Id. at 101. With respect to foreclosures pursuant to an assent to a decree, this Court, in Ahrens v. Ijams, 158 Md. 412, 148 A. 816 (1930), said: "[T]he mortgagees had at their command two plain remedies which were prescribed by statute, whereby they could at one time and in one proceedings sell the entire lot, by beginning, either in the city or the county, [at the time of the mortgage, the property was intersected by the boundary between Baltimore City and Baltimore County and the mortgage was recorded in both jurisdictions] a bill of complaint for foreclosure in accordance with ancient equity practice [common-law foreclosure] or a sale under the power specifically conferred by the mortgage upon the mortgagees, their personal representatives or assigns, or their attorney named in the mortgage.
Maryland Rule 515. Cf. Clayten v. Proutt, 227 Md. 198, 175 A.2d 757. The case of Ahrens v. Ijams, 158 Md. 412, 148 A. 816, cited by appellee is readily distinguishable upon the facts. Judgment reversed, and case remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
The parties agree that a vendee has in equity a lien on the land bought for any payment upon the purchase price in case the contract is not consummated by the fault of the vendor. Ahrens v. Ijams, 158 Md. 412, 423. It may be assumed (a) that prior to default in the terms of the deed of trust, the Gerbers could make their equitable lien effective by redeeming the lot they had bought from the deed of trust by paying the total amount advanced with respect to the lot, with interest, The Kent Building Loan Company v. Middleton, 112 Md. 10, 15, and (b) that after default the Gerbers could have paid the full amount due under the deed of trust and received a conveyance of the title held by the mortgagee. Better v. Williams, 203 Md. 613.
"In such case, according to the authorities a Court of Equity ought to give relief, because there is no remedy at law, or a very inadequate and pecarious one." We find the same principle applied in the cases of Cross v. Iler, 103 Md. 592, 64 A. 33; Wiley v. Wiley, 115 Md. 646, 81 A. 180, Ann. Cas. 1913A, 789; Ahrens v. Ijams, 156 Md. 1, 142 A. 489; and Ahrens v. Ijams, 158 Md. 412, 148 A. 816. In our opinion the principles applied in the cases above cited apply with equal force to this case.
(b) 2 Mechem on Agency (2nd Ed.), sec. 2202; National Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 25 L.Ed. 621; Warvelle on Abstracts and Examination of Titles (4th Ed.), sec. 619, pp. 654-656; Caltrider v. Weant, 147 Md. 338, 339-341, 128 A. 72; Watson v. Calvert Bldg. Loan Assn., 91 Md. 25, 33, 45 A. 879; Cochrane v. Little, 71 Md. 323, 18 A. 698; Brewster v. Frazier, 32 Md. 302. (c) 2 Mechem on Agency (2nd Ed.), sec. 1291; Horner v. Beasley, 105 Md. 193, 198, 65 A. 820; Ahrens v. Ijams, 158 Md. 412, 423, 148 A. 816. I. There is testimony tending to show that the plaintiff employed the defendants to examine and pass upon the title to certain lots in Anne Arundel County which one Thomas J. Fyffe claimed to own in fee simple, and which the plaintiff was under contract to buy, if the title were good and marketable.
The question is whether they, or either of them, are so located as to materially affect the use, enjoyment, and marketability of the rest of the property covered by the agreement. If the result is a deduction in acreage, the defendants might be entitled to a proportionate abatement of the purchase money. Ahrens v. Ijams, 158 Md. 412, 148 A. 816; Tolchester Beach Imp. Co. v. Boyd, 161 Md. 269, 156 A. 795. Inasmuch as the title company has raised the question of their effect on the insurability of the property, it becomes the duty of the plaintiffs to show by proper evidence, by survey if the chancellor requires it, the location of these two tracts. The conveyance to the Board of School Commissioners requires no consideration, as Edward J. Dougherty, who owns nearly all of the stock of the corporate defendant, testified that he "would not think that would interfere."
The statute is strictly construed, since the remedy provided is of a summary nature for the benefit of the mortgagee. Owens v. Graetzel, 146 Md. 361, 126 A. 224; Ahrens v. Ijams, 158 Md. 412, 417-420, 148 A. 816. The meaning of the clause, "In all cases of conveyances of lands or hereditaments or of chattels real, or goods and chattels personal, situate in the said city," is therefore not to be enlarged beyond the limits set by these words when read in connection with their context and the subject-matter of the legislation. When so regarded, "goods" is not so comprehensive a term as "chattels," since it is used to designate inanimate objects, and chattels embraces both animate and inanimate property.
Maryland appellate decisions, in addition to Roessner, dealing with ยง 6-203(b) actions involving property lying in more than one county, have involved common ownership of the subject realty. See Ahrens v. Ijams, 158 Md. 412, 148 A. 816 (1930) (holding that the public local law of Baltimore City, authorizing foreclosure by assent to decree, did not give the court in Baltimore City jurisdiction over a portion of mortgaged land lying in Baltimore County); Murguiondo v. Hoover, 72 Md. 9, 18 A. 907 (1889) (holding that lis pendens did not bar acquisition of good title by plaintiff, a mortgage foreclosure sale purchaser, to portion of partitioned property lying in non-forum county, where purchase was consummated before recording in non-forum county of partition judgment from forum county). In Federal Land Bank of Baltimore, Inc. v. Esham, 43 Md.App. 446, 406 A.2d 928 (1979), this Court applied Roessner to the construction of former Maryland Rule W74 b, under which the mortgage foreclosure sale of property located in more than one county could be made "in any county in which part of the property is located."
If no default occurs, it never becomes effective. . . ." Ahrens v. Ijams, 158 Md. 412, 418, 148 A. 816 (1929). It is obvious that if the decree was entered prior to default, the nature of the default could not possibly have been identified in the petition.
Id. at 190. See also Ahrens v. Ijams, 158 Md. 412, 148 A. 816 (1930). Webb, which dealt with a single parcel wholly situated within one jurisdiction, provides no guidance under the current Rule and the instant facts.