Opinion
B335446
09-24-2024
JOSEPH AGUILAR, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MARTHA GONZALEZ, Defendant and Appellant.
Jeffrey B. Singer for Defendant and Appellant. Anderson & LeBlanc and Jeff W. LeBlanc for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. KC070412, Peter A. Hernandez, Judge.
Jeffrey B. Singer for Defendant and Appellant.
Anderson & LeBlanc and Jeff W. LeBlanc for Plaintiff and Respondent.
KLINE, J.[*]
A jury found in favor of respondent Joseph Aguilar on several contract and non-contract causes of action that he brought against his aunt, appellant Martha Gonzalez. Without specifying the amount of damages allotted to each cause of action, the jury awarded Aguilar $199,500 in damages and determined that he was entitled to prejudgment interest. The resulting judgment awarded Aguilar "the amount of One Hundred and Ninety-Nine Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($199,500) plus pre-Judgment interest."
While appellant was erroneously sued under the name "Martha Aguilar," this Court's opinion and caption reflect her correct name.
Sixteen months later, Aguilar moved to amend the judgment to quantify the amount of "pre-Judgment interest." Over Gonzalez's opposition, the court granted the motion and awarded $188,577 in prejudgment interest. It entered an amended judgment in the amount of $388,077 (i.e., $199,500 + $188,577).
Gonzalez appeals the order granting the motion to amend the judgment. She argues that: (a) Aguilar's motion was untimely; (b) the court used an incorrect interest rate; (c) the court calculated interest using an incorrect starting date; (d) Aguilar's motion was based on hearsay; (e) the court lacked personal jurisdiction over Gonzalez; (f) Aguilar's delay in filing the motion prejudiced Gonzalez; (g) Aguilar had no excuse for his dilatory filing; (h) the court applied incorrect law; and (i) Aguilar should have asked the jury to calculate the amount of interest.
Gonzalez has forfeited most of her arguments by failing to provide us with an adequate record to evaluate them. The remaining arguments lack merit. We therefore affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
We limit our summary to the facts and procedural history relevant to the issues raised on appeal.
A. Aguilar Files a Complaint
In June 2018, Aguilar filed a complaint against Gonzalez for breach of contract, fraud, constructive trust, and breach of fiduciary duties. He alleged:
In 1994, when Aguilar was three years old, his grandparents owned certain real property in Azusa, California (the Property), that they intended to pass on to him. However, due to fear that the Property would be seized to pay medical bills for Aguilar's grandfather, the grandparents transferred the Property to Gonzalez, Aguilar's aunt, to hold in trust until Aguilar became an adult. To Aguilar's knowledge, at the time the Property was transferred, it was unencumbered by any mortgage or other debt.
In 2011, when Aguilar was 20 years old, Gonzalez delivered to him a signed and notarized grant deed, transferring the Property from her to him. Gonzalez had always acknowledged she was holding the Property on his behalf, and Aguilar agreed that Gonzalez could continue to take care of and exercise control over the Property. Because Aguilar trusted Gonzalez, he did not record the grant deed.
In 2017, Aguilar learned that Gonzalez "had been taking actions and using the property in such a manner as to impinge upon his rights and to profit Defendant at Plaintiff's expense." Specifically, Aguilar alleged on information and belief that, in 2013, Gonzalez encumbered the Property with a mortgage and used the proceeds therefrom for her own benefit. Aguilar claimed damages in a sum to be determined at trial, "but which is equivalent to the value of the [Property] which is currently estimated to be approximately $300,000, plus litigation costs and pre-Judgment interest."
B. Aguilar Amends His Complaint
In July 2021, Aguilar filed a First Amended Complaint, alleging causes of action for breach of contract, breach of constructive trust, fraud, breach of a resulting trust, breach of fiduciary duties, and money had and received. The preliminary allegations were substantively identical to those alleged in the original complaint except that, instead of alleging on information and belief that Gonzalez had encumbered the Property with a mortgage in 2013, Aguilar alleged Gonzalez had sold the Property in 2013. Aguilar still claimed damages in a sum to be determined at trial, "but which is equivalent to the value of the [Property] which is currently estimated to be approximately $300,000, plus litigation costs and pre-Judgment interest."
For the two trust causes of action, Aguilar alleged damages "in excess of $300,000.00 or an amount to be proven at trial."
