Agency of Natural Resources v. Godnick

15 Citing cases

  1. Agency of Natural Resources v. Towns

    173 Vt. 552 (Vt. 2002)   Cited 3 times

    Towns makes this argument because the Uniform Environmental Enforcement Act (UEEA), under which the Agency and court acted, became effective on July 1, 1989, well after Towns sold the property. As we held in Agency of Natural Resources v. Godnick, 162 Vt. 588, 594, 652 A.2d 988, 992 (1994), Vermont statutory law and case law normally prohibit retrospective application of new and amended statutes. 1 V.S.A. §§ 213, 214. "Retrospective laws are defined as those which take away or impair vested rights acquired under existing laws, or create a new obligation, impose a new duty, or attach a new disability in respect to transactions or considerations already past."

  2. Jones v. Department of Forests, Parks and Recreation

    2004 Vt. 49 (Vt. 2004)   Cited 5 times
    Giving deference to FPR on decision regarding violation of forest-management plan

    The party invoking the doctrine has the burden of establishing four essential components: (1) the party to be estopped must know the facts; (2) the party being estopped must intend that his or her conduct shall be acted upon or the acts must be such that the party asserting the estoppel has a right to believe it is so intended; (3) the party asserting estoppel must be ignorant of the true facts; and (4) the party asserting estoppel must rely on the conduct of the party to be estopped to his or her detriment. Agency of Natural Res. v. Godnick, 162 Vt. 588, 592, 652 A.2d 988, 991 (1994). In addition, we have held that estoppels "against the government are rare and are to be invoked only in extraordinary circumstances," In re McDonald's Corp., 146 Vt. 380, 383, 505 A.2d 1202, 1203-04 (1985), where the "injustice that would ensue from a failure to find an estoppel sufficiently outweighs any effect upon public interest or policy that would result from estopping the government in a particular case."

  3. Agency of Natural Resources v. Weston

    175 Vt. 573 (Vt. 2003)   Cited 11 times

    The latter argument is without merit in that it ignores the trial court's unchallenged finding that defendant realized an economic gain through the avoided costs of not having to pay someone to cut hay that was not worth selling. Cf. Sec'y, Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. Irish, 169 Vt. 407, 418, 738 A.2d 571, 580 (1999) (upholding penalty imposed based on avoided cost of not having to hire wetland consultant); Agency of Natural Res. v. Godnick, 162 Vt. 588, 597, 652 A.2d 988, 994 (1994) (upholding penalty imposed based on avoided cost of delaying landscaping work for one year). ¶ 21.

  4. In re Letourneau

    168 Vt. 539 (Vt. 1998)   Cited 21 times
    Stating that trial courts have "broad discretion to exclude marginally relevant evidence"

    (1) the party to be estopped must know the facts; (2) the party to be estopped must intend that its conduct shall be acted upon, or the conduct must be such that the party asserting estoppel has a right to believe it is intended to be acted upon; (3) the party asserting estoppel must be ignorant of the true facts; and (4) the party asserting estoppel must detrimentally rely on the conduct of the party to be estopped. Agency of Natural Resources v. Godnik, 162 Vt. 588, 592, 652 A.2d 988, 991 (1994). Estoppel, which is "based upon the grounds of public policy, fair dealing, good faith, and justice," is rarely invoked against the government; that result "is appropriate only when the injustice that would ensue from a failure to find an estoppel sufficiently outweighs any effect upon public interest or policy that would result from estopping the government in a particular case."

  5. Agency of Natural Resources v. Bean

    672 A.2d 469 (Vt. 1995)   Cited 3 times
    Affirming penalty for "all economic gain," including both profits and delayed and avoided costs, resulting from mobile home park constructed in violation of and prior to obtaining final Act 250 permits

    10 V.S.A. § 8012(b)(1), (4). Regardless of whether defendant subsequently sought an amended permit, he violated his permit by developing mobile home sites on unapproved lots 2-6 and V-Z. The ELD set the penalty for these violations at the economic gain from the violations. We will not disturb the penalty assessment because the ELD acted within its authority and the penalty was not unreasonable. See Agency of Natural Resources v. Godnick, 162 Vt. 588, 597-98, 652 A.2d 988, 994 (1994) (ELD has broad discretion in fashioning appropriate sanctions). V.

