Opinion
A-13570
03-02-2022
MARTHA AHKIVGAK, Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.
Justin N. Gillette, Assistant Public Defender, and Samantha Cherot, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Renner J. St. John, Assistant District Attorney, Fairbanks, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
UNPUBLISHED See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d)
Appeal from the District Court, Fourth Judicial District, Trial Court No. 4FA-19-02657 CR Fairbanks, Matthew C. Christian, Judge.
Justin N. Gillette, Assistant Public Defender, and Samantha Cherot, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant.
Renner J. St. John, Assistant District Attorney, Fairbanks, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Allard, Chief Judge, and Wollenberg and Terrell, Judges.
SUMMARY DISPOSITION
Martha Ahkivgak was convicted of first-degree criminal trespass after her boyfriend told her to leave his property and she instead tried to crawl into his apartment through his bedroom window. To prove first-degree criminal trespass, the State was required to prove that Ahkivgak unlawfully entered a dwelling. During her rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutor discussed the elements of the charge and argued to the jury why Ahkivgak's entry was unlawful:
AS 11.46.320(a)(2).
Unlawfully, she was not invited. She was not told to come in through the window. Just imagine that, if someone could just randomly do that to you and it's just a sense of security lost there. So that's why we have laws about that. So that's why that part of it is unlawful.
Ahkivgak did not object to this comment at trial. But on appeal, Ahkivgak argues that this comment was an impermissible "golden rule" argument, and that it constituted plain error.
See Adams v. State, 261 P.3d 758, 764 (Alaska 2011).
A "golden rule" argument is an argument that asks the jurors to imagine themselves in the shoes of the victim, and to consider what result they would wish for under the circumstances. It is true that the prosecutor asked the jurors to "imagine" if it were legal for an uninvited person to enter their home, but, understood in context, the prosecutor was not asking the jurors to imagine themselves as the victim. Instead, the prosecutor was arguing to the jury why Ahkivgak's entry was unlawful, an element of the offense the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt.
See Phillips v. State, 70 P.3d 1128, 1139 (Alaska App. 2003).
Had defense counsel objected, it would have been appropriate for the court to ask that the prosecutor clarify her statement, to ensure the jury did not misunderstand her. But in the absence of any objection, the court did not commit plain error by declining to intervene sua sponte.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.