Opinion
CV-18-02660-PHX-SHR (BGM)
07-27-2021
Eduardo Aguilera, Petitioner, v. David Shinn, et al. Respondents.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Honorable Bruce G. Macdonald United States Magistrate Judge
Currently pending before the Court is Petitioner Eduardo Aguilera's pro se Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody (Non-Death Penalty) (“Petition”) (Doc. 1). Respondents have filed an Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) (Doc. 35), and Petitioner replied (Doc. 39). The Petition (Doc. 1) is ripe for adjudication.
Pursuant to Rules 72.1 and 72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure, this matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Macdonald for Report and Recommendation. The Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court deny the Petition (Doc. 1).
Rules of Practice of the United States District Court for the District of Arizona.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Initial Charge, Trial, and Sentencing
The Arizona Court of Appeals stated the facts as follows:
As these state court findings are entitled to a presumption of correctness and Petitioner has failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that the findings are erroneous, the Court hereby adopts these factual findings. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473-74, 127 S.Ct. 1933, 1940, 167 L.Ed.2d 836 (2007); Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 426, 105 S.Ct. 844, 853, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985); Cf. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 519, 102 S.Ct. 1198, 1204, 71 L.Ed.2d 379 (1982).
On July 1, 2015, a grand jury indicted [Eduardo Aguilera] on two counts of aggravated assault, each a class five felony. See A.R.S. §§ 13-1203, 13-1204.
Before trial, Appellant's counsel raised concerns as to Appellant's competency to stand trial, and the court ordered Appellant to be evaluated pursuant to Rule 11, Ariz. R. Crim. P. After reviewing the medical evaluations, the court found Appellant understood the nature of the proceedings and the charges brought against him, and was competent to stand trial.
Appellant moved to represent himself in the proceedings and the trial court granted Appellant's motion after verifying that Appellant was “knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily” waiving his right to representation. Thereafter, before each hearing, the court asked Appellant whether he wanted to continue to represent himself, and each time, Appellant confirmed his decision. Appellant represented himself at trial until closing arguments, when he asked for the assistance of his advisory counsel.
At trial, the State presented the following evidence: On June 24, 2015, Appellant, who was in custody for charges related to a 2014 aggravated D.U.I., was brought to the Maricopa County Superior Court to begin trial. However, Appellant's trial was postponed due to a scheduling conflict.
Upon hearing his trial was postponed, Appellant became verbally combative with the court commissioner assigned to his case. The commissioner warned Appellant that if he did not calm down he would be removed from the courtroom. Appellant continued to be verbally combative, and the commissioner ordered a detention officer to remove Appellant from the courtroom.
Detention Officer Norris (“Officer Norris”) commanded Appellant to leave and placed his hand on Appellant's shoulder to direct him out of the courtroom. Appellant did not comply with Officer Norris' commands and continued arguing with the commissioner. Officer Norris took hold of Appellant by his shirt. Appellant then reached out to grab Officer Norris. As Officer Norris successfully pushed Appellant's hands away, he struck his own hands on Appellant's handcuffs. Officer Norris sustained abrasions on his hands from this interaction.
A second detention officer and Phoenix police officers arrived to help Officer Norris remove Appellant from the courtroom. Appellant refused to
leave, and the officers carried Appellant out of the courtroom. Additional officers, including Detention Officer Blood (“Officer Blood”), helped place Appellant in a holding tank outside the courtroom.
In the holding tank, the officers commanded Appellant to his knees in order for them to safely exit, but Appellant would not comply with their commands. Officer Blood eventually forced Appellant to the ground and placed his knee on Appellant's back to allow the other officers to exit the holding tank. As Officer Blood removed his knee from Appellant and began to exit the holding tank, Appellant rolled onto his back, pushing his feet into Officer Blood's shins several times. Officer Blood then used his knee to hold Appellant's legs against his body and commanded Appellant to roll onto his stomach before Officer Blood exited the holding tank.
In his defense, Appellant presented evidence that neither Officer Norris nor Officer Blood were seriously injured during the interactions with Appellant. Appellant further alleged that he was unlawfully incarcerated at the time of the assault due to what he believed were wrongful aggravated D.U.I. charges.Answer (Doc. 35), State v. Aguilera, No. 1 CA-CR 16-0848, Mem. Decision (Ariz.Ct.App. Sept. 26, 2017) (Exh. “F”) (Doc. 35-1) at 71-73.
Page citations refer to the CM/ECF page number for ease of reference.
After trial, “[t]he jury found [Aguilera] guilty as charged of two counts of aggravated assault.” Id. at 73. The trial court, based on Petitioner's own testimony, found that he had been convicted of two (2) prior felonies and sentenced him to concurrent, presumptive prison terms of five years, to be served concurrently with his six (6) year term for his aggravated Driving Under the Influence (“DUI”) convictions. Id.
