The Court notes that some cases have found even longer delays in treating a broken finger insufficiently prolonged to satisfy the objective element. See, e.g., Beaman v. Unger, 838 F. Supp. 2d 108, 110 (W.D.N.Y. 2011) (ten-week delay); Aho v. Hughes, No. 03-CV-1552, 2005 WL 2452573, at *7 (D. Conn. Sept. 30, 2005) (two-month delay). However, these cases involved broken fingers alone and did not involve allegations of infection, protruding pins, and permanent deformity.
See, e.g., Crique v. Magill, No. 12-CV-3345, 2013 WL 3783735, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. July 9, 2013) ("While delays in providing necessary medical care may in some cases demonstrate deliberate indifference, the Second Circuit has reserved those instances to cases when prison officials 'deliberately delayed care as a form of punishment, ignored a life-threatening and fast-degenerating condition for three days, or delayed major surgery for over two years.'" (quoting Demata v. New York State Correctional Dep't of Health Servs., 198 F.3d 233, 1999 WL 753142, at *2 (2d Cir. Sept. 17, 1999) (citations omitted)); see also Beaman v. Unger, 838 F. Supp. 2d 108, 110 (W.D.N.Y. 2011) (ten-week delay in between injury and treatment of a broken wrist and finger insufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim); Aho v. Hughes, No. 03-CV-1552, 2005 WL 2452573, at *7 (D. Conn. Sept. 30, 2005) (two-month delay in between injury and treatment of broken hand insufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim); Coqueran v. Eagen, No. 98-CV-7185, 2000 WL 96768 at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2000) (two-month delay between ankle injury and diagnostic X-rays not deliberate indifference). Plaintiff's claims against Nurses Stevens and Reese fare no better. Plaintiff's only allegations related to Nurse Stevens are that, after evaluating him, she diagnosed his injury as a sprained ankle, denied his request for an X-ray, and instead prescribed him Ibuprofen and instructed him to keep his leg elevated and return in one week if his ankle remained swollen.
Am. Compl. at 1-2. See Hathaway v. Coughlin, 841 F.2d 48, 50-51 (2d Cir. 1988) (over two-year delay in between hip injury and treatment constitutes deliberate indifference); Beaman v. Unger, 838 F. Supp. 2d 108, 110 (W.D.N.Y. 2011) (ten-week delay in between injury and treatment of a broken wrist and finger insufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim); Aho v. Hughes, No. 03-CV-1552, 2005 WL 2452573, at *7 (D. Conn. Sept. 30, 2005) (two-month delay in between injury and treatment of broken hand insufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim). For these reasons, Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment medical indifference claims against Nurse Jane Doe are dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
For this reason internal regulations governing prison grievance procedures do not give rise to federally protected liberty interests, and the alleged failure of prison officials to follow prescribed procedures associated with an established grievance process does not support a civil rights claim under section 1983, absent the independent deprivation of a right protected under the Constitution, or by federal statute. See Shell v. Brzezniak, 365 F. Supp. 2d 362, 370 (W.D.N.Y. 2005) ("[I]nmate grievance programs created by state law are not required by the Constitution and consequently allegations that prison officials violated those procedures does not give rise to a cognizable § 1983 claim."); Aho v. Hughes, No. 03-CV-1552, 2005 WL 2452573, at *7 (D.Conn. Sept. 30, 2005) (noting that the "failure of a correctional official to comply with the institutional grievance procedures is not cognizable in an action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, unless the action caused the denial of a constitutionally or federally protected right"); Cancel v. Goord, No. 00-CV-2042, 2001 WL 303713, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2001) ("While there is a First Amendment right of meaningful access to the courts and a right to petition the government for redress, inmate grievance procedures are not required by the Constitution and therefore a violation of such procedures does not give rise to a claim under § 1983.") (internal citations omitted); see also Hunnicutt v. Armstrong, 305 F. Supp. 2d 175, 188 (D. Conn. 2004), vacated on other grounds, 152 F. App'x 24 (2d Cir. 2005).
