Opinion
CV 22-08185-PCT-JAT (MTM)
12-08-2022
Daniel CV Aguilar, Plaintiff, v. Charles Wynn, et al., Defendants.
ORDER
James A. Teilborg Senior United States District Judge
I. Procedural History
On October 6, 2022, Plaintiff Daniel CV Aguilar, who is confined in the Arizona State Prison Complex-Yuma, filed a pro se civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and a deficient Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. In an October 12, 2022 Order, the Court denied the Application to Proceed with leave to refile within 30 days.
On October 24, 2022, Plaintiff filed an Amended Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. In a November 4, 2022 Order, the Court granted the Amended Application to Proceed and dismissed the Complaint because Plaintiff had failed to state a claim. The Court gave Plaintiff 30 days to file an amended complaint that cured the deficiencies identified in the Order.
On November 28, 2022, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint (Doc. 9). The Court will order Defendants Wynn, Pizzi, and Syzmanski to answer the First Amended Complaint and will dismiss Defendant Winn without prejudice. ....
II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints
The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)-(2).
A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 does not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.
“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff's specific factual allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must assess whether there are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant's conduct. Id. at 681.
But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, courts must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'” Id. (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). ....
III. First Amended Complaint
In his one-count First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff sues Chino Valley Police Department Chief Charles Wynn, Sergeant Winn, and Officers Syzmanski and Pizzi. Plaintiff asserts a Fourteenth Amendment claim for denial of due process and “judicial deception.” He seeks monetary relief.
Plaintiff alleges the following:
On May 3, 2021, Defendant Wynn had Plaintiff arrested on a failure-to-appear warrant. Until that time, Plaintiff had never had contact with the Chino Valley Police Department or any other Yavapai County law enforcement agency. During the arrest, Defendant Pizzi forcefully threw Plaintiff against his truck and then to the ground and handcuffed him. Defendant Pizzi told Plaintiff he was under arrest for a failure-to-appear warrant and placed him into a police vehicle. Defendants Pizzi and Syzmanski asked Plaintiff for permission to enter his residence and search it for items that belonged to a friend who had been staying with Plaintiff for a few days. Plaintiff refused, and he was told he was also being charged with petty theft for items his friends had brought into his residence. Plaintiff was taken to the Chino Valley Police Department while “they” waited to obtain a search warrant for his residence. The failure-to-appear and petty theft charges ultimately were dismissed.
Plaintiff claims the events described above “all c[a]me about based upon the judicial deception of a bogus failure to appear warrant.” He asserts that due to the “manufacturing of the failure to appear warrant,” his arrest was “committed under false probable cause.” Plaintiff alleges Defendant Winn “approved this conduct because when [Plaintiff] told [Winn] he did nothing.” Plaintiff claims Defendant Wynn “has approved [the] conduct because he has refused to discipline these officers['] prior similar conduct.”
IV. Failure to State a Claim
To prevail in a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show that (1) acts by the defendants (2) under color of state law (3) deprived him of federal rights, privileges or immunities and (4) caused him damage. Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1163-64 (9th Cir.2005) (quoting Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. Idaho Fish & Game Comm'n, 42 F.3d 1278, 1284 (9th Cir. 1994)). In addition, a plaintiff must allege that he suffered a specific injury as a result of the conduct of a particular defendant and he must allege an affirmative link between the injury and the conduct of that defendant. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 37172, 377 (1976).
Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972), conclusory and vague allegations will not support a cause of action. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Further, a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled. Id.
Plaintiff designates his claim as a one for “judicial deception,” but his allegations suggest he intends to assert a false arrest claim. “False arrest, a species of false imprisonment, is the detention of a person without his consent and without lawful authority.” Donahoe v. Arpaio, 869 F.Supp.2d 1020, 1064 (D. Ariz. 2012) (quoting Reams v. City of Tucson, 701 P.2d 598, 601 (Ariz.Ct.App. 1985)), aff'd sub nom. Stapley v. Pestalozzi, 733 F.3d 804 (9th Cir. 2013). Under Arizona law, false imprisonment and false arrest consist of non-consensual detention of a person “without lawful authority.” Slade v. City of Phx., 541 P.2d 550, 552 (Ariz. 1975). “Reflective of the fact that false imprisonment consists of detention without legal process, a false imprisonment ends once the victim becomes held pursuant to such process-when, for example, he is bound over by a magistrate or arraigned on charges.” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 389 (2007) (emphasis in original).
To state a § 1983 claim for false arrest, Plaintiff must show that Defendants made the arrest without probable cause or other justification. Gravelet-Blondin v. Shelton, 728 F.3d 1086, 1097 (9th Cir. 2013). “‘Probable cause exists if the arresting officers ‘had knowledge and reasonably trustworthy information of facts and circumstances sufficient to lead a prudent person to believe that [the arrestee] had committed or was committing a crime.'” Id. at 1097-98 (quoting Maxwell v. County of San Diego, 697 F.3d 941, 951 (9th Cir. 2012)); see also Edgerly v. City & County of S.F., 599 F.3d 946, 953 (9th Cir. 2010) (“To determine whether the Officers had probable cause at the time of the arrest, we consider ‘whether at that moment the facts and circumstances within [the Officers'] knowledge . . . were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the petitioner had committed or was committing an offense.'” (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964))). “[P]robable cause supports an arrest so long as the arresting officers had probable cause to arrest the suspect for any criminal offense, regardless of their stated reason for the arrest.” Edgerly, 599 F.3d at 954 (emphasis added). “If an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.” Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001).
