Opinion
18-16553
02-18-2022
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada Gloria M. Navarro, District Judge, Presiding D.C. No. 2:17-cv-02739-GMN-CWH
Before: FERNANDEZ, TASHIMA, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Agha-Khan's request for oral argument, set forth in the opening and reply briefs, is denied.
Salma Agha-Khan, M.D., appeals pro se from the district court's judgment dismissing her action alleging federal and state law claims arising out of a foreclosure. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion the district court's application of judicial estoppel. Ah Quin v. County of Kauai Dep't of Transp., 733 F.3d 267, 270 (9th Cir. 2013). We affirm.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Agha-Khan's action on the basis of judicial estoppel. The factual allegations in the complaint established that Agha-Khan was aware of, but failed to disclose, the existence of her claims in her bankruptcy proceeding, and Agha-Khan did not show that her failure to disclose was inadvertent or mistaken. See Ah Quin, 733 F.3d at 271-76 (explaining application of judicial estoppel in the bankruptcy context; where plaintiff-debtor reopens bankruptcy proceedings and corrects the initial filing error, the court will conduct inquiry into inadvertence or mistake).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Agha-Khan's February 21, 2018 motion for disqualification because Agha-Khan failed to establish extrajudicial bias or prejudice. See 28 U.S.C. § 144 (setting forth requirements for recusal), § 455 (setting forth circumstances requiring disqualification); United States v. Hernandez, 109 F.3d 1450, 1453-54 (9th Cir. 1997) (setting forth standard of review; under § 144 and § 455, the substantive standard for recusal is whether "a reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned" (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
We reject as unsupported by the record Agha-Khan's contention that the district court ignored her motions for sanctions.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
All pending motions and requests are denied.
AFFIRMED.