Opinion
24A-JV-370
09-25-2024
A.H., Appellant-Respondent v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Petitioner
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Peter Laramore Marion County Public Defender Agency Appellate Division Indianapolis, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General Justin F. Roebel Supervising Deputy Attorney General Michelle Hawk Kazmierczak Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court The Honorable Pauline A. Beeson, Magistrate Trial Court Cause No. 49D16-2309-JD-8238.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Peter Laramore Marion County Public Defender Agency Appellate Division Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General Justin F. Roebel Supervising Deputy Attorney General Michelle Hawk Kazmierczak Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Judges Foley and Kenworthy concur.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Crone, Judge.
Case Summary
[¶1] After a factfinding hearing, the trial court adjudicated A.H. a delinquent for dangerous possession of a firearm and possession of marijuana. On appeal, A.H. argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence that he possessed the firearm. He also argues that the trial court erred in admitting testimony that he gave a false name to the arresting officer and in admitting the marijuana that was found on his person. We affirm.
We heard oral argument at DePauw University on September 6, 2024, as part of our Appeals on Wheels program. We thank the school's administration, faculty, and staff for their hospitality and support, counsel for their excellent advocacy, and the students for their thought-provoking post-argument questions.
[¶2] On September 25, 2023, the State filed a petition alleging that A.H., who was born in April 2009, committed class A misdemeanor dangerous possession of a firearm and class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana. A factfinding hearing was set for November 29. On that date, the trial court first held a hearing on A.H.'s oral motion to suppress the marijuana. The court stated, "If after we do the hearing on the Motion to Suppress, we want to incorporate any of that into evidence for the trial, I'd be happy to entertain a motion on that as well." Tr. Vol. 2 at 23.
[¶3] The State called one witness, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department (IMPD) Officer Alejandro Renteria. Officer Renteria testified that on September 22, he was dispatched to a park on West 30th Street "on a report of a suspicious person" and was notified that "a group of juveniles had attempted to break into a vehicle earlier in the day." Id. at 26. According to Officer Renteria, the dispatcher "identified . . . a possibly Asian male with a white headband and a white t-shirt[.]" Id. at 27. When the officer arrived at the park in his "police vehicle[,]" he saw four juveniles, including an "Asian male, a black male and a Hispanic guy[,]" "sitting or standing near" a picnic table. Officer Renteria got out of his vehicle, and three of the juveniles ran away. The fourth, who was "wearing the white headband with the white t-shirt[,]" was lying on the picnic table "next to a black article of clothing looking up into the sky[.]" Id. at 27, 28. According to the officer, he "approached the juvenile and initiated a[n] investigative detention based on the facts and circumstances that were given to [IMPD] by [the] verified caller." Id. at 28. The "juvenile proceeded to kind of stand up and realized oh the police is here. He got up and sat on the chair part of the picnic table." Id.
[¶4] Officer Renteria "decided to move" the black article of clothing "out of the way[.]" Id. He "felt a hard object and lifted up the article of clothing and saw a barrel and a magazine, telling [him] that that was a firearm." Id. The juvenile was "placed in handcuffs for safety due to the firearm being in arm[']s reach." Id. The officer asked the juvenile for his name, and he identified himself as Abril Smith. The officer asked if "he had ever been arrested in Marion County to which he proceeded to say yes." Id. at 29. Officer Renteria went to his computer and was unable "to get a response for that name in [IMPD's] records database[.]" Id.
A.H. accurately characterizes this as "a first name similar to his legal name with a generic surname." Appellant's Br. at 8.
[¶5] At that point, the officer believed that the juvenile "was lying about his identity." Id. So the officer "conducted a search incident to arrest of this person, and located marijuana in his right pocket." Id. The officer did not "recover any identification documents" from the juvenile. Id. Officer Renteria identified A.H., who was present in the courtroom, as that juvenile, and testified that A.H. was arrested for "possession of marijuana and the false identity statement." Id. at 30.
