Opinion
05-05-2017
Robert P. Stamey, Corporation Counsel, Syracuse (Mary D'Agostino of Counsel), for Defendant–Appellant. Harris & Panels, Syracuse (Michael W. Harris of Counsel), for Plaintiffs–Respondents.
Robert P. Stamey, Corporation Counsel, Syracuse (Mary D'Agostino of Counsel), for Defendant–Appellant.
Harris & Panels, Syracuse (Michael W. Harris of Counsel), for Plaintiffs–Respondents.
PRESENT: PERADOTTO, J.P., LINDLEY, TROUTMAN, AND SCUDDER, JJ.
MEMORANDUM:
Plaintiffs commenced this negligence action seeking damages for injuries allegedly sustained by David Ahern (plaintiff) when he tripped and fell on a broken curb. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs (see Vega v. Restani Constr. Corp., 18 N.Y.3d 499, 503, 942 N.Y.S.2d 13, 965 N.E.2d 240 ), we conclude that Supreme Court properly determined that plaintiffs raised an issue of fact sufficient to defeat defendant's motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Defendant met its initial burden by establishing that it did not receive prior written notice of the allegedly dangerous or defective condition, and the burden therefore shifted to plaintiffs to demonstrate "as relevant here, that defendant affirmatively created the defect through an act of negligence ... that immediately result[ed] in the existence of a dangerous condition" (Simpson v. City of Syracuse, 147 A.D.3d 1336, 1337, 46 N.Y.S.3d 347 [internal quotation marks omitted] ). In opposition to the motion, plaintiffs submitted evidence that plaintiff was very familiar with the condition of the walk and curb both before and after excavation work performed by defendant inasmuch as he had parked on that street almost daily for approximately 10 years. Plaintiff testified that he observed the area immediately after construction fencing was removed and noticed that the curb had been damaged. Plaintiff also testified that no other repairs took place at the site from the time of the excavation until his fall approximately six months later. We therefore conclude that plaintiffs raised an issue of fact whether defendant's affirmative act of negligence " ‘immediately result[ed] in the existence of a dangerous condition’ " (Yarborough v. City of New York, 10 N.Y.3d 726, 728, 853 N.Y.S.2d 261, 882 N.E.2d 873 ; cf. Duffel v. City of Syracuse, 103 A.D.3d 1235, 1236, 958 N.Y.S.2d 916 ).
Contrary to defendant's further contention, it is not entitled to summary judgment because the alleged dangerous condition is open and obvious. "The fact that a dangerous condition is open and obvious does not negate the duty to maintain premises in a reasonably safe condition, but, rather, bears only on the injured person's comparative fault" (Bax v. Allstate Health Care, Inc., 26 A.D.3d 861, 863, 809 N.Y.S.2d 378 ; see Custodi v. Town of Amherst, 81 A.D.3d 1344, 1346–1347, 916 N.Y.S.2d 685, affd. 20 N.Y.3d 83, 957 N.Y.S.2d 268, 980 N.E.2d 933 ).
It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.