In addition, the defendants established that they were entitled to summary judgment dismissing the cause of action alleging breach of fiduciary duty, as this claim is based upon the same alleged acts of legal malpractice (see Breslin Realty Dev. Corp. v. Shaw, 72 A.D.3d 258, 261, 893 N.Y.S.2d 95 ; Adamski v. Lama, 56 A.D.3d 1071, 1072–1073, 869 N.Y.S.2d 256 ; see also Boone v. Bender, 74 A.D.3d 1111, 1113, 904 N.Y.S.2d 467 ). The plaintiff's contention that the defendants' motion for summary judgment was premature is improperly raised for the first time on appeal and, thus, not properly before this Court (see Aglow Studios, Inc. v. Karlsson, 83 A.D.3d 747, 749, 921 N.Y.S.2d 266 ).Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the first and second causes of action.
In opposition, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact ( see Alvarez v. Prospect Hosp., 68 N.Y.2d 320, 324, 508 N.Y.S.2d 923, 501 N.E.2d 572). The plaintiffs' contention that the CGA defendants' motion should have been denied as premature is improperly raised for the first time on appeal ( see Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v. Shimon, 84 A.D.3d 861, 861, 921 N.Y.S.2d 909; Aglow Studios, Inc. v. Karlsson, 83 A.D.3d 747, 749, 921 N.Y.S.2d 266; Burgos v. Rateb, 64 A.D.3d 530, 530, 883 N.Y.S.2d 115).
The plaintiff's remaining contention, which relates to the Supreme Court's modification of the award for damages with respect to a certain sewer construction project, is not properly before this Court, as the plaintiff did not raise, in opposition to the defendants' motion, the specific contention that he now raises in this regard ( see Panteleon v. Amaya, 85 A.D.3d 993, 995, 927 N.Y.S.2d 85;Aglow Studios, Inc. v. Karlsson, 83 A.D.3d 747, 749, 921 N.Y.S.2d 266).
Accordingly, the matter must be remitted to the Supreme Court, Westchester County, for a determination of the amounts owed to Plaza for unpaid rent and a reasonable attorney's fee. The plaintiffs' claim for a rent abatement is improperly raised for the first time on appeal ( see Aglow Studios, Inc. v Karlsson, 83 AD3d 747.]; Town of Huntington v Beechwood Carmen Bldg. Corp., 82 AD3d 1203).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted Amaya's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against her. Moreover, the plaintiffs contention that Amaya's motion was premature and should have been denied pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f) is improperly raised for the first time on appeal and, thus, is not properly before this Court ( see Aglow Studios, Inc. v Karlsson, 83 AD3d 747).
The appellant's contention that the branch of the plaintiffs motion which was for summary judgment on the complaint insofar as asserted against him should have been denied as premature ( see CPLR 3212 [f]) is raised for the first time on appeal and, therefore, is not properly before us ( see Aglow Studios, Inc. v Karlsson, 83 AD3d 747 [2d Dept 2011]; Burgos v Rateb, 64 AD3d 530, 531). The appellant's remaining contention is without merit.
Plaintiffs cite no authority that the alleged wrongful acts of Eugene Gold, undertaken at a time when he was the sole shareholder of Doral, and which have not been alleged to have affected the rights of creditors, were wrongs to the corporations. (See e.g. Aglow Studios, Inc. v Karlsson, 83 AD3d 747, 748 [2d Dept 2011]; Masek v Wichelman, 67 AD3d 444, 446 [1st Dept 2009]; 546-552 W. 146th St. LLC v Arfa, 54 AD3d 543 [1st Dept 2008], lv dismissed in part & denied in part 12 NY3d 840 [2009].) The court accordingly holds that the complaint fails to state a cause of action for fraud.