C. The Court Enters Judgment
A jury trial apparently occurred. The record contains nothing to explain what happened during the trial-who testified, what evidence was introduced, what motions (if any) were filed or granted, what the parties argued, whether the operative complaint was amended to conform to proof, etc.- except for a March 2022 jury verdict form, finding in Aguilar's favor for Breach of Contract, Breach of Constructive Trust, Breach of a Resulting Trust, Breach of Fiduciary Duties, and Money Had and Received, but in Gonzalez's favor for Fraud. After a line on the verdict form stating "We award Joseph Aguilar the following damages," the jury wrote "$199,500." The jury also checked "Yes" when the form asked whether Aguilar was entitled to prejudgment interest.
In April 2022, the court entered judgment in favor of Aguilar for "the amount of One Hundred and Ninety-Nine Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($199,500) plus pre-Judgment interest." Neither the jury verdict form nor the judgment specified the rate at which the interest was to be calculated, or the amount of interest owed. Gonzalez filed a Notice of Entry of Judgment in June 2022.
D. The Court Amends the Judgment
In August 2023, Aguilar moved to amend the judgment "to reflect pre-judgment interest award." He contended he was entitled to $188,577 in pre-judgment interest, calculated by dividing $19,950 (10% of the $199,500 damages award) by 365 days to arrive at a daily interest number of $54.66, and then multiplying $54.66 by the 3,450 days between November 1, 2012 (when he claimed the Property was sold) and April 12, 2022 (when judgment was entered). In support of his motion, Aguilar asked the court to judicially notice a grant deed, transferring title from Gonzalez to "California Foreclosure Prevention Inc." The deed is dated "11/01/2012" but has a notary statement attesting that the signer appeared before the notary on "November 08, 2012." The record does not disclose whether the court granted Aguilar's request for judicial notice.
According to this motion, in August 2022, the trial court denied Gonzalez's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
In October 2023, Gonzalez opposed Aguilar's motion. She argued: (1) the motion was untimely; (2) the motion requested an incorrect interest rate; (3) the motion requested an incorrect starting date for calculating interest; (4) the motion was based on hearsay; (5) the motion was not properly served; (6) the delay in filing the motion prejudiced Gonzalez; (7) Aguilar had no excuse for the delay in filing the motion; (8) the incorrect law was applied; and (9) Aguilar failed to have the jury calculate the amount of interest owed. Aguilar's reply disputed Gonzalez's arguments.
In November 2023, the court granted Aguilar's motion, stating that "Upon reviewing the moving papers, exhibits, the opposition papers (if any), and the argument of counsel, it is hereby Ordered that . . . The Judgment in Case Number KC070412 Aguilar v. Aguilar that was entered on April 12, 2022, be Amended to the amount of $388,077." Gonzalez timely appealed. In designating the record, she chose to proceed with an appendix and without a reporter's transcript.
DISCUSSION
A. Aguilar's Motion Was Not Untimely
"When jurisdiction is . . . conferred on a Court or judicial officer, all the means necessary to carry it into effect are also given; and in the exercise of this jurisdiction, if the course of proceeding be not specifically pointed out by this Code or the statute, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which may appear most conformable to the spirit of this Code." (Code Civ. Proc., § 187.) Neither statute nor case law provides a time limit on when a motion under section 187 may be made. (Cf. Highland Springs Conference &Training Center v. City of Banning (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 267, 273 [reversing trial court's decision that motion to amend judgment under section 187 to add judgment debtor, brought four years after entry of original judgment, barred by laches]; id. at p. 287 ["It is apparent that the Legislature, in determining not to subject a section 187 motion to amend a judgment to any limitations period, does not wish to hamper courts in exercising their authority to carry their jurisdiction into effect"].)
Aguilar brought his motion to amend judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 187. The parties cite no case permitting the amendment of a judgment to specify the amount of an award of prejudgment interest, and our independent research has discovered none. However, because no party has disputed the propriety of requesting to amend the judgment in this way under section 187, we do not address this issue.
Citing various authorities, Gonzalez argues that Aguilar was required to file his motion "within the statutory time limit for motions under Code of Civil Procedure section 657." Her authorities are inapposite. They stand for the proposition that a request for entitlement to prejudgment interest must be brought within the statutory time limit for a motion for new trial, not for the proposition that, when a jury awards prejudgment interest and the judgment reflects that award, a motion to quantify that interest award is subject to the same time limit. Gonzalez therefore fails to demonstrate that Aguilar's motion was untimely.
Code of Civil Procedure section 657 discusses bases for a motion for a new trial.
