Aguayo v. Richardson

146 Citing cases

  1. N.Y. State Citizens' Coal. for Children v. Poole

    922 F.3d 69 (2d Cir. 2019)   Cited 37 times
    Reaffirming this "string of opinions" starting with Aguayo

    In a string of opinions, this Court has held that organizations suing under Section 1983 must, without relying on their members' injuries, assert that their own injuries are sufficient to satisfy Article III's standing requirements. Nnebe , 644 F.3d at 156-58 ; League of Women Voters v. Nassau Cty. , 737 F.2d 155, 160-61 (2d Cir. 1984) ; Aguayo v. Richardson , 473 F.2d 1090, 1099-1100 (2d Cir. 1973). To establish its own injury, an organization must show that it has suffered a "perceptible impairment" to its activities.

  2. Nnebe v. Daus

    Docket No. 09-4305-cv (2d Cir. Mar. 25, 2011)   Cited 449 times   1 Legal Analyses
    In Nnebe, the Court observed that it has “reaffirmed the Aguayo rule in League of Women Voters nine years after Warth and have not since reconsidered it.

    It is the law of this Circuit that an organization does not have standing to assert the rights of its members in a case brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as we have "interpret[ed] the rights [§ 1983] secures to be personal to those purportedly injured." League of Women Voters of Nassau Cnty. v. Nassau Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 737 F.2d 155, 160 (2d Cir. 1984) (citing Aguayo v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 1090 (2d Cir. 1974) ("Neither [the] language nor the history [of § 1983] suggests that an organization may sue under the Civil Rights Act for the violations of rights of members")). We are thus bound to agree with the district court that NYTWA cannot bring this action as the representative of its members.

  3. Beno v. Shalala

    30 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 1994)   Cited 144 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding an agency's decisions to waive federal welfare requirements that "in the judgment of the Secretary [were] likely to assist in promoting the [program's] objectives," were reviewable because the objectives of the statute were "set forth with some specificity" in the statute

    We agree. 853 F. Supp. at 1205 (citing Aguayo v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 1090 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1146, 94 S.Ct. 900, 39 L.Ed.2d 101 (1974); Crane v. Mathews, 417 F. Supp. 532, 539 (N.D.Ga. 1976); California Welfare Rights Org. v. Richardson, 348 F. Supp. 491, 497 (N.D.Cal. 1972)) (" CWRO"); cf. Georgia Hosp. Ass'n v. Department of Medical Assist., 528 F. Supp. 1348, 1355 (N.D.Ga. 1982). See also Esmeralda, 925 F.2d at 1218-19 (holding that agency decision made pursuant to a provision of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act was subject to APA review, even though the statute at issue contained even more discretionary language than § 1315(a) and its legislative history evidenced an intent to grant broad discretion).

  4. Beno v. Shalala

    853 F. Supp. 1195 (E.D. Cal. 1993)   Cited 3 times

    Perhaps for this reason, every court that has looked at section 1315 has assumed that the Secretary's waiver decisions are subject to at least limited review. See Aguayo v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 1090 (2d Cir. 1973); Crane v. Mathews, 417 F. Supp. 532 (N.D.Ga. 1976); California Welfare Rights Organization v. Richardson, 348 F. Supp. 491 (N.D.Cal. 1972). One may acknowledge that the Secretary's position is of some force particularly in light of certain of the language in Webster.

  5. Stewart v. Azar

    366 F. Supp. 3d 125 (D.D.C. 2019)   Cited 11 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Describing purpose of Medicaid

    ) Kentucky contends finally that its "interpretation of ‘independence’ is bolstered by 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-1(b)(3)(A), which permits termination of Medicaid benefits to those individuals who have had Temporary Assistance for Needy Families benefits terminated ‘because of refusing to work,’ " and the Second Circuit’s decision in Aguayo v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 1090 (2d Cir. 1973), in which it believes that the court approved a similar waiver application for a different entitlement program on the basis that it would promote beneficiaries' self-sufficiency. See Kentucky MSJ at 18–19.

