orcement of an agreement to arbitrate a particular matter would so contravene an important public policy that arbitration should not proceed (see Matter of National Equip. Rental [American Pecco Corp.], 35 A.D.2d 132, 135, affd 28 N.Y.2d 639; Durst v Abrash, 22 A.D.2d 39, 44, affd 17 N.Y.2d 445). It is recognized, for example, that "matters affecting marriage, child custody, and the like, are not subject to unbridled arbitrability, as might be the case in a private building construction agreement (see, e.g., Schneider v Schneider, 17 N.Y.2d 123, 127-128; Sheets v Sheets, 22 A.D.2d 176, 178; Matter of Fence v Fence, 64 Misc.2d 480, 483-484 [POLIER, J.]; see, generally, Arbitration — Alimony — Support — Custody, Ann 18 ALR 3d 1264; Domke, Commercial Arbitration, § 13.09, pp 128-129)" (Matter of Susquehanna Val. Cent. School Dist. [Susquehanna Val. Teachers' Assn.], 37 N.Y.2d 614, 617; see, also, Agur v Agur, 32 A.D.2d 16, app dsmd as moot 32 N.Y.2d 703, mot to vacate order dsmg app den 33 N.Y.2d 643). Similarly, public policy has been held to prohibit arbitration of matters of will probate and estate distribution (Matter of Jacobovitz, 58 Misc.2d 330, 334), as well as alleged violations of New York's antitrust law (Matter of Aimcee Wholesale Corp. [Tomar Prods.], 21 N.Y.2d 621, 629-630).

(Peterson v Spartan Industries, Inc., 33 N.Y.2d 643, 467 [1974].) Plaintiff seeks to depose Lat given that his affidavit appears to contradict BRHI's public disclosures.