THIS REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties have fourteen (14) days (including weekends and holidays) from service of this Report and Recommendation to file any objections. See also Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (b), (d). A party may respond to any objections within 14 days after being served. Any objections and responses shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. Any request for an extension of time to file objections or responses must be directed to the District Judge. If a party fails to file timely objections, that party will not be permitted to raise any objections to this Report and Recommendation on appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wagner & Wagner, LLP v. Atkinson, Haskins, Nellis, Brittingham, Gladd & Carwile, P.C., 596 F.3d 84, 92 (2d Cir. 2010).