  6. Athanson v. Grasso

    411 F. Supp. 1153 (D. Conn. 1976)   Cited 17 times
    In Athanson v. Grasso, 411 F. Supp. 1153, 1157 (D. Conn. 1976), the District of Connecticut (sitting as a three-judge panel) carefully considered the interpretation placed upon Allen by the Second Circuit.

    " Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at 499, 95 S.Ct. at 2205, 45 L.Ed.2d at 354. The description of the plaintiffs as "officials" in the amended complaint was apparently a reaction to two decisions in this circuit, City of New York v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 923 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 950, 93 S.Ct. 3012, 37 L.Ed.2d 1002 (1973), and Aguayo v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 1090 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1146, 94 S.Ct. 900, 39 L.Ed.2d 101 (1974). In those cases the Court of Appeals, relying upon Williams v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36, 40, 53 S.Ct. 431, 432, 77 L.Ed. 1015, 1020 (1933), and its reasoning that

  7. C. K. v. New Jersey Dept., Health, Human Ser

    92 F.3d 171 (3d Cir. 1996)   Cited 66 times
    Finding a five year AFDC § 1315 project was for the extent and period necessary

    In saying this we are not insensitive to the impact these projects may have on the lives of thousands of people, many of whom are in `brutal need[.]' Aguayo v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 1090, 1103 (2d Cir. 1973) (citations and footnotes omitted), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1146, 94 S.Ct. 900 (1974). The court in Aguayo stated that "the only limitation imposed on the Secretary was that he must judge the project to be `likely to assist in promoting the objectives'" of AFDC, and so the central question before the court was "whether the Secretary had a rational basis" for making that determination.

  8. Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre

    476 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1973)   Cited 59 times
    In Boraas we granted standing to unrelated persons living together in an apartment to challenge an ordinance limiting the right of unrelated persons to live in the same dwelling.

    But even if there were some differences in the broad language used by different panels, it would be pointless and unwise to attempt to express a standard in crystallized terms along the lines suggested by the dissent. Aguayo v. City of New York, 2 Cir. 1973, 473 F.2d 1090 at 1108-1110 (per Friendly, Waterman, Hays, C. JJ.); City of New York v. Richardson, 2 Cir. 1973, 473 F.2d 923 at 930-931 (per Kaufman, Lumbard, Mansfield, C. JJ.); Green v. Board of Education, Jan. 29, 1973, Slip Sheet 1723 at 1726-28 (per Feinberg, Lumbard, Mansfield, C. JJ.); Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 2 Cir. 1973, 476 F.2d 806 (per Mansfield, Oakes, Timbers, C. JJ.). An en banc hearing would not contribute in any significant way to clarity and coherence in the area of Equal Protection for the reason that in pursuing the elusive quest for standards we are dealing with broad general principles which must be capable of adaption to widely varying factual contexts.

  9. American Charities for Reasonable v. Shiffrin

    46 F. Supp. 2d 143 (D. Conn. 1999)   Cited 9 times

    "This Circuit has restricted organizational standing under § 1983 by interpreting the rights it secures to be personal to those purportedly injured." Id. at 160 ( citing Aguayo v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 1090 (2d Cir. 1973); Albany Welfare Rights Org. v. Wyman, 493 F.2d 1319 (2d Cir. 1974)). At issue in Aguayo was whether welfare rights organizations had standing to sue under § 1983.

  10. C.K. v. Shalala

    883 F. Supp. 991 (D.N.J. 1995)   Cited 6 times
    Noting the New Jersey Department of Human Services implemented reforms to the state's welfare program after obtaining federal approval of its waiver request and then promulgating regulations

    Indeed, while the Secretary contends that § 1315(a) waivers are one of the rare instances where agency action has been committed to agency discretion by law, this flies in the face of each court which has previously addressed the issue. See, e.g., Beno v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 1994); Aguayo v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 1090 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1146, 94 S.Ct. 900, 39 L.Ed.2d 101 (1974); Crane v. Mathews, 417 F. Supp. 532, 539 (N.D.Ga. 1976); California Welfare Rights Org. v. Richardson, 348 F. Supp. 491, 497 (N.D.Cal. 1972). This Court, too, must reject her premise.