The duties set forth in Scindia apply to any independent contractor and its employees covered by the [Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act]." Aguilar v. Bollinger Shipyards, Inc. , 833 F. Supp. 2d 582, 591 (E.D. La. 2011). "As a general matter, the shipowner may rely on the stevedore to avoid exposing the longshoremen to unreasonable hazards." Scindia , 451 U.S. at 170, 101 S.Ct. 1614.
While the worker's employer "shall not be liable to the vessel for such damages directly or indirectly," the worker may bring negligence claims against the vessel owner. Id. ; seeAguilar v. Bollinger Shipyards, Inc. , 833 F. Supp. 2d 582, 591 (E.D. La. 2011) ; Jackson v. Lykes Bros. S. S. Co. , 386 U.S. 731, 87 S.Ct. 1419, 18 L.Ed.2d 488 (1967) ; Reed v. S. S. Yaka , 373 U.S. 410, 83 S.Ct. 1349, 10 L.Ed.2d 448 (1963). The crane barge OC 160 is a vessel to which the provisions of § 905(b) apply.
Id.; see Aguilar v. Bollinger Shipyards, Inc., 833 F.Supp.2d 582, 591 (E.D. La. 2011); Jackson v. Lykes Bros. S. S. Co., 386 U.S. 731 (1967); Reed v. S. S. Yaka, 373 U.S. 410 (1963). The crane barge OC 160 is a vessel to which the provisions of § 905(b) apply.
Such plaintiffs under the LHWCA may also bring negligence claims against the vessel owner. Aguilar v. Bollinger Shipyards, Inc. , 833 F. Supp. 2d 582, 591 (E.D. La. 2011) (Berrigan, J.). Vessel owners owe three general duties to longshoremen:
Id.Id. at 13–14 (citing Clay v. Daiichi Shipping , 74 F.Supp.2d 665, 673 (E.D.La.1999) ; Aguilar v. Bollinger Shipyards, Inc. , 833 F.Supp.2d 582, 592 (E.D.La.2011) ).Id. at 14 (citing Greenwood , 111 F.3d at 1248 ).
Scindia and its progeny involve the scenario of an injured longshoreman in the employ of a stevedore, but the same principles apply to cases like the instant action that involve harborworkers in the employ non-stevedore contractors working aboard a vessel. Levene v. Pintail EnterprisesBB, 943 F.2d 528 (5th Cir. 1991); Hill v. Texaco, Inc., 674 F.2d 447, 451 (5th Cir. 1982); Aguilar v. Bollinger Shipyards, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 2d 582, 591 (E.D. La. 2011). III.
Because the vessel has a reasonable expectation that the stevedore will inspect and repair hazards, courts have thus repeatedly warned parties of the limited scope of the duty to intervene, categorizing it as a “narrow duty that ‘requires something more than mere shipowner knowledge of a dangerous condition.’ ” Aguilar v. Bollinger Shipyards, Inc., 833 F.Supp.2d 582, 592 (E.D.La.2011) (quoting Singleton v. Guangzhou Ocean Shipping Co., 79 F.3d 26, 28 (5th Cir.1996) ).Here, there is no evidence that ARRC knew: (1) that the deck was slippery, (2) that Nichols' forklift had faulty brakes, or (3) that Nichols was operating the forklift at a high rate of speed around the open elevator hatch.
In general, 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) allows a plaintiff to make claims of negligence against a vessel owner. Aguilar v. Bollinger Shipyards, Inc., 2011 WL 2457703 at *7 (E.D. La. Jun. 16, 2011). Also, under general maritime law, a plaintiff may make claims concerning the unseaworthiness of a vessel against the owner or operator of that vessel.
Because the vessel owner has a reasonable expectation that the stevedore will provide a safe place to work for the longshoremen in the stevedore's employ, and also inspect the work areas, courts have described the "duty to intervene" as a "narrow duty that 'requires something more than mere shipowner knowledge of a dangerous condition.'" Aguilar v. Bollinger Shipyards, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 2d 582, 592 (E.D. La. 2011) (quoting Singleton v. Guangzhou Ocean Shipping Co., 79 F.3d 26, 28 (5th Cir. 1996)). "[I]t is the stevedore, not the shipowner, who assumes the responsibility for the safety of its employees[,]" and the vessel owner is entitled to rely on the stevedore's expertise to remedy a dangerous condition.