See Ind. Code § 35-44.1-2-4(a) ("A person who: (1) with intent to mislead public servants; (2) in a five (5) year period; and (3) in one (1) or more official proceedings or investigations; has knowingly made at least two (2) material statements concerning the person's identity that are inconsistent to the degree that one (1) of them is necessarily false commits false identity statement, a Class A misdemeanor.").
[¶6] After a brief cross-examination, the trial court heard argument from A.H.'s counsel, who asserted that Officer Renteria lacked probable cause to arrest A.H. for false identity statement, thus implying that the officer had no basis for conducting a search incident to arrest. The State argued that the officer had probable cause to arrest A.H. for dangerous possession of a firearm. The court denied A.H.'s motion to suppress and remarked, "[W]e'll continue on and we can do this all over again, but it wasn't very much testimony but we can start all over with the trial." Id. at 39. Neither party moved to incorporate the testimony from the suppression hearing into the factfinding hearing.
[¶7] The State called Officer Renteria as its first witness. When he was asked what happened on September 22, the officer replied, "At that time, I was dispatched to a suspicious person where a verified complainant had identified a group of ju- juvenile-" Id. at 40-41. A.H.'s counsel raised a hearsay objection, which the trial court sustained. Counsel did not move to strike this response from the record, however, so it remained in evidence. Officer Renteria then testified that he "arrived in [his] police car . . . and approached the table of the people that were identified on [his] computer." Id. at 41. As he got out of his "police vehicle, three of the four juveniles that were there proceeded to flee." Id. The officer testified, "I can clear as day remember [A.H.] was laying down on the picnic table." Id. at 41-42. Officer Renteria then identified A.H. in open court.
Singh v. Lyday, 889 N.E.2d 342, 351 (Ind.Ct.App. 2008), trans. denied (2009).
[¶8] The officer testified that he "proceeded to approach" A.H. "and proceeded to do an investigative stop, an investigative detention." Id. at 42. At that point, A.H.'s counsel stated, "I would have [to] object to further testimony as I have yet to hear a lawful ground to detain." Id. The trial court overruled the objection. Officer Renteria testified that A.H. was "wearing a white headband and a white T shirt." Id. According to the officer, he "observed a black article of clothing" that he "attempted to move . . . out of the way and that's when [he] felt something hard and lifted it up and proceeded to see a magazine. Made [him] believe there was a firearm." Id. at 43. The object was in fact "a black firearm with an extended magazine." Id. The officer described the firearm as "bigger than [his] duty issued firearm" but "smaller than a shotgun." Id. at 44. Officer Renteria placed A.H. in handcuffs "given the fact that the firearm was in arm[']s reach" and he "didn't want any ... officer safety issues to arise." Id.
[¶9] Officer Renteria testified that he asked A.H. for his personal information. A.H. "provided the name of Abril Smith with a date of birth," which the officer "attempted to run through [IMPD's] database which came back with no . . . hits." Id. at 45. The officer asked A.H. if he "had ever been arrested in Marion County to which the response was yes and again, [the officer] had no response in [IMPD's] records for anybody under that name being arrested in Marion County." Id. Officer Renteria testified that he believed that he had "probable cause to arrest [A.H.] for false identity statement and proceeded to do a search incident to arrest which yielded -" Id. At that point, A.H.'s counsel raised an objection to the officer's anticipated testimony on the basis that the search lacked probable cause "for the reasons, uh argument previously made as part of the suppression hearing we held prior to this." Id. The court overruled the objection. The officer testified that the search yielded "[a] lollipop [w]rapper with two nuggets of marijuana." Id. at 46. The purported marijuana was admitted into evidence over objection.
[¶10] In response to further questioning, Officer Renteria testified that A.H. was lying "a matter of inches definitely within arm's reach of the hoodie" under which the firearm was found and that "his left arm" was the closest "body part" to the hoodie. Id. at 47, 48. The officer could not "remember honestly off the top of [his] head" whether anyone was "wearing a sweatshirt" that day, and he recalled that the weather was "fairly warm." Id. at 48. Officer Renteria testified that A.H. "sat up from his laying position where he was near the gun" and "ended up on the middle of the - the sitting part of the picnic table." Id. The officer stated that he "requested a wagon to transport" A.H. to the detention facility and that "when [A.H.] was placed into the wagon, [he] learned [A.H.'s] true identity." Id.
[¶11] On cross-examination, the officer acknowledged that he "didn't know just from looking until [he] went to touch the sweatshirt" that there was a firearm underneath. Id. at 49. He also acknowledged that he had recognized two of the three juveniles who fled the scene and had described one of them as his "main suspect regarding the firearm" because he had previously been arrested for "firearm offenses." Id. at 50, 51. The officer testified that A.H. was the only one lying on the table and that he could not remember whether anyone else was "sitting at the table[.]" Id. at 54.
[¶12] The State then called IMPD Officer/ATF Gun Liaison Joshua Smith, who testified that he photographed the firearm at the scene and swabbed "three different areas" of the firearm "three different times" for DNA. The firearm, a 5.56 millimeter "American tactical omni hybrid AR-15 pistol[,]" id. at 56, was admitted into evidence over objection. Finally, the State called crime lab analyst Philip Brandyberry, who testified over objection that the substance that was seized from A.H. was in fact marijuana weighing just over two grams.
[¶13] After the State rested, A.H.'s counsel made a motion for involuntary dismissal of the firearm allegation pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 41(B), which the trial court denied. A.H.'s counsel then made a motion to bifurcate the hearing due to the State's belated disclosure of DNA evidence. The trial court granted the motion and set the matter for December 13. A.H. failed to appear on that date, and the hearing proceeded in his absence. Forensic scientist Chelsea Miller testified that three different DNA profiles were recovered from the firearm and that A.H. was excluded as a contributor to those profiles. The court then recessed the hearing to "set a date to resume when [A.H.] reappears." Id. at 87.
[¶14] On January 24, 2024, the parties presented closing arguments. The trial court remarked, "In preparation of today's hearing, I went back and looked at my notes from the trial and reviewed the exhibits that had been entered in. I find that the State has met their burden with respect to .. . both counts. I'm adjudicating [A.H.] a delinquent child to both counts." Id. at 95-96. The court placed A.H. on formal probation. This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
Section 1 - The State presented sufficient evidence that A.H. possessed the firearm.
[¶15] The State alleged, and the trial court found, that A.H. committed class A misdemeanor dangerous possession of a firearm. That offense is defined by Indiana Code Section 35-47-10-5, which provides in pertinent part, "A child who knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly possesses a firearm for any purpose other than a purpose described in section 1 of this chapter commits dangerous possession of a firearm, a Class A misdemeanor." A "child" is a person less than eighteen years of age. Ind. Code § 35-47-10-3. A.H. argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence that he possessed the firearm.
Among the purposes described in Indiana Code Section 35-47-10-1 are "attending a hunters safety course or a firearms safety course[,]" "engaging in practice in using a firearm for target shooting at an established range[,]" and "hunting or trapping under a valid license[.]"
[¶16] "In juvenile delinquency adjudication proceedings, the State must prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt." C.D.H. v. State, 860 N.E.2d 608, 610 (Ind.Ct.App. 2007), trans. denied. "When reviewing a claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, we will neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witnesses' credibility." Id. "Rather, we look to the evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom that support the true finding." D.B. v. State, 842 N.E.2d 399, 401 (Ind.Ct.App. 2006). "We will affirm the adjudication if evidence of probative value exists from which the factfinder could find the juvenile guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 401-02. "In other words, we will affirm the finding of delinquency unless it may be concluded that no reasonable factfinder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 402.