B. Direct Appeal
On November 28, 2016, Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal. Answer (Doc. 35), State v. Aguilera, No. 2015-129233-001, Pet.'s Not. of Appeal (Maricopa Cnty. Super. Ct. Nov. 28, 2016), (Exh. “B”) (Doc. 35-1). On July 10, 2017, counsel for Petitioner filed an Anders brief with the Arizona Court of Appeals. See Answer (Doc. 35), Appellant's Opening Br., State v. Aguilera, No. 1 CA-CR16-0848 (Ariz.Ct.App. July 10, 2017) (Exh. “B”) (Doc. 35-1). On July 24, 2017, Petitioner filed his pro se supplemental brief. See Answer (Doc. 35), Petr.'s Suppl. Opening Br. in Propria Persona, State v. Aguilera, No. 1 CA-CR 16-0848 (Ariz.Ct.App. July 24, 2017) (Exh. “E”) (Doc. 35-1). Petitioner alleged that his “conviction was obtain [sic] in violation of [his] 6th amendment right to a fast and speedy trail [sic] being violated [sic] [his] 8th amendment right of cruel and unusual punishment being inflicted [sic] and [his] Arizona constitutional right of Administration of Justice ARS Const ART 2 § 11.” Id. at 39. Petitioner argued that his “conviction was in violation of [his] 6th amendment right to a fast and speedy trail [sic] being violated is because on June 24, 2015 [he] was 7 months incarserated [sic] 2 months past the 150 days required under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 8.2(a)(1) [his] case was never determine [sic] to be complex there should be absolutly [sic] no reason for [him] to be having a difficult time getting the courts to acknowledge [his] constitutional rights.” Id. at 40. Petitioner asserted that cross-examination of the aggrieved officers showed that neither suffered serious injury and that he “caught this case for standing up for [him]self.” Id. at 40-42. Petitioner further asserted that he suffered “serious physical injuries” and that his mental health suffered due to “the year of solitary confinement that [he] did.” Id. at 42-43. Petitioner also alleged that he lost employment opportunities that resulted in financial losses. Answer (Doc. 35), Exh. “E” (Doc. 35-1) at 43. Next, Petitioner asserted a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights, alleging that “the State ha[d] never had any legal right to have [him] falsely incarserated [sic].” Id. at 43. Petitioner alleged that “[e]v[e]rything the state ha[d] done to [him] through out [sic] the last 3 years [was] a crime.” Id. Petitioner further asserted that “these legislatures in Arizona have pass [sic] this bill into law know [sic] as an (Admin per se) in this admin per se it states that my drivers [sic] license is going to be suspened [sic] ¶ 15 days from the date served[, ]” which Petitioner argued violated the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 43-44. Petitioner urged that “[t]he only reasson [sic] that he lost [the July 5, 2014 case regarding his license suspension] [wa]s because commisioner [sic] David Seyer collaberated [sic] with the state and with held [sic] certain evidence from the Jurors.” Id. at 44. Petitioner alleged that the withheld evidence included “a hearing that took place at the Arizona Department of transportation . . . on November 6, 2014 . . . to determine whether [his] drivers [sic] license should be suspended.” Answer (Doc. 35), Exh. “E” (Doc. 35-1) at 44-45. Petitioner noted that “[a]t trail [sic] [he] wanted the opportunity to compare the second admin per se suspension that went into effect on July 20, 2014.” Id. at 45. Petitioner also alleged that the court declined to provide jurors with additional evidence which resulted in a guilty verdict. Id. at 46. Petitioner vaguely asserted a double jeopardy violation regarding the aggravated DUI case, because the state apparently offered to drop the charges against him to a misdemeanor, but Petitioner declined because the DUI case had already been dismissed without prejudice and presumed to be considered a felony. Id. Finally, Petitioner asserted that the appellate court failed to address the evidence allegedly withheld during trial and sought an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 46-47.
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396 (1967).
The Arizona Court of Appeals has described the procedure of filing an Anders brief as follows:
Under our procedure, when appointed counsel determines that a defendant's case discloses no arguable issues for appeal, counsel files an Anders brief. The brief contains a detailed factual and procedural history of the case, with citations to the record. See Scott, 187 Ariz. at 478 n.4, 930 P.2d at 555 n.4. Counsel submits the brief to the court and the defendant. The defendant is then given the opportunity to file a brief pro per. After receiving all briefing, the court reviews the entire record for reversible error. If any arguable issue presents itself, the court directs appointed counsel to brief the issue. Only after the court has ascertained that counsel has conscientiously performed his or her duty to review the record, and has itself reviewed the record for reversible error and found none, will the court allow counsel to withdraw. See State v. Shattuck, 140 Ariz. 582, 584-85, 684 P.2d 154, 156-57 (1984). We conclude that this procedure permits counsel to perform ethically, while simultaneously ensuring that an indigent defendant's constitutional rights to due process, equal protection, and effective assistance of counsel are protected.State v. Clark, 196 Ariz. 530, 537, 2 P.3d 89, 96 (Ct. App. 1999).
On September 26, 2016, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner's conviction and sentence. See Answer (Doc. 35), State v. Aguilera, No. 1 CA-CR 16-0848, Mem. Decision (Ariz.Ct.App. Sept. 26, 2017) (Exh. “F”). Regarding Petitioner's speedy trial rights, the appellate court held that “Appellant's Rule 11 hearing f[e]ll[] under th[e] exception [excluding delays that result from hearings to determine competency or intellectual disability from the computation of the 150 day time limit], . . . thus, toll[ing] the calculation of time to start Appellant's trial.” Id. at 73-74. The appellate court further noted that “Appellant's time deadline for trial was also properly tolled due to Appellant's own requests for continuances.” Id. at 74 n.3 (citing Ariz. R. Crim. P. 8.4(c), (e)). Additionally, the appellate court held that “even if Appellant [wa]s correct in claiming that his trial was untimely, there was no fundamental error that would require reversal[, ]” because Appellant neither alleged nor did the record reflect that he suffered any prejudice. Id. at 74. Regarding Petitioner's alleged Eighth Amendment violation, the appellate court observed that “[u]nderlying his argument, Appellant relies on his contention that he was falsely incarcerated and wrongfully convicted of the aggravated D.U.I. charges.” Id. at 74. The appellate court reviewed the trial court's explanation to Appellant “that it had no power during that proceeding to decide any issue related to Appellant's previous aggravated D.U.I. charges and convictions” and held that “[t]he trial court's explanations were legally correct[.]” Answer (Doc. 35), Exh. “F” at 74. The appellate court further recognized that “to the extent that Appellant wishes to challenge the constitutionality of the D.U.I. laws, he must do so in a separate appeal of his aggravated D.U.I. convictions.” Id. at 74-75. Regarding Petitioner's sufficiency of the evidence claim, the appellate court stated that “Appellant's argument mischaracterize[d] the nature of the charges.” Id. at 75. The appellate court reviewed Count I, in which “the State charged Appellant with intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causing physical injury to an employee of the Maricopa County Sherriff's Office acting in his official capacity[, ]” and Count II which “charged Appellant with knowingly touching Officer Blood, an employee of the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office acting in his official capacity, with the intent to injure, insult, or provoke the officer.” Id. at 75 (citing A.R.S. §§ 13-1203(A)(1), (3), 13-1204(A)(8)(a)). The appellate court noted that as to Count I, “[t]here [wa]s no requirement . . . that the assault victim suffer substantial, permanent, or serious harm[, ]” and as to Count II, “the State did not need to prove injury[, ]” merely contact. Id. The appellate court held that the State met its burden for both counts. Answer (Doc. 35), Exh. “F” at 75. Finally, the appellate court held that Appellant's claim that he acted in self-defense was “inapplicable in this situation[, ]” noting that “[e]ven if Appellant [wa]s correct in his assertion that he was wrongfully detained on June 24, 2015, he was still not allowed to use physical force to prevent the detention officers from lawfully fulfilling their job duties.” Id. at 75-76. After a review of the entire record, the appellate court found “[t]he evidence presented at trial was substantial and support[ed] the verdicts.” Id. at 76.
On January 23, 2018, the Arizona Supreme Court summarily denied Petitioner's Petition for Review. Answer (Doc. 35), State v. Aguilera, No. CR-17-0469-PR, Mem. (Ariz. Jan. 23, 2018) (Exh. “G”) (Doc. 35-1). On February 23, 2018, the Arizona Court of Appeals issued its mandate. Answer (Doc. 35), State v. Aguilera, No. 1 CA-CR 16-0848, Mandate (Ariz.Ct.App. Feb. 23, 2018) (Exh. “H”) (Doc. 35-1).
C. Post-Conviction Relief Proceeding
On January 23, 2018, Petitioner filed his Notice of Post-Conviction Relief (“PCR”) and Opening Brief. Answer (Doc. 35), Petr.'s Not.: Pet. for PCR in pro per Opening Br., State v. Aguilera, No. CR 2015-129233-001 (Maricopa Cnty. Super. Ct. Jan. 16, 2018) (Exh. “I”) (Doc. 35-1). On April 11, 2018, Petitioner filed a second opening brief regarding his Petition for PCR. Answer (Doc. 35), Not.: Pet. for PCR in pro per Opening Br., State v. Aguilera, No. CR 2015-129233-001 DT (Maricopa Cnty. Super. Ct. Jan. 16, 2018) (Exh. “J”) (Doc. 35-1). On May 22, 2018, the State filed its response to Petitioner's petition. Answer (Doc. 35), Response to Pet. for PCR, State v. Aguilera, No. CR 2015-129233-001 DT (Maricopa Cnty. Super. Ct. May 22, 2018) (Exh. “K”) (Doc. 35-1).
Both petitions were signed by Petitioner on January 16, 2018 but were filed on different dates as indicated by the court's timestamp. The petitions appear to be identical.
1. Initial pro se PCR Petition
In his January 23, 2018 PCR Petition, Petitioner asserted three (3) claims for relief. See Answer (Doc. 35), Petr.'s Not.: Pet. for PCR in pro per Opening Br., State v. Aguilera, No. CR 2015-129233-001 (Maricopa Cnty. Super. Ct. Jan. 16, 2018) (Exh. “I”) (Doc. 35- 1). First, Petitioner alleged a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. Id. at 82-83. Second, Petitioner asserted that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction because neither officer sustained serious injuries. Id. at 83-84. Third, Petitioner argued that his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment was violated because he was “falsely incarserated [sic].” Id. at 85.
2. Second pro se PCR Petition
Petitioner's April 11, 2018 PCR Petition appears to be identical to the Notice and Opening Brief filed on January 23, 2018. Compare Answer (Doc. 35), Petr.'s Not.: Pet. for PCR in pro per Opening Br., State v. Aguilera, No. CR 2015-129233-001 (Maricopa Cnty. Super. Ct. Jan. 16, 2018) (Exh. “I”) (Doc. 35-1), with Answer (Doc. 35), Not.: Pet. for PCR in pro per Opening Br., State v. Aguilera, No. CR 2015-129233-001 DT (Maricopa Cnty. Super. Ct. Jan. 16, 2018) (Exh. “J”) (Doc. 35-1). Petitioner alleged a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial, challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his aggravated assault convictions, and asserted a violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. See Answer (Doc. 35), Exh. “J.”
3. Rule 32 Court Order
On August 12, 2018, the Rule 32 court issued its order summarily dismissing Petitioner's PCR petition and denying his request for an evidentiary hearing. Answer (Doc. 35), State v. Aguilera, No. CR2015-129233-001 DT, Minute Entry (Maricopa Cnty. Super. Ct. Aug. 12, 2018) (Exh. “L”) (Doc. 35-1). The Rule 32 court found that “the issues raised by Defendant in his PCR ha[d] already been adjudicated on their merits on appeal as reflected in Court of Appeals CA-CR-16-0848, Memo Decision affirming trial court, filed 9/26/2017.” Id. at 126. As such, the Rule 32 court held that “pursuant to Ariz. Rules of Crim. Pro. Rule 32.2(a)(2), Defendant's PCR claims are precluded in a post-conviction relief proceeding.” Id.
4. PCR Reconsideration
On August 22, 2018, the Rule 32 court denied Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of its order summarily dismissing his PCR petition and denying his request for an evidentiary hearing. Answer (Doc. 35), State v. Aguilera, No. CR2015-129233-001 DT, Minute Entry (Maricopa Cnty. Super. Ct. Aug. 22, 2018) (Exh. “M”) (Doc. 35-1).
On September 21, 2018, the Rule 32 court denied Petitioner's second motion for reconsideration and affirmed its denial of his request for an evidentiary hearing. Answer (Doc. 35), State v. Aguilera, No. CR2015-129233-001 DT, Minute Entry (Maricopa Cnty. Super. Ct. Sept. 21, 2018) (Exh. “N”) (Doc. 35-1). The record does not reflect that Petitioner appealed any of the Rule 32 court's decisions to the Arizona Court of Appeals. See State v. Aguilera, No. CR2015-129233-001, Docket (Maricopa Cnty. Super. Ct.), available at http://www.superiorcourt.maricopa.gov/docket/CriminalCourtCases/ caseInfo.asp?caseNumber=CR2015-129233 (last visited July 16, 2021).
D. The Instant Habeas Proceeding
On August 21, 2018, Petitioner filed his Petition Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody (Non-Death Penalty) (Doc. 1). On December 21, 2018, the Hon. Jennifer G. Zipps issued her Order dismissing Ground One of Petitioner's petition, directing service, and ordering Respondents to respond to Grounds Two, Three, and Four. Order 12/21/2018 (Doc. 25). Petitioner filed motions seeking reconsideration and a response to his petition. See Petr.'s Mot. for Recon. (Docs. 27, 30) Petr.'s Mot. for Response (Docs. 28, 29). Judge Zipps denied Petitioner's motions. Order 1/23/2019 (Doc. 34).
Petitioner's Petition (Doc. 1) asserts three (3) grounds for relief. First, Petitioner asserts a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. Petition (Doc. 1) at 7. Petitioner alleges that “[o]n June 24, 2015, [he] was 7 months incarcerated 2 months past the 150 days required under rule 8.2(a)(1).” Id. Petitioner contends that same day he was scheduled to start trial, but “[w]hen [he] heard [his] trial court [sic] being reschedule [sic] [he] invoked [his] 6th amendment right of a speedy trial.” Id. Petitioner asserts that “[he] do[esn't] care what reasson [sic] the courts had of denying [him] [his] trial.” Id. Petitioner further asserts that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing. Id. Second, Petitioner claims his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment was violated. Petition (Doc. 1) at 8. Petitioner alleges that “[o]n June 24, 2015 [he] was 7 months unlawfully detained [and] . . . was schedule[d] to start trial for an aggravated DUI case.” Id. Petitioner maintains that “[b]ecause of the State's actions [he has] lost [his] life, liberty, [his] free will, [his] employment, [his] residence and [his] vehicle[, ] [and] [a]ll this pain, anguish, and torment is being inflicted upon [him] for no reasson [sic].” Id. Petitioner further contends that he has “lost [his] unreplaceable moments with [his family]” due to the State's actions. Id. Finally, Petitioner asserts that “[n]o aggravated assault took place.” Id. at 9. Petitioner argues that upon cross-examination “both officers made it very clear that they felt no pain, didn't suffer any finacial [sic] loses [sic], didn't need to speak to a psych to help [them] cope with what happen [sic], didn't lose any sleep, both officers can walk, run, jump, do push ups [sic], and work out just fine.” Petition (Doc. 1) at 9.
The Court does not include Ground One which was previously dismissed by Judge Zipps.
On January 29, 2019, Respondents filed their Answer (Doc. 35), and Petitioner replied (Doc. 37).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. In General
The federal courts shall “entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added). Moreover, a petition for habeas corpus by a person in state custody:
shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim - (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1398, 179 L.Ed.2d 557 (2011). Correcting errors of state law is not the province of federal habeas corpus relief. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67, 112 S.Ct. 475, 480, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991). Ultimately, “[t]he statute's design is to ‘further the principles of comity, finality, and federalism.'” Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 945, 127 S.Ct. 2842, 2854, 168 L.Ed.2d 662 (2007) (quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 337, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003)). Furthermore, this standard is difficult to meet and highly deferential “for evaluating state-court rulings, [and] which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 181, 131 S.Ct. at 1398 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 110 Stat. 1214, mandates the standards for federal habeas review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The “AEDPA erects a formidable barrier to federal habeas relief for prisoners whose claims have been adjudicated in state court.” Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 19, 134 S.Ct. 10, 16, 187 L.Ed.2d 348 (2013). Federal courts reviewing a petition for habeas corpus must “presume the correctness of state courts' factual findings unless applicants rebut this presumption with ‘clear and convincing evidence.'” Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473-74, 127 S.Ct. 1933, 1940, 167 L.Ed.2d 836 (2007) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)). Moreover, on habeas review, the federal courts must consider whether the state court's determination was unreasonable, not merely incorrect. Id., 550 U.S. at 473, 127 S.Ct. at 1939; Gulbrandson v. Ryan, 738 F.3d 976, 987 (9th Cir. 2013). Such a determination is unreasonable where a state court properly identifies the governing legal principles delineated by the Supreme Court, but when the court applies the principles to the facts before it, arrives at a different result. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 131 S.Ct. 770, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000); see also Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 905 (9th Cir. 2004). “AEDPA requires ‘a state prisoner [to] show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error . . . beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.'” Burt, 134 S.Ct. at 10 (quoting Harrington, 562 U.S. at 103, 131 S.Ct. at 786-87) (alterations in original).
B. Exhaustion of State Remedies
Prior to application for a writ of habeas corpus, a person in state custody must exhaust all of the remedies available in the State courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). This “provides a simple and clear instruction to potential litigants: before you bring any claims to federal court, be sure that you first have taken each one to state court.” Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 520, 102 S.Ct. 1198, 1204, 71 L.Ed.2d 379 (1982). As such, the exhaustion doctrine gives the State “the opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of its prisoners' federal rights.” Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29, 124 S.Ct. 1347, 1349, 158 L.Ed.2d 64 (2004) (internal quotations omitted). Moreover, “[t]he exhaustion doctrine is principally designed to protect the state courts' role in the enforcement of federal law and prevent disruption of state judicial proceedings.” Rose, 455 U.S. at 518, 102 S.Ct. at 1203 (internal citations omitted). This upholds the doctrine of comity which “teaches that one court should defer action on causes properly within its jurisdiction until the courts of another sovereignty with concurrent powers, and already cognizant of the litigation, have had an opportunity to pass upon the matter.” Id. (quoting Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204, 70 S.Ct. 587, 590, 94 L.Ed. 761 (1950)).
Section 2254(c) provides that claims “shall not be deemed . . . exhausted” so long as the applicant “has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure the question presented.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c). “[O]nce the federal claim has been fairly presented to the state courts, the exhaustion requirement is satisfied.” Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275, 92 S.Ct. 509, 512, 30 L.Ed.2d 438 (1971). The fair presentation requirement mandates that a state prisoner must alert the state court “to the presence of a federal claim” in his petition, simply labeling a claim “federal” or expecting the state court to read beyond the four corners of the petition is insufficient. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 31-33, 124 S.Ct. 1347, 1351, 158 L.Ed.2d 64 (2004) (rejecting petitioner's assertion that his claim had been “fairly presented” because his brief in the state appeals court did not indicate that “he was complaining about a violation of federal law” and finding the justices' opportunity to read a lower court decision addressing the federal claims insufficient to support fair presentation); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that petitioner failed to exhaust federal due process issue in state court because petitioner presented claim in state court only on state grounds). Furthermore, in order to “fairly present” one's claims, the prisoner must do so “in each appropriate state court.” Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 29, 124 S.Ct. at 1349. “Generally, a petitioner satisfies the exhaustion requirement if he properly pursues a claim (1) throughout the entire direct appellate process of the state, or (2) throughout one entire judicial postconviction process available in the state.” Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 916 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Liebman & Hertz, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure, § 23.3b (9th ed. 1998)).
In Arizona, however, for non-capital cases “review need not be sought before the Arizona Supreme Court in order to exhaust state remedies.” Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Crowell v. Knowles, 483 F.Supp.2d 925 (D. Ariz. 2007); Moreno v. Gonzalez, 192 Ariz. 131, 962 P.2d 205 (1998). Additionally, the Supreme Court has further interpreted § 2254(c) to recognize that once the state courts have ruled upon a claim, it is not necessary for an applicant to seek collateral relief for the same issues already decided upon direct review. Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 350, 109 S.Ct. 1056, 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 380 (1989).
C. Procedural Default
“A habeas petitioner who has defaulted his federal claims in state court meets the technical requirements for exhaustion; there are no state remedies any longer ‘available' to him.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 732, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2555, 115 L.Ed.2d 650 (1991). Moreover, federal courts “will not review a question of federal law decided by a state court if the decision of that court rests on a state law ground that is independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment.” Id., 501 U.S. at 728, 111 S.Ct. at 2254. This is true whether the state law basis is substantive or procedural. Id. (citations omitted). Such claims are considered procedurally barred from review. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977).
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals explained the difference between exhaustion and procedural default as follows:
The exhaustion doctrine applies when the state court has never been presented with an opportunity to consider a petitioner's claims and that opportunity may still be available to the petitioner under state law. In contrast, the procedural default rule barring consideration of a federal claim applies only when a state court has been presented with the federal claim, but declined to reach the issue for procedural reasons, or if it is clear that the state court would hold the claim procedurally barred. Franklin v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1230 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Thus, in some circumstances, a petitioner's failure to exhaust a federal claim in state court may cause a procedural default. See Sandgathe v. Maass, 314 F.3d 371, 376 (9th Cir. 2002); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002) (“A claim is procedurally defaulted ‘if the petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies and the court to which the petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred.'”) (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n. 1, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991)).Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 621 n. 5 (9th Cir. 2005). Thus, a prisoner's habeas petition may be precluded from federal review due to procedural default in two ways. First, where the petitioner presented his claims to the state court, which denied relief based on independent and adequate state grounds. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 728, 111 S.Ct. at 2554. Federal courts are prohibited from review in such cases because they have “no power to review a state law determination that is sufficient to support the judgment, resolution of any independent federal ground for the decision could not affect the judgment and would therefore be advisory.” Id. Second, where a “petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies and the court to which the petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred.” Id. At 735 n.1, 111 S.Ct. at 2557 n.1 (citations omitted). Thus, the federal court “must consider whether the claim could be pursued by any presently available state remedy.” Cassett, 406 F.3d at 621 n.6 (quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
Where a habeas petitioner's claims have been procedurally defaulted, the federal courts are prohibited from subsequent review unless the petitioner can show cause and actual prejudice as a result. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1068, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (holding that failure to raise claims in state appellate proceeding barred federal habeas review unless petitioner demonstrated cause and prejudice); see also Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 534, 106 S.Ct. 2661, 2666, 91 L.Ed.2d 434 (1986) (recognizing “that a federal habeas court must evaluate appellate defaults under the same standards that apply when a defendant fails to preserve a claim at trial.”). “[T]he existence of cause for a procedural default must ordinarily turn on whether the prisoner can show that some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel's efforts to comply with the State's procedural rule.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2645, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986); see also Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1996) (petitioner failed to offer any cause “for procedurally defaulting his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, [as such] there is no basis on which to address the merits of his claims.”). In addition to cause, a habeas petitioner must show actual prejudice, meaning that he “must show not merely that the errors . . . created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.” Murray, 477 U.S. at 494, 106 S.Ct. at 2648 (emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted). Without a showing of both cause and prejudice, a habeas petitioner cannot overcome the procedural default and gain review by the federal courts. Id., 106 S.Ct. at 2649.