  6. Knapp v. Dasler

    2024 Vt. 65 (Vt. 2024)

    "Retrospective laws are defined as those which take away or impair vested rights acquired under existing laws, or create a new obligation, impose a new duty, or attach a new disability in respect to transactions or considerations already past." Agency of Nat. Res. v. Godnick, 162 Vt. 588, 595, 652 A.2d 988, 992 (1994) (quotation omitted). However, a law is not retrospective when "it merely relates to prior facts or transactions but does not change their legal effect, or because some of the requisites for its action are drawn from a time antecedent to its passage." Carpenter v. Vt. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 143 Vt. 329, 333, 465 A.2d 1379, 1382 (1983) (quotation omitted).

  7. Agency of Natural Resources v. Deso

    2003 Vt. 36 (Vt. 2003)   Cited 7 times
    In Deso, the Agency of Natural Resources imposed a fine on the owner of a gas station who impermissibly operated the station without the required vapor recovery system.

    In calculating the amount of a penalty under UELEA, the environmental court must consider all of the statutory criteria set forth in § 8010(b), including "the economic benefit gained from the violation." 10 V.S.A. § 8010(b)(5); Agency of Natural Res. v. Godnick, 162 Vt. 588, 598, 652 A.2d 988, 994 (1994). Although the term "economic benefit" is not defined in § 8010(b)(5), it is clear from the purpose of UELEA that the goal of the economic benefit analysis is to "prevent the unfair economic advantage obtained by persons who operate in violation of environmental laws."

  8. Agency of Nat. Res. v. Supeno

    2018 Vt. 30 (Vt. 2018)   Cited 2 times

    The Environmental Division has discretion to determine how to apply each of the factors and "how any mitigating circumstances found should affect the amount of the penalty imposed as long as its assessment is not unreasonable." Agency of Nat. Res. v. Godnick, 162 Vt. 588, 597, 652 A.2d 988, 994 (1994). The court here did not penalize respondents for exercising their constitutional rights.

  9. Town of Fairfax v. Beliveau

    2013 Vt. 41 (Vt. 2013)   Cited 13 times

    Homeowner's argument is unavailing. ¶ 25. Homeowner fails to recognize that this Court in Deso found that the cost alternative approach was not applicable in cases where a violation consists of the start of business operations without a permit, as is the case here. See, e.g., Agency of Natural Res. v. Godnick, 162 Vt. 588, 597, 652 A.2d 988, 994 (1994) (employing economic-benefit calculation from use of newly constructed warehouse prior to obtaining final Act 250 permits). Furthermore, in July 2008, the Legislature made express that an economic benefit includes “a reasonable approximation of any gain, advantage, wrongful profit, or delayed avoided cost, financial or otherwise, obtained as a result of a violation.

  10. Braun v. Greenblatt

    2007 Vt. 53 (Vt. 2007)   Cited 9 times
    Finding error in court's use of a "formula" to calculate husband's maintenance award—a specific dollar amount plus tax consequences—because it forced husband to pay wife's obligation whatever it was and to whatever degree it fluctuated—regardless of husband's needs

    ¶ 12. Though the failure to address the jurisdictional threshold of changed circumstances is sufficient to warrant a remand on the issue of the spousal maintenance obligation after August 2004, we consider three issues related to the maintenance award that are likely to recur on remand. See Agency of Natural Res. v. Godnick, 162 Vt. 588, 596, 652 A.2d 988, 993 (1994) (considering issues not necessary to reach holding but likely to recur on remand). ¶ 13. Critical to the trial court's rationale for both the amount and duration of the new obligation was its conclusion that wife was entitled to compensatory alimony.