[¶17] Possession of a firearm can be either actual or constructive. Tate v. State, 835 N.E.2d 499, 511 (Ind.Ct.App. 2005), trans. denied. Actual possession occurs when a defendant has direct physical control over an item. Jones v. State, 881 N.E.2d 1095, 1098 (Ind.Ct.App. 2008). Constructive possession occurs when a defendant has the intent and capability to maintain dominion and control over an item. Id. A.H. did not have direct physical control over the firearm in Officer Renteria's presence. He concedes that he had the capability to maintain dominion and control over the firearm, i.e., that he was able to reduce the firearm to his personal possession, Goliday v. State, 708 N.E.2d 4, 6 (Ind. 1999), but he asserts that the State failed to establish that he had the intent to maintain dominion and control over it.
[¶18] A defendant's intent may be proven by circumstantial evidence alone and may be inferred from the facts and circumstances of each case. Chastain v. State, 58 N.E.3d 235, 240 (Ind.Ct.App. 2016), trans. denied. To prove the intent element of constructive possession, the State must demonstrate the defendant's knowledge of the contraband's presence. Goliday, 708 N.E.2d at 6. "Knowledge may be inferred from either exclusive dominion and control over the premises containing the firearm, or from evidence of additional circumstances indicating the defendant's knowledge of the presence of the firearm." Causey v. State, 808 N.E.2d 139, 143 (Ind.Ct.App. 2004). "These additional circumstances may include incriminating statements by the defendant; flight or furtive gestures; defendant's proximity to the contraband; the contraband being in plain view; or the location of the contraband in close proximity to items owned by the defendant." K.F. v. State, 961 N.E.2d 501, 510 (Ind.Ct.App. 2012), trans. denied. These circumstances are nonexhaustive, and ultimately the question is whether a reasonable factfinder could conclude from the evidence that the defendant knew of the contraband's presence. Johnson v. State, 59 N.E.3d 1071, 1074 (Ind.Ct.App. 2016).
[¶19] Assuming, without deciding, that A.H. did not have exclusive dominion and control over the premises, the record establishes that he was lying on top of the picnic table within inches of the firearm when Officer Renteria approached, distanced himself from the firearm by moving to the table seat, and gave a false name after the officer found the firearm under the hoodie. We conclude that this evidence would be sufficient for a reasonable factfinder to conclude that A.H. knew of the firearm's presence and thus constructively possessed it. See Bennett v. State, 883 N.E.2d 888, 892 (Ind.Ct.App. 2008) ("The giving of a false name is a form of flight and thus evidence of consciousness of guilt."), trans. denied. Accordingly, we affirm A.H.'s adjudication for dangerous possession of a firearm.
A.H. observes that he was in "a public park." Appellant's Br. at 12. The State suggests that A.H. had exclusive dominion and control over the premises because he "was found alone next to the gun." Appellee's Br. at 10. But this disregards his companions' flight from the area as Officer Renteria approached.
As indicated above, A.H. challenges the admissibility of Officer Renteria's testimony that he gave a false name. We address this argument below.
A.H. focuses on potentially exculpatory evidence, such as the DNA test results and the other juveniles' flight from the scene, but our standard of review requires us to look only to the evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom that support the trial court's true finding to determine whether a reasonable factfinder could find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. D.B., 842 N.E.2d at 401-02.
Section 2 - The trial court did not err in admitting testimony that A.H. gave a false name and in admitting the marijuana found on his person.
[¶20] Next, A.H. argues that Officer Renteria detained and then arrested him in violation of the Fourth Amendment and thus the trial court erred in admitting the officer's testimony that A.H. provided a false name and in admitting the marijuana that was found on his person. "The trial court has broad discretion to rule on the admissibility of evidence." Guilmette v. State, 14 N.E.3d 38, 40 (Ind. 2014). "We review its rulings 'for abuse of that discretion and reverse only when admission is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances and the error affects a party's substantial rights.'" Id. (quoting Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 260 (Ind. 2013)). "But when an appellant's challenge to such a ruling is predicated on an argument that impugns the constitutionality of the search or seizure of the evidence, it raises a question of law, and we consider that question de novo." Id. at 40-41. "We do not reweigh the evidence and consider the evidence most favorable to the trial court's ruling." Harris v. State, 19 N.E.3d 298, 301 (Ind.Ct.App. 2014), trans. denied (2015).