(North Oakland Medical Clinic v. Rogers (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 824, 829 ["the question we address is whether plaintiffs timely requested the court to exercise its power to determine whether plaintiffs were entitled to interest under section 3287 in circumstances where damages had been awarded but no interest was included in the verdict and where neither court nor jury had determined whether the damages were liquidated or unliquidated"], italics added; id. at p. 831 ["requests for prejudgment interest under section 3287 by a successful plaintiff must be made by way of motion prior to entry of judgment, or the request must be made in the form of a motion for new trial no later than the time allowed for filing such a motion"]; Watson Bowman Acme Corp. v. RGW Construction, Inc. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 279, 292, 296-298 [plaintiff's request for prejudgment interest was timely when made less than 15 days after judgment was filed; neither verdict nor initial judgment awarded prejudgment interest]; Fairbank, Wegner & Wegner, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Trials and Evidence (The Rutter Group 2023) ¶ 17:1126 [request for prejudgment interest should be made before entry of judgment or by way of a motion for new trial].)
B. Gonzalez Forfeits Her Argument That the Incorrect Interest Rate Was Applied
While Gonzalez concedes that Aguilar would be entitled to 10 percent interest on his contract claims, she argues that he also prevailed on non-contract claims, and interest for those amounts should be calculated at 7 percent. Aguilar responds that Gonzalez's arguments "would have merit if Plaintiff's only claims were in tort; however, they were not."
Gonzalez has forfeited this argument by failing to supply an adequate record for review. "[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment." (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608-609.)" 'In the absence of a contrary showing in the record, all presumptions in favor of the trial court's action will be made by the appellate court. "[I]f any matters could have been presented to the court below which would have authorized the order complained of, it will be presumed that such matters were presented." '" (Id. at p. 609.)
Here, the record demonstrates that the jury found in Aguilar's favor on both contract and non-contract claims, and awarded total damages of $199,500. If the jury awarded Aguilar $199,500 for contract claims, then the trial court would have correctly awarded 10 percent prejudgment interest on that amount. Without an adequate record to discern what the jury actually did, we must presume the jury awarded Aguilar $199,500 for contract claims, and thus the court did not err in applying a prejudgment interest rate of 10 percent.
C. Gonzalez Forfeits Her Argument That Interest Was Calculated Using an Incorrect Starting Date
In Aguilar's motion to amend judgment, he asserted that Gonzalez sold the Property on November 1, 2012, citing to the grant deed that he asked the court to judicially notice. Aguilar then calculated interest with November 1 as the day interest began to accrue. When the court granted his motion, it ordered the previous judgment amount to be augmented by the amount of interest Aguilar had requested. In doing so, the court impliedly found that interest began to accrue on November 1, 2012.
Gonzalez argues the court erred in this implied finding both because: (1) according to the grant deed Aguilar relied on, November 1, 2012 was "not the date upon which the Deed was recorded, the transaction closed and when the money on the sale changed hands"; and (2) Aguilar's damages were unliquidated and, pursuant to Civil Code section 3287, subdivision (b), unliquidated contract damages could not accrue interest "earlier than the date the action was filed."
Gonzalez forfeits the first argument for lack of an adequate record. Even assuming she is correct regarding the grant deed not showing that the sale was consummated on November 1, 2012, without any record of what occurred at trial, or at the November 2023 hearing in which the court heard Aguilar's motion, we must presume that some admissible evidence was either referenced or presented at that hearing to support the court's determination that interest should begin to accrue on November 1, 2012. (Jameson v. Desta, supra, 5 Cal.5th at pp. 608-609.)
As for Gonzalez's second argument, she contends that Aguilar's damages were unliquidated because he "did not pray for any specific or liquidated amount of damages in his new amended complaint." But what Aguilar requested in his complaint is not determinative of his entitlement to prejudgment interest. "A person who is entitled to recover damages certain, or capable of being made certain by calculation, and the right to recover which is vested in the person upon a particular day, is entitled also to recover interest thereon from that day, except when the debtor is prevented by law, or by the act of the creditor from paying the debt." (Civ. Code, § 3287, subd. (a); see also Wisper Corp. v. California Commerce Bank (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 948, 960 ["The test for recovery of prejudgment interest under [Civil Code] section 3287, subdivision (a) is whether defendant actually know[s] the amount owed or from reasonably available information could the defendant have computed that amount"].) Without any record of what occurred at trial save the verdict form, we must assume that the jury determined that Aguilar was entitled to recover an amount of damages that Gonzalez either knew or could have calculated, and thus was entitled to prejudgment interest under Civil Code section 3287, subdivision (a). (Jameson v. Desta, supra, 5 Cal.5th at pp. 608-609.)
