Opinion
9414 Index 150871/13
05-28-2019
Manzoor AHMAD, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. The CITY OF NEW YORK, et al., Defendants–Respondents.
Pollack, Pollack, Isaac & DeCicco, LLP, New York (Brian J. Isaac of counsel), for appellant. Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York (Kevin Osowski of counsel), for respondents.
Pollack, Pollack, Isaac & DeCicco, LLP, New York (Brian J. Isaac of counsel), for appellant.
Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York (Kevin Osowski of counsel), for respondents.
Friedman, J.P., Gische, Tom, Webber, Gesmer, JJ.
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Debra A. James, J.), entered on or about October 23, 2017, which denied plaintiff's motion to set aside the jury's verdict in defendants' favor and direct a judgment in his favor, unanimously affirmed, without costs.
Plaintiff claims that defendant police officer used excessive force and committed battery against him during a traffic stop. The uncontested trial evidence shows that the officer saw plaintiff's vehicle make an illegal turn and gestured to plaintiff to pull over, that plaintiff initially slowed down and then drove around the officer to a point 40 feet from where he was standing, that the officer ran to the car and instructed plaintiff to take the car out of drive and place it in park so that he would be unable to drive away again, and that, as the officer reached into the car for the gear shift, plaintiff pushed his hands away.
We cannot conclude on this evidence that the jury's verdict in defendants' favor was utterly irrational, that is, that there is no valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences that could lead a rational person to the same conclusion (see Killon v. Parrotta, 28 N.Y.3d 101, 108, 42 N.Y.S.3d 70, 65 N.E.3d 41 [2016] ). Nor can we conclude that the evidence weighed so heavily in plaintiff's favor that the jury could not have interpreted it fairly in finding for defendants (see id. at 107, 42 N.Y.S.3d 70, 65 N.E.3d 41 ). In view of the fact that plaintiff had driven away from the officer once, the jury could reasonably have found that under the circumstances the minor contact between plaintiff's and the officer's hands did not constitute excessive force (see Koeiman v. City of New York, 36 A.D.3d 451, 453, 829 N.Y.S.2d 24 [1st Dept. 2007], lv denied 8 N.Y.3d 814, 838 N.Y.S.2d 840, 870 N.E.2d 160 [2007] ; see also Davila v. City of New York, 139 A.D.3d 890, 892, 33 N.Y.S.3d 306 [2d Dept. 2016], lv denied 28 N.Y.3d 914, 2017 WL 580238 [2017] ).
Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that, as he argues, the officer's testimony was incredible as a matter of law because it is contrary to "recognized realities" (see People v. Moore, 93 A.D.3d 519, 522, 940 N.Y.S.2d 274 [1st Dept. 2012], lv denied 19 N.Y.3d 865, 947 N.Y.S.2d 414, 970 N.E.2d 437 [2012] ). We have considered plaintiff's remaining arguments and find them unavailing.