The Supreme Court has recognized, however, that “the cause and prejudice standard will be met in those cases where review of a state prisoner's claim is necessary to correct ‘a fundamental miscarriage of justice.'” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 135, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 1572-73, 71 L.Ed.2d 783 (1982)). “The fundamental miscarriage of justice exception is available ‘only where the prisoner supplements his constitutional claim with a colorable showing of factual innocence.'” Herrara v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404, 113 S.Ct. 853, 862, 122 L.Ed.2d 203 (1993) (emphasis in original) (quoting Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 454, 106 S.Ct. 2616, 2627, 91 L.Ed.2d 364 (1986)). Thus, “‘actual innocence' is not itself a constitutional claim, but instead a gateway through which a habeas petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred constitutional claim considered on the merits.” Herrara, 506 U.S. at 404, 113 S.Ct. at 862. Further, to demonstrate a fundamental miscarriage of justice, a habeas petitioner must “establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for the constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found [him] guilty of the underlying offense.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(B).
In Arizona, a petitioner's claim may be procedurally defaulted where he has waived his right to present his claim to the state court “at trial, on appeal or in any previous collateral proceeding.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3) (2018). “If an asserted claim is of sufficient constitutional magnitude, the state must show that the defendant ‘knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently' waived the claim.” Id., 2002 cmt. Neither Rule 32.2. nor the Arizona Supreme Court has defined claims of “sufficient constitutional magnitude” requiring personal knowledge before waiver. See id.; see also Stewart v. Smith, 202 Ariz. 446, 46 P.3d 1067 (2002). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that this assessment “often involves a fact-intensive inquiry” and the “Arizona state courts are better suited to make these determinations.” Cassett, 406 F.3d at 622.
III. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
A. Timeliness
As a threshold matter, the Court must consider whether Petitioner's petition is barred by the statute of limitation. See White v. Klizkie, 281 F.3d 920, 921-22 (9th Cir. 2002). The AEDPA mandates that a one-year statute of limitations applies to applications for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in state custody. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Section 2244(d)(1) provides that the limitations period shall run from the latest of:
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by the State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1); Shannon v. Newland, 410 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 2005). “The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Respondents do not dispute the timeliness of Aguilera's petition, and the Court has independently reviewed the records and finds that the Petition (Doc. 1) is timely pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Ground Two: Speedy Trial
Petitioner asserts a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. Petition (Doc. 1) at 7. Petitioner alleges that “[o]n June 24, 2015, [he] was 7 months incarcerated 2 months past the 150 days required under rule 8.2(a)(1).” Id. Petitioner contends that same day he was scheduled to start trial, but “[w]hen [he] heard [his] trial court [sic] being reschedule [sic] [he] invoked [his] 6th amendment right of a speedy trial.” Id. Petitioner asserts that “[he] do[esn't] care what reasson [sic] the courts had of denying [him] [his] trial.” Id. Petitioner further asserts that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing. Id. Respondents assert that “[t]he Arizona Court of Appeals correctly identified Petitioner's federal constitutional right to a speedy trial, as well as the four controlling factors set forth by the United States Supreme Court for evaluating claims involving speedy trials.” Answer (Doc. 35) at 12 (citations omitted).
1. Legal Standards
The Sixth Amendment guarantees that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speed . . . trial[.]” U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Supreme Court of the United States has described “[t]he speedy-trial right [a]s ‘amorphous,' ‘slippery,' and ‘necessarily relative.'” Vermont v. Brillon, 556 U.S. 81, 89, 129 S.Ct. 1283, 1290, 173 L.Ed.2d 231 (2009) (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972)). “In Barker, the Court refused to ‘quantif[y]' the right ‘into a specified number of days or months' or to hinge the right on a defendant's explicit request for a speedy trial.” Brillon, 556 U.S. at 89, 129 S.Ct. at 1290 (alterations in original) (citing Barker, 407 at 522-25, 92 S.Ct. 2182). The Court further observed that “[t]he States, of course, are free to prescribe a reasonable period consistent with constitutional standards, but our approach must be less precise.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 523, 92 S.Ct. at 2188; see also State v. Wassenaar, 215 Ariz. 565, 571, 161 P.3d 608, 614 (“the right to a speedy trial afforded by Rule 8[, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, ] is more strict than that provided by the United States Constitution.”). In assessing “whether a particular defendant has been deprived of his right” to a speedy trial, courts should consider inter alia the “[l]ength of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. at 2192. “[D]elay caused by the defense weighs against the defendant: “[I]f delay is attributable to the defendant, then his waiver may be given effect under standard waiver doctrine.” Brillon, 566 U.S. at 90, 129 S.Ct. at 1290 (second alteration in original) (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S.Ct. 2182)). “[N]one of the[se] four factors . . . [are] a necessary of sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial[, ] . . . [they] have no talismanic qualities[, ] [and] courts must still engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 533, 92 S.Ct. at 2193.
2. State Court Proceedings
On direct appeal, Petitioner argued that his “conviction was in violation of [his] 6th amendment right to a fast and speedy trail [sic] being violated is because on June 24, 2015 [he] was 7 months incarserated [sic] 2 months past the 150 days required under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 8.2(a)(1) [his] case was never determine [sic] to be complex there should be absolutly [sic] no reason for [him] to be having a difficult time getting the courts to acknowledge [his] constitutional rights.” Answer (Doc. 35), Petr.'s Suppl. Opening Br. in Propria Persona, State v. Aguilera, No. 1 CA-CR16-0848 (Ariz.Ct.App. July 24, 2017) (Exh. “E”) (Doc. 35-1) at 40. The appellate court held that “Appellant's Rule 11 hearing f[e]ll[] under th[e] exception [excluding delays that result from hearings to determine competency or intellectual disability from the computation of the 150 day time limit], . . . thus, toll[ing] the calculation of time to start Appellant's trial.” Answer (Doc. 35), State v. Aguilera, No. 1 CA-CR 16-0848, Mem. Decision (Ariz.Ct.App. Sept. 26, 2017) (Exh. “F”) at 73-74. The appellate court further noted that “Appellant's time deadline for trial was also properly tolled due to Appellant's own requests for continuances.” Id. at 74 n.3 (citing Ariz. R. Crim. P. 8.4(c), (e)). Moreover, the appellate court observed that “even if Appellant [wa]s correct in claiming that his trial was untimely, there was no fundamental error that would require reversal[, ]” because Appellant neither alleged nor did the record reflect that he suffered any prejudice. Id. at 74.
3. Analysis
Petitioner asserts that “[t]he rule 11 process is a waste of time, its garbage[, ] . . . [and] [he] do[es]n't care what reasson [sic] the courts have of denying [him] [his] trial.” Reply (Doc. 37) at 4. Petitioner's opinion, however, does not demonstrate that the Arizona courts' decisions regarding the tolling of his speedy trial rights are contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law or based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 698-99, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 1852, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002). The Arizona appellate court properly considered the factors outlined by the Supreme Court in Barker in reaching its determination that Petitioner's speedy trial rights were not violated.
It is unclear whether Petitioner's Sixth Amendment claim is directed to his trial for aggravated assault or to his trial for aggravated D.U.I. The Court presumes that Petitioner argued the former and the state court considered the same. This Court lacks jurisdiction to consider issues that arose in Petitioner's case for aggravated D.U.I. See Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401, 95 S.Ct. 2330, 2334, 45 L.Ed.2d 272 (1975) (“[A] federal court has neither the power to render advisory opinions nor to decide questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before them.”).
Accordingly, this Court finds that the Arizona courts did not unreasonably apply clearly established Federal law or unreasonably determine the facts in light of the evidence presented, and Petitioner cannot meet his burden to show prejudice. See Gulbrandson v. Ryan, 738 F.3d 976, 991 (9th Cir. 2013). Petitioner's alleged speedy trial violation is without merit.
The Court further finds that Petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. Section 2254, Title 28, United States Code, provides in relevant part:
(e)(2) If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim unless the applicant shows that-
(A) the claim relies on-
(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or
(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence; and
(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.28 U.S.C. § 2254 (emphasis added). Petitioner has not met this burden. Petitioner's claim is neither a new rule of constitutional law nor does it rely on a previously undiscoverable factual predicate. See Id. As such, Petitioner's demand for an evidentiary hearing is denied.
B. Ground Three: Eighth Amendment
Petitioner asserts that his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment was violated. Petition (Doc. 1) at 8. Petitioner alleges that “[o]n June 24, 2015 [he] was 7 months unlawfully detained [and] . . . was schedule[d] to start trial for an aggravated DUI case.” Id. Petitioner maintains that “[b]ecause of the State's actions [he has] lost [his] life, liberty, [his] free will, [his] employment, [his] residence and [his] vehicle[, ] [and] [a]ll this pain, anguish, and torment is being inflicted upon [him] for no reasson [sic].” Id. Petitioner further contends that he has “lost [his] unreplaceable moments with [his family]” due to the State's actions. Id. Respondents observe that Petitioner's “argument does not . . . provide facts [on which] to base an Eighth Amendment violation[, ] [and] [he] again appears to challenge his convictions in a separate matter, which is not a proper legal basis to challenge the length of his sentences in this matter.” Answer (Doc. 35) at 15 (citations omitted). The Court agrees with Respondents.
On direct appeal, Petitioner urged that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated because “the state has never had any legal right to have me falsely incarserated [sic].” Answer (Doc. 35), Petr.'s Suppl. Opening Br. in Propria Persona, State v. Aguilera, No. 1 CA-CR16-0848 (Ariz.Ct.App. July 24, 2017) (Exh. “E”) (Doc. 35-1) at 43. Petitioner asserted that he was wrongly accused of driving with a suspended license in conjunction with his aggravated DUI charge. Id. at 43-47. The appellate court observed:
At trial, the court informed Appellant that it had no power during that proceeding to decide any issue related to Appellant's previous aggravated D.U.I. charges and convictions. The court further explained that even if Appellant was found to be wrongfully convicted or incarcerated for aggravated D.U.I., that finding would not affect Appellant's charges and trial for aggravated assault. The court explained to Appellant numerous times that his sentence and imprisonment as it related to the aggravated D.U.I. convictions had no bearing on his aggravated assault charges. The trial court's explanations were legally correct, and we find no error. Further, to the extent that Appellant wishes to challenge the constitutionality of the D.U.I. laws, he must do so in a separate appeal of his aggravated D.U.I. convictions.Answer (Doc. 35), State v. Aguilera, No. 1 CA-CR 16-0848, Mem. Decision (Ariz.Ct.App. Sept. 26, 2017) (Exh. “F”) at 74-75.