D. Gonzalez Has Forfeited Her Argument That the Court Should Have Denied the Motion Because It Was Based on Hearsay
Gonzalez contends that, because the grant deed Aguilar asked the court to judicially notice constituted hearsay, the court lacked "documentary evidence" about what was admitted at trial, and therefore should not have granted the motion to amend judgment. Again, even were Gonzalez correct that the grant deed constituted hearsay, because Gonzalez failed to provide us with a record of what occurred at the hearing or what was admitted at trial, we must presume that some admissible evidence was either referenced or presented at the hearing to support the court's determination that interest should begin to accrue on November 1, 2012. (Jameson v. Desta, supra, 5 Cal.5th at pp. 608-609.)
E. The Court Had Jurisdiction Over Gonzalez
Gonzalez contends that because the initial motion to amend was served on Gonzalez as opposed to her counsel, Aguilar "failed to confer personal jurisdiction to the Court over Martha [Gonzalez] regarding his Motion." We disagree.
"Except as otherwise provided by statute, the court in which an action is pending has jurisdiction over a party from the time summons is served on him [or her] as provided by Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 413.10). A general appearance by a party is equivalent to personal service of summons on such party." (Code Civ. Proc., § 410.50, subd. (a).) "Jurisdiction of the court over the parties and the subject matter of an action continues throughout subsequent proceedings in the action." (Code Civ. Proc., § 410.50, subd. (b).)
Gonzalez does not dispute the court had jurisdiction over her during the pendency of the action. She cites no statute or other authority providing that the court subsequently lost jurisdiction over her for a motion to amend judgment-a "subsequent proceeding[] in the action"-because the motion was served on her, and not her counsel. Moreover, Gonzalez opposed Aguilar's motion and presumably was represented at the hearing thereon (as the court stated it had considered "the argument of counsel"). The court therefore had jurisdiction to grant Aguilar's motion and enter an amended judgment.
F. Gonzalez Fails to Establish Prejudice
Gonzalez claims that Aguilar's delay in filing his motion prejudiced her because, had he brought his motion before entry of the initial judgment, she "could have timely appealed from such awards all at once." This argument lacks merit. The initial judgment awarded Aguilar "One Hundred and Ninety-Nine Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($199,500) plus pre-Judgment interest." If Gonzalez believed that "pre-Judgment interest" was improperly awarded, nothing prevented her from appealing that judgment.
The amended judgment provides that Aguilar is awarded $388,077. This number is the total of the original judgment of $199,500 plus the $188,577 that Aguilar requested in prejudgment interest. If Gonzalez contends the interest number was erroneous, nothing prevented her from appealing the amended judgment or-as she is doing now-appealing the order granting the motion to amend the judgment. Gonzalez fails to establish prejudice.
Because we hold that Gonzalez fails to demonstrate Aguilar's motion was untimely or that she suffered prejudice from his filing of it, we need not address her argument that he lacked an excuse for the delay in filing it.
G. Gonzalez Fails to Demonstrate the Court Applied Incorrect Law
Gonzalez argues that the court erred in applying a prejudgment interest rate of 10 percent when Aguilar "cited to no case authorizing 10% interest on a tort claim, for breach of fiduciary duty, which is an express basis for his Motion." However, the jury found in Aguilar's favor on contract claims, as well. As discussed above, because the record does not disclose what amount of the awarded damages were attributable to contract claims, we must presume the correctness of the court's decision that the entire $199,500 in damages was subject to a 10 percent prejudgment interest rate.
H. It Is Irrelevant That Aguilar Could Have Asked the Jury to Calculate Interest on Non-Contract Claims
Gonzalez contends that because the jury was instructed with CACI No. 3935-Prejudgment Interest (Civ. Code, § 3288)- Aguilar should have asked the jury to make the interest calculation. She further contends that the "determination of such award is the jury's province, not the judge's."
Civil Code section 3288 provides that "[i]n an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, and in every case of oppression, fraud, or malice, interest may be given, in the discretion of the jury." However, section 3288 does not address the breach of an obligation arising from contract.
"A person who is entitled to recover damages certain, or capable of being made certain by calculation, and the right to recover which is vested in the person upon a particular day, is entitled also to recover interest thereon from that day ...." (Civ. Code, § 3287, subd. (a).) Gonzalez provides no authority that the jury was required to calculate the interest owed under Civil Code section 3287.
DISPOSITION
The trial court's order is affirmed. Respondent is awarded his costs on appeal.
We concur: BENDIX, Acting P. J., WEINGART, J.
[*]Retired Justice of the California Court of Appeal, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution