The Court held (159) that the inquiry was reasonable, in contemplation of the statute, and that defendant, therefore, did not incur the penalty. But the facts in Williams v. Hodges, 101 N.C. 300; Cole v. Laws, 104 N.C. 651, and Agent v. Willis, 124 N.C. 29, were very different from those in this case. In Williams v. Hodges the plaintiff, father of the girl, lived in the adjoining county, only 25 miles from Kinston.

" The Court said in Agent v. Willis, 124 N.C. 29: "The defendant seemed to think that an oath on the part of anybody was all that was necessary to authorize him to issue the license. But the character of the witness and accuracy of information are the things that the register of deeds should look to when he issues a license for marriage, in case where there is doubt about the age of the parties.

This test of responsibility, laid down by Associate Justice Connor in Trolinger v. Buroughs, 133 N.C. 312, as the proper construction of the statute and the fair deduction of the cases interpreting the same, was again formally stated by the same learned judge in Furr v. Johnston, 140 N.C. 157, and has been repeatedly approved and applied by the Court in sustaining recoveries for this penalty. Gray v. Lentz, supra; Joyner v. Harris, supra; Morrison v. Teague, 143 N.C. 186 Agent v. Willis, 124 N.C. 29; Cole v. Laws, 104 N.C. 651. In illustration of the position, it was held in Morrison v. Teague, Associate Justice Brown delivering the opinion, that "In an action against a register of deeds to recover the penalty under Revisal, sec. 2090, for issuing a marriage license contrary to its provisions, where the uncontradicted evidence showed that the register took the word of the prospective bridegroom and his friend, neither of whom he knew, as to the age of the young lady, and made no further inquiry of any one, the court should have given the plaintiff's prayer for instruction that as a matter of law defendant failed to make reasonable inquiry as to the age of plaintiff's daughter."

Such inquiry as the defendant made in this case was not reasonable. It was purely perfunctory and did not furnish the security against a violation of the law required by a proper observance of the requirements of the statute." The same rule was adopted by the Court in Agent v. Willis, 124 N.C. 29, where Justice Montgomery says, at p. 33: "The defendant seemed to think that an oath on the part of anybody was all that was necessary to authorize him to issue the license. But the character of the witness and accuracy of information are the things that the register of deeds should look to when he issues a license for marriage, in cases where there is doubt about the age of the parties.

The register violating these requirements is not liable to the penalty when he has made reasonable inquiry and has been deceived, without laches on his part. Agent v. Willis, 124 N.C. 29; Cole v. Laws, 104 N.C. 656; Williams v. Hodges, 101 N.C. 303. In the latter case it is said: "The license shall not be issued as of course to any person who shall apply for it; the register is charged to be cautious and to scrutinize the application; it must appear probable to him, upon reasonable inquiry, when he has not personal knowledge of the parties, that the license may and ought to be issued."

His using, or failing to use, such discretionary power is merely a circumstance to be considered by the jury. In Agent v. Willis, 124 N.C. 29, the examination of the witness was made by the register upon oath, but the Court held that under the suspicious circumstances attendant upon that case there was not reasonable inquiry. In Trolinger v. Boroughs, 133 N.C. 312, a rule easily understood and very proper to be followed is laid down: "While we may not prescribe any rule for the guidance of the register it would sem that `reasonable inquiry' involves at least an inquiry made of, or information furnished by, some person known to the register to be reliable, or if unknown, identified and approved by some reliable person known to the register.

The evil intended to be remedied by the statute is improper, hasty, and injudicious marriage by girls under the age of eighteen years without the written consent of their parents, or, as amended by Laws 1895, ch. 387, guardians or other persons standing in loco parentis. We adopt, with full approval, the remarks of Mr. Justice Montgomery in Agent v. Willis, 124 N.C. 29: "To all persons who believe that the welfare of human society depends largely upon the family relation, and that the contract of marriage should be defended by careful and just laws for the purpose of guarding against legal impediments and to prevent the marriage of those under a certain age, when the parties are presumed not to be able to contract, the duty of the register of deeds, the officer in our State charged with the duty of issuing marriage licenses, seems most important and most solemn. That officer must exercise his duties carefully and conscientiously, and not as a mere matter of form.

Modified and Affirmed. Cited: Shields v. McNeill, post, 593; Moore v. Hurtt, 124 N.C. 29; Hendon v. R. R., 127 N.C. 113. (573)

Error. Cited: Brown v. Brown, 121 N.C. 10, 11; Shannonhouse v. Withers, ib., N.C. 381; Moore v. Hurtt, 124 N.C. 29; Thomas v. Cooksey, 130 N.C. 151; Kochs v. Jackson, 156 N.C. 328; Daniels v. R. R., 158 N.C. 427; Rosenbacher v. Martin, 170 N.C. 237.

Error. Cited: Moore v. Hurtt, 124 N.C. 29; Lumber Co. v. McPherson, 133 N.C. 290; Shuford v. Cook, 164 N.C. 48. (670)