“[A] claim for false arrest turns only on whether probable cause existed to arrest a defendant, and . . . it is not relevant whether probable cause existed with respect to each individual charge, or, indeed, any charge actually invoked by the arresting officer at the time of arrest.” Jaegly v. Couch, 439 F.3d 149, 154 (2d Cir. 2006); see also Price v. Roark, 256 F.3d 364, 369 (5th Cir. 2001) (“Claims for false arrest focus on the validity of the arrest, not on the validity of each individual charge made during the course of the arrest.”). “Thus . . . ‘[i]f there was probable cause for any of the charges made . . . then the arrest was supported by probable cause, and the claim for false arrest fails.'” Price, 256 F.3d at 369 (quoting Wells v. Bonner, 45 F.3d 90, 95 (5th Cir. 1995)); see also Barry v. Fowler, 902 F.2d 770, 773 n.5 (9th Cir. 1990) (no unconstitutional seizure where police had probable cause to arrest plaintiff for one offense, even if police lacked probable cause to arrest for a second offense).
Plaintiff's allegations against Defendant Winn are too vague and conclusory to state a claim. Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant Winn was in any way involved in the issuance of the failure-to-appear warrant, Plaintiff's arrest, or his subsequent charges. Thus, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Defendant Winn, who will be dismissed. ....
V. Claims for Which an Answer Will be Required
Liberally construed, Plaintiff has stated a Fourth Amendment false arrest claim against Defendants Wynn, Pizzi, and Syzmanski. The Court will require Defendants Wynn, Pizzi, and Syzmanski to answer the First Amended Complaint.
VI. Warnings
A. Release
If Plaintiff is released while this case remains pending, and the filing fee has not been paid in full, Plaintiff must, within 30 days of his release, either (1) notify the Court that he intends to pay the unpaid balance of his filing fee within 120 days of his release or (2) file a non-prisoner application to proceed in forma pauperis. Failure to comply may result in dismissal of this action.
B. Address Changes
Plaintiff must file and serve a notice of a change of address in accordance with Rule 83.3(d) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff must not include a motion for other relief with a notice of change of address. Failure to comply may result in dismissal of this action.
C. Copies
Plaintiff must serve Defendants, or counsel if an appearance has been entered, a copy of every document that he files. Fed.R.Civ.P. 5(a). Each filing must include a certificate stating that a copy of the filing was served. Fed.R.Civ.P. 5(d). Also, Plaintiff must submit an additional copy of every filing for use by the Court. See LRCiv 5.4. Failure to comply may result in the filing being stricken without further notice to Plaintiff.
D. Possible Dismissal
If Plaintiff fails to timely comply with every provision of this Order, including these warnings, the Court may dismiss this action without further notice. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) (a district court may dismiss an action for failure to comply with any order of the Court). ....
IT IS ORDERED:
(1) Defendant Winn is dismissed without prejudice.
(2) Defendants Wynn, Pizzi, and Syzmanski must answer the First Amended Complaint.
(3) The Clerk of Court must send Plaintiff a service packet including the First Amended Complaint (Doc. 9), this Order, and both summons and request for waiver forms for Defendants Wynn, Pizzi, and Syzmanski.
(4) Plaintiff must complete and return the service packet to the Clerk of Court within 21 days of the date of filing of this Order. The United States Marshal will not provide service of process if Plaintiff fails to comply with this Order.
(5) If Plaintiff does not either obtain a waiver of service of the summons or complete service of the Summons and First Amended Complaint on a Defendant within 90 days of the filing of the Complaint or within 60 days of the filing of this Order, whichever is later, the action may be dismissed as to each Defendant not served. Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m); LRCiv 16.2(b)(2)(B)(ii).
(6) The United States Marshal must retain the Summons, a copy of the First Amended Complaint, and a copy of this Order for future use.
(7) The United States Marshal must notify Defendants of the commencement of this action and request waiver of service of the summons pursuant to Rule 4(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 4(j)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 4.1(c) of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure. The notice to Defendants must include a copy of this Order.
(8) A Defendant who agrees to waive service of the Summons and First Amended Complaint must return the signed waiver forms to the United States Marshal, not the Plaintiff, within 30 days of the date of the notice and request for waiver of service pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(1)(F) to avoid being charged the cost of personal service.
(9) The Marshal must immediately file signed waivers of service of the summons. If a waiver of service of summons is returned as undeliverable or is not returned by a Defendant within 30 days from the date the request for waiver was sent by the Marshal, the Marshal must:
(a) personally serve copies of the Summons, First Amended Complaint, and this Order upon Defendant pursuant to Rule 4(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and
(b) within 10 days after personal service is effected, file the return of service for Defendant, along with evidence of the attempt to secure a waiver of service of the summons and of the costs subsequently incurred in effecting service upon Defendant. The costs of service must be enumerated on the return of service form (USM-285) and must include the costs incurred by the Marshal for photocopying additional copies of the Summons, First Amended Complaint, or this Order and for preparing new process receipt and return forms (USM-285), if required. Costs of service will be taxed against the personally served Defendant pursuant to Rule 4(d)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, unless otherwise ordered by the Court.
(10) Defendants Wynn, Pizzi, and Syzmanski must answer the First Amended Complaint or otherwise respond by appropriate motion within the time provided by the applicable provisions of Rule 12(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
(11) Any answer or response must state the specific Defendant by name on whose behalf it is filed. The Court may strike any answer, response, or other motion or paper that does not identify the specific Defendant by name on whose behalf it is filed.
(12) This matter is referred to Magistrate Judge Michael T. Morrissey pursuant to Rules 72.1 and 72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure for all pretrial proceedings as authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).