[¶21] The parties disagree about which evidence we may consider in reviewing A.H.'s claim. The State asserts that because A.H.'s counsel objected to the marijuana evidence during the factfinding hearing by incorporating the argument made during the suppression hearing, that "necessarily required the trial court to consider the evidence from the suppression hearing." Appellee's Br. at 6 n.1. Consequently, according to the State, the suppression ruling and the suppression evidence are "now properly considered in this appeal." Id. at 15. A.H. contends that because neither party moved to incorporate the testimony from the suppression hearing into the factfinding hearing, and the trial court based its adjudication solely on the evidence presented at the factfinding hearing, we must limit our review to that evidence. We need not resolve this dispute because the relevant evidence from the factfinding hearing alone is sufficient to affirm the trial court's rulings.
[¶22] Turning to the merits of A.H.'s claim, the Fourth Amendment provides,
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
This provision "protects persons from unreasonable search and seizure by prohibiting, as a general rule, searches and seizures conducted without a warrant supported by probable cause." Clark, 994 N.E.2d at 260. "This provision applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment." State v. Schlechty, 926 N.E.2d 1, 3 n.1 (Ind. 2010). The fundamental purpose of the Fourth Amendment "is to protect the legitimate expectations of privacy that citizens possess in their persons, their homes, and their belongings." Taylor v. State, 842 N.E.2d 327, 330 (Ind. 2006).
[¶23] Under the Fourth Amendment, "[a] warrantless search or seizure is per se unreasonable, and the State bears the burden to show that one of the well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement applies." Erickson v. State, 72 N.E.3d 965, 970 (Ind.Ct.App. 2017) (quoting Holder v. State, 847 N.E.2d 930, 935 (Ind. 2006)), trans. denied. "[W]hen evidence is obtained in violation of the constitution, such evidence may not be used against a defendant at trial." Osborne v. State, 805 N.E.2d 435, 439 (Ind.Ct.App. 2004), trans. denied. The exclusionary rule "is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard the right of people to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures by deterring police misconduct." Hendricks v. State, 897 N.E.2d 1208, 1212 (Ind.Ct.App. 2008). A.H. argues that the marijuana found on his person should have been excluded pursuant to this rule and that Officer Renteria's testimony about him giving a false name should have been excluded pursuant to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, an extension of the rule that "bars evidence directly obtained by the illegal search or seizure as well as evidence derivatively gained as a result of information learned or leads obtained during that same search or seizure." Clark, 994 N.E.2d at 266.
[¶24] There are three levels of police investigation, two of which implicate the Fourth Amendment and one of which does not. Overstreet v. State, 724 N.E.2d 661, 663 (Ind.Ct.App. 2000), trans. denied. First, the Fourth Amendment requires that an arrest or detention that lasts for more than a short period of time must be justified by probable cause. Id. "Probable cause adequate to support a warrantless arrest exists when, at the time of the arrest, the officer has knowledge of facts and circumstances that would warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that the suspect committed a criminal act." Moffitt v. State, 817 N.E.2d 239, 246 (Ind.Ct.App. 2004), trans. denied. "An officer may . . . arrest a suspect without a warrant if he observes the suspect committing a crime, or if the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect has committed a felony." Thomas v. State, 81 N.E.3d 621, 625-26 (Ind. 2017). An officer may also arrest a suspect without a warrant "when the officer has probable cause to believe the person has committed a misdemeanor in his presence." Winebrenner v. State, 790 N.E.2d 1037, 1040 (Ind.Ct.App. 2003).
[¶25] "Probable cause is a fluid concept that is incapable of precise definition and that must be decided based on the facts of each case." Sloan v. State, 224 N.E.3d 362, 367 (Ind.Ct.App. 2023), trans. denied (2024). It "depends on the totality of the circumstances, viewed as a whole[,]" Hodges v. State, 125 N.E.3d 578, 582 (Ind. 2019), and it "deals with probabilities, not certainties." Sloan, 224 N.E.3d at 372. "The level of proof necessary to establish probable cause is less than that necessary to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Probable cause, in fact, requires only a fair probability of criminal activity, not a prima facie showing." Jellison v. State, 656 N.E.2d 532, 534 (Ind.Ct.App. 1995) (citation omitted). "Whether probable cause exists depends upon the reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the facts known to the arresting officer at the time of the arrest." Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153 (2004). "[A]n arresting officer's state of mind (except for the facts that he knows) is irrelevant to the existence of probable cause." Id. "That is to say, his subjective reason for making the arrest need not be the criminal offense as to which the known facts provide probable cause." Id. If an arrest is supported by probable cause, the officer may search the suspect and the area within his immediate control without a warrant. Moffitt, 817 N.E.2d at 246.
[¶26] Second, pursuant to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the police may, without a warrant or probable cause, briefly detain an individual for investigatory purposes if, based upon specific and articulable facts, the officer has a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity has occurred or is about to occur. See Clark, 994 N.E.2d at 263 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)). "Whether a particular fact situation justifies an investigatory stop is determined on a case-by-case basis." Crabtree v. State, 762 N.E.2d 241, 246 (Ind.Ct.App. 2002). "Reasonable suspicion entails something more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch, but considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence." Id. "When making a reasonable-suspicion determination, the court examines the totality of the circumstances to see whether the officer has a 'particularized and objective basis' for suspecting legal wrongdoing." Corbett v. State, 179 N.E.3d 475, 488 (Ind.Ct.App. 2021) (quoting Turner v. State, 843 N.E.2d 937, 944 (Ind.Ct.App. 2006)), trans. denied (2022).
[¶27] The third level of investigation occurs when a police officer makes a casual and brief inquiry of a citizen, which involves neither an arrest nor a stop. Overstreet, 724 N.E.2d at 663. A consensual encounter does not evolve into a stop or seizure so long as a reasonable person would feel free to disregard the police and go about his business. Finger v. State, 799 N.E.2d 528, 532 (Ind. 2003). "[L]aw enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment by merely approaching an individual on the street or in another public place, by asking him if he is willing to answer some questions, [or] by putting questions to him if the person is willing to listen[.]" Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983).
[¶28] Here, the facts most favorable to the trial court's rulings establish that Officer Renteria was dispatched to investigate a "suspicious person" report from a "verified complainant" who had "identified a group of juvenile[s.]" Tr. Vol. 2 at 40-41. He "arrived in [his] police car" and "approached the table of the people that were identified on [his] computer." Id. at 41. "[T]hree of the four juveniles that were there proceeded to flee." Id. The fourth juvenile, A.H., was lying on top of the table within inches of a black hoodie. As the officer approached, A.H. arose and sat on the table seat. Officer Renteria testified that he "proceeded to do ... an investigative detention[,]" id. at 42, but there is no evidence that he actually told A.H. that he was being detained or otherwise indicated to A.H. that he was not free to leave. The officer "attempted to move [the hoodie] out of the way[,] felt something hard[,]" and discovered the firearm underneath. Id. at 43. At that point, Officer Renteria had probable cause to arrest A.H. without a warrant for dangerous possession of a firearm, and thus he was permitted to conduct a warrantless search incident to that arrest. The officer was also permitted to ask A.H. for his name and other personal information. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 600-01 (1990). Finding no Fourth Amendment violation, we find no error in the trial court's evidentiary rulings. Therefore, we affirm A.H.'s adjudication for possession of marijuana.
A.H. asserts that "[t]he State could have elicited testimony from Officer Renteria regarding how much time elapsed between his approach of A.H. and his eventual discovery of the firearm-it failed to do so." Reply Br. at 17. Based on the testimony that was elicited, it was reasonable for the trial court to infer that this interval was brief.
Accordingly, we need not address A.H.'s argument that the officer did not have probable cause to arrest him for the offense of false identity statement.
[¶29] Affirmed.
Foley, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.