The Eighth Amendment provides “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII. “Eighth amendment analysis focuses on the sentence imposed for each specific crime, not on the cumulative sentence.” United States v. Aiello, 864 F.2d 257, 265 (2d Cir. 1988). Moreover, “[F]ederal courts should be reluctant to review legislatively mandated terms of imprisonment, and that successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences should be exceedingly rare.” Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 21, 123 S.Ct. 1179, 1186, 155 L.Ed.2d 106 (2003) (quoting Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 374, 102 S.Ct. 703, 70 L.Ed.2d 556 (1982)).
Here, it is undisputed that Petitioner continues to seek relief arising from his incarceration resulting from his aggravated driving under the influence case. Nothing in his arguments regarding the Eighth Amendment relate to the aggravated assault charges that gave rise to the instant habeas petition. Petitioner has failed to show how the Arizona courts' decisions regarding any alleged Eighth Amendment violation are contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law or based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 698-99, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 1852, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002). As such, Petitioner's claim is without merit.
C. Ground Four: Sufficiency of the Evidence
Petitioner asserts that “[n]o aggravated assault took place.” Petition (Doc. 1) at 9. In support of this contention, Petitioner points to the apparent lack of serious injuries sustained by the officers. Id. Respondents assert that “the court of appeals correctly held[] [that] there was sufficient evidence of Petitioner's convictions because, contrary to his arguments, he did not need to inflict serious physical injury on the officers to be convicted of aggravated assault.” Answer (Doc. 35) at 17 (citations omitted).
On direct appeal, Petitioner asserted that cross-examination of the aggrieved officers showed that neither suffered serious injury and that he “caught this case for standing up for [him]self.” Answer (Doc. 35), Petr.'s Suppl. Opening Br. in Propria Persona, State v. Aguilera, No. 1 CA-CR16-0848 (Ariz.Ct.App. July 24, 2017) (Exh. “E”) (Doc. 35-1) at 40-42. The appellate court observed that “Appellant's argument mischaracterize[d] the nature of the charges.” Id. at 75. The appellate court reviewed Count I, in which “the State charged Appellant with intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causing physical injury to an employee of the Maricopa County Sherriff's Office acting in his official capacity[, ]” and Count II which “charged Appellant with knowingly touching Officer Blood, an employee of the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office acting in his official capacity, with the intent to injure, insult, or provoke the officer.” Id. at 75 (citing A.R.S. §§ 13-1203(A)(1), (3), 13-1204(A)(8)(a)). The appellate court noted that as to Count I, “[t]here [wa]s no requirement . . . that the assault victim suffer substantial, permanent, or serious harm[, ]” and as to Count II, “the State did not need to prove injury[, ]” merely contact. Id. The appellate court held that the State met its burden for both counts. Answer (Doc. 35), Exh. “F” at 75. Finally, the appellate court held that Appellant's claim that he acted in self-defense was “inapplicable in this situation[, ]” noting that “[e]ven if Appellant [wa]s correct in his assertion that he was wrongfully detained on June 24, 2015, he was still not allowed to use physical force to prevent the detention officers from lawfully fulfilling their job duties.” Id. at 75-76. After a review of the entire record, the appellate court found “[t]he evidence presented at trial was substantial and support[ed] the verdicts.” Id. at 76.
The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized that “it is the responsibility of the jury-not the court-to decide what conclusions should be drawn from evidence admitted at trial.” Cavazos v. Smith, 565 U.S. 1, 2, 132 S.Ct. 2, 4, 181 L.Ed.2d 311 (2011) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 433 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)). Furthermore, “[a] reviewing court may set aside the jury's verdict on the ground of insufficient evidence only if no rational trier of fact could have agreed with the jury.” Id. A federal court's simple disagreement with the state court's findings is insufficient to overturn a state court decision, rather the state court's findings must be “objectively unreasonable.” Id. (citing Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773, 130 S.Ct. 1855, 1862, 176 L.Ed.2d 678 (2010). Thus, sufficiency of the evidence claims “face a high bar in federal habeas proceedings because they are subject to two layers of judicial deference.” Coleman v. Johnson, 566 U.S. 650, 651, 132 S.Ct. 2060, 2062, 182 L.Ed.2d 978 (2012).
Here, the appellate court reviewed the relevant Arizona statutes and found that “the State met its burden of showing that Officer Norris suffered physical injury through testimony that he scraped his hands and through phot evidence of the injuries” and “by producing evidence that Appellant's feet made contact with Officer Blood's legs multiple times and by showing that Appellant kicked or intended to kick Officer Blood.” Answer (Doc. 35), Exh. “F” at 75. Petitioner has failed to show that “no rational trier of fact could have agreed with the jury” or that the state court's findings were “objectively unreasonable.” As such, Petitioner's claim regarding the sufficiency of the evidence is without merit.
V. CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds that Petitioner Eduardo Aguilera's habeas claims are without merit and recommends that his Petition (Doc. 1) be denied. The Court further finds that Petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing.
VI. RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons delineated above, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Judge enter an order DENYING Petitioner's Petition Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody (Non-Death Penalty) (Doc. 1).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72(b)(2), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, any party may serve and file written objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to another party's objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). No. replies shall be filed unless leave is granted from the District Judge. If objections are filed, the parties should use the following case number: CV-18-02660-PHX-SHR.
Failure to file timely objections to any factual or legal determination of the Magistrate Judge may result in waiver of the right of review.