Given that Plaintiff's injury was clearly not life-threatening or otherwise seriously endangering him at that moment, and given that Jane Doe #1 informed Plaintiff how to obtain care for his knee, the Court finds that Jane Doe #1 was not deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's need for medical care. See, e.g., Aho v. Hughes, No. 3:03CV1552(SRU)(WIG), 2005 WL 2452573, at *7 (D. Conn. Sept. 30, 2005) (holding that the incarcerated plaintiff did not state a deliberate indifference claim against medical providers when his principal complaints were that he should have been sent to the hospital sooner, should have seen the doctor sooner, and should have had surgery on his broken hand); see also Vining, 2013 WL 2036325, at *5 (stating that the speed of treatment in non-life-threatening situations generally translates to negligence or medical malpractice, not deliberate indifference). Thus, Defendant Jane Doe #1 is entitled to qualified immunity.
See Grose v. Correctional Medical Services, No. 06–CV–15175, 2009 WL 2741515, at *4 (E.D.Mich. Aug. 25, 2009) (at most, evidence supported a finding that defendant committed medical malpractice in failing to diagnose prisoner's knee fractures, and “the delays experienced by Grose under the circumstances reflected in the record, including the circumstance that Grose was continuously provided with medical care throughout her incarceration, do not permit a reasonable inference of subjective deliberate indifference”); Aho v. Hughes, No. 3:03CV1552, 2005 WL 2452573, at *7 (D.Conn. Sept. 30, 2005) (two-month delay in diagnosing fracture in plaintiff's left hand did not satisfy subjective prong of Eighth Amendment claim); Rodriguez v. Ames, 224 F.Supp.2d 555, 563 (W.D.N.Y.2002) (defendant's delay in diagnosing fractured hand did not constitute deliberate indifference to serious medical needs). Plaintiff's claims must therefore be dismissed.
To the extent that the plaintiff alleges that the defendants failed to comply with the grievance procedure, this allegation, without more, does not constitute a constitutional violation. See Pocevic v. Tung, No. 3:04CV1067 (CFD), 2006 WL 680459, at *8 (D. Conn. Mar. 14, 2006) ("court can discern no federally or constitutionally protected right that was violated by defendant['s] failure to comply with the institutional procedures regarding the timing of his response to [plaintiff's] level 2 grievance"); Vega v. Lantz, No. 3:04CV1215 (DFM), 2006 WL 2788374, at *6 (D. Conn. Sept. 26, 2006) ("failure of a correctional official to comply with the institutional grievance procedures is not cognizable in an action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless the action caused the denial of a constitutionally or federally protected right"); Aho v. Hughes, No. 3:03CV1552 (SRU), 2005 WL 2452573, at *7 (D. Conn. Sept. 30, 2005) (same). B. Lack of Personal Involvement
Moreover, "mere disagreement with prison officials about what constitutes appropriate care does not state a claim cognizable under the Eighth Amendment." Aho v. Hughes, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22790 (D. Conn. 2005). Ultimately there is no violation of the Eighth Amendment "[s]o long as the treatment given is adequate. . . ." Henderson v. Doe, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8672 (S.D.N.Y. June 10, 1999).
For this reason internal regulations governing prison grievance procedures do not give rise to federally protected liberty interests, and the alleged failure of prison officials to follow prescribed procedures associated with an established grievance process does not support a civil rights claim under section 1983, absent the independent deprivation of a right protected under the Constitution, or by federal statute. See Shell v. Brzezniak, 365 F. Supp. 2d 362, 370 (W.D.N.Y. 2005) ("[l]nmate grievance programs created by state law are not required by the Constitution and consequently allegations that prison officials violated those procedures does [sic] not give rise to a cognizable § 1983 claim."); Aho v. Hughes, No. 03CV1552, 2005 WL 2452573, at *7 (D. Conn. Sept. 30, 2005) (noting that the "failure of a correction official to comply with the institutional grievance procedures is not cognizable in an action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, unless the action caused the denial of a constitutionally or federally protected right.") (citations omitted); Cancel v. Goord, No. 00 Civ. 2042, 2001 WL 303713, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2001) ("While there is a First Amendment right of meaningful access to the courts and a right to petition the government for redress, inmate grievance procedures are not required by the Constitution, and therefore a violation of such procedures does not give rise to a